How NATO is Preparing for War

Since the early 2020s, NATO has stepped up its preparations for a potential armed confrontation with Moscow. This process was complicated by the U.S. policy of cutting the costs in the European theatre. As a result, Washington’s allies, long accustomed to relying on access to U.S. capabilities, have come under growing pressure to assume greater responsibility. Nevertheless, efforts to strengthen the Alliance’s military potential have become systematic.

Despite the extensive efforts undertaken, the Alliance is not yet prepared for a large-scale war with Russia. Its European members continue to face significant shortfalls in air and missile defense systems, long-range strike capabilities, and a number of other critical weapons systems. The challenge of attracting younger generations to military service remains particularly acute. While the Baltic and Nordic countries have succeeded in reintroducing conscription, strong opposition persists elsewhere, including in Germany and Poland.

Many of the plans to build up military capabilities and scale up defense production are designed to run through 2030. Significantly, several political leaders, strategic policy documents, and experts point to precisely this timeframe as a potential date for a conflict. This also explains NATO member states' continued interest in the conflict in Ukraine: as was the case with the Minsk Agreements, the goal is to buy time.

At the same time, history shows that armed conflicts do not always occur when the parties are ready for them. More often, they are driven by frustration stemming from a deteriorating strategic position. In recent years, the West has employed a broad range of political and economic measures in an effort to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia, but has failed to achieve that objective. In this context, the military component of the confrontation will inevitably assume greater significance.

Moreover, NATO's growing military strength gives Western policymakers a greater sense of added leverage when pressuring Moscow. This, in turn, could encourage them to undertake reckless actions to which Russia would be compelled to respond using all means at its disposal. In this regard, the Alliance's mantra that militarization is intended to prevent conflict may prove to be a dangerous illusion—one that only increases the risks.

Since the early 2020s, NATO has stepped up its preparations for a potential armed confrontation with Moscow. This process was complicated by the U.S. policy of cutting the costs in the European theatre. As a result, Washington’s allies, long accustomed to relying on access to U.S. capabilities, have come under growing pressure to assume greater responsibility. Nevertheless, efforts to strengthen the Alliance’s military potential have become systematic.

The first step was to identify the strategic imperatives that would serve as the basis for detailed military planning. The Alliance then reformed its organizational structures, mobilized resources, and began testing operational scenarios through military exercises. The result was an expansion of NATO’s military capabilities and infrastructure along Russia’s borders. Given the West’s increasingly hardline policy toward Russia, the risk of a major war in Europe has risen significantly.

An analysis of NATO’s transformation helps refine assessments of the Alliance’s current state and trace the trajectory of its future evolution. It shifts the focus to the fundamental characteristics of the international political environment, which are often overshadowed by U.S. and ally verbal spats. The results of the NATO summit in Ankara are also becoming clearer.

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The Evolution of Western Approaches Prior to 2022

NATO’s strategic shift began to take shape between 2014 and 2016, when the Alliance reoriented its focus from expeditionary operations in distant regions to interstate competition. Moscow was immediately identified as its main adversary due to its opposition to the West’s political and economic expansion. At the same time, NATO had been developing contingency plans for a conflict with Russia in Central Europe as early as 2010.

In line with the updated priorities, by the 2020s, NATO’s strengthened its command and control structure on the eastern flank, established a forward presence through multinational battlegroups in Poland and the Baltic states, and enhanced the capabilities of the NATO Response Force.

NATO set the objective of eliminating barriers to the movement of troops across the territories of member states. Allies agreed to establish two Joint Force Commands—in Norfolk, Virginia, and Ulm, Germany—responsible for protecting transatlantic lines of communication and coordinating rear-area logistics, respectively. At the same time, the European Union undertook efforts to reduce the bureaucratic and infrastructure-related obstacles to military mobility.

With the participation of think tanks, work began on developing scenarios for an armed conflict with Russia, including on the territory of the Baltic states. Initially, this work was carried out without any formal coordination with NATO. At the same time, the results of the simulation exercises were used to justify a further buildup of the military presence.

In 2019, the alliance adopted its first military strategy since the Cold War. Unlike the strategic concepts that had been publicly released since 1991, this one remained classified. That same year, the London Summit launched a discussion on the future of the alliance. In 2021, this discussion was formalized in the form of the “NATO 2030” initiative, under which a group of prominent experts put forward recommendations for reforming NATO. At the same time, the Alliance approved the Concept for Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA), which established the principles for revising military planning. Also in 2021, NATO published the Warfighting Capstone Concept (NWCC), setting out its strategic vision for military operations through 2040.

These documents formed the basis for the decisions adopted at NATO’s 2021 Brussels Summit. They explicitly committed the Alliance to maintaining military superiority over potential adversaries and placed particular emphasis on preparing for high-intensity conflicts. They also announced plans to restructure NATO’s force posture and called for the development of regional military plans and domain-specific operational plans.

Thus, even before Russia’s special military operation, NATO had been laying the groundwork for a stronger military deterrence posture. Given the catastrophic risks inherent in a confrontation with a nuclear power, the West prioritized political and economic instruments (or levers) of pressure against Moscow. Nevertheless, the military dimension of its strategy continued to grow in importance.

Building Capacity and Refining Plans

The escalation of tensions between Russia and the West accelerated the military development trends that had already been set in motion. Building on the guidance issued at the 2021 Summit, NATO developed a new model for its forces over the next two years and refined its deployment plans. These decisions specified where, in what numbers, and how rapidly forces and assets were to be concentrated in the event of a confrontation with Moscow.

The contingents assigned by member states to NATO command were organized into three echelons. The first consists of 100,000 personnel expected to be ready for deployment within ten days of a decision to activate them. The second and third echelons, comprising 200,000 and 500,000 personnel respectively, are to be deployed within one month and six months. As a result, member states committed substantially larger forces to NATO than they had previously. According to some estimates, implementing these decisions would require the Allies to establish between 35 and 50 additional brigades.

At the same time, readiness requirements became significantly more demanding. Whereas the previous NATO Response Force, numbering up to 40,000 personnel, was expected to deploy within 30 days, the new first echelon—2.5 times larger—is expected to accomplish the same mission in one-third of the time. Overall, NATO’s high-readiness forces are projected to comprise approximately 100 brigades, 1,400 combat aircraft, and 250 surface combatants and submarines.

In 2023, the NATO Response Force was replaced by the Allied Reaction Force (ARF), which serves as the vanguard of the first echelon and consists of approximately 40,000 personnel. In terms of its role, it is analogous to the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), which formed part of the NATO Response Force and comprised around 5,000 troops. In other words, NATO decided to increase its highest-readiness forces by a factor of eight.

The military plans approved in 2023 contained detailed directives for three regional theaters: the north (Scandinavia and the Arctic), the center (the Baltic states and Poland), and the south (the Black Sea region). Each unit assigned by member states to NATO command was designated a specific deployment area, thereby simplifying coordination in the event of a war with Russia.

At the same time, the plans developed—at least based on information available in the public domain—do not encompass the majority of the combined armed forces of NATO member states, which total more than three million personnel. This reflects not only the logistical challenges involved in moving such large forces, but also the political constraints arising from national governments’ reluctance to place their armed forces in their entirety under NATO’s operational command.

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Expanding the Forward Presence

The plans envision that incoming forces will reinforce the NATO contingents already stationed on the Alliance's eastern flank. In 2022, NATO decided to supplement the four existing multinational enhanced Forward Presence battlegroups by establishing comparable formations in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. In 2026, the Alliance also began establishing NATO Forward Land Forces in Finland.

At the same time, NATO continued to expand the battlegroups that had already been established. In Lithuania, for example, the existing battalion-sized contingent is scheduled to be transformed into a Bundeswehr armored brigade by 2027. In Latvia, the multinational contingent under Canadian command has likewise been expanded to brigade strength. By contrast, the United Kingdom has limited its presence in Estonia to forward elements designed to facilitate the rapid deployment of a brigade based in the UK.

In addition, NATO has been prepositioning stockpiles of weapons and equipment on its eastern flank for the contingents slated to deploy in the event of a crisis. These stockpiles are intended to facilitate the rapid movement of large forces over long distances and to sustain the operational tempo during a conflict by preventing a critical “ammunition hunger.”

Alongside its ground forces, NATO has maintained Allied fighter aircraft in the Baltic states since 2004 to patrol the Alliance’s airspace. As tensions with Russia intensified, the number of aircraft assigned to the mission increased from two to twelve. At the Alliance’s 2026 Ankara Summit, the mission was reconfigured: military commanders were granted the authority to shoot down aircraft operating within NATO airspace without requiring additional political authorization.

Since September 2025, NATO has been conducting Operation Eastern Sentry, involving the deployment of aircraft and radar assets to Poland and Romania. During 2025–2026, the Baltic Sentry and Arctic Sentry initiatives further expanded patrols in the maritime areas adjacent to Russia. Meanwhile, Operation Neptune Strike, conducted since 2022, has increasingly blurred the line between military exercises and routine operational patrols in the Mediterranean and Black Seas.

Collectively, these measures are referred to in NATO terminology as enhanced vigilance activities. They complement the Alliance’s land-based deterrence posture toward Russia by extending it into the adjacent maritime domains. Among other objectives, they provide opportunities to rehearse scenarios for establishing control over these waters and interdicting maritime lines of communication. Notably, these missions were incorporated into NATO’s updated dated Alliance Maritime Strategy, published in 2025.

The contingents deployed on NATO's eastern flank become familiar with the regional theater and develop interoperability with the armed forces of the host nations. The rotational deployment model broadens the pool of units that gain operational experience in Northern and Central Europe. At the same time, it creates a growing reserve of forces that are best prepared to be placed under NATO command in the event of a conflict.

It should also be noted that the countries bordering Russia have been actively pressing for a further expansion of the foreign military presence on their territory. Among other initiatives, they have intensified their lobbying for the deployment of nuclear weapons on their soil. Poland and the Baltic states have openly expressed interest in hosting such weapons. In 2026, Finland removed its legislative restrictions on the deployment of nuclear weapons on its territory.

Initially, discussions focused primarily on expanding the geographic footprint of U.S. nuclear capabilities. Following France's announcement of its “forward deterrence” (dissuasion avancée) concept in 2026, discussions intensified over the possibility of Paris deploying nuclear forces on NATO's eastern flank or developing plans for their rapid deployment in a crisis. By mid-year, nine countries had expressed interest in the initiative, including two that border Russia (Norway and Poland).

The deployment of nuclear weapons closer to Russian territory, given the resulting reduction in potential flight times, would mean a significant escalation of tensions. At the same time, the logic underlying the Alliance’s previous actions does not allow this option to be ruled out. Such a step would also be consistent with the U.S. objective of reducing the costs of maintaining forces in Europe. Its proponents likewise justify the measure on the grounds that dispersing nuclear forces would enhance their survivability in the event of a crisis.

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Military Capabilities of Host Nations

The NATO contingents deployed, or designated for deployment, on the Alliance’s eastern flank cannot be assessed in isolation from the military capabilities of the host nations’ armed forces, with which they are intended to operate as an integrated force. At the same time, these “frontline” states (Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia) differ substantially in their military strength.

Poland stands apart from the other frontline states. By 2030, it plans to expand its armed forces to 300,000 personnel. This would double the size of the Polish military compared with 2022 and make it the third largest in NATO, after those of the United States and Turkey. Warsaw is also building a reserve force of 200,000 personnel. Between 2021 and 2025, Poland became Europe’s largest arms importer, acquiring large numbers of tanks, artillery systems, multiple-launch rocket systems, and combat aircraft.

The armed forces of the other states on NATO’s eastern flank are considerably smaller. Romania plans to expand its military to 100,000 personnel by 2030. The armed forces of the remaining countries in the region number no more than 40,000 personnel each. Finland is a notable exception: thanks to its well-trained reserve system, it can rapidly expand its armed forces to 280,000 personnel. It also possesses artillery stockpiles and an air force that are substantial by NATO standards.

Since 2024, Poland and the Baltic states have been constructing fortified defensive lines along their borders with Russia and Belarus, including networks of trenches, bunkers, anti-tank and counter-drone systems, and surveillance sensors. Their withdrawal from the Ottawa Convention has expanded their ability to employ anti-personnel landmines in the adjacent border areas. Such fortifications can serve not only defensive purposes but also free up forces for concentration on offensive operations.

If these plans are implemented, the combined military capabilities of the eastern flank states, including their reserve forces, will exceed 1.2 million personnel by the end of the decade. In this context, NATO’s role extends beyond deploying additional forces: it also consists of integrating these national capabilities under a unified command structure. The resulting complex force structure places particularly demanding requirements on command-and-control arrangements capable of ensuring effective coordination.

When Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty on collective defense is invoked, most of the military capabilities of the state requesting assistance are placed under the authority of NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). At the operational level, under the regional plans adopted in 2023, each theater is assigned to a separate Joint Force Command: Norfolk (United States), Brunssum (the Netherlands), and Naples (Italy), respectively.

These commands are subordinate to headquarters at the regional-tactical level. Until recently, responsibility for commanding forces in Central Europe rested with the Multinational Corps Northeast, headquartered in Szczecin, Poland. In June 2026, its area of responsibility was reduced to Poland and Lithuania, while command of NATO land forces in Latvia and Estonia was transferred to the 1^st German-Netherlands Corps, headquartered in Münster, Germany.

The Alliance’s extensive command structure is excessive for the contingents currently deployed along Russia’s borders; it is designed to accommodate their expansion in the event of a crisis. NATO continues to adapt this command architecture, drawing in part on lessons learned from its military exercises.

Building Experience in Joint Operations

NATO began practicing potential conflict scenarios with Russia as early as the first half of the 2010s. These scenarios formed the basis of the Alliance’s Steadfast Jazz 2013 exercise. Beginning in 2024, NATO reoriented its exercises to reflect the force deployment plans adopted the previous year. The emphasis shifted toward the large-scale movement of forces to the eastern flank, the conduct of joint operations involving multiple military services, and the coordination of actions across several regional theaters.

The Steadfast Defender 2024 exercise, involving approximately 90,000 personnel, was NATO’s largest military exercise since the Cold War. It rehearsed the deployment of forces from North America and the United Kingdom to Central Europe. The exercise scenario envisioned repelling an invasion by a near-peer adversary and subsequently transitioning to a counteroffensive.

That same year, NATO conducted the Steadfast Deterrence exercise, a computer-assisted simulation that for the first time rehearsed the employment of the Alliance Reaction Force. In 2025, these concepts began to be validated in field exercises. During Steadfast Dart, NATO practiced the deployment of forces to Romania and Bulgaria in anticipation of a hypothetical crisis. The 2026 iteration involved a larger-scale deployment of the Alliance Reaction Force in Germany.

The exercises also exposed shortcomings in the Alliance’s planning. During Steadfast Dart 2026, forces were deployed not to the eastern flank itself but to a rear-area country а в тыловую страну. They moved along predesignated routes, without any opposition, following an extended period of preparation. Even under these favorable conditions, the deployment failed to meet the target timeline of 10 days. Moreover, the exercise rehearsed the deployment of only one-tenth of the 100,000 personnel assigned to the first echelon.

It is reasonable to expect that NATO’s ability to move large formations toward Russia’s borders will continue to improve in the coming years. Nevertheless, even with advances in military mobility, experience suggests that the Alliance would prefer to have substantial forces already concentrated in the relevant theater by the time a confrontation begins.

Alongside efforts to improve military mobility and operational interoperability, the Alliance is working to incorporate lessons from the conflict in Ukraine into its approach to warfare. A key vehicle for this process is the NATO–Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre (JATEC), established in Bydgoszcz, Poland, in 2025. Its work has resulted in a far-reaching reassessment of the capability requirements imposed on member states, including with respect to both the quantity and the characteristics of their weapons and military equipment.

Alliance exercises have become increasingly focused on integrating UAVs and other robotic systems into combat formations, as well as on counter-drone operations. Ukrainian units with extensive combat experience are actively involved in these exercises. Since the early 2020s, NATO has also devoted growing attention to rehearsing operations in the Arctic. Although the Alliance characterizes its preparations as defensive in nature, its forces continue to practice assault operations, breaching fortified defenses, and conducting airborne operations.

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Strengthening the Foundations of Military Power

In 2024, U.S. analysts posed the question point-blank: Is the Alliance prepared for war? Their answer amounted to a master class in Jesuit casuistry: yes, NATO is ready for war today, but it is not prepared for a prolonged war—and any confrontation with Russia would inevitably be protracted. This line of argument reflected an effort both to justify the course pursued in preceding years and to make the case for the additional costs that further military preparations would entail.

As early as 2006, the Alliance formally committed its member states to spending at least 2% of GDP on defense. In 2014, that commitment was reaffirmed and supplemented by a requirement that at least 20% of defense spending be devoted to the procurement and development of military equipment. Even so, not all NATO members had met these benchmarks by 2024. Nevertheless, since the early 2020s, defense spending across the Alliance has risen sharply.

Countries such as Poland and the United Kingdom argued that even these requirements were insufficient. In 2025, the targets were revised: Allies committed to increasing defense spending to 3.5% of GDP over the following decade, while allocating an additional 1.5% to the development of related infrastructure. A year later, Secretary General Mark Rutte stated that European Allies and Canada had already raised their defense budgets to 4% of GDP. Between 2025 and 2026, they increased defense spending by a total of $260 billion.

Greater funding does not, by itself, increase military strength: financial resources must be translated into corresponding forces and capabilities. Given the complexity of manufacturing modern weapons, NATO has encountered the inability of its defense industrial base to deliver the required volumes of equipment. The problem was compounded by the fact that a portion of the Alliance’s industrial capacity was committed to supporting Kyiv.

U.S. corporations have been the main beneficiaries of these growing investments. In 2024, their order portfolio from NATO allies exceeded $68 billion, although in the second half of the 2010s through the early 2020s, it averaged just $11 billion. Purchases from the United States accounted for more than half of European countries’ defense spending in 2022–2024 (compared to just over a quarter in 2019–2021).

Since 2022, South Korea has become Europe’s second-largest supplier of imported arms. It secured this position not through the export of unique weapons systems, but thanks to its large-scale production. The country has emerged as a major supplier of basic military equipment, including tanks and artillery. As European production capacity expands, it will be easier to replace these supplies than American ones. To strengthen its position, Seoul initiated a framework agreement with NATO in 2026 on the joint development and production of weapons.

European companies are significantly expanding their production capacity on their own. For example, Rheinmetall, which produced 70,000 artillery shells for 155-millimeter guns in 2022, plans to produce 1.5 million by 2030. The corporation is opening factories in Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Romania in 2026, with another one in Latvia in 2027. Automakers, which are losing ground to China in the electric vehicle market, are also shifting their focus to defense equipment. For example, the French automaker Renault has begun producing UAVs.

Nevertheless, European allies are facing challenges with a number of systems. To overcome these challenges, coalitions of several countries are being formed. For example, in 2024, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Poland, France, and Sweden launched a joint project for a ground-based cruise missile. At the same time, involving a wide range of partners increases the risks. For example, Germany and France shut down a long-standing sixth-generation fighter jet project due to disagreements.

In light of the growing focus on supplying member states with weapons, NATO has strengthened its coordinating role in this area. In 2023, alongside the approval of detailed deployment plans for the Alliance’s eastern flank, NATO adopted an action plan on defense production. Among other things, this led to the creation of the Defense Industrial Production Council, designed to pool best practices in industrial planning, procurement, and supply chain management.

That same year, the DIANA Innovation Accelerator and the NATO Innovation Fund were launched to attract venture capital for startups developing military technologies. They are designed to ensure the Alliance’s dominance in areas such as artificial intelligence, automated combat systems, and quantum encryption.

In 2024, the Allies agreed on a list of critical minerals needed for the defense-industrial complex. In 2026, 12 NATO member states launched a project for their joint procurement and transportation. Combined with other initiatives, such as agreements between the U.S. and the EU, as well as the action plan adopted by the Group of Seven, these decisions are aimed at reducing the dependence of Western supply chains on China.

In 2025, an action plan for accelerated implementation was adopted, setting a 24-month deadline for the procurement of technological solutions in response to emerging needs. At the same time, the alliance updated its defense production action plan, which had been adopted just two years earlier. In addition, it approved new targets for military capabilities to support the military plans approved in 2023.

The next step in 2026 was a defense industry summit held ahead of the Alliance leaders’ meeting. Agreements totaling more than $50 billion were signed at the summit. Among other things, a UK-led initiative on high-precision long-range weapons was announced, and an agreement was reached on the production of ATACMS missiles in Germany.

At the summit, participants agreed on $40 billion in investments for counter-drone efforts over the next five years and announced plans to increase UAV operator training fivefold by 2027. Information resources for defense contractors—NATO Front Door for Industry and NATO Engine—were launched.

Thus, the alliance is actively strengthening its industrial base to sustain a protracted war. Despite their continuing—and even growing—dependence on U.S. manufacturers, European allies are increasing production of key weapons categories. Promoting efforts in this area has become a key priority for NATO in 2025–2026.

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Bound by the Same Chain?

On the eve of World War I, British commander Henry Wilson asked French General Ferdinand Foch what the minimum number of British soldiers would be needed to contain Germany. His counterpart replied, “One, and we will do everything to ensure that he is the first to die.” Historically, NATO has operated on the basis of a similar logic of mutual responsibility.

The enhanced Forward Presence and the three-echelon force model were originally designed to reinforce the commitment of the Alliance's "rear-area" member states to the defense of those “on the front line.” Of the multinational battlegroups, only the one stationed in Hungary was led by the host nation. Command of the remaining groups was entrusted to NATO's leading military powers, including the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Italy, Canada, and France.

It is telling that in NATO’s initiatives on the eastern flank, the primary responsibility was placed on European allies. In 2016, the U.S. assumed command only of the battlegroup in Poland—the only one of the four original groups that was not expanded after 2022. At the same time, Washington deployed two additional brigades to Central Europe, but outside the framework of NATO’s enhanced forward presence.

Moreover, U.S. forces were not assigned to the Alliance Reaction Force, whose core was instead formed by the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Turkey, and France. These decisions were made while Joe Biden was in office. Thus, even before Donald Trump’s second presidential term, the U.S. sought to shift the burden of non-strategic deterrence against Russia to other member states. Under the current administration, this policy has only become more stringent.

In 2026, the U.S. began reducing its presence in Europe, specifically by cutting its contingent in Romania by about 1,000 troops and announcing the withdrawal of 5,000 military personnel from Germany. So far, this involves only a small portion of U.S. forces in the region, which number 80,000. The Trump administration also abandoned plans to deploy Tomahawk cruise missiles in Germany, which had been scheduled for 2026.

In addition, the U.S. transferred command of the northern and southern regional commands to the United Kingdom and Italy. Another sign of Washington’s distancing itself was its limited participation in NATO exercises. This decision led to a reduction in the scale of such exercises in 2025, following peak levels the previous year. Finally, the U.S. warned of a significant reduction in the number of aircraft and ships reserved for NATO operations.

European allies are capable of making up for some of the forces that the United States is no longer willing to place under the Alliance’s command. In particular, this applies to fighter jets and reconnaissance aircraft. Nevertheless, NATO member states remain dependent on the United States for reconnaissance assets, command and control systems, communications, electronic warfare, and aerial refueling aircraft.

Washington also supplies a number of weapons systems for which its allies have no viable alternatives, including F-35 fifth-generation fighter aircraft, Patriot air and missile defense systems, and HIMARS multiple launch rocket systems. Even as U.S. resources are increasingly redirected to other regions, Washington has not curtailed these exports. On the contrary, it has actively encouraged NATO members to procure them. At the same time, however, the United States does not always possess sufficient industrial capacity to meet demand.

As a result, for example, Germany and the Netherlands, which have ordered Tomahawk missiles, will not receive them until at least 2028. This has led to an increase in requests from European countries for licenses to manufacture these weapons. For example, production of interceptors for the Patriot system is set to begin in Germany in 2027. The ATACMS partnership agreed upon in Ankara is another example.

As a result of the U.S. distancing itself from its allies, these nations are attempting to rely on their own domestic production wherever possible. A telling example was the agreement reached at the Ankara summit to replace the aging fleet of AWACS long-range radar detection and control aircraft under NATO command with Swedish-made aircraft rather than U.S. ones. Similarly, Airbus aircraft—rather than Boeing—were selected for the military transport aircraft pool currently being established.

In addition, NATO member states are showing growing interest in leveraging Ukraine’s manufacturing capabilities for their own benefit. A key example of this is cooperation in the production of unmanned systems. European allies are seeking Ukraine’s expertise in developing long-range missile systems and cooperation in creating interceptors for ballistic missiles—two areas where the United States has so far remained the sole supplier.

Thus, the reduction in the U.S. contribution to NATO has taken on a multifaceted character and has had tangible consequences. At the same time, it does not imply a total withdrawal from the alliance, but is largely driven by negotiations over the redistribution of benefits and costs within NATO. Moreover, from the very beginning, the alliance’s plans to deter Russia were based on limited U.S. participation. This increases the likelihood of adapting to an even more diminished role for Washington.

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Despite the extensive efforts undertaken, the Alliance is not yet prepared for a large-scale war with Russia. Its European members continue to face significant shortfalls in air and missile defense systems, long-range strike capabilities, and a number of other critical weapons systems. The challenge of attracting younger generations to military service remains particularly acute. While the Baltic and Nordic countries have succeeded in reintroducing conscription, strong opposition persists elsewhere, including in Germany and Poland.

Many of the plans to build up military capabilities and scale up defense production are designed to run through 2030. Significantly, a number of political leaders, strategic policy documents, and experts identify that same time point to precisely this timeframe as a potential date for a conflict. This also explains NATO member states’ continued interest in the conflict in Ukraine: as was the case with the Minsk Agreements, the goal is to buy time.

At the same time, historical experience shows that armed conflicts do not always occur when the parties are ready for them. More often, they are driven by frustration stemming from a deteriorating strategic position. In recent years, the West has employed a broad range of political and economic measures in an effort to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia, but has failed to achieve that objective. In this context, the military component of the confrontation will inevitably assume greater significance.

Moreover, NATO's growing military strength gives Western policymakers a greater sense of added leverage when pressuring Moscow. This, in turn, could encourage them to undertake reckless actions to which Russia would be compelled to respond using all means at its disposal. In this regard, the Alliance's mantra that militarization is intended to prevent conflict may prove to be a dangerous illusion—one that only increases the risks.