‘From Hell’ Already Arrived

A new law imposing sanctions on Russia has been passed in the United States. Deliberations on the measure dragged on for over a year.

Politicians and the media have dubbed the new restrictions “sanctions from hell,” a label intended to highlight their severity and destructive impact. Such a characterisation would have been realistic had the law been passed in early 2022. However, the phrase now seems like an exaggeration. Virtually all the restrictions codified in the law have already been imposed on Russia—either through presidential executive orders or via previously enacted federal statutes. Possessing broad authority, the administration often implements sanctions well in advance.

Can the law be considered innocuous? Certainly not. It enshrines in statute restrictions that were previously imposed by the president, making it difficult to repeal. Along with a host of other laws, it will loom over any future administration. However, the latter possesses broad discretion in applying the law. Given the political will to normalise relations, the law is unlikely to prove an insurmountable obstacle.

A new law imposing sanctions on Russia has been passed in the United States. Deliberations on the measure dragged on for over a year. It was introduced in the US Senate by the late Republican Senator Lindsey Graham back on April 1, 2025. There was little partisan disagreement over the bill; alongside Graham, 83 other senators—from both the Republican and Democratic parties—co-sponsored the legislation. An identical bill was introduced in the House of Representatives; the House version, named H.R. 5334, is the one that will become law.

Politicians and the media have dubbed the new restrictions “sanctions from hell,” a label intended to highlight their severity and destructive impact. Such a characterisation would have been realistic had the law been passed in early 2022. However, the phrase now seems like an exaggeration. Virtually all the restrictions codified in the law have already been imposed on Russia—either through presidential executive orders or via previously enacted federal statutes. Possessing broad authority, the administration often implements sanctions well in advance.

For instance, Section 102 mandates that the president must impose blocking financial sanctions on Russian officials, major business figures, executives of leading enterprises, suppliers of dual-use goods to Russia, and maritime vessels transporting a wide range of Russian raw materials. In practice, the administration had already imposed such sanctions on a massive scale following the start of the Special Military Operation—and, in some cases, even before it began.

Natalia Tsvetkova:
Russia in Trump’s Political Calculations Ahead of the 2026 Congressional Elections

Sections 103 and 104 call for sanctions against Russian banks and state-owned companies, but these entities are already subject to comprehensive US sanctions. Sections 105, 106, and 107 prohibit the transfer of assets linked to the Russian government, the listing of Russian companies on US stock exchanges, and investment in Russia. However, these restrictions are already in place. The ban on exporting American energy resources to Russia (Section 108) is striking, given that Russia itself is a major player in the energy market. Bans on purchasing Russian sovereign bonds were first introduced during Donald Trump’s first term, and Joe Biden cemented them in 2022. The ban on Russian uranium (Section 111) was enacted in 2024 via the Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act (PL 118-62).

The “hellish” nature of the sanctions was often linked to tariff hikes. Section 112 mandates that the president raise tariffs on Russian imports by up to 500%. However, Russian imports to the US plummeted by an order of magnitude following the start of the Special Military Operation, leaving virtually nothing left to tax. Normal trade relations with Russia were legally severed back in 2022. The president is also required to raise tariffs—by up to 100%—on third countries that purchase Russian oil and gas (Section 113). However, this is a measure that has been employed previously—for instance, against India in 2025, with the tariffs subsequently lifted in 2026. One might surmise that this creates a loophole for raising tariffs more broadly, with Russia serving merely as a pretext. However, the administration already possesses such tools—even absent the Russia factor—despite potential legal hurdles. Section 110 appears to be a novel provision; it threatens secondary sanctions against third-country providers of financial messaging services to Russia if those services facilitate sanctions evasion. While this may prompt greater caution among providers, it is worth noting that Belgium-based SWIFT has already largely curtailed such services, and the provision’s wording specifically targets sanctions evasion.

Can the law be considered innocuous? Certainly not. It enshrines in statute restrictions that were previously imposed by the president, making it difficult to repeal. Along with a host of other laws, it will loom over any future administration. However, the latter possesses broad discretion in applying the law. Given the political will to normalise relations, the law is unlikely to prove an insurmountable obstacle.

First published in the Valdai Discussion Club.