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Prokhor Tebin

PhD in Political Science, RIAC expert

Research in general, and naval research in particular, suffers heavily from a language barrier hampering the exchange of ideas between Russian and foreign specialists. This review covers only three carefully selected foreign books (two American, one British) on naval issues, which seem relevant to specialists in international relations, governance, military policy and naval affairs, as well as to a broad readership of people interested in military history and naval issues.

Research in general, and naval research in particular, suffers heavily from a language barrier hampering the exchange of ideas between Russian and foreign specialists. Few foreigners are familiar with works by Russian authors, and Russians frequently neglect foreign publications, even though there are, especially on naval science, considerably more international publications than there are Russian books and papers on a wide range of theoretical and applied issues.

This review covers only three carefully selected foreign books (two American, one British) on naval issues, which seem relevant to specialists in international relations, governance, military policy and naval affairs, as well as to a broad readership of people interested in military history and naval issues.

James L. Holloway III, Aircraft Carriers at War: A Personal Retrospective of Korea, Vietnam, and the Soviet Confrontation, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2007.

This autobiography, by James Holloway, a retired US Navy admiral, is devoted to aircraft carriers, the symbol of American naval power. Admiral Holloway began his outstanding career as an officer in destroyers during World War II, after which he became a naval aviator and took part in the Korean War. Later, James Holloway commanded the USS Enterprise, the world's first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, during the Vietnam War and was Commander of the 6th Fleet’s Carrier Striking Force during Black September in Jordan. These are the landmarks of his career, and all are described in detail in this book. His account of his experience of top staff positions in the Pentagon and his relationship with Hyman Rickover, the legendary "Father of the Nuclear Navy," are no less gripping.

In 1974-1978, Admiral Holloway was Chief of Naval Operations, the top post in the U.S. Navy. During his time in that role, he did a great deal to shape its current format and equip it with key weapons systems, such as F/A-18 Hornet jets, Tomahawk sea-based cruise missiles and Nimitz Class aircraft carriers. On retiring, he continued to serve the United States in various posts in both governmental and nongovernmental organizations.

Admiral Holloway's book will be definitely of interest to anyone who is interested in the history of the U.S. Navy and its aircraft carriers. It reveals fascinating details of the Korean and Vietnam wars, life inside the Pentagon, the creation of the U.S. nuclear-powered fleet, and relationships between members of the top brass and political decision makers. Many of his ideas and conclusions are still relevant, as they provide an insight into many realms of the U.S. Navy’s activities and its interaction with other sections of the Armed Forces, the Department of Defense, and Congress. Admiral Holloway unstintingly shares his views on various aspects of U.S. foreign policy and strategy during the Cold War, shining a light on that period in history and the basics of America’s Grand Strategy.

Although the book is not only about aircraft carriers, they are definitely its centerpiece, with detailed attention given to their deployment and the evolution of deck-based aviation. The book appears most insightful in the context of the (seemingly eternal) debate about aircraft carriers’ future underway in the United States, Russia, and elsewhere. To this end, Admiral Holloway provides a comprehensible description of their merits and their crucial role in Washington's military-political strategy. The book makes it clear that many of the carrier opponents' current arguments, such as their perceived vulnerability, had been voiced and disproved as far as 40-50 years ago.

Finally, the book offers an enticingly detailed description of the navy officer's rise to the top position in the U.S. Navy, which seems helpful for a stepwise comparison of Russian and American commissioned officers' training.

The book was enthusiastically received by critics and has received several prominent awards, although perhaps the most telling recognition it has earned appears to be its inclusion in the U.S. Navy’s recommended reading list, as compiled by the Chief of Naval Operations.

Geoffrey Till, Seapower: a Guide for the Twenty-First Century, 3rd edition, Routledge, New York, 2013.

This book by Geoffrey Till, Professor of Maritime Studies in the Defence Studies Department of King's College London and one of the best-known and respected Western naval experts, is a thorough examination of contemporary sea power and the basics of naval strategy.

This fundamental piece of research attempts to deliver a single paradigm of sea power through the collation and structuring of concepts developed by such classics as Alfred Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett, in addition to more recent research work. Professor Till offers some fresh and topical ideas, primarily the theory that there are two types of navies in the 21st century, which he dubs modern and post-modern. Essentially, the theory implies the division of navies into traditional, i.e. orientated toward independent wartime operations and an independent national defense industry, and navies of a new type, focused on peacetime missions, international cooperation and internationalized navy building. Although its key points are both conditional and contentious, they offer an apt description of the status quo and help explain the nuances involved in building and deploying modern navies.

Professor Till offers a detailed description of the key landmarks in the evolution of the theory of naval strategy and components of sea power. The author also devotes a great deal of attention to the classification of navies and to an investigation into the role and influence of technology in naval development.

In his account of the fundamental principles of maritime warfare and today’s realities, the author presents a detailed survey of naval supremacy, naval diplomacy, naval security and expeditionary operations. One of the main benefits of Professor Till's book is its systemic nature and attention to detail combined with a laconic style, which enables the author to fit his meticulous research into the key aspects of naval strategy into one, readable, volume.

The book's final section contains a case study on the theoretical and conceptual strategic principles applied to analyze the situation in the South China Sea: one of the most conflict-prone regions of the world. This renders this particular chapter significant both independently and as an example of the application of naval strategy in the research of security problems in the World Ocean and the formation of naval policy.

Written in rich, even sumptuous, language, while remaining clear and easy to understand, this book also contains numerous useful charts, tables and maps. Professor Till's work has won a loyal following among Western experts, military specialists, educators and researchers. First published in 2004, this book has been expanded and updated, and the third edition is available now.

Benjamin F. Armstrong, 21st Century Mahan: Sound Military Conclusions for the Modern Era, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2013.

Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan established the theory of sea power, and was America’s most prominent strategist, responsible for formulating a concept that substantially defined U.S. foreign policy and military action in the late 19th – early 20th centuries, and which contributed greatly to the United States’ (and several other countries’) development of their sea power.

Between the two world wars, Admiral Mahan's works served as handbooks for most naval powers’ top brass and politicians. However, most Russian researchers, especially during the Soviet period, viewed him as a propagator of aggressive American imperialism, which explains why the author is largely viewed skeptically, if not negatively, in Russia.

By contrast, in the United States Admiral Mahan has long been viewed with utmost respect, perhaps on a par with Carl von Clausewitz and Sun Tsu, although he has also had his fair share of detractors. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson once said that "the U.S. Navy Department is switching to a dim religious world where “Neptune was God, Mahan his prophet, and the United States Navy the only true church.”

Moreover, today even certain figures in the U.S. Navy and naval experts and elsewhere maintain that Admiral Mahan's theory is obsolete and unsuited to today’s realities. That said, it should be noted that U.S. Navy Lieutenant Commander Benjamin Armstrong is working on a dissertation at King's College London that challenges this opinion.

Lt. Commander Armstrong believes that Admiral Mahan's critics falsely maintain that he only wrote about battleships and colonial aspirations, about the geopolitics of imperialism, while in fact his ideas rest on the immutable laws of strategy, politics and combat that are valid in any era. Moreover, today’s geopolitical situation bears many similarities with that of the late 19th and early 20th centuries – Admiral Mahan’s time.

Lt. Commander Armstrong believes that Admiral Mahan's popularity has subsided due to the obscure language he uses, which also characterizes his book The Influence of Sea Power upon History. Clearly aiming his books at specialists, Admiral Mahan was presenting his ideas as a comprehensive assessment of the lessons we can learn from history and attempted to condense arguments as much as possible.

In order to demonstrate the continuing value of his ideas, Lt. Commander Armstrong has selected five little-known short papers by Admiral Mahan and included them in his book, adding his own introduction and foreword for each.

Admiral Holloway's book will be definitely of interest to anyone who is interested in the history of the U.S. Navy and its aircraft carriers.

Article The Principles of Naval Administration, 1903, is devoted to Naval administration based on a comparative analysis of the British Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy. It comes to the conclusion that the methods outlined are applicable across the entire Armed Forces. Admiral Mahan presents a painstaking analysis of disagreements and relations between the operational and administrative leaders, military and civilians, in the governance of the armed forces, their missions as state institutions and their wartime functions, as well as the red tape involved in Department of Defense operations.

The second article – Considerations Governing the Disposition of the Navies, 1902 – covers various aspects of naval deployment in the World Ocean, including the intricacies of naval warfare, the balance of offensive and defensive operations, missions performed by elements of the navy, and the role played by new technologies. Although written over 100 years ago, it remains of interest in view of current maritime developments.

Other articles – Naval Education, 1879; The Strength of Nelson, 1905; and Pellew: the Frigate Captain and Partisan Officer, 1901 – deal with matters that are similarly important for building up sea power, i.e. training naval officers, the role and place of naval commanders’ leadership and trust in their subordinates, cruiser operations and international naval cooperation. The articles demonstrate that Admiral Mahan’s legacy is not limited to the concept of general battle line fleets and the use of sea power in imperialist policies.

Featuring little known but original and topical articles, the book has been welcomed by the expert community in the United States and other countries, and has brought Lt. Commander Armstrong to prominence. At the same time, his introduction and commentaries take much less space than Admiral Mahan’s articles, which are comparatively short but densely written, combining long complicated sentences with narration that at times seems rambling but which remains quite logical. Therefore his ideas, accents and recommendation are difficult to draw out, making the book harder to read compared to works by Admiral Holloway and Professor Till. However, it remains a mine of exciting information for the assiduous and thoughtful reader.

These three books may be but a drop in the ocean of international publications on naval affairs, but they can still significantly expand the Russian reader’s outlook, open up fresh facets of well-known aspects and uncover new phenomena. Hopefully, the Russian general public, members of the military and politicians will also soon become more interested in naval issues, sea power and naval strategy.

Currently, Russian readers predominantly see historical research or reviews of naval hardware that cover the Soviet and preceding periods, while contemporary issues are dealt with solely in journals. The further development of Russian scholarship in this area requires quality monographs intended for both Russian and foreign expert readerships, which involves different text standards, structure, arrangement and, preferably, translation into English. Internationalization seems the only way to ensure that the Russian naval scholarship is reinvigorated and freed from the many limitations that currently weigh so heavily upon it.

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