Egypt’s Arab Spring chooses who?
In
Login if you are already registered
(no votes) |
(0 votes) |
PhD in History, Chief of Research and Publishing Dept, RAS Oriental Studies Institute
The campaign to choose Egypt’s new president took place under very different conditions both domestically and in the region. Islamists have come to power in some Arab countries enveloped in a wave of protests. Representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists occupy most seats in the Egyptian parliament. This new uneasy alarm has been acquired by anti-Israel rhetoric. However, Islamist politicians are not exclusively leading in the presidential race: experienced secular politicians and even those from the previous administration are confidently along in the forefront with the Islamist politicians.
The campaign to choose Egypt’s new president took place under very different conditions both domestically and in the region. Islamists have come to power in some Arab countries enveloped in a wave of protests. Representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists occupy most seats in the Egyptian parliament. This new uneasy alarm has been acquired by anti-Israel rhetoric. However, Islamist politicians are not exclusively leading in the presidential race: experienced secular politicians and even those from the previous administration are confidently along in the forefront with the Islamist politicians.
The current campaign in Egypt has explicitly demonstrated the disunity among the community of Muslim radicals. Dominating in the parliament for several months, they were unable to unite the different members of Islamist political forces on common positions. An indicator was the actual failure of the agreed nomination of candidates of leading Islamist parties: initially, the election commission rejected nominees from the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and the Al-Nour Party, and later, only FJP managed to nominate a new candidate. This is despite the fact that at the last parliamentary elections, held at the end of 2011, Islamists won a landslide victory, taking nearly two-thirds of seats in the People’s Assembly of Egypt (the lower house of parliament). Moreover, the number of Ikhwans was almost twice the number of Salafists in the parliament (233 to 121). The FJP (affiliated to the Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun association) became the leader, having won about 35% of seats.
A motley political palette
The position of the Islamists in the Egyptian society is really as strong as ever. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to say that they have the support of the majority of the population.
The position of the Islamists in the Egyptian society is really as strong as ever. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to say that they have the support of the majority of the population. In opposition to the FJP and the Salafi Al-Nour Party there are such parties as Wafd Party, Free Egyptians Party, and the Reform and Development Party.
The Egyptian society witnessed a deep division on the question of choosing the path of national development. The dilemma is this: it is either further Islamization of all aspects of social life, or independent development of the religious component.
Mubarak regime, Ahmed Shafiq
The sharpest confrontation between the parliamentary majority and opposition parties emerged in the work of the Constitutional Committee, which was supposed to present a new draft of the basic law of the country in 2012. Due to the fact that the vast majority of its members were Islamists and those sympathizing with them (businesspersons and public figures), representatives of the Coptic community, secular parties and even members of the Al-Azhar boycotted the meeting. Due to this confrontation, the Committee lasted for only about two weeks and was dissolved in April 10, 2012.
Egyptian presidential election campaign was officially launched on April 30, 2012. Strict requirements were placed on candidates. For example, persons who have held high public office and party positions (in the National Democratic Party) during the Mubarak era, those who came out of prison during the Arab Spring, as well as those whose relatives have foreign citizenship are all not allowed standing for the election. 10 candidates were excluded from the list of candidates for the presidential election. Among them were Khairat El-Shater – an Ikhwan candidate, Hazem Salah Ismail – Salafi candidate, and the former vice-president, Omar Suleiman.
Freedom and Justice Party
Mohamed Morsi became a new candidate from the FJP, while the Al-Nour Party supported a moderate Islamist Abdel Moneim Abu al-Futuh, who was hastily removed from the FJP “for being too independent”. The Coalition of New Muslims party nominated Hussam Abu al-Bukhari. Secular candidates enjoyed huge public support: former Minister of Aviation and the last prime minister under the Mubarak regime, Ahmed Shafiq, and Hamdin Sabbah from the Nasser’s socialist wing. However, most of the supporters of a secular way of the country development pinned their hopes on the former Secretary General of the League of Arab States (LAS), Amr Moussa.
Amr Moussa was leading according to preliminary ratings released in early May. According to various estimates, up to 40% of Egyptians were ready to vote for him. Despite the fact that he headed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt from 1991 to 2001, the electoral commission allowed him participating in the elections because Amr Moussa was never a member of the National Democratic Party (NDP), and headed the Arab League for ten years. One of the former leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood Abu al-Futuh was supported by about 30% of voters, and not just by the Islamists – part of the Ikhwans, Salafis from Al-Nour Party, Al-Da’wa Al-Salafiyya, and supporters of Al-Gama’a al-Islamiya – but also by a significant portion of Egyptian liberals.
Elections have been held
However, distribution of votes was not the case as was shown by the preliminary ratings. As expected, none of the applicants were able to receive 50% of votes. M. Morsi and A. Shafiq received the highest votes.
No one doubts the results of the presidential elections. Of course, for the secular-oriented part of the majority of Egyptians, majority vote won by the Islamist candidate is an alert about the state of public consciousness, especially because there are many cases where Islamists were defeated in relatively fair elections in the Arab countries: in Palestine (Hamas) in 2006; in Tunisia and Morocco in 2011; finally, the parliamentary elections in Egypt in winter 2011. It is possible that the FJP candidate will win even if the second round of presidential elections on June 16-17 is held flawlessly.
Nevertheless, it is premature to assert that M. Morsi will surely win in Egypt’s presidential election. This is proved by the very little gap recorded between the candidates from opposing political camps – less than half a percent of the vote.
Possible political scenarios
The importance of the Egyptian elections for the region as a whole is beyond doubt. For decades, Egypt has been creating political models that were subsequently tested in many countries of the region.
There is a high probability that the thirst for economic and social stability and uncertainty in a fair social policy of the Islamists, tip the scales of public opinion in favor of the experienced manager and secular-oriented A. Shafiq. Moreover, he shows the willingness to cooperate in every way with Islamist politicians of the moderate Islamist wing, and always mentions the Coptic community (which has a considerable weight) in his speeches.
Supporters of the FJP, however, are gathering an alliance to fight against the restoration of the former regime. Their statements echo sounds of distrust not only to the former officials, but also to technocrats. Pogroms in Coptic areas and intensification of relations with neighboring Israel, also appear to add no political points to the Islamists in the face of the broad masses of people who are tired of the instability in violation of economic relations and the principles of public administration.
A major asset for the FJP is the apparent possibility of wresting power from the military (the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces), if the military remains persistent. For those who witnessed the current military crackdown, this is a serious factor that may play a role in favor of the Islamists.
It is quite possible to witness a scenario where the coalition led by the FJP attempts to discredit the secular candidate as a representative of the Mubarak administration. It is significant that almost immediately after the elections on May 24-25, there were active protests against a number of senior officials of the previous administration accused of corruption: Zakaria Azmi, former chief of the presidential staff was sentenced to seven years in prison and was fined hugely; Ahmad Fathi Sorour, the former Speaker of the People’s Assembly of Egypt, and Safwat el-Sherif, the ex-chairman of the Shura Council, and their families fell under suspicion. Therefore, no one will be surprised if some “high-profile case” related to the activities of A. Shafiq, for example, as a prime minister, suddenly shows up. In this connection, we can recall the unexpected exclusion of O. Suleiman from the lists of candidates for the presidential election under the pretext of his activity as the chief of Egyptian intelligence. Although his name remained on the ballot, Egyptians could not vote for this prominent figure that had all the chances to win.
Thus, there are two possible scenarios. The first is that the secular candidate, who has a serious electoral base, and is able to gather the votes of those who voted for A. Moussa (11.2%) and other candidates, for example, Nasser’s H. Sabbah (20.5%), will win the second round of elections. The second scenario is that the Islamists may try to use the courts to remove the candidacy of their only rival candidate. In this case, the Egyptian voters will be asked once again to vote for only one candidate.
What awaits Egypt tomorrow?
The vector of the Egypt–Russia relations may be ambiguous. The Syrian factor will clearly not have a positive impact on the relations, and a weak trade links between Russia and Egypt will not contribute to the development of bilateral relations.
Predicting the future is a thankless task, especially with regard to Egypt, where predictions on the ratings of the presidential candidates once again did not come true. An unexpected outcome and a second round of voting are possible. Nevertheless, the importance of the Egyptian elections for the region as a whole is beyond doubt. For decades, Egypt has been creating political models that were subsequently tested in many countries of the region.
In the meantime, the situation is as follows. The Islamists, who have been at the forefront of a wave of protests in 2011, are confidently – most importantly by the results of fair elections and through legitimate methods – occupying increasingly high positions in the country. In Egypt today, there is a real multi-party system, and the position of secular parties of various kinds, based on a rich history and political traditions is quite strong. They have a real foothold in the society, and this part of the electorate is very active. Public expectations are, to a large extent, linked to economic stability and social justice. Platforms of non-Islamist candidates meet these aspirations. Moreover, the “compromise” candidate of the Islamists, M. Morsi, is paradoxically bypassing two experienced managers and politicians (by leaving the most probable candidate according to many, M. Morsi, very far behind,), as well as the energetic socialist H. Sabbah, who just might focus on strengthening the economy and streamlining public life.
The next president will face complex multidimensional tasks: to ensure a smooth transition of power from the interim military government to civilian; to form a government of national unity (only such a cabinet can be able to operate); to appoint experienced ministers to implement economic development programs; to solve the problems of security and reduce social tensions. It is also important to maintain the country’s position in the Arab League; to determine the country’s foreign policy guidelines (primarily concerning Egypt–Israel relations), and the position on the situation in neighboring Libya, Syria, etc.
The vector of the Egypt–Russia relations may be ambiguous. The Syrian factor will clearly not have a positive impact on the relations, and a weak trade links between Russia and Egypt will not contribute to the development of bilateral relations. However, the openness of the Russian diplomacy towards Arab Islamist organizations (the Palestinian movement Hamas, Lebanon’s Hezbollah and the radicals from the Yemeni and Syrian opposition) makes it possible to look with optimism towards building constructive relationships between Russia and Egypt in the future, regardless of the ideological positions of the Egyptian leadership. For Egypt, the only possible way of building these relationships is to soften radical rhetoric and use a constructive approach towards solving social and economic problems. For Russia – a systematic advocacy and promotion of its moral position, striving to resolve the misunderstanding of this position in the Arab world, making the views of the Russian leadership on what is happening in the region known through dialogue. For both countries, tourism development will continue being important, and this essential unifying factor must be considered among the main factors.
(no votes) |
(0 votes) |
