The “Trump Doctrine” in NATO
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PhD in Economics, Head of the European Security Department RAS Institute of Europe
For the EU, Donald Trump’s ascension to power poses a challenge, although European leaders are not openly talking about it. The EU is seriously concerned not so much about NATO as a forum for a daily political dialogue with the United States as about the future substance of the north-Atlantic alliance’s policy. Trump has warned the EU that “business as usual” is unacceptable. Could a new “Trump Doctrine” emerge with respect to NATO?
For the EU, Donald Trump’s ascension to power poses a challenge, although European leaders are not openly talking about it. The EU is seriously concerned not so much about NATO as a forum for a daily political dialogue with the United States as about the future substance of the north-Atlantic alliance’s policy. Trump has warned the EU that “business as usual” is unacceptable. Could a new “Trump Doctrine” emerge with respect to NATO?
In general, Donald Trump has not expressed categorical opposition to Washington’s policy with respect to its European allies. He has said that European nations should take on a greater share of responsibility as part of NATO. However, EU and NATO countries have pointed out other things that Trump emphasized during his election campaign.
Everyone was troubled by Trump’s statement that U.S. policy with respect to NATO will depend on how much Europeans’ responsibility for their own security corresponds to the American vision. Moreover, Trump stressed that the U.S. is willing to protect its allies in Europe, but only to the extent that these allies are willing to protect themselves, to say nothing of their “usefulness” to the U.S. In other words, the new U.S. president intends to apply to NATO the same principle of conditionality (“more for more”) that the EU applies in relations with external partners. Only now he is changing his polarity to “less for less”. Trump has quite reasonably warned the EU that “business as usual” (U.S. money and guarantees in exchange for European promises) is unacceptable to him.
Trump has quite reasonably warned the EU that “business as usual” (U.S. money and guarantees in exchange for European promises) is unacceptable to him.
The question is whether these guidelines can form the basis of a new U.S. policy in Europe with respect to NATO and whether a certain new “Trump Doctrine” is truly possible. And while there is no clarity in the future the U.S. European policy, Europe has to immediately begin working on a new trans-Atlantic contract with the U.S. In general, neither European allies nor NATO can afford to take a wait-and-see approach only to have Trump come to the White House with his administration and ultimately turn his radical election campaign declarations into the official U.S. position concerning the involvement of the U.S. in European affairs and security guarantees for NATO without waiting for intelligible proposals from the EU. But Trump’s potential “revisionism” is also extremely limited – both by external and, most importantly, internal constraints. In this situation, it’s virtually impossible to predict any significant erosion in the internal cohesion and solidarity within NATO, although it’s highly likely that the U.S. will once again shift the balance from a “strategic alliance” to a more instrumental approach to the organisation.
At any rate, however, the U.S. insistence on Europe’s “contribution” will inevitably intensify, and the EU, which has already been warned by Trump, is already responding to this political prospect. European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker is actively in favour of creating a European army. Now this major objective of his has become even more justified by potential changes to the U.S. policy with respect to NATO. European allies of the U.S. are already holding substantive discussions about the need to increase their Atlantic contribution, including growth in military spending. The EU Council on 14 November 2016 adopted a European plan for security and defence, which, on the one hand, should confirm the EU’s ability for partnership and, on the other hand, the prudence of its “autonomous” ambitions, rejection of any kind of duplication of NATO and unconditional commitment to Atlantic priorities.
It is unlikely that Trump would take steps to alter the established conceptual approaches and plans based on which NATO is developing its activities. It is also highly improbable that the U.S. would give up its involvement in a forward presence on the eastern borders of NATO since it is precisely the U.S. presence that is regarded as a key political achievement and an issue for the alliance’s corresponding reforms.
It’s virtually impossible to predict any significant erosion in the internal cohesion and solidarity within NATO, although it’s highly likely that the U.S. will once again shift the balance from a “strategic alliance” to a more instrumental approach to the organisation.
However, for European countries and NATO the problem of “assured” support for U.S. guarantees and presence will once again emerge as a practical matter despite the seemingly highly specific decisions adopted in July 2016 at the Warsaw summit. In particular, NATO still does not have an answer to the question of what would happen with its forward presence on eastern borders as well as the Spearhead Force in Poland and Baltic countries if suddenly one of the framework nations is unable or refuses to perform this role for one reason or another (due to internal political changes, for example) or whether it would be possible in general to replace the U.S. or Canada with a European rotation. At this point it is unclear, and NATO will probably try to find a solution, but starting with how to change the Russian vector of Trump’s policy. European allies have fallen into a dual-sided trap: they lost out big time when forced to join the extremely hard Obama/Clinton line with respect to Russia; but now they are also at risk of falling into the trap of Trump’s new policy towards Russia, having lost the prospect of “strategic autonomy”.
Since they are firmly stuck in the deep American rut of the Obama team and, unlike Trump, cannot aspire to make significant changes to the route or independently choose the path to take.
The EU needs to take a serious approach to the problem of increasing its financial contribution for defence efforts. However, it is still unclear how European countries will increase their military spending amidst a crisis within the EU and the duplication of two projects – NATO and the so-called European army. Following the U.S. election, these issues have become even more sensitive for the EU and require searching for practical answers.
In this case, Trump will have more opportunities to manoeuvre. Even if he does not change the practical policy with respect to NATO and the EU, he will nevertheless have new levers of significant pressure on European allies. To this end, the EU’s motivation related to an increase in the European contribution and responsibility within the framework of Euro-Atlantic structures and NATO, on the contrary, may be undermined by the U.S. lack of interest in actually expanding the EU’s capabilities to consolidate its own defence market, military economy, industry and technology. The U.S. and the EU are highly competitive in this field, and the EU’s attempts to provide resources for European defence, which today is the mainstream EU policy, in practical terms run counter to the priorities, military-industrial complex and military-political lobbying of the U.S.
European allies have fallen into a dual-sided trap: they lost out big time when forced to join the extremely hard Obama/Clinton line with respect to Russia; but now they are also at risk of falling into the trap of Trump’s new policy towards Russia, having lost the prospect of “strategic autonomy”.
In this regard, the question remains of how independent Trump’s policy may be and how it will differ from that of the Obama administration on fundamental issues. There are serious doubts in this regard since Trump will have to battle the American political establishment in order to pursue a policy that runs counter to the strategies that have already been outlined. It is unlikely that the newly elected President Trump will be able to repeat the va banque of Trump the candidate – the risk of ending up in an empty game room instead of the Oval Office is extremely high.
In order to somehow protect the U.S. policy against serious revisionism and perhaps against anti-European opportunism and isolationism, the American establishment and the Republican Party will be interested in restricting the new U.S. president’s relative freedom of action. It could be that Trump’s opportunities for manoeuvring will increase, however not likely beyond the scope of the general strategies of the trans-Atlantic policy, but rather as regards potential dividends from being “liberated” from the commitments of the outgoing Obama administration. In this sense, Trump is interested in securing quick results “for the United States” from his presidency without which he will unable to strengthen his position and the political role of the new administration. He is probably counting on such dividends both from Brussels and from Moscow. But Moscow has an advantage since it does not have to give up its principled positions. Things are more difficult for the European allies since they are firmly stuck in the deep American rut of the Obama team and, unlike Trump, cannot aspire to make significant changes to the route or independently choose the path to take.
It is unlikely that the newly elected President Trump will be able to repeat the va banque of Trump the candidate – the risk of ending up in an empty game room instead of the Oval Office is extremely high.
Both the European partners of the U.S. as well as Russia are probably preparing for an undeclared tender for a new contract with the Trump administration. He has already established himself as a strong player. But it should be remembered that a good poker player must always sense when it’s time to give up a bluff and start playing seriously, not only after getting a major widow, but with a wildcard in hand.
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