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Fedor Zamuruev

Master Student at MGIMO-University

In late April 2015, the media reported that the leaders of Islamic State (IS) and Taliban declared jihad against each other. Earlier, there had been violent clashes between supporters of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Jabhat al-Nusra leader Abu Mohammad al-Julani, who refused to swear allegiance to the future caliph. Given the exacerbated divisions among various different radical groups, two questions arise: what is the nature of these differences, and whether Islamic State can overcome them and unite other members of the international jihadist movement under its banner?

In late April 2015, the media reported that the leaders of Islamic State (IS) and Taliban declared jihad against each other. Earlier, there had been violent clashes between supporters of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Jabhat al-Nusra leader Abu Mohammad al-Julani, who refused to swear allegiance to the future caliph. Given the exacerbated divisions among various different radical groups, two questions arise: what is the nature of these differences, and whether Islamic State can overcome them and unite other members of the international jihadist movement under its banner?

The rise of ISIS in June 2014 and the seizure of Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, resulted from a comprehensive and multifaceted process, incorporating a variety of factors, ranging from the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the political vacuum that followed to Iran’s growing influence in the region.

Islamic State occupies leading positions in the global jihad movement today due to a number of internal and external factors. However, recent developments on the Syrian front, where Islamic State is conquering territories controlled by Jabhat al-Nusra and other Islamic groups, the outbreak of armed confrontation between supporters of the Caliphate and the Taliban in Afghanistan, as well as the intensified conflict between Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the al-Qaeda leader who replaced the man who had been terrorist number one, Osama bin Laden, killed by US forces in 2011, testify to the acute contradictions among the major organizations of the global jihad movement.

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s legacy and disagreements between al-Qaeda and Islamic State in Iraq

The radical Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad group’s anti-Shia orientation caused disagreement between its leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Osama bin Laden. Different perception of the main enemy was the main stumbling block dividing the two leaders.

This conflict between the leaders of terrorist organizations is rooted in the Iraq crisis, during which al-Qaeda interacted with a number of radical Salafi groups that declared the establishment of the Islamic State in Iraq in October 2006.

When analyzing the reasons behind the split in the international jihadist movement, it is worth taking a closer look at notorious militant Islamist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the founder of Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad terrorist group, which later united various Islamist forces in the Sunni-populated parts of Iraq, as well as representatives of Saddam Hussein’s military elite. Al-Zarqawi started out in the Afghan underground, where he met the founders of the global jihad, including Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir, with whom he was personally involved in the activity of Beit al-Ansar in Peshawar, which was directly related to al-Qaeda.

The aggravated Sunni crisis in Iraq, where the Sunni were debarred from the process of political decision-making after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and faced repression by the Shiite majority, who came to power in the wake of the U.S. invasion in 2003, played a major role in shaping al-Zarqawi’s views. This occupation, establishing illegitimate power mechanisms, as well as Tehran’s growing influence have only made matters worse.

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Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf

The radical Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad group’s anti-Shia orientation caused disagreement between its leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Osama bin Laden. Different perception of the main enemy was the main stumbling block dividing the two leaders. Osama bin Laden and his associates considered the United States and its allies, especially Israel, the archenemy. These countries were combined into the notion of the “distant enemy”. Zarqawi offered to concentrate on fighting against the “near enemy”, namely “collaborationist” Arab regimes and domestic forces, cooperating with the invaders.

Despite the fact that Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad formally pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda in 2004, resulting in the establishment of al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, they failed to resolve their differences. On the contrary, terrorist attacks against the Iraqi army, police, and civilians started taking place on a regular basis. So, on August 29, 2003 a bomb exploded in the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf, the heart of Shiite political life. The attack claimed 83 lives, including Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim, the spiritual leader of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. From December 2003 to March 2004 a number of terrorist attacks in Kerbela were carried out, killing more than 200 people. Subsequently, the violence only intensified, acquiring the features of a religious war.

The main problem was caused by the foreign component’s “wash-out”, resulting from the declining attractiveness of Islamic State in Iraq’s ideas in the eyes of foreign jihadists, frustrated by frequent defeats and sine die postponement of the destruction of the “distant enemy,” whether that be Israel or the United States.

To justify jihad against Shiites and Sunnis who cooperate with the occupying forces, Zarqawi used the Islamic concept of Al-Wala’ Wal Bara’ (loyalty and disavowal), developed by Ibn Taymiyyah, philosopher, juridical scholar of the Hanbalist Madh’hab and one of the founders of the Salafi movement. This concept boils down to friendship towards fellow Muslims, never loving nor praising the Non-Muslims and fighting against renegades, hypocrites and heretics who support infidels.

Although al-Qaeda’s leadership preferred not to comment, the central figures of the “terrorist international” condemned the strategy of the Iraqi “affiliate.” Zarqawi’s Jordanian mentor Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi issued a missive entitled Support and Advice, Pains and Hopes that harshly criticized Zarqawi’s actions in Iraq and urged him to abandon suicide-bombing, leading to numerous victims among civilians.

In 2006 al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq, making the relations with Osama bin Laden’s grouping even more obscure, as all decisions at the scene were taken by the Mujahideen Shura Council, not connected with al-Qaeda. The death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, whose “Afghan past” allowed him to liaise between the “center” and local groups, only deepened the rift.

Establishing Jabhat al-Nusra and launching open confrontation

France24

The years preceding the Arab Spring were a serious test for al-Qaeda. Many researchers believed that, due to the loss of influence in Iraq, the killing of Osama bin Laden, the intensification of the power struggle within the group and, finally, the triumph of political Islam in Tunisia and Egypt, the organization would fall into decline. However, Ayman al-Zawahiri’s succession to the command of al-Qaeda and the development of a new strategy, which involved providing aid to national protest movements and gradually reorienting the latter towards the “Islamic alternative,” strengthened the position of the group. Moreover, the failure of democratic reforms and the growth of extremism in Egypt, Yemen, Libya and Syria helped increase the number of its supporters.

The Islamic State in Iraq also faced difficulties. The new tactical techniques developed by Commander of Multi-National Coalition Force in Iraq Gen. David Petraeus, involving the Sunni tribal Sahwa (Awakening) militia in fighting the Islamists, bore fruit: in a brief space of time the militant-controlled territory halved, 75% of their manpower was destroyed [1]. However, Islamic State in Iraq managed to preserve its organizational structure, which became evident after a series of bloody terrorist attacks in the “green zone” in Baghdad, claiming the lives of over 400 people.

The main problem was caused by the foreign component’s “wash-out”, resulting from the declining attractiveness of Islamic State in Iraq’s ideas in the eyes of foreign jihadists, frustrated by frequent defeats and sine die postponement of the destruction of the “distant enemy,” whether that be Israel or the United States, while the interests of Iraq's Sunni and their fight against Nouri al-Maliki’s Shia government came to the fore [2].

Events in Syria have become a catalyst for a direct clash of interests between al-Qaeda, the traditional power center of the global jihad movement, and ISIS, which is gathering momentum.

Most of those who left Iraq rushed into Syria, where the “Islamization” of the revolution was well underway. The loss of foreign fighters jeopardized the integrity of Islamic State in Iraq, and its new leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi decided to establish a branch in the Syrian theater of war, and sent in his emissaries, led by Abu Mohammad al-Julani. In January 2012 the new group announced its formation under the name of Jabhat al-Nusra (the al-Nusra Front) and was quick to dissociate itself from Islamic State in Iraq, encouraged by growing number of supporters, military success (more than 500 successful operations), as well as the flow of funds and weapons from Persian Gulf countries, especially Qatar [3].

On April 4, 2013 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra and the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), but Abu Mohammad al-Julani refused to obey orders. Instead, fearing for his life, he affirmed the group’s allegiance to al-Qaeda and its leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. This was followed by a series of tangible defeats inflicted by ISIS militants upon the “separatists” and ISIS occupied large territories in east Syria, including Raqqa, which was made the capital of the Caliphate on June 29, 2014.

Division within the global jihad

Ayman al-Zawahiri’s attempts to reconcile the conflicting parties have culminated in failure. Senior Ahrar ash-Sham commander Abu Khaled al-Souri, whom he sent to resolve the conflict, was killed. Since then, the split in the global jihad movement took the form of a direct confrontation.

It should be noted that the number of al-Qaeda supporters is beginning to steadily decline. Thus the leader of Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, operating on the Sinai Peninsula, pledged allegiance to the Caliphate. The militants of Ansar al-Sharia in Libya who allegedly carried out an attack on the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli in 2012, issued a video message supporting ISIS actions.

Events in Syria have become a catalyst for a direct clash of interests between al-Qaeda, the traditional power center of the global jihad movement, and ISIS, which is gathering momentum.

What happens next?

The growing support for Islamic State not only from radical groups, but from the ideologists of global jihad (Abu Saad al-Amili, Abu Muhammad al-Azdi, Abu Mundhir Omar Mahdi Zeidan, and others), testify to the failure of the policy pursued by Ayman al-Zawahiri after the beginning of the Arab Spring: however he did not manage to blur the distinction between the “distant enemy” and the “near enemy.” By contrast, the ISIS leader moved from internal Iraqi issues to shaping the world order.

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Foreign fighters flow to Syria

In the near future we can expect a steady increase in the number of Caliphate supporters. For example, erstwhile opponent of ISIS Jabhat al-Nusra supported the militants’ attack on the Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp, resulting in the latter’s seizure. [4] Recently there have been reports that Abu Mohammad al-Julani is going to break the alliance with Ayman al-Zawahiri.

However, expectations that the jihadists will unite around ISIS are somewhat premature. Al-Qaeda still retains its traditional allies, such as the Taliban. Despite the fact that the Taliban in Pakistan supported Islamic State, the Afghan faction will strengthen its position after the withdrawal of U.S. troops in 2016. Therefore, if the differences within the global jihad movement are not resolved by then, a further escalation of the conflict between the camps of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and of Ayman al-Zawahiri seems to be the most likely scenario.

1. Abdel Bari Atwan. The Islamic State: The Roots, The Savagery, The Future. Beirut: Dar al Saky, 2015, p. 124.

2. Abu Huneyya Hassan, Muhammad Abu Rumman. The Islamic State: Sunni Crisis and the Fight against the Global Jihad. Amman: the Friedrich- Ebert-Stiftung Academic Foundation, 2015, p. 69.

3. Ibid. p. 82.

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