“Core Asia” in the Spotlight: How Russia and ASEAN Can Preserve an Inclusive Order in the Asia-Pacific

Ahead of the fifth Russia–ASEAN Summit, scheduled to take place in Kazan from June 17 to 19, 2026, and timed to coincide with the 35th anniversary of bilateral relations, it is worthwhile to reflect on the position and role of Southeast Asian nations amid the global geopolitical shift. As the postwar world order centered on Western dominance was running out of steam, a state of “global chaos” has taken hold, where countries across the Asia-Pacific are ever so aware of the risks of spillover effects from conflicts originating in other parts of the world.

Three destructive trends are having the most immediate impact on the region. First, the deep polarization between Washington and Beijing, which is undermining the inclusive mechanisms that took decades to build. Second, there is the phenomenon of “loss of agency” among small and medium-sized countries. We are witnessing a dangerous erosion of “ASEAN centrality”, as open structures are being replaced by closed, exclusive blocs. Third, traditional sources of tension are now being compounded by “digital fronts,” such as AI-driven disinformation campaigns and cross-border cybercrime, something that demands fundamentally different competencies from ASEAN.

Russia understands these concerns and supports the “ASEAN way”—one of soft diplomacy and consensus, which, despite criticism of its ineffectiveness, remains the only barrier preventing the region from descending into open chaos. Russia’s approach emphasizes combating “bloc discrimination” and attempts to draw “dividing lines.” In contrast to the Western “rules-based order,” Moscow promotes the concept of “sovereign multipolarity,” grounded in international law and the UN Charter. The “pivot to the East” is interpreted not as an opportunistic move, but as Russia’s return to its Eurasian identity.

With its unique experience in ensuring security under sanctions pressure, Russia can offer the region an alternative model of stability. Russia’s cooperation with China within the ARF already demonstrates an example of effective “multilateral balancing.” Moscow can and should act as a guarantor of inclusive architecture, opposing the emergence of closed military alliances as part of its broader approach to comprehensive Eurasian security.

Over the next five to ten years, these scenarios appear possible:

• “Fragmentation into Blocs” (high probability): ASEAN loses its cohesion, turning into an arena for proxy conflicts. The regional economy stagnates under the pressure of tariff wars and sanctions. The expanding presence of AUKUS and similar structures leads ASEAN to split into pro-Western and pro-Chinese camps. ASEAN centrality effectively disappears, and the region becomes a scene of constant military conflicts. Russia maintains selective partnerships with individual states such as Vietnam, Myanmar and Laos.
• “Armed neutrality” (medium probability): ASEAN countries successfully consolidate their position as a “third force.” The ARF evolves into a robust moderation mechanism. The region preserves its sovereignty, but at the cost of massive defense spending and continuous maneuvering between centers of power.
• “Inclusive revitalization”: ASEAN manages to transform the ARF into an effective mechanism for preventive diplomacy. Russia and China are successfully thwarting the emergence of closed blocs, while regional disputes (South China Sea, Myanmar and Thailand–Cambodia) are moving into a phase of institutionalized dialogue. Russia acts as a “balancing force,” helping ensure the region’s technological and energy sovereignty.
• “Eurasian Synthesis” (optimal for Russia): ASEAN is gradually incorporated into a wider framework of indivisible Eurasian security. ASEAN is aligning itself with BRICS and the SCO. The development of new logistic and financial hubs independent of Western infrastructure turns Southeast Asia into a haven in a multipolar world.

Russia’s “pivot to the East” today carries a growing conceptual weight that resonates with many Asian countries with a “neutral” orientation. It is not in Russia’s interest to become too dependent on China, falling into economic and psychological dependence on it. Instead, Russia’s interests would be better served by maintaining a “cold stabilization” with rivals in the Asia-Pacific, while simultaneously adding substance to its dialogue with ASEAN countries open to engagement through concrete projects in energy sovereignty, cybersecurity and the use of the Northern Sea Route. The main goal is to prevent the region from turning into an arena for proxy conflicts, while preserving Russia’s status as a “balancing force” and a guarantor of inclusivity. The task of the expert community is to provide policymakers with tools for direct engagement, bypassing cumbersome bureaucratic channels that are susceptible to outside influence.

Ahead of the fifth Russia–ASEAN Summit, scheduled to take place in Kazan from June 17 to 19, 2026, and timed to coincide with the 35^th anniversary of bilateral relations, it is worthwhile to reflect on the position and role of Southeast Asian nations amid the global geopolitical shift. As the postwar world order centered on Western dominance was running out of steam, a state of “global chaos” has taken hold, where countries across the Asia-Pacific are ever so aware of the risks of spillover effects from conflicts originating in other parts of the world.

Recent expert meetings in ASEAN countries, particularly the 18^th meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Experts and Eminent Persons in Kuala Lumpur, along with contacts and discussions in Asian capitals, point to a growing sense of concern that Russian policymakers should also take into account.

Alexander Korolev:
The World Majority and ASEAN: Ideational Convergence or Tension?

Asia-Pacific vs. Indo-Pacific: a duel of concepts

Russia’s current “pivot to the East” and emphasis on engagement with the Global Majority have sharpened the discussion over the terminological meaning of these designations. Within the broader Global South and East, there is a clear division of roles and objectives. These concepts need to be deconstructed through the lens of Russian geopolitics. The conceptual debate between the terms “Asia-Pacific” and “Indo-Pacific” is therefore not merely semantic, but fundamentally geopolitical in nature.

The term “Asia-Pacific” has traditionally been about openness and equality among all players, including Russia and China. It proclaims a reliance on international law and consensus-based mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ARF and the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus. We view the U.S.-proposed concept of the Indo-Pacific as a tool designed to build a “sanitary cordon” around China and push Russia to the periphery. The bloc-based logic underpinning the Indo-Pacific runs counter to the principle of indivisible security. The introduction of the idea of the “Indo-Pacific” erodes ASEAN’s central role, turning the organization into a passive link between two oceans dominated by extra-regional players—the United States, Australia and even the European Union. Inclusivity is giving way to “minilateralism,” embodied by formats such as AUKUS and the Quad.

In Western discourse, any attempts at multilateral cooperation outside the framework of Western-led institutions are interpreted as destructive. The narrative of a “growing threat from authoritarian states” is being used as a foundation for consolidating exclusive structures. Some Western-centric forums have even floated the idea of creating an Indo-Pacific Treaty Organization (IPTO)—either as a NATO affiliate or as an independent organization aimed at countering CRINK (China, Russia, Iran and North Korea) and other so-called “revisionist” states. In addition to the U.S., Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, the Philippines and other Indo-Pacific nations could join this organization.

“Core Asia”

What impact are all these developments having on East and Southeast Asia—still the world’s most peaceful and economically dynamic region—and ASEAN’s zone of responsibility? We have previously put forward the concept of “Core Asia”, although some perceive this as a form of Sinocentrism. Its key features are as follows:

• The region is rooted, to one degree or another, in Confucian and Buddhist values, which shaped a distinct “Asian” identity. It is characterized by historical cohesion and a shared destiny.
• It was here that the “Asian economic miracle” began, which by the second half of the 20^th century had established Asia as the world’s most dynamic region.
• We refer to this region as the “heartland” of the Asia-Pacific, the Indo-Pacific space and the eastern part of Eurasia, since it lies at the center of the value chains linking the Near and Middle East, Europe, the U.S., and other global economic hubs.
• The concept of “Core Asia” may be better suited to ASEAN countries than the idea of “Maritime Southeast Asia”. From this perspective, security in Asia should primarily be the concern of the countries located in the region, rather than that of extra-regional powers. Other nations in the Asia-Pacific (the U.S., Russia, India, Australia and others) are considered as external partners to “Core Asia.”

It is precisely this region that remains the steadily beating heart of global manufacturing and bears the brunt of geoeconomic shocks, including the Iran war. Yet this is not merely a regional reverberation of the conflicts in Ukraine or the Middle East, but the West’s systemic resistance to an emerging multilateral world order—in effect, an element of a hybrid Third World War.

Andrey Gubin:
Can Southeast Asia Avoid Hierarchy?

Challenges facing ASEAN

Three destructive trends are having the most immediate impact on the region. First, the deep polarization between Washington and Beijing, which is undermining the inclusive mechanisms that took decades to build. Second, there is the phenomenon of “loss of agency” among small and medium-sized countries. We are witnessing a dangerous erosion of “ASEAN centrality”, as open structures are being replaced by closed, exclusive blocs. Third, traditional sources of tension are now being compounded by “digital fronts,” such as AI-driven disinformation campaigns and cross-border cybercrime, something that demands fundamentally different competencies from ASEAN.

There is little doubt that the U.S.–China rivalry today is not merely a background factor, but a structural force shaping the entire security architecture in the Asia-Pacific. For ASEAN, this confrontation is reflected in a profound institutional and existential crisis.

The main challenge for ASEAN has been the unraveling of the inclusive security model in which the organization functioned as a neutral mediator. U.S.–China rivalry is exacerbating existing local fault lines:

• South China Sea: Washington is using the disputes in the South China Sea as leverage to draw ASEAN nations into anti-China coalitions, undermining negotiations on the Code of Conduct (CoC).
• Myanmar and Taiwan: any escalation in these areas is viewed through the lens of a global confrontation, making a purely regional resolution of the conflicts impossible.
• Fragmentation into blocs: broad formats such as the ARF and the EAS are losing ground to “minilateral” structures such as AUKUS and Quad.
• The standoff between Beijing and Washington is dealing a direct blow to ASEAN’s economic foundations. U.S. tariff policies, erratic actions and the use of sanctions mechanisms are fostering an atmosphere of chaos in the regional economy.
• Digital fragmentation, tech wars over standards and AI stacks, and control over mineral resources, semiconductors and 5G/6G communications standards are forcing ASEAN countries to think in terms of “digital sovereignty.” Initiatives such as the Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA) represent an attempt by the organization to build its own secure space, but pressure from proponents of the Indo-Pacific is complicating this process.
• The region is losing its agency. Small and medium-sized countries increasingly find themselves relegated to the role of passive observers, while major powers are taking action behind their backs.
• Local experts admit that “ASEAN centrality” is turning from a political reality to a figure of speech.

There is a view that in order to preserve ASEAN’s stability, its institutions need to be “revitalized.” The key goal is to transform the ARF from a platform for non-binding consultations into an instrument of actual preventive diplomacy. This means moving toward “process management.” The consolidation of the region’s middle powers, which are capable of collectively opposing bloc-based logic and rules imposed from outside, is viewed as an important element in safeguarding sovereignty.

Toward a New Agenda for Russia–ASEAN Relations. RIAC Report

Russia understands these concerns and supports the “ASEAN way”—one of soft diplomacy and consensus, which, despite criticism of its ineffectiveness, remains the only barrier preventing the region from descending into open chaos. Russia’s approach emphasizes combating “bloc discrimination” and attempts to draw “dividing lines.” In contrast to the Western “rules-based order,” Moscow promotes the concept of “sovereign multipolarity,” grounded in international law and the UN Charter. The “pivot to the East” is interpreted not as an opportunistic move, but as Russia’s return to its Eurasian identity.

With its unique experience in ensuring security under sanctions pressure, Russia can offer the region an alternative model of stability. Russia’s cooperation with China within the ARF already demonstrates an example of effective “multilateral balancing.” Moscow can and should act as a guarantor of inclusive architecture, opposing the emergence of closed military alliances as part of its broader approach to comprehensive Eurasian security.

Strengthening ASEAN’s links with BRICS and the SCO is not merely about expanding diplomatic engagement, but about shaping a “new security framework” in Greater Eurasia.

Russia can contribute to ensuring the energy sovereignty of countries in the region and offer practical cybersecurity solutions without the political strings that are commonly attached to Western technology platforms.

Short-term outlook

The Asia-Pacific is entering a phase of “cold destabilization.” The spillover effect of escalation in the Gulf is becoming a real risk factor through threats to energy and food security. The ASEAN countries themselves have increasingly less capacity to prevent this.

Over the next five to ten years, these scenarios appear possible:

• “Fragmentation into Blocs” (high probability): ASEAN loses its cohesion, turning into an arena for proxy conflicts. The regional economy stagnates under the pressure of tariff wars and sanctions. The expanding presence of AUKUS and similar structures leads ASEAN to split into pro-Western and pro-Chinese camps. ASEAN centrality effectively disappears, and the region becomes a scene of constant military conflicts. Russia maintains selective partnerships with individual states such as Vietnam, Myanmar and Laos.
• “Armed neutrality” (medium probability): ASEAN countries successfully consolidate their position as a “third force.” The ARF evolves into a robust moderation mechanism. The region preserves its sovereignty, but at the cost of massive defense spending and continuous maneuvering between centers of power.
• “Inclusive revitalization”: ASEAN manages to transform the ARF into an effective mechanism for preventive diplomacy. Russia and China are successfully thwarting the emergence of closed blocs, while regional disputes (South China Sea, Myanmar and Thailand–Cambodia) are moving into a phase of institutionalized dialogue. Russia acts as a “balancing force,” helping ensure the region’s technological and energy sovereignty.
• “Eurasian Synthesis” (optimal for Russia): ASEAN is gradually incorporated into a wider framework of indivisible Eurasian security. ASEAN is aligning itself with BRICS and the SCO. As these structures strengthen, Southeast Asian nations find refuge within them from “sanctions terror” and bloc pressure. The development of new logistic and financial hubs independent of Western infrastructure turns Southeast Asia into a haven in a multipolar world. A new Greater Eurasia takes shape, where the Asia-Pacific emerges as the eastern flank of an indivisible security system.

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Russia’s “pivot to the East” today carries a growing conceptual weight that resonates with many Asian countries with a “neutral” orientation. Moscow advocates the right to sovereign development, in which “Core Asia” can play a decisive role. It is not in Russia’s interest to become too dependent on China, falling into economic and psychological dependence on it. Instead, Russia’s interests would be better served by maintaining a “cold stabilization” with rivals in the Asia-Pacific, while simultaneously adding substance to its dialogue with ASEAN countries open to engagement through concrete projects in energy sovereignty, cybersecurity and the use of the Northern Sea Route. The main goal is to prevent the region from turning into an arena for proxy conflicts, while preserving Russia’s status as a “balancing force” and a guarantor of inclusivity.

The task of the expert community is to provide policymakers with tools for direct engagement, bypassing cumbersome bureaucratic channels that are susceptible to outside influence.