Cooperation Between Russia and France Benefits Both Countries

Interview

Russia and France have been always had a special relationship in a variety of ways, from economy to culture. However, in recent years the two have seriously diverged on key global issues, including the Syrian crisis. We met Yuri Rubinsky, Professor at the Higher School of Economics and Head of the Center for French Studies at the RAS Institute for European Studies, to talk about critical bilateral issues, prospects for advancing dialog, and France's policies in Europe and Middle East.

Interview

Russia and France have been always had a special relationship in a variety of ways, from economy to culture. However, in recent years the two have seriously diverged on key global issues, including the Syrian crisis. We met Yuri Rubinsky, Professor at the Higher School of Economics and Head of the Center for French Studies at the RAS Institute for European Studies, to talk about critical bilateral issues, prospects for advancing dialog, and France's policies in Europe and Middle East.

Dr. Rubinsky, the attitudes of Russia and France towards the Syrian crisis appear to be virtually polar opposites. Could they attempt to reconcile their differences and develop a compromise solution in the short term? Would the different sides of the conflict in Syria accept such a solution?

To my mind, "opposite" is not quite the right word to describe the attitudes of the two countries, since both Russia and France seek an end to the bloodshed, and to have Syria preserved as a viable state within the highly complex, volatile environment of the present Middle East. But there are different ways to reach this goal.

Photo: Yuri Rubinsky

Let me refer to a commentary given by a former chief of the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs at the U.S. State Department, and former U.S. ambassador to Israel and Syria, on the American approach to the issue. He believes the Obama administration's policy has been flawed since the start, as it put forward Bashar Assad's resignation as a precondition for negotiations. He is sure that Assad's departure could be part of a political solution, but only towards the end of the conflict, when the parties presently divided by an abyss of violence sit down at the table to negotiate. At the same time, it is not at all clear who would represent the armed opposition, an extremely divided and controversial group including an extremist wing linked to al-Qaeda. And the Syrian regime also has foreign sponsors.

Under the circumstances, the Geneva Conference, with the participation of all regional actors, offers the only practical opportunity to approach a resolution to the conflict. The odds of success are slim, but there is no other way out. The alternative could entail the disintegration of Syria, with all the unpredictable implications this would entail for its neighbor states.

Also note that Syria, like all other states in the region, emerged from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. Its borders and confessional and ethnic composition suggest that neither party can win a truly decisive victory – neither the Alawite minority nor Sunni majority can prevail, if only because there are other minorities which have brothers in blood and faith abroad. Under these circumstances, the breakdown of Syria would be the worst-case scenario.

The ascent of François Hollande has brought an end to the foreign policy triangle of Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarcozy and David Cameron. Some experts regard this as a sign of France's weakening role in European politics. Do you believe this to be the case?

The triangle had never been equilateral. The United Kingdom and Germany were united on tough management of the EU budget. At the same time, the approaches to construction of Europe had long been a product of the French-German tandem, especially beginning from the Elysee Treaty which has just turned 50 years old. Under Sarcozy, people were keen on the "Mercozy" formula, where EU problems were handled by Paris and Berlin.

The German-French dialogue has not come to an end under the Hollande presidency. Rather, it has been balanced by France's attempts to simultaneously maintain a special relationship with the South European countries and soften Germany's stance. As soon as Paris accentuated stimulation of economic growth instead of austerity, a certain disharmony arose with Berlin.

As for developing dialog with London, it cannot be said that France is building it solely to balance its role in the French-German tandem. Paris and Berlin are linked by Europe-building and its economic content. Furthermore, the United Kingdom, just like France, is a West European nuclear power. They are permanent members of the Security Council, whereas Germany is not. They are former colonial states that some time ago divided North Africa and Middle East between themselves. Both empires suffered huge losses and disintegrated during the decolonization period. And the most dramatic chapter of that period was the collapse of the Suez expedition as predetermined by the U.S.A. and the USSR, the two superpowers.

These reminiscences are being kept alive by more than nostalgia, as pragmatic interests remain. France's concern is primarily Maghreb and the Middle East. When the region was shaken by the Arab revolutions, the United Kingdom, and to an even greater extent France, were especially affected because the toppled regimes had been Paris’s close partners. Among other things, they were involved in the abortive Mediterranean Union project initiated by President Sarcozy. Incidentally, it was not only former Tunisian President Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, but also Muammar Gaddafi of Libya and Bashar Assad who had been projected as driving this future association. Today, the picture is quite different. France was most active in the Libyan crisis, including the military operation. The result is tragic, since Libya has become a failed state torn apart by tribal wars. The mercenaries took up their weapons and crossed Sahara to settle in Sahel and cause the Mali crisis.

The current search for a balance within the triangle is quite peculiar. Paris and Berlin maintain privileged economic cooperation despite the numerous differences that have recently emerged during the selection of an anti-crisis program. Concurrently, the 2010 Lancaster House Treaties have brought new life to French-British military-technical cooperation. Since France is back in the NATO integrated system, the USA is encouraging the process, seeing it as an opportunity to partially shift responsibility for common Western interests in the Middle East onto its European partners who are well acquainted with the region. This is only more true as Washington continues to shift its priorities to Asia Pacific. At the same time, Germany is has no non-economic interest in the Middle East. This is why in 2011 Berlin joined Moscow and Beijing in abstaining in the vote on a no-fly zone in Libya.

Photo: vartel.ru

Six months after the French military operation, Mali is still a failed state. More than that, remnants of armed Islamist groups are scattered over its neighbor states, threatening regional stability. How does French society feel about the Mali operation? Are there any plans to build up French military presence to maintain stability?

Mali (formerly French Sudan) was part of the French colonial empire and the French Union. After obtaining independence, the country preserved close economic and political ties with Paris. As for French military involvement in the Mali domestic conflict, Paris was concerned about the highly menacing triangle of extremist, jihadist and fundamental Islamic forces fed by arms, drugs and human trafficking in Mali and all the neighboring Sahel countries. In fact, a sizeable region of Africa became an aggregation of failed states, where armed extremists were seeking to establish their dominance. At the same time, it was seeing an influx of weapons from Libya and other places. According to some sources, al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups were also transferring arms from Qatar and Saudi Arabia.

In addition to the statehood crisis, the situation in Mali was also set off by the decades-long national conflict between the Tuareg and "black Africa", which the Islamists exploited to divide the country. A coup followed, and the Malian state collapsed. Fearing the capture of Bamako by Islamists, Hollande was forced to launch his military operation.

Note that the decision was supported by the French public despite the overall drop in the presidential and left-wing majority government ratings. More than that, the measure met with understanding and sympathy in many countries, including Russia. The action was legitimized by two UN Security Council resolutions. Furthermore, Paris has set a clear-cut goal to restore the legitimacy and viability of the Malian state through elections across the entire country, which will be far from easy under the present circumstances.

At the same time, the situation in northern Mali is still unstable, among other things because of the Tuareg, who demand autonomy and independence. As such, the French troops’ key mission is to erect a military barrier as had been done against the Islamists. However, France has promised to withdraw its main contingent after the elections, to be replaced by African forces. If France manages to engage the West African countries, and maybe the African Union, within the UN peacekeeping force, there is a chance to overcome the crisis. But the outcome is far from guaranteed. In essence, it is a question of preventing Mali and entire Sahel from becoming a second Afghanistan.

In June 2012, construction of a second Mistral-class ship was commenced for the Russian Navy. Do you see more prospects for Russia-France military cooperation?

I lack the information necessary to judge the economic and military-technical feasibility of these helicopter carriers. However, the very fact of the agreement seems quite positive. Critics in the Russian military establishment insisted that the ships’ technical profile would not fit the structure of Russia’s armed forces. There were other objections too. But I do hope that this will set a successful precedent, and that the inclusion of at least two French-built ships in the Russian Navy will be more than a historical footnote.

Russian-French economic, technical and industrial cooperation often has dual significance. In the first place, this applies to the aerospace sector. Both Russia and France are facing tough competition in the world arms market, including each other. Nevertheless, rivalry and cooperation may at times go hand by hand. And this is just the case for Russia and France.

Take nuclear safety, which is a most significant issue because, unlike Germany, neither Russia nor France is going to give up atomic power. Hence, bilateral technology cooperation appears beneficial for both countries to the extent that they see no threats to their security, or the emergence of a dependence that might limit their freedom to maneuver in decision-making.

The space for such interaction is quite broad. With economy, technology and information going global, nobody can succeed on their own. Given that the United States is ordering Russian helicopters for safe withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, France could well seek its own forms of cooperation within the same sphere. The black-and-white thinking of the Cold War is absolutely inapplicable today, because the entire world is in the same boat. Russia and France are by no means incompatible militarily and geopolitically, which means that bilateral military-technical cooperation between them can be wholly worthwhile.

Interviewer: Nikolay Markotkin, RIAC Program Coordinator