Contemporary International Politics: Anarchy or World War?

The protracted crisis in relations between Russia and the “collective West”, the military campaign by the United States and Israel against Iran, and the situation in Gaza, Yemen, and other global flashpoints naturally raise the question: what exactly is taking place in the contemporary world? Military conflicts are being compounded by a revolution in military affairs, the widespread use of various forms of so-called “hybrid warfare” in the informational and digital domains, as well as economic and financial restrictions. There is a strong temptation to characterise what is happening as a new world war that is already under way, and whose end is nowhere in sight. However, such an assessment appears premature. International relations remain in a familiar condition of anarchy—namely, competition among states in the absence of a stable and effective system of international law and a monopoly on the use of force. Anarchy may, in time, escalate into a world war, but it is by no means identical to one. An accurate classification of the present situation is essential for determining the appropriate foreign policy instruments.

Is such anarchy dangerous? Undoubtedly. A clash between two powers—whether deliberate or accidental—could have global consequences. For example, an exchange of nuclear strikes between Russia and the United States would affect everyone. Yet such an exchange would hardly be the direct result of a world war as such. The danger lies in the fact that the constant succession of diverse conflicts inherent in anarchy may produce consequences that harm a far wider range of participants. That harm may take many forms—from disruptions to logistics, to the consequences of nuclear weapon use.

Is the current conflict between the West and Russia part of a world war? No—because there is no world war. Rather, it represents a prolonged consequence of the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR. In this extended confrontation, the West has sought to consolidate the outcome in its favour by advancing its military infrastructure eastwards and drawing post-Soviet states into its orbit. Ukraine has been a central objective in this process, as one of the largest fragments of the Soviet Union, without which any integration project would remain incomplete. Strengthened in the early 2000s, Russia has attempted to reverse this trajectory. The armed conflict around Ukraine has become the peak of a crisis whose conditions accumulated over three decades. Its resolution remains unclear. However, no broader pool of participants from other centres of power has yet formed around the confrontation between Russia and the collective West that could transform it into a world war.

The protracted crisis in relations between Russia and the “collective West”, the military campaign by the United States and Israel against Iran, and the situation in Gaza, Yemen, and other global flashpoints naturally raise the question: what exactly is taking place in the contemporary world? Military conflicts are being compounded by a revolution in military affairs, the widespread use of various forms of so-called “hybrid warfare” in the informational and digital domains, as well as economic and financial restrictions. There is a strong temptation to characterise what is happening as a new world war that is already under way, and whose end is nowhere in sight. However, such an assessment appears premature. International relations remain in a familiar condition of anarchy—namely, competition among states in the absence of a stable and effective system of international law and a monopoly on the use of force. Anarchy may, in time, escalate into a world war, but it is by no means identical to one. An accurate classification of the present situation is essential for determining the appropriate foreign policy instruments.

Dmitriy Trenin:
Peace in Times of War

The concept of a world war can be characterised in terms of its scale and methods of warfare, as well as the organisational structure of its participants. In terms of scale, it implies the involvement of all or a significant proportion of the leading powers, and the extension of conflict across all or most of the world’s geographical space. In terms of methods, it entails the use of a broad range of military and non-military instruments aimed at forcing the adversary into capitulation, or at radically exhausting it, and compelling a change in both its foreign and domestic political course. In organisational terms, it presupposes the existence of stable—or at least temporary—coalitions of states engaged in confrontation. One may also add the struggle of political ideologies and doctrines that bind such coalitions together, although this feature is far from universal. The principal driver of conflict appears to be the clash of concrete material interests of major states—their competition for resources, power, and dominance in specific regions and in international relations as a whole.

The twentieth century provides a rich record of world wars. The crucible of the First World War lay in the European theatre. Military operations in other regions were far less intense, yet the outcome of the war effectively shaped the prospects for the redistribution of the world among the leading colonial powers. All known military and non-military means of warfare were employed, including intensive propaganda and trade blockades. The conflict unfolded between two coalitions, which evolved over the course of the war, though their structure had taken shape long before it began. The Second World War assumed a far greater scale. In addition to the critically important European theatre, it encompassed battles in the Pacific and Africa. Its apotheosis was the combat use of nuclear weapons. The war concluded with the complete defeat of the Axis powers.

The Cold War did not escalate to the stage of employing all available types of weaponry. It was restrained by the balance of nuclear forces and the threat of unacceptable damage to the aggressor in the event of a retaliatory strike. Nevertheless, military confrontation persisted on the periphery of the leading powers—Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Stable coalitions formed around the two principal adversaries—the USSR and the United States—bound together by close military, economic, and ideological ties. The Cold War did not develop into a third world war in the same sense as its predecessors. Yet it was unmistakably global in character and ended in a major defeat for the Soviet bloc. The result was the dissolution of the coalition of socialist states, their integration into the Western model, and the collapse of the Soviet Union itself.

Ivan Timofeev:
Security in Europe: A Problem Without Solution

The current situation clearly differs from this earlier experience. Armed conflicts in various parts of the world hardly share a unified logic of struggle among specific centres of power that underpinned the world wars of the past. The crisis in the Persian Gulf is only loosely connected to the Conflict in Ukraine. Both could be presented as part of the United States’ effort to preserve its hegemony. The difficulty, however, is that Washington lacks a consolidated adversary. For example, Iran and Russia have no mutual military obligations. Flare-ups along the Indo-Pakistani border scarcely fit into any overarching world war framework. The same applies to incidents along the Sino-Indian border, as well as to smaller yet instructive conflicts such as the recent war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. No fundamental line of a global conflict underlies these developments.

Accordingly, there are presently no clear global coalitions of opposing sides. At first glance, such a coalition might appear to exist around the United States. Yet it was formed under different conditions and for different purposes. Moreover, there is, in principle, no opposing coalition. The countries of the global majority remain fragmented. Some maintain very close ties with the United States. Even China, which is ostensibly a strategic rival to the United States, is in no hurry to sever economic and humanitarian links. Russia cooperates closely with the PRC, yet there is no military alliance between them, nor any mutual obligations in the event of war.

There are also no political doctrines that clearly delineate opposing camps. The United States and the Western bloc retain a doctrine inherited from the Cold War. However, no coherent and thoroughly elaborated alternative has yet been proposed. There are slogans—but no alternative political philosophy. Nor is there, at present, a discernible global clash of civilisations. While a number of powers incorporate a civilisational component into their political identity—Russia, China, and India—it is clearly premature to speak of a clash of civilisations, let alone one in the form of a world war.

It may be argued that world war has shifted into “hybrid forms”. Yet have these not existed before? Intelligence struggles are as old as the world itself. Information campaigns have been conducted since the advent of print. What has changed is the technological substrate, not the underlying essence. Where once a secret was stolen by a specialised agent, today it may be taken by an IT specialist. Certainly, new tools are dangerous, and the boundaries of their use remain unclear. However, such “hybrid” forms of confrontation between individual states hardly render a war global in nature.

Dmitriy Trenin:
Russia’s Foreign and Security Priorities in the Era of World Turbulence

In summary, there is no world war at present. Instead, there exists a series of crises and conflicts of varying intensity, involving different participants, objectives, and means. But if not a world war, then what?

Any student of international relations begins with a basic postulate—international relations are anarchic. Unlike domestic politics, where a monopoly on the use of force is held by the state, no such monopolist exists in international affairs. International law does exist, but it cannot be enforced through permanent, systematic, and, crucially, legitimate coercion.

States are therefore condemned to live under the constant fear of potential aggression, engaged in a struggle for resources and influence. In other words, they exist in a condition of so-called “Hobbesian fear”: the state is a wolf to the state. The security dilemma may be addressed by increasing one’s own capabilities, forming coalitions with relatively equal partners, or aligning with stronger actors on their terms. The historical moment we are witnessing today is a typical instance of international anarchy, in which actors pursue their security concerns through familiar means, albeit with new technological dimensions.

Is such anarchy dangerous? Undoubtedly. A clash between two powers—whether deliberate or accidental—could have global consequences. For example, an exchange of nuclear strikes between Russia and the United States would affect everyone. Yet such an exchange would hardly be the direct result of a world war as such. The danger lies in the fact that the constant succession of diverse conflicts inherent in anarchy may produce consequences that harm a far wider range of participants. That harm may take many forms—from disruptions to logistics, to the consequences of nuclear weapon use.

A Festival of Nuclear Umbrellas: Extended Nuclear Deterrence with Asian Characteristics

Is the current conflict between the West and Russia part of a world war? No—because there is no world war. Rather, it represents a prolonged consequence of the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR. In this extended confrontation, the West has sought to consolidate the outcome in its favour by advancing its military infrastructure eastwards and drawing post-Soviet states into its orbit. Ukraine has been a central objective in this process, as one of the largest fragments of the Soviet Union, without which any integration project would remain incomplete. Strengthened in the early 2000s, Russia has attempted to reverse this trajectory. The armed conflict around Ukraine has become the peak of a crisis whose conditions accumulated over three decades. Its resolution remains unclear. However, no broader pool of participants from other centres of power has yet formed around the confrontation between Russia and the collective West that could transform it into a world war.

What we are observing today is an attempt to enact, in relation to Russia, something resembling the Crimean War of 1853–1856. Ukraine is playing a role analogous to that of the Ottoman Empire at the time. Yet there are many differences. Most importantly, Western countries have not openly entered the conflict, and Russia is hardly in a position of passive defence against an advancing adversary. However, the classification of the Russian–Ukrainian conflict is a subject for separate analysis.

First published in the Valdai Discussion Club.