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Igor Delanoë

Ph.D. in History, Research affiliate at the Ukrainian Research Institute (Harvard University) and the Center for International and European Studies, Kadir Has University, Istanbul, Deputy Director, Analytical Center Observo, French-Russian Chamber of Commerce

On November 13, the Kurdish Peshmerga forces, backed by US airstrikes, retook the Northern Iraqi town of Sinjar, located on the Road 47, about 60 miles from Mosul and 120 miles from Raqqa, in Syria, the self-proclaimed capital of the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL). The Iraqi Kurdish forces lost the control of the city in August 2014, during an overwhelming assault launched by the jihadists who were eventually stopped in their expansion by US airstrikes, and the subsequent creation of the US-led coalition in September 2014.

On November 13, the Kurdish Peshmerga forces, backed by US airstrikes, retook the Northern Iraqi town of Sinjar, located on the Road 47, about 60 miles from Mosul and 120 miles from Raqqa, in Syria, the self-proclaimed capital of the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL). The Iraqi Kurdish forces lost the control of the city in August 2014, during an overwhelming assault launched by the jihadists who were eventually stopped in their expansion by US airstrikes, and the subsequent creation of the US-led coalition in September 2014.

The seizure of Sinjar by the Kurds highlights the key-role played by the Peshmerga in fighting the jihadists in Northern Iraq. Significantly, the US planned and carried out this operation with the Kurds and not with the Iraqi army. Beyond military considerations related to the inefficiency of Iraqi forces, the objective was most probably to avoid retaliation against the population of Sinjar, a city mainly populated by Kurdish Yazidi and Sunni Arabs. By the past, Shia militias and Iraqi forces abducted and killed Sunni civilians as revenge for ISIS attacks and for purported support provided by these populations to jihadists. Yet, following the seizure of Sinjar, retaliations by Yazidi fighters against Sunni civilians have been reported. The Yazidis remember that in summer 2014, among other atrocities, after ISIS took the city, 700 Yazidis women were rapped and sold as slaves for $150 each by jihadists.

More significantly, from the operational point of view, the 7500 Kurdish fighters involved in the offensive included not only Iraqi Kurds, but also Kurds from the Syrian YPG (People’s Protection Units), the military branch of the Syrian Kurdish party, the PYD (Democratic Union Party), as well as units of the Turkish PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party). Historically, Iraqi Kurds have poor, if not tense, relations with Syrian and Turkish Kurds, and this military coordination orchestrated by the US is of a significant importance since its success could pave the way for a greater efficiency in the fight on the ground against ISIS. Furthermore, during the offensive, the Kurds noticeably used military hardware provided by their Western supporters, including German antitank semi-guided missiles Milan. This highlights positive results of the train and equip program implemented for almost a year by Western countries in the Iraqi Kurdistan.

Yet, the ‘battle’ for Sinjar was not as ferocious as it might have been since the 600 to 700 jihadists who had been dispatched there promptly vanished as the Kurdish forces showed up in the surroundings of the city. Supposedly, they retreated in Raqqa, while some of the terrorists were still believed to be in the nearby desert shortly after the Kurds had entered in Sinjar. By denying the fight to the Kurds, the jihadists gave them the city, operating a strategic retreat as they did in Kobani in February 2015. However, ISIS subsequently lost the control of a strategic communication and supply line linking Raqqa to Mosul, two of its strongholds in Syria and in Iraq.

The significance of this victory is twofold. Regarding the fight against ISIS, the seizure of Sinjar tends to split the Islamic State between the Iraqi theater on the one hand, and the Syrian theater on the other hand. Whereas the coordination between US forces, Western military support (Germany and France in particular) and the Iraqi Kurds, keeps on gaining traction, Moscow carries on its military and intelligence cooperation with Bagdad and Teheran. On the other side
of the border, the US try to work out a ground force with the YPG as a backbone, and Arab fighters. Yet, the US and Kurdish strategic agendas diverge in Syria. Whereas the US want to focus on Raqqa, the Kurds are not necessarily ready to fight for an Arab city, and they have their own agenda which includes gaining as much as possible ground on what they consider to be the Syrian Kurdistan. Furthermore, the YPG has to face the Turkish threat on its Northern flank, whereas the US need Turkish air asset in Incirlik to efficiently carry out air strikes in Syria. In Iraq, the victory in Sinjar has demonstrated the ability of the Kurds to overcome their internal disputes which led to critical clashes a few weeks before the offensive. It might furthermore be the prelude of a wider offensive on Mosul, a target clearly quoted by Iraqi Kurdistan President, Massoud Barzani, in his speech delivered shortly after the seizure of Sinjar. It is significant that the Kurdish leader mentioned Mosul as a target since it is not that obvious that the Iraqi Kurds are ready to fight for an Arab Sunni city. It raises questions about what the US have promised to the Kurds in return for their involvement in ground operations to retake areas mostly populated with Arab populations. It might be either a sort of reconnaissance of their future enlarged autonomy, although this option seems strategically tricky considering US ties with Ankara, or a guarantee of their stakes in the exploitation of the Kirkuk and Mosul giant oil fields. Major oil resources in the region of Kirkuk and Mosul could provide a critical lifeline and financial viability to Iraqi Kurdistan. Until recently, the Iraqi Kurds have been indeed reluctant to fight in Arab Shia or Sunni areas, since they know that they could hardly hold the ground after having retaken it. Furthermore, for the Kurds, Sinjar might also be a useful card for future negotiations with Bagdad regarding the status and borders of Iraqi Kurdistan. The Kurds claim the city of Kirkuk as not only being Kurdish, but also as being the capital of their State, something Bagdad has consistently refused to accept.

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