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Artem Dankov

PhD in History, Director of the TSU Confucius Institute, Associate Professor, Department of World Politics, Faculty of Historical and Political Studies, Tomsk State University

Recent developments in Central Asia strongly suggest that in the 21st century the region will undergo changes unique in their magnitude. There may be no comparison even with the transformations that the region underwent during the 20th century. In terms of their scale and complexity, these changes in the future deserve to be called the Great Transformation. They encompass a whole set of social, economic and political changes whose elements we shall discuss below.

In developing an efficient strategy for Central Asia, one needs to understand which long-term socioeconomic trends will dominate the region’s political agenda in the 21st century.

Recent developments in Central Asia strongly suggest that in the 21st century the region will undergo changes unique in their magnitude.

There may be no comparison even with the transformations that the region underwent during the 20th century. In terms of their scale and complexity, these changes in the future deserve to be called the Great Transformation. They encompass a whole set of social, economic and political changes whose elements we shall discuss below.

End of the Demographic Explosion

Central Asia's largest cities

Population growth in Central Asia will continue throughout the first half of the 21st century, assisted by the large proportion of young people, a relatively low level of urbanization and the large-family traditions of the Muslim population. However, growth will slow down, and the population numbers in the region will gradually stabilize. Kazakhstan will be the first to arrive at this destination: its population in the 2020s is expected to stabilize at around 19–20 million. Some of the reasons for such a stabilization include a high proportion of its urban population, which is the highest in the region (55 per cent); the high rate of urbanization of the Kazakhs; the large proportion (26 per cent) of “European ethnicities”, mostly Slavs and Germans, in the country’s population [1]; and the gradual transition towards smaller families. Between 1991 and 2011, the total fertility rate in Kazakhstan dropped from 2.72 to 2.44.

Population growth in Central Asia will continue throughout the first half of the 21st century. However, growth will slow down, and the population numbers in the region will gradually stabilize.

Kazakhstan will be followed by Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan whose populations will also stabilize. The demographic explosion will last longest in Tajikistan, but even there population growth is expected to cease in the second half of the 21st century. It is not that the population will stop growing at once across the entire region or even in one of its countries: it will continue for a longer period in agrarian districts, while in industrial areas with larger urban populations, this demographic transition will be completed faster.

“Great Transmigration of People”

The 21st century in Central Asia was marked by migration comparable in magnitude only with the migration flows in the late 19th century and early 20th century. Back then, first came peasants resettling from the central regions of the Russian Empire. They were followed by workers and engineers who carried out Soviet industrialization, and, later still, by persecuted ethnicities (Koreans, Germans, Chechens, etc.) and GULAG convicts. As a result, by the 1950s, the ethnic picture had changed dramatically: Central Asia was “Europeanized”. According to the 1959 Soviet census, Russians had already become the largest ethnicity in Kazakhstan and in Central Asia (6.2 million, or 27 per cent of the population), while the overall proportion of “European” ethnicities (Slavs, Germans, Jews, etc.) exceeded one third of the total population in the region.

Today Central Asia is on the verge of even more serious transformations in the migration process, the magnitude of which may be likened to a local “Great Transmigration of People”. Let us look at the key elements of that process.

At the beginning of the new millennium, migration flows again were responsible for major changes in the region. The mass exodus of the “European” population in the 1990s, labour migration in the 2000s, and spontaneous urbanization affected millions of people. Estimates suggest that during the past two decades, internal and external migration processes in Kazakhstan alone have affected 9,475,000, or almost 58 per cent of the population that used to live in the republic in the beginning of 1991 [2].

Today Central Asia is on the verge of even more serious transformations in the migration process, the magnitude of which may be likened to a local “Great Transmigration of People”. Let us look at the key elements of that process.


Proportions of urban and rural population

First, Central Asia will continue to see its “European” population rapidly shrinking in size due to mass-scale emigration. Whereas in 1970, there were over 11 million Europeans (almost 1/3 of the population), in 2009–2010 there were just 5.6 million (9 per cent of the population) [1]. Over the two decades following the disintegration of the USSR, the region lost almost 5 million people, who left mostly for Russia, Ukraine, Germany or Israel. The only Central Asian country where “Europeans” still have a tangible presence is Kazakhstan. Forecasts suggest that in the early 21st century, the proportion of Russian speakers in the region will continue to dwindle due to their low birth rate and emigration. As a result, by the middle of the 21st century, Central Asia will have become totally “de-Europeanized”. Who will replace the “Europeans” in the economic and social sphere? This is still an open question.

Secondly, Central Asia faces intense urbanization of indigenous ethnicities. The emigration of urban “Europeans”, the devastating crisis in agriculture and overpopulation of rural areas have made hundreds of thousands of people, who for centuries lived in their villages, travel in search of jobs, housing and a better life. This process is at its most advanced stage in Kazakhstan. Since 2010, the proportion of ethnic Kazakhs of the urban population has exceeded 60 per cent. Over two thirds of Kazakhs live in cities now. There is a relatively high proportion of city dwellers in Uzbekistan (51 per cent) and in Turkmenistan (50 per cent) [2], and they are dominated by indigenous people. Even in countries with a low level of urbanization, such as in Tajikistan, most of the population has been exposed to city-living through growing labour migration, as millions of people spend a few months in the year living and working in large cities in Russia and Kazakhstan.

Central Asia is deemed to be a source of human resources for those post-Soviet countries that are facing rapid declines in their populations. This is particularly true of Russia and Kazakhstan.

Thirdly, Central Asia will have higher outward labour migration. The regional population is relatively young, with an average age of about 26 years. The active working age (between 15 and 64) of the population will account for about 65–67 per cent in the foreseeable future, keeping up pressure on the labour market in the longer term [3]. With regional powers incapable of providing required employment, the only way out is to export workforce.

There are several factors that are bound to intensify migration processes in the early 21st century.

First, Central Asia is deemed to be a source of human resources for those post-Soviet countries that are facing rapid declines in their populations. This is particularly true of Russia and Kazakhstan. These two countries have already accepted hundreds of thousands of emigrants from Central Asia, and have implemented repatriation programmes in which Central Asia features prominently. Millions of labour migrants from labour-abundant areas travel annually to Russia and Kazakhstan for jobs. Both countries will have to increase the size of their external workforces in the future and introduce dedicated programmes to bring in labour from Central Asia, offering language courses and vocational training to migrants.

rybakovsky.ru
Migration in Russia
1994-1996

Secondly, Central Asia has suffered from agrarian overpopulation. Rural areas there have virtually reached the minimum per capita rate of fertile land. Further expansion of cultivated lands (extensively) through irrigation is no longer possible, with ever more acute water shortages in the region. The intensification of agriculture today is not an option either, because of a lack of fertilizers, machines and an educated workforce. As a result, yields in Central Asia are falling, the soil is degrading, and agriculture is becoming inefficient, giving rise to even higher unemployment. The locals are effectively “pushed out” of rural areas, and many villagers are bearing down on towns and particularly capital cities, which, in terms of available infrastructure and labour markets, have proven to be unprepared to cope with such an inflow of newcomers. Large cities are exposed to uncontrolled growth and the emergence of slums, with an associated rise in crime and social tensions. Kyrgyzstan, where residents of outer Bishkek were the prime movers behind the 2005 and 2010 coups, serves as a graphic example of things that await Central Asian countries in future. In the first half of the 21st century and until the demographic transition is completed, given the current rates of inflow, at least 20-25 million villagers will migrate to cities.

Central Asia has suffered from agrarian overpopulation. Rural areas there have virtually reached the minimum per capita rate of fertile land. Further expansion of cultivated lands through irrigation is no longer possible, with ever more acute water shortages in the region.

Those who have failed to find a job in the region will be more and more involved in external labour migration processes. There is no reliable data on the number of Central Asian labour migrants in Russia or other destination countries. However, indirect data suggests at least 5 million people. It is also important to stress the ever-expanding geography of destination countries where Central Asia workers are searching for employment; they are no longer restricted to Russia or Kazakhstan, but also have moved to the Persian Gulf states and Turkey.

Thirdly, people are compelled to resettle because of the deplorable environmental conditions in many areas of Central Asia. The governments of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are relocating people from the unsafe Aral Sea region. Expert estimates suggest that during 1992–2009 alone, some 80,000 people were relocated from Karakalpakstan to the central regions of Uzbekistan.

Fourthly, following the disintegration of the USSR, conflicts, political instability and inter-ethnic clashes forced hundreds of thousands to leave their homes across Central Asia. For instance, as a result of inter-ethnic warring in the south of Kyrgyzstan in 2010, tens of thousands of Uzbeks and Kyrgyz had to abandon their homes. According to the UN Office of Higher Commissioner for Refugees, armed clashes in Osh and Jalal-Abad displaced almost 375,000 people, and, according to 2011 records, 169,500 of those never returned.

The 21st century is likely to be quite eventful, with many new identities emerging. Mass-scale migration inside as well as outside the region, urbanization and industrialization, and new developments connected to religion are expected to facilitate the disintegration of traditional societal relations, as well as the emergence of new communities and identities and, possibly, new nations.

In the first half of the 21st century, the region will see even more conflicts [4], which cannot but intensify migration flows. A growing number of migrants should be expected during this period from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

The “Great Transmigration of People” in Central Asia is likely to continue through the third quarter of the 21st century, although its magnitude may well contract significantly with the stabilization of the regional population around the mid-21st century.

New Identities

The 21st century is likely to be quite eventful, with many new identities emerging. Mass-scale migration inside as well as outside the region, urbanization and industrialization, and new developments connected to religion are expected to facilitate the disintegration of traditional societal relations, as well as the emergence of new communities and identities and, possibly, new nations.

The influence of women in public life will grow. It is relevant already today, with the changing role of women in society due to the dissemination of the modern, “urban” way of life in Central Asia as well as due to labour migration. Millions of men leave their homes looking for jobs for 6-12 months at a time, entrusting their wives with managing the household and handling family problems. Women are becoming more and more involved in social and economic processes, and in labour migration.

New identities are bound to arise from religion. The growing religious consciousness throughout Central Asia after the disintegration of the USSR has helped to revive traditional confessions as well as generate new religious groups.

RadioSvoboda.org/ Volodymyr Prytula
Митинг сторонников "Хизб-ут Тахрир" в
Hizb ut-Tahrir supporters

Of note here are two “new” religious movements. One includes “new” Islamic groups that appeared in Central Asia in the mid-1990s. Many Islamic organisations entered the region, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir (Islamic Party of Liberation). After Hizb ut-Tahrir was proclaimed extremist in 1999–2003 in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, many “new” Islamic groups went underground and decentralized their management. Multiple small autonomous and semi-autonomous groups emerged as a result, becoming increasingly active despite mass arrests of their activists and the pressure put on them by the authorities. It is impossible today to give even an approximate estimate of the strength of clandestine Islamic groups, but they surely number in the tens of thousands, mostly in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. This growth in the numbers of supporters of outlawed Islamic organisations cannot be curbed even by the fact that over the past 15 years, over 10,000 people across Central Asian countries have been convicted for disseminating radical religious propaganda. Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir are trying to set up their cells even in prisons.

Islamic radicals should not be presented as destitute or poorly educated people. There are many university graduates and businessmen among the members of “new” Islamic groups. They conduct their propaganda mostly in cities and suburbs. With growing urbanization, they are bound to become even more active.

The other religious movement of note is the “new” Christians, first and foremost, Protestants (Pentecostals, Evangelists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, etc.) who have launched extensive missionary work in Central Asia after the collapse of the USSR. Despite serious pressure from the authorities, the number of Protestants continues to grow, among other things, due to active proselytizing amidst traditionally Muslim ethnicities (Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Uzbeks). Data suggest that in Kyrgyzstan, 40 per cent of all Protestants are ethnic Kyrgyz. There is no accurate data on the number of Protestant believers in Central Asia, but one can be sure that they number in hundreds of thousands in Kazakhstan and tens of thousands in other countries in the region. Protestants have more officially registered religious organisations than the Russian Orthodox communities in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (1, 2, 3). South Korea offers a good example of what Protestant missionaries can achieve. Owing to the spread of Protestantism, in the second half of the 20th century, this country turned from one dominated by Buddhism or traditional local cults into a country where 30 per cent of the population are now Christians.

The issue of identity will also affect ethnic minorities. The emigration of “Europeans” from Central Asia, which is expected to continue throughout the first half of the 21st century, has not resolved any of the issues related to ethnic minorities in the region. First, titular ethnicities of some countries are minorities in others (e.g., Uzbeks). Secondly, there are many minor Asian ethnic groups living all across Central Asia, both autochthonous (the Uigurs, Dungans, Karakalpaks, Pamiri people, etc.) and those who settled in the region in the 20th century (Koreans, Kurds, Azerbaijanis, Chechens, etc.). In contrast to the “Europeans”, these ethnicities have no plans to emigrate en masse from Central Asia. Their numbers practically do not change (Koreans) or grow (the Uigurs, Dungans); besides, they prefer compact settlements and fairly constant communities. In Kazakhstan, for example, the 1989–2009 statistics showed that the number of the Uigurs increased by 21 per cent - from 181,200 to 224,700, and 82 per cent of all Uigurs lived in the city of Almatyand within three districts of the Almaty Region [5].

The place and the role of ethnic minorities in the region remain uncertain. Pressure from the “titular” nations, issues relating to native languages and religions, and dire socioeconomic conditions will make them look for new footholds and may generate new identities.

Changing Economic Models

The best choice for industrialization in Central Asia is in light industry (textiles and garments), food, and chemicals (petrochemicals and fertilizers).

Modern economic models in Central Asian countries, with all their diversity, have one thing in common: they are mono-economies. And the reason lies in the Soviet past. It was then that the “cotton curse” became part and parcel of socioeconomic life in the region. During the Soviet times, these countries had substantial mining (gold, uranium and rare-earth metals) and metal production sectors, while manufacturing industries tended to concentrate in the defence sector.

The disappearance of the Soviet Union and the subsequent economic transformations failed to change the nature of Central Asian economies. Exports of steel and non-ferrous metals and cotton gave way to oil, gas and labor.

Since independence, Central Asian economies have converged on three economic models:

  • A “petro-state”, which is based on the production and export of hydrocarbons; the well-being of the economy depends strongly on world prices (Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan);
  • “economies of cash remittances”, where economic growth depends on the level of demand for labour in the recipient countries (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan);
  • a combination model, with elements of the Soviet legacy economy, “petro-state” and “cash remittances economy” (Uzbekistan); although more stable, it has serious imbalances.

All of today’s economic models have largely exhausted themselves, and Central Asia is bound to go through serious economic transformations in the first half of the 21st century.

Newsruss.ru
GDP, Central Asian countries

With population growth, which is expected to continue through the first half of the 21st century, and in view of serious limitations on growth in agriculture, there will be added pressure on the labour market. To overcome this imbalance, the countries need to implement accelerated industrialization, focusing on labour-intensive manufacturing industries. The export of workforce can only have a short-lived effect, and in the longer term, only new jobs in cities will alleviate social tensions.

The best chance to succeed with industrialization today is in Kazakhstan (within the Common Economic Area with Russia and Belarus), Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. These countries have substantial labour resources and oil and gas revenues, which may be reallocated to other industries and the construction sector. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have very limited capacity for an industrialization leap; however, given successful economic integration with Uzbekistan, these countries, too, have every chance to succeed.

The best choice for industrialization in Central Asia is in light industry (textiles and garments), food, and chemicals (petrochemicals and fertilizers). With mass migration to cities, there is a growing demand for tens of millions of square meters of housing and associated infrastructure. This calls for a need to develop construction materials production and utilities. With industrialization and better living standards, there will be a growing demand for machines, vehicles, electronics (TV and video equipment), and electrical goods (household appliances). The expanding internal and external migration and the growing industries will facilitate the development of transportation and logistical services. In the mining industries, the focus must be on uranium, precious and rare-earth metals.

Changes in Political Borders

There is a high likelihood that in the 21st century, borders in Central Asia may well be rearranged for political reasons. The main problem with existing borders is that they were drawn by Europeans motivated by their own interests and based on their understanding of borders and statehood.

In the 21st century Central Asia will face serious challenges to its existing borders.

The first challenge is that of culture. Central Asian countries are weak, and the region does not have nations as such, in the contemporary meaning of the term. Much has to do with weak national identities, which can be attributed to the traditional “oasis-bound” mentality of sedentary ethnicities, and the “tribal” mentality of nomadic people in central Asia, coupled with language issues. The region has displayed rigid tribalism and serious interregional conflicts, which are further compounded by issues relating to the integration of ethnic minorities. It is bound to create a constant threat to stability and integrity of the Central Asian states.

The second challenge is economic. Central Asian economies can only develop and grow through integration and a more efficient utilization of resources (land, water, mineral resources). Today, economic relations of the region’s countries with their outside partners are evolving much more successfully than those with their regional neighbours. This is not to mean that economic ties inside Central Asia are non-existent. Simply, because of unresolved border issues, customs barriers and complicated inter-state relationships, most of the trade tends to concentrate in the grey zone, breeding corruption and promoting organized crime. The more profound are economic changes, and the deeper is industrialization, the higher is the need to lower and remove barriers to growth, including existing customs barriers and borders.

The final, third challenge is political. There is a high likelihood that in the 21st century, borders in Central Asia may well be rearranged for political reasons. The main problem with existing borders is that they were drawn by Europeans motivated by their own interests and based on their understanding of borders and statehood. Most of the external regional borders were drawn in the 19th century based on the “natural borders” concept or military and political reasons pursued by Russia and Great Britain. Internal borders are the outcome of the Soviet ethnic and territorial demarcations in 1924–1936, when borders were drawn based on the European understanding of nations, which has little value for the current state of affairs in Central Asia.

As a result, the region has to face multiple political problems, including, inter alia:

  • the issue of divided ethnicities (according to the 2010 data, there were 6 million Tajiks living in Tajikistan, and 10-15 million in the neighbouring Afghanistan and Uzbekistan) (1, 2, 3);
    • inter-ethnic differences (to be found in many regional states with their threatened territorial integrity, for example, such as Kyrgyzstan); and
    • recurring conflicts over land and cross-border rivers.

Given these factors, the ‘Great Transmigration’ in Central Asia may well lead to the creation of a new state in the basin of the Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya rivers. It is difficult to say today whether this new state will emerge as a result of an armed conflict, or regional elites will have enough wisdom to follow voluntary integration. One thing is for sure: the efficient utilization of water in Central Asia, with pressure from growing populations, can only succeed through the well-coordinated efforts of all actors. This is the only way towards a balanced use of the powerful hydroelectric power stations in the upper reaches and irrigation in the lower reaches of rivers. This is the only way to fully modernize the system of irrigation and satisfy the demand for water resources coming from the growing population, agriculture and industry. Things that today appear to divide Central Asian peoples should help to integrate them in future. And this will be the central political challenge to the existing borders in the region in the 21st century.

It is obviously impossible to make accurate predictions about borders in Central Asia by the start of the 22nd century. However, general patterns of societal changes can well be visualized, particularly given some of the already emerging social trends.

Overall, in one hundred years, the population in Central Asia will grow, albeit, at a significantly slower pace than in the 20th century (UN estimates suggest that by 2100 the region will have a population of about 80 million). The level of urbanization will be higher, with up to two thirds of the population living in cities. Following the “Great Transmigration of People”, societies in Central Asia will be largely industrial: at the very least, there will be attempts at industrialization. They will also be societies with new borders, new states and identities, while the typically high level of conflict in the times of the “Great Transmigration” will fall considerably.

As for scenarios for the region, given the above features, there are two long-term models of development in the region.

One of the models, which can be provisionally called “Soviet”, basically traces the route that the USSR followed in the 20th century. This is the way that is being repeated, in many aspects, by China. This model is generally characterized by:

    • an authoritarian political regime and suppression of any opposition;
    • successful completion of industrialization and industrial development;
    • emergence of stable urban communities;
    • emergence of new identities;
    • introduction of relative social equality; and
    • a moderate level of corruption.

The other model, “Latin American”, is substantially different from the former, “Soviet”, one, featuring:

  • populist political regimes and political instability;
  • incomplete industrialization and economic disproportions;
  • unstable urban communities (favelas);
  • marginal identifies and highly organized crime;
  • strong social inequality; and
  • high level of corruption.

It is hard to predict which way the region will go; besides, the true way may well be somewhere in the middle. The Central Asian way is likely to combine both of the models.

In terms of Russia’s interests, one should remember the important role Russia is capable of playing to resolve regional problems and alleviate the negative effects of the “Great Transmigration”. Russia can and should help in the industrialization of the region, contribute to strong transportation and urban infrastructure, and help to combat crime and terrorism. This does not mean that Russia should invest huge resources in Central Asia; however, we could supply equipment and technologies, offer engineering services, and train the workforce, the more so as it is vital for Russian interests to have a stable and well-developed industrial region on its southern borders.

 

1. Ethnic composition, religious confessions and proficiency in various languages in the Republic of Kazakhstan. The 2009 Population Census in the Republic of Kazakhstan. Collected papers / Ed. A. Smaylov. Astana, 2010. P. 4–9 (in Russian)

2. Urbanization in Central Asia: challenges, issues and prospects. Analytical paper. Tashkent: Centre for Economic Studies, 2013. P. 21. (in Russian)

3. ibid. P. 50.

4. Dankov A. Central Asia in 2025: from uncertainty to crisis // Bulletin of the Tomsk State University. Ser. History. 2013. No 1(21). P. 118–124 (in Russian)

5. Ethnic composition, religious confessions and proficiency in various languages in the Republic of Kazakhstan. Astana, 2010. P. 5 (in Russian)

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