Bronislaw Komorowski: Second to Duda

Bronislaw Komorowski has lost the presidential election in Poland, where there are still clear divisions between the “conservative East” and the “progressive West.” Incoming President Andrzej Duda has managed to run the distance from being a little-known bureaucrat and European Parliament deputy to a leader pushing through changes reflecting the aspirations of most Poles, in record time.

Bronislaw Komorowski has lost the presidential election in Poland, where there are still clear divisions between the “conservative East” and the “progressive West.” Incoming President Andrzej Duda has managed to run the distance from being a little-known bureaucrat and European Parliament deputy to a leader pushing through changes reflecting the aspirations of most Poles, in record time.

Presidential campaigns

The Office of President of the Republic of Poland was restored in 1989, as a result of the Polish Round Table Talks between the Polish People's Republic and the opposition.

The figure of the President in the country’s political system is considered largely as a figurehead for the state and guarantor of state tradition, with the practical agenda primarily shaped by the Prime Minister. The President has advantageous powers (compared to the government) in the field of national security, is the supreme political arbitrator (with the right to initiate the legislative process and veto a bill) and has influence over the formation of the judicial and oversight institutions.

The President’s role in the Polish political system is largely determined by the personal qualities of the individual holding this post. Due to the considerable creative, blocking and controlling instruments at his disposal, the President has the power to shape the overall domestic political climate and plays a decisive role in external relations, which explains the particular importance attached by Poland’s highly politicized society to the President.

The landslide victory in the 1989 presidential election of legendary Solidarity leader Lech Walesa was a fait accompli, given the widespread enthusiasm inspired by the ongoing anti-communist changes in the country. However, by the end of Walesa’s presidency in 1995, it became apparent that he would not be reelected for the second term: the disappointment in Walesa’s feverish activity was so great that he actually lost in the first round of the elections (although there was a second round) to Aleksander Kwasniewski, the leader of the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland, successor to the former ruling Polish United Workers’ Party.

The outcome of the next presidential elections in 2000 was quite telling: Aleksander Kwasniewski won the first round, while Lech Walesa scored little more than one percent of the vote and finally exited the political scene.

When Aleksander Kwasniewski’s second term as president was coming to a close, discussion about his successor gained momentum, since Kwasniewski’s popularity eclipsed that of all other candidates put forward by the political elites: they all seemed faceless figures devoid of personality. An influential Polish weekly described the outgoing president as follows: “He seems to personify the Poles’ ideas of an ideal president – he is neither too thin, nor too heavy; neither an ardent believer, nor an atheist; he speaks foreign languages; he can drink, but does not overindulge in wine.”

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The President’s associates proposed unusual ideas such as Alexander’s wife Jolanta Kwasniewska for President, as a way of ensuring not only party-political continuity, but dynastic continuity, too. Despite the First Lady’s apparent popularity and decent chances of succeeding her husband as President, this idea never progressed.

The presidential elections in 2005 were the first to follow Poland’s accession to the European Union and saw confrontation between the “Euro-enthusiasts,” represented by rising star Donald Tusk, and the “Euro-realists”, represented by Lech Kaczynski, a veteran of the Polish political elite. For the first time in Poland’s modern political history the winner of the first round Donald Tusk failed to gain the majority of votes in the second round: charismatic Andrzej Lepper, who received the third largest number of votes, supported Lech Kaczynski and this was of crucial importance for the outcome of the presidential election.

The tragic events of April 2010 that claimed the life of the President of the Republic of Poland launched a new, extraordinary presidential campaign in quite particular domestic conditions (the next presidential elections were due in autumn), which some commentators described as “hysterical confusion.”

Some election participants were already preparing for the upcoming autumn 2010 presidential campaign (Bronislaw Komorowski, Janusz Korwin-Mikke, Andrzej Lepper, Waldemar Pawlak, Marek Jurek), but those who replaced the Presidential candidates killed in the Smolensk air crash (Jaroslaw Kaczynski instead of his brother Lech, Grzegorz Napieralski instead of Jerzy Shmaydzinski) had to start from scratch.

Bronislaw Komorowski, who became the country's Acting President under the Constitution, defeated his rival Jaroslaw Kaczynski in the second round by almost a million votes (about 6% of the electorate). It is worth noting that before the presidential election Bronislaw Komorowski had won the Civic Platform Presidential primaries, defeating his (rather strong) party colleague Radoslaw Sikorski.

Presidential Election, 2015: history and geography

There were 11 candidates in the first round, including President Bronislaw Komorowski (independent candidate, supported by Civil Platform), Andrzej Duda (Law and Justice candidate), Magdalena Ogorek (independent candidate, supported by Democratic Left Alliance), Adam Yarubas (Polish People's Party candidate), Marian Kowalski (National Movement candidate), Janusz Palikot (Your Movement candidate), Janusz Korwin-Mikke (KORWIN party candidate), Pawel Kukiz (independent candidate), Jacek Wilk (Congress of the New Right candidate), Pawel Tanayno (Direct Democracy candidate) and Grzegorz Braun (independent candidate).

According to the National Electoral Commission of Poland, Andrzej Duda came out ahead with 34.76% in the first round with a turnout of 48.96%, surprising many observers. He was followed by current President Bronislaw Komorowski with 33.77%, shocking his supporters and inspired his opponents who believed in the coming victory. Rock musician Pawel Kukiz with 20.80% of votes cast was a sensation: this protest candidate for change and a system-wide overhaul without any political experience won support from young people who had previously voted for Civil Platform candidates.

Janusz Korwin-Mikke, whose participation in the presidential election is a kind of hobby, predictably scored under five percent, namely 3.26%, while Magdalena Ogorek, the only woman in the presidential race, received 2.38% of the votes cast. Other candidates received less than 2% of the vote and are not considered relevant or even marginal participants.

The current political season confirmed that the invisible geographic borders of “historic delimitation” in Poland remain an important factor in the political process: electoral preferences and residents’ votes in the eastern, central and southern parts of the country and the northern and western parts of the country vary significantly. (See illustrations on the website of the National Electoral Commission of Poland: Polish political journalism reveals a fairly clear distinction between the “Eastern Wall” (conservative, suffering from inertia, much less developed economically, socially compliant and with high unemployment rate) and the “Western Front” (reformists, liberal-minded voters, stable economic situation, high social mobility). The boundary between these differing electoral preferences is virtually identical to the “historical borders,” i.e. the territories of Poland that used to be parts of the Russian Empire, Prussia and the Austrian Empire.

Indeed, the 2015 presidential election showed that the country’s eastern and central regions (provinces) demonstrate low social mobility as well as more active involvement in the political life of the country and higher turnout, compared to the western and northern parts of Poland. (Turnout Data from the National Electoral Commission of Poland). Low fluctuation among elective forces and self-identification of the electorate with a certain ideological stance, rather than with a specific political party (low party loyalty), are among the most important features of Poland’s modern party system.

The candidates entered the second round of the election in a different mood: Bronislaw Komorowski presented himself as national candidate and had taken virtually no steps to mobilize his supporters in the regions, which had rendered him maximum support in the first round, while Andrzej Duda’s team had spared no effort increasing turnout in eastern provinces and had worked in almost every municipality.

According to Poland’s National Electoral Commission, the turnout in the second round of the presidential elections was 53.96%; Andrzej Dudu received 51.55% of the votes cast, while current President Bronislaw Komorowski – 48.45%.

Andrzej Duda: Overtaking offside

mikepark.co.uk
The Law and Justice Party has already
announced that it will build on its success in
the autumn parliamentary elections and offer
Jaroslaw Kaczynski for the position of Prime
Minister.

Bronislaw Komorowski has clearly demonstrated that his strong points, namely the desire and ability to compromise with opponents both inside the supporting party and among his political opponents, may be viewed as a weakness without a clear and expressive political stance. Bronislaw Komorowski’s presidency was rather unemphatic, although he faced no serious political failures and scandals.

Moreover, it is possible, were it not for the upcoming presidential elections, that Bronislaw Komorowski would not have taken a proactive stance on the Ukrainian crisis, leaving the actions and statements outlining grave consequences to his associates or assigning the issue to the largely technical government of Eva Kopacz (after Donald Tusk’s occupational change-over for the European Union). After Donald Tusk took a new job, Civic Platform struggled to find a real charismatic leader for premiership: Eva Kopacz was largely appointed as a temporary and passing figure until the parliamentary elections.

Foreign policy issues became grandstand for Komorowski’s main rival Andrzej Duda, who became a sudden but very convenient choice for Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s party. No analysts or political commentators, and few public figures in the Law and Justice party expected this little-known party functionary with modest administrative experience, a member of the lower house of Parliament, and subsequently a deputy of the European Parliament, to win the presidential elections.

Criticizing President Komorowski for passivity in shaping the foreign policy agenda with Poland’s immediate neighbors in the first place, Andrzej Duda committed an overtake offside: in the heat of the presidential race he allowed himself to make forceful statements and called for more decisive action, while Bronislaw Komorowski being the President could not afford such politicking. The issues involved in the Ukrainian crisis and the role of the EU and NATO structures were covered by the presidential candidate with more expression and clarity. The Russian vector of Polish foreign policy had been shaped by inertia, in line with the development of Poland’s geopolitical allies’ policies, and the servility displayed by Bronislaw Komorowski and Civic Platform was rejected by many Poles.

Andrzej Duda gained his victory by a very narrow margin: the gap is just 5% and does not deliver a strong public mandate for radical change. The Law and Justice Party has already announced that it will build on its success in the autumn parliamentary elections and offer Jaroslaw Kaczynski for the position of Prime Minister. A tandem of the President and the Prime Minister in Poland could produce profound, conservative changes in the domestic sphere, embracing family issues, conducting a more cautious policy towards the EU institutions and adopting a policy of fiscal discipline.

Europe’s media are not too optimistic about the election results. They realize that the man who came to power in one of the EU’s largest countries does not favor the “Euro-realistic” attitude towards supranational structures and champions a prudent approach towards intensive integration. Preserving Poland’s national currency, the zloty, and rejecting the single European currency, which was an important issue of Andrzej Duda’s election agenda, are quite telling.

The Ukrainian crisis has become both a painful and an unavoidable issue for election campaigns in Poland. Andrzej Duda is known for his statements about the need for military intervention in the Ukrainian conflict, and he had criticized the President for the latter’s indecision and lack of clarity on this question, which he made clear was of fundamental importance for Poland.

It is unlikely that now, having won, Andrzej Duda will indeed send a military contingent to Donbass, but he can use the tools available for the formal and informal support of Kiev, directly and indirectly, through international institutions and structures.

The incoming President views pragmatism and openness as the grounds for his political course, pledging that the doors of the Presidential Palace will always be open to visitors. Hopefully, Andrzej Duda’s pragmatism will become the foundation for the search for rational models of cooperation between Poland and Russia: too many people on both sides of the border have been waiting for a breakthrough long enough already. Russian President Vladimir Putin congratulated the winner of Poland’s presidential race, noting “that building constructive relations between Russia and Poland, based on the principles of good neighborly relations and mutual respect of interests, would strengthen security and stability in Europe” (RIA Novosti).

There is little doubt that Andrzej Duda’s foreign policy agenda will be largely regional: a significant part of Polish society places more value on neighborliness and cooperation with the country’s immediate neighbors, than on supranational projects, such as the Eastern Partnership. At the same time, it should be understood that the scope of Poland’s independence in shaping its foreign policy is limited due to its exceptionally close military, political and economic integration with the EU and NATO.

Outgoing president Bronislaw Komorowski, having overestimated his popularity, will be left with little to do other than write touching memoirs in political retirement about how to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory in a presidential race against a little-known opponent. There were no signs of trouble: the economic situation looked healthy enough, the opponent did not seem formidable, the team worked efficiently and calmly. Many observers believe that Bronislaw Komorowski relaxed too much too soon, and underestimated the readiness of the Polish electorate for a conservative shift in the spirit of Viktor Orban.