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Nickolay Silaev

PhD in History, Caucasus Problems and Regional Security Center at the MGIMO University

It will not be long before mass surveys stop being a satisfactory tool for analysing the attitudes of Russian people towards Georgia. Indeed, the Russian media has lost interest in the country, especially against the background of the Ukrainian crisis and economic turmoil. The majority of people who take part in surveys will be simply unable to form a more or less specific opinion about Georgia because they no longer will hear about it. This is why any analysis of how Russian society perceives Georgia should be more differentiated in nature.

It will not be long before mass surveys stop being a satisfactory tool for analysing the attitudes of Russian people towards Georgia. Indeed, the Russian media has lost interest in the country, especially against the background of the Ukrainian crisis and economic turmoil. The majority of people who take part in surveys will be simply unable to form a more or less specific opinion about Georgia because they no longer will hear about it. This is why any analysis of how Russian society perceives Georgia should be more differentiated in nature.

The article is prepared within the framework of the RIAC-ICCN Istanbul process "Assistance to Russia-Georgia Dialogue"

According to data from the Levada Center, it is a long time since Russian attitudes towards Georgia have been so positive. A November 2014 survey showed that 4 per cent of the Russian population has a “very positive” attitude towards Georgia, with 49 per cent of respondents saying they had a “generally positive” attitude towards the country. This makes 53 per cent, the highest it has been since October 2001 (no earlier data are available). A total of 33 per cent of respondents answered “very bad” or “generally bad”, with 14 per cent remaining undecided (see Fig. 1).

Figure 1. Russian Attitudes towards Georgia

Source: Levada Center Press Releases. Russian Attitudes towards Different Countries. November 21–24, 2014. (in Russian)

Other sociological services have also noted an improvement in the attitudes of Russian people towards Georgia over the past few years. According to the Russian Public Opinion Research Center WCIOM, 25 per cent of people surveyed in 2008 included Georgia in the list of countries with which Russia has intense hostile relations. By 2014, this number had dropped to 1 per cent. And we are talking about a sudden improvement of relations. The majority of Russians are probably unaware of the relatively feeble attempts at provocation from the Georgian side, such as the initiative to set up training camps for Syrian rebels in the country, although such actions lead to increased tensions in diplomatic relations between Moscow and Tbilisi.

In addition to this, Georgia is no longer the focus of mass public attention in Russia. The Public Opinion Foundation has noted a surge in the number of respondents who say they are indifferent to Georgia. In February 2014, that figure was 50 per cent. The Levada Center data does not account for this trend, although it is likely to prevail in the near future.

Changing Geopolitics

The indifference towards Georgia felt by half of the Russian people (if we are to believe the data provided by the Public Opinion Foundation) has at least two positive aspects to it.

During the first decade of this century, Georgia became the centre of Russian foreign policy. Or, rather, it became a key point on the international agenda regarding the future of European security.

In his foreign policy, Mikheil Saakashvili managed to do what no other Georgian leader had done before him. He capitalized on elements of the United States’ foreign policy under Geroge W. Bush brilliantly while at the same time embodying the democratization of previously “undemocratic” regions of the world, promoting the idea of limiting Russia’s influence in the former Soviet Union and bringing the United States new allies to complement, and in some cases replace, its traditional allies. By sending large military contingents to Iraq and Afghanistan and maintaining close relations with Poland and the Baltic countries, Georgia positioned itself symbolically alongside those Central and Eastern European countries that had just become members of NATO and the European Union, or, in the vernacular of Washington’s foreign policy, “New Europe”. At the same time, it was under Saakashvili that the country became intent on turning its conflicts with Abkhazia and Ossetia into a conflict between Russian and Georgia and make it a part of the confrontation between Russia and the United States on European security. Finding itself at the centre of this standoff, Georgia was never far from the thoughts of the Russian people. Perhaps this is why the Levada Center continues to include Georgia in its surveys on Russian attitudes towards different countries.

The stigma of being a “migrant worker” is not generally attached to people from Georgia like it is to representatives of other countries in the post-Soviet space.

Now, the focus of hostilities has shifted towards Kiev, relations with which Moscow views in the broader context of European and global security. Ukraine and its current leadership occupy a similar place in Russian public opinion to the one Georgia occupied in 2008.

The indifference towards Georgia felt by half of the Russian people (if we are to believe the data provided by the Public Opinion Foundation) has at least two positive aspects to it. Firstly, we have Georgia’s image – that is, an image of its own, and not one brought about by Russian’s relations with global political players. The shadow of U.S. politics, both global and in the post-Soviet space, does not hang over Georgia the way it once did. Secondly, because it is its “own image”, Tbilisi has greater control over it. Mikheil Saakashvili was always conscious of what the people in Russia said and thought about him and invested heavily in improving his image in that country. However, any improvement in the attitudes of Russian people towards Georgia since August 2008 can probably be put down to other reasons. On the one hand, there was an improvement in relations between Russia and the United States. On the other hand, the Georgian component of the confrontation with the West became less important for Moscow following the events of 2008. In practice, this has resulted in a change of rhetoric with regards to Tbilisi, with Russian dignitaries making very respectful statements about the Georgian people (but not the Georgian authorities). This shift appears to have played a decisive role in the growth of pro-Georgian sentiment since the autumn of 2008.

The Georgian Diaspora in Russia

REUTERS/Vladimir Sindeyev
Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Kirill,
Catholicos-Patriarch Ilia II of Georgia and
Metropolitan of Kiev and all Ukraine Vladimir
take part in a festive service at Vladimirskaya
Gorka in Kiev July 27, 2011

According to the 2010 census, there are 158,000 Georgians living in Russia. And this figure is probably on the conservative side. The real figure, in terms of different ethnic communities and regions, is a different matter. And if we assume that the figure is correct, then it turns out that the Georgian diaspora is not the largest among the peoples of the former Soviet republics.

The visa restrictions on entering, residing and working in Russia imposed on Georgian citizens in 2006 clearly make it difficult for the diaspora to grow. Georgians do not belong to the group of people from other former Soviet countries who flock to Russian cities to fill unskilled manual labour positions. The stigma of being a “migrant worker” is not generally attached to people from Georgia like it is to representatives of other countries in the post-Soviet space. Significantly, there has been no mention in the media (or among the participants themselves) of Georgians taking part in any of the social, “interethnic” conflicts. We can thus assume that Russian people do not really associate Georgians with the “Caucasus” (Kavkaz), and all the negative connotations that that word carries.

Another feature of Georgian society in Russia is the fact that there are no prominent organizations to represent the interests of the Georgian community in the country. There are a number of reasons for this. To begin with, Georgians have adapted better than most to Russian society and there is not much demand for such an organization. Secondly, the efforts to support the Georgian diaspora in Russia (similar to the policy of Azerbaijan) adopted during Mikheil Saakashvili’s term in office were directed at organizations and leaders that were sharply critical of the Russian authorities. It is very difficult to set up an organization that could have any kind of influence when such an approach is being used. Thirdly, there are no canonical divisions between the Russian and Georgian orthodox churches, which, on the one hand, makes it easier for Georgian people to adapt to life in Russia and, on the other hand, means that there are fewer opportunities for them to set up organizations themselves.

Despite the absence of a strong organization to represent the interests of the Georgian diaspora in Russia, the most prominent representatives of the Georgian community do have a visible presence in Russian public life. Their personal achievements and popularity have a positive effect on the general perception of Georgians and Georgia. And this could have contributed to the improving attitudes of the Russian people towards that country over recent years, even though practically nobody is actively working to improve Georgia’s image in Russia.

We should point out here that the Georgian community is not only represented by those who achieved public and professional recognition during Soviet times. One of the newer prominent public figures, for example, is entrepreneur Levan Vasadze, who enjoys great popularity in Georgia and is also well known in the Russian community for defending family values.

A New Cultural Expansion

picture alliance / Heritage Images /Vostock Photo
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A total of 640,000 Russian tourists visited Georgia from January to September 2014, which is 40,000 more than during the same period in 2013. More than likely, this number does not accurately represent the number of people who went to Georgia for the purposes of tourism, as many people who enter Georgia via Upper Lars are in transit to Armenia and Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, Georgia is growing in popularity as a tourist destination for Russians. This is in part thanks to the active advertising campaign conducted during Saakashvili’s time in office. The campaign may have finished, but the number of tourists travelling to Georgia continues to grow. Visa-free travel for Russian citizens and the developed tourist infrastructure in the country mean that this trend will carry on for the foreseeable future. And given the devaluation of the rouble, Georgia looks set to replace cheap European options as the destination of choice on the Russian travel market.

Political differences have a negligible impact on tourism. Travel agents in Vladikavkaz, for example, advertise and sell tour packages to Georgian resorts on the Black Sea, as they work out cheaper than tour packages to the Russian part of the Black Sea and more up-scale than Caspian Sea resorts.

It would be fair to assume that the increased popularity of Georgia as a tourist destination for Russian citizens has a lot to do with the sharp increase in the number of Georgian restaurants around the country. According to the restaurant rating website zoon.ru, there are 541 eateries offering Georgian cuisine in Moscow alone more than the number of Armenian (139), Azerbaijani (328) and Chinese (412) restaurants. It seems that the only national cuisines that are more popular among Muscovites than Georgian cuisine are Russian (more than one thousand restaurants, although the list includes all restaurants that do not specify the type of cuisine they offer) and Japanese (also more than one thousand restaurants).

Georgian art and culture also remain popular. The Georgian “cultural expansion” into Russia is also helped by the fact that show business in the country has a ready-made audience for Georgian performers. The same cannot be said of Georgian show business.

What Has Changed?

Another feature of Georgian society in Russia is the fact that there are no prominent organizations to represent the interests of the Georgian community in the country.

It is not hard to notice that in the minds of Russian people the image of Georgia hasn’t actually changed that much since Soviet times: the country is invariably associated with tourism, hospitality, wine, music and cinema, and famous Georgians. And while this image is often criticized in Tbilisi for being Orientalist or “imperialist”, it has never really been consciously constructed. The “capital” accumulated in various spheres over the past decades has turned liquid in new conditions.

However, it is important to look not at how things have stayed the same, but rather at how Russian habits of thinking and talking about Georgia have changed. No longer are Russians tormented by an inferiority complex with regard to their southern neighbours, which hasn’t really been seen or felt since the liberal portion of Russian society debated the reforms carried out in Georgia under Saakashvili. In 2008, journalist Yulia Latynina compared the small modern Georgia to Israel, and Russia to Israel’s bully – the Arab world. The discourse about the successful reforms in Georgia, which in Tbilisi at least were seen as a reaction to the old imperialistic Soviet view of Georgia being “about wine and comedy films”, never took root in Russia. And the reforms did not deliver on their promises, propagated as they were by a small circle of journalists. More importantly, however, is the fact that the Russian liberals lost interest in Georgia after the country ceased being a major issue in the standoff between Russia and the West. Since the beginning of 2014, that place has been occupied by Ukraine.

Another change is related to the increased role of the Orthodox community in the two countries. The most influential Russian Orthodox media outlets, Pravoslavie (“Orthodoxy”) and Pravoslavie i Mir (“Orthodoxy and Peace”), publish a great deal of information on the Georgian Orthodox Church. The Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia, Ilia II, is extremely popular among Russian Orthodox Christians. Much is written about him and his actions are observed with keen interest. Russians often see in Georgian Orthodoxy an ideal that they cannot find in their own country, where most people consider themselves to be Orthodox Christians, but very few actually lead a religious life.

The dialogue between two Orthodox Churches, which continued even during the most difficult years in Russian–Georgian relations, has always been isolated from politics. But it has always been of great socio-political significance, forming a kind of “traditionalist alliance” between the two countries. As far as Russian conservatives are concerned, Georgia is a like-minded Orthodox country that is in direct opposition to the cultural policy of the European Union and provides grounds to criticize that policy.

Public opinion surveys do not latch on to this nuance. In the studies conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation, for example, the Orthodox community was near bottom on the list of reasons in the “other” category for the positive attitudes of Russian people towards Georgia. However, given the increasingly conservative tendencies of the Russian socio-political agenda, we can expect this particular image of Georgia to become more relevant.

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