Armenia’s National Security and Foreign Policy: A Change of Course

Armenia’s 2026 parliamentary elections have already become a matter of history. The voting is over, the Central Electoral Commission has announced the final results, the first session of the new ninth convocation has opened, and a new Speaker of the National Assembly—Ruben Rubinyan, Yerevan’s key negotiator with Ankara on the normalization of bilateral relations—has been elected. Yet political tensions in the country have not subsided. On the contrary, the debate over Armenia’s strategic development prospects has gained new momentum, both within the republic and beyond its borders.

On August 20, the Armenian government approved its program for 2026–2031. Four days later, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan presented it to the National Assembly. The republic’s highest legislative body subsequently approved the program by 63 votes in favor, 24 against, with no abstentions. The program not only set out the government’s positions on all key issues on the country’s domestic and foreign policy agenda, but also effectively articulated a sweeping reset of Armenia’s national state-building project.

The approval and presentation of the program appear to have been a carefully prepared improvisation. The project’s main provisions are widely known: they have repeatedly been articulated in interviews, speeches, and statements by Nikol Pashinyan and other senior Armenian politicians and diplomats. What can now be seen, however, is how these previously disparate statements have been consolidated into a coherent set of goals and objectives for the renewed Armenian state.

At first glance, the Armenian leadership’s coherent and carefully structured plans may encounter both domestic and foreign obstacles. Russia, however, will not have an easy time either. There is a significant risk that Moscow’s tougher economic policy toward Armenia could accelerate the country’s “turn to the West,” if only because Russia would lose channels of influence over developments within Armenia. It remains important to distinguish relations with Nikol Pashinyan and his government from those with members of the political establishment, intellectual community, and broader public who are not prepared to accept the ideology of “Real Armenia” unconditionally. It is critically important not to play into the hands of the EU and pro-European elites in Yerevan—that is, at the very least, for Russia not to accelerate the severing of existing ties itself.

Government Programs: From the Old to the New

Armenia’s 2026 parliamentary elections have already become a matter of history. The voting is over, the Central Electoral Commission has announced the final results, the first session of the new ninth convocation has opened, and a new Speaker of the National Assembly—Ruben Rubinyan, Yerevan’s key negotiator with Ankara on the normalization of bilateral relations—has been elected. Yet political tensions in the country have not subsided. On the contrary, the debate over Armenia’s strategic development prospects has gained new momentum, both within the republic and beyond its borders.

On August 20, the Armenian government approved its program for 2026–2031. Four days later, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan presented it to the National Assembly. The republic’s highest legislative body subsequently approved the program by 63 votes in favor, 24 against, with no abstentions. The program not only set out the government’s positions on all key issues on the country’s domestic and foreign policy agenda, but also effectively articulated a sweeping reset of Armenia’s national state-building project.

At first glance, the approval and presentation of the program appear to be a carefully prepared improvisation. The project’s main provisions are widely known: they have repeatedly been articulated in interviews, speeches, and statements by Nikol Pashinyan and other senior Armenian politicians and diplomats. What can now be seen, however, is how these previously disparate statements have taken shape as a coherent set of goals and objectives for the renewed Armenian state.

However, this is not a continuation of the previous course. The government program for the preceding “five-year period” (2021–2026) was developed by the same team led by Nikol Pashinyan. Yet even a cursory comparison of that document with the new program gives the impression that they were drafted by entirely different teams; their strategic objectives are diametrically opposed.

One might object that, compared with the Civil Contract party’s election platform, the government’s proposals are hardly novel. There is, however, an important nuance. In its current form, the government program is not a document intended for public relations purposes or the contest for votes. It is not merely a declaration of principles, but also a plan for concrete action in the coming years, particularly at a time when the Armenian authorities see themselves as the winners of the five-year period’s main electoral campaign and are seeking to reinforce their success through the use of administrative and judicial resources against key opposition figures. At the same time, Nikol Pashinyan’s team has been given considerable latitude by its Western allies: the U.S. and the EU are prepared to turn a blind eye to departures from democratic standards, since what is at stake is minimizing Russian influence in the South Caucasus and, in effect, dismantling the model of allied relations between Moscow and Yerevan.

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The “Fourth Republic” Instead of “Miatsum”: A New Ideological Foundation for Post-Soviet Armenia

The concept of the “Fourth Republic” is key to understanding the domestic and foreign policy priorities of the Armenian authorities. The term refers to the historical periodization of Armenian statehood: the First Republic existed from May 1918 to December 1920, following the collapse of the Russian Empire and until the “Sovietization” of Armenia; the Second was the Armenian SSR (1920–1990); and the Third was post-Soviet Armenia, proclaimed by the Declaration of Independence of August 23, 1990. For Nikol Pashinyan, the “Fourth Republic” is above all a designation for a new political model of the state, as well as a new state identity and civic loyalty around which the government program for 2026–2031 is structured.

Five years ago, as Nikol Pashinyan began another term as prime minister, he officially promoted previously established pan-Armenian approaches. The Declaration of August 23, 1990, which proclaimed the self-determination of the new post-Soviet Armenia as a common project of the former Armenian SSR and the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast within the Azerbaijan SSR, was also based largely on this foundation. In 2021, official Yerevan was prepared to continue the course pursued by the previous authorities, advancing such priorities as the security of the Armenian state, Nagorno-Karabakh (the name “Artsakh” had not yet become taboo), and the diaspora. A key element in this context was the alliance with Russia, encompassing both bilateral ties and membership in the CSTO and the EAEU.

These priorities came under revision not in 2026, but much earlier. In his congratulatory message marking the 33^rd anniversary of the adoption of the Declaration of Independence, Nikol Pashinyan specifically emphasized that the document, which proclaimed the new republic on the basis of the act on the “reunification of the Armenian SSR and Nagorno-Karabakh,” contained elements of permanent confrontation with neighboring states.

Armenia’s “de-Karabakhization” did not begin yesterday. It has unfolded gradually. Yet now, right before the world’s eyes, the desacralization of the Karabakh cause is becoming the main ideological trend of official Yerevan. The political language of the authorities has changed radically. The new government program contains no mention of “Artsakh,” self-determination, the OSCE Minsk Group, or conflict settlement. The issue of conflict settlement itself has been almost entirely eliminated from the agenda.

Today, it is counterproductive to speculate about when the Armenian prime minister was sincere—when he asserted that “Artsakh” belonged to his country or when he just as vehemently renounced territorial claims against the neighboring state. The fact remains that the government program for 2026–2031 unequivocally formalizes the renunciation of Karabakh, a sharply critical assessment of the entire Karabakh movement, and its interpretation as an anti-national cause.

The concept of the “Fourth Republic” is officially replacing “Miatsum” (the idea of unity between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh) and pan-Armenian approaches. According to the prime minister, it has already “become reality.” In effect, this is a search for a new source of legitimacy—both for the government and for the state as a whole.

The logic of Armenian authorities is as follows: the ruling Civil Contract party won the parliamentary elections. It was this political force that consistently and persistently promoted the concept of “Real Armenia,” systematically set out in Nikol Pashinyan’s February 2025 address. If the majority of citizens supported the pro-government political force, then, from the country’s leadership’s perspective, they also endorsed the Armenian “realists.” This, in turn, gives the government the right to revise the state’s domestic and foreign policy priorities—radically so in certain areas.

According to the core tenets of this concept, “Real Armenia is the Republic of Armenia with its internationally recognized territory of 29,743 square kilometers”—that is, within the borders of the Armenian SSR, without claims to Nagorno-Karabakh or the adjacent territories. The homeland is understood as the “state,” identified with the internationally recognized Republic of Armenia, while patriotism is defined as serving the interests of that state. Under this approach, Armenians in the diaspora are de facto excluded from the framework of Armenian national and state identity. Thus, “Pashinyan-style realism” entails a of the idea of “Miatsum” and a substantial revision of the previous approach based on solidarity between Armenian citizens and the diaspora in advancing Yerevan’s interests on the international stage.

A separate theme of the new program is “church reform,” to which a dedicated section is devoted. The struggle for influence over the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC) fits within the government’s broader efforts to eliminate potential sources of opposition sentiment. Yet in the wider context of the “reset” of the entire national state-building project, this struggle is also important because authorities are dissatisfied with what amounts to the AAC hierarchy’s de facto sabotage of “de-Karabakhization.”

The practical implementation of the transition to the “Fourth Republic” is envisaged through constitutional change. The prime minister is not deterred even by the fact that these intentions are being voiced at the same time as Baku is putting forward preconditions. Azerbaijan considers the signing of a peace agreement impossible without substantive amendments to Armenia’s Constitution. The revised Constitution will contain no references to the 1990 Declaration. It is expected to be adopted by referendum. In Nikol Pashinyan’s view, this step will bring the “Karabakh movement” to an end, along with the identity politics of post-Soviet Armenia that accompanied it.

The Karabakh movement is now regarded as anti-state and anti-national not only—and not even primarily—in Azerbaijan’s official narrative, but also in Armenia’s. A direct consequence of political “de-Karabakhization” is a radical reshaping of Armenia’s foreign policy priorities.

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Foreign Policy Reconfiguration

The main foreign policy slogan of Armenia’s new “five-year period” can be formulated as “peace without a strategic alliance with Russia.” Just five years ago, the Armenian government—importantly, under the leadership of the current prime minister— highlighted “allied relations and strategic cooperation” as a priority. In the 2026 program, Yerevan’s relations with Moscow are described as a “transforming and deepening” partnership. They are no longer characterized as a strategic alliance. The symbolic geography of the foreign policy section has also changed: Russia, which was mentioned first in the program five years ago, now ranks eighth—after Azerbaijan, Turkey, Iran, Georgia, the European Union, the U.S., and France.

Perhaps the harshest assessments in the program are reserved for the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). During his presentation of the program to the National Assembly, Nikol Pashinyan even stated that it would be desirable for Armenia to withdraw from the CSTO to avoid creating additional dilemmas for Yerevan. This “improvisation” also appears to have been carefully prepared. As early as September 18, 2024, at the Second World Armenian Summit in Yerevan, Nikol Pashinyan stated that the Organization posed a threat to his country’s sovereignty and that Armenia was approaching a “point of no return” in its relations with the CSTO.

This positioning also has a domestic political dimension. It is critically important for the prime minister to shift responsibility for the two catastrophic defeats in Karabakh and the incidents along the Armenia–Azerbaijan border onto other actors. The CSTO is particularly well-suited for this purpose. First, it serves as veiled criticism of Moscow. Second, the Organization was also criticized by the current prime minister’s predecessors, especially Serzh Sargsyan, who resigned as a result of the “Velvet Revolution.” Best not to forget, however, that following the CSTO summit in Yerevan in November 2022, it was Nikol Pashinyan who refused to sign the final declaration and the document on joint measures to assist Armenia, citing the allies’ lack of a clear assessment of the situation on the border. His signature, meanwhile, would have opened the way for the deployment of a CSTO monitoring mission along the Armenia–Azerbaijan border, before the EU civilian mission in Armenia was established (with the participation of Canadian experts, which de facto gives it a NATO dimension). In any event, references to the CSTO in a negative context, coupled with the abandonment of the “strategic alliance” formula in relations with Russia, amplify the effect of Armenia’s foreign policy pivot.

“De-Karabakhization” is radically changing Yerevan’s approach toward Azerbaijan and Turkey. If there is no conflict and the Karabakh movement does not correspond to Armenian national interests, then relations with Baku and Ankara are viewed differently. In the new program, Azerbaijan effectively ranks first among Yerevan’s bilateral foreign policy priorities.

The government has set the goals of signing and ratifying an Agreement on Peace and Interstate Relations with Baku, continuing the delimitation and demarcation of the border, developing contacts between the two societies and business communities, and, in the longer term, promoting bilateral trade. Turkey is viewed in the context of full normalization, replacing the policy of a closed border. The stated objectives are to establish diplomatic relations, open the border, ensure the operation of at least two modern border crossing points, restore and expand transportation, energy, and digital links, and develop trade. Under the concept of the “Fourth Republic,” Turkey is no longer regarded as a “constitutive Other” or a historical threat. It is positioned as a neighbor with which Armenia needs to establish functional interstate relations.

The most important element in the “constructive” part of the program is the European track. This is not merely about expanding cooperation, but about possible EU membership. The program builds on the law adopted in 2025 launching the process of Armenia’s accession to the Union. In his August 24, 2026 speech, Nikol Pashinyan stated that the next step should be the preparation of a formal application. Once Brussels responds and a roadmap emerges, he intends to hold a referendum (which may be combined with a vote on constitutional amendments). In addition, the government has set the goal of achieving a visa-free regime with the EU; Pashinyan identified 2029 as the target year.

An interesting detail is that, while calling for European integration, the government is not seeking to place itself in direct opposition to the EAEU. The “CSTO bad, EAEU good” formula remains in place. For now, the program provides for continued use of the Union’s mechanisms and for ensuring the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor. In other words, the Russia-centric military framework is being dismantled much faster than the economic one. This is explained by the fact that in January–June 2026, Armenia’s trade turnover with EAEU countries amounted to approximately USD 2.82 billion, out of total foreign trade turnover of around USD 9.57 billion. The EAEU’s share, on the other hand, was approximately 29.4%. A year earlier, it stood at 36.3%, and in 2024 at almost 43%. The downward trend is evident, but the EAEU’s importance cannot be ignored. Thus, to paraphrase one of the Soviet leaders, “the goals are clear, the tasks are defined.” This time, however, they are not in favor of Russia or Eurasian integration projects.

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Plans on Paper and Obstacles in Practice

The Armenian government’s program leaves little room for doubt: a radical reset of the national state-building project and an official reinterpretation of history are leading to fundamental changes in foreign policy priorities. Today, Yerevan gives preference, first, to the Western track—closer ties with the EU and the U.S., while the NATO factor still appears marginal—and, second, to so-called “regionalization,” meaning rapprochement with its immediate neighbors (Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Georgia), including those with which the country was until very recently engaged in a protracted ethno-political conflict. But does this mean that Armenia will rapidly reorient itself and enter the Western sphere of influence? The answer is not as straightforward as it might seem.

First, foreign policy positioning is inseparable from domestic political trends. The Civil Contract has indeed won the parliamentary elections for the third consecutive time. The government appears to be rushing to translate this success into concrete foreign policy decisions—not only tactical but also strategic—while continuing to bring criminal cases against its opponents. Armenian law enforcement agencies have already targeted former President Robert Kocharyan; businessman and politician Gagik Tsarukyan; Avetik Chalabyan, coordinator of the opposition Hayakve initiative; Ishkhan Saghatelyan, a leader of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsutyun); and newly elected MP Narek Karapetyan, nephew of Samvel Karapetyan, leader of the second-largest parliamentary faction, Strong Armenia, who spent the entire election campaign under house arrest and remains under house arrest.

The authorities may be tempted to completely “clear” the country’s political field. Yet this would violate many of the informal taboos of Armenian politics: refraining from prosecuting former national leaders, avoiding the redistribution of property as a regular practice, and not suppressing dissent, including through pressure on the hierarchy of the national church. The continuation and consolidation of authoritarian trends could create problems for the government’s domestic legitimacy, potentially followed by changes in foreign policy as well. These may not be radical—although the authorities scare citizens into thinking war would be inevitable if Nikol Pashinyan were to leave office and Civil Contract were defeated—but policy adjustments cannot be ruled out, particularly a return to “normalcy” in relations with Russia.

Second, the stated goals, such as European integration, will not be easy to implement in practice. The EU has not expanded since 2013, when Croatia joined. As of August 2026, formal EU accession negotiations were underway with seven countries: Turkey, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, North Macedonia, Ukraine, and Moldova. Georgia and Bosnia and Herzegovina remain stalled at the “candidate status” stage. Kosovo has yet to obtain official candidate status, as five EU member states—Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Romania, and Slovakia—refuse to recognize it as a state. Armenia is not on this list, although EU Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos believes that Yerevan could potentially submit an application, without specifying a timeframe.

This raises the question of whether, during a prolonged period of waiting, Yerevan might lose the benefits it already derives from cooperation with the EAEU. The model of simultaneously distancing itself from the CSTO while retaining membership in and ties with the Eurasian Economic Union does not satisfy Moscow, as senior Russian officials have repeatedly stated. Russia has emphasized that it does not intend to preserve preferential arrangements for Armenia if the country strategically reorients toward the EU—and, in the longer term, toward NATO. Consequently, the range of restrictions already imposed on Armenian producers could be expanded. This, however, is unlikely to accelerate Armenia’s accession to the European Union ahead of the Balkan states or Moldova and Georgia. The restrictions could have twofold consequences: on the one hand, they could produce a “rally around the flag” effect; on the other, they could fuel protest sentiment and public dissatisfaction with the authorities.

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Thus, at a first glance, the Armenian leadership’s coherent and carefully structured plans may encounter both domestic and foreign obstacles. Russia, however, will not have an easy time either. There is a significant risk that Moscow’s tougher economic policy toward Armenia could accelerate the country’s “turn to the West,” if only because Russia would lose channels of influence over developments within Armenia. It remains important to distinguish relations with Nikol Pashinyan and his government from those with members of the political establishment, intellectual community, and broader public who are not prepared to accept the ideology of “Real Armenia” unconditionally. It is critically important not to play into the hands of the EU and pro-European elites in Yerevan—that is, at the very least, for Russia not to accelerate the severing of existing ties itself.