Aircraft Carriers in Europe: From an Expensive Tradition to an Inexpensive Universality

Maritime powers of Europe, which have or once have had classical attack aircraft carriers, are gradually abandoning this type of ship in favor of smaller, but multifunctional vessels. This process within the fleets of such major actors as the United Kingdom or France is either very painful or has not yet begun. Countries with more limited financial resources have reoriented their shipbuilding programs towards combining attack aircraft carriers with amphibious assault ships, since building and operating them separately appears to be too expensive.

Maritime powers of Europe, which have or once have had classical attack aircraft carriers, are gradually abandoning this type of ship in favor of smaller, but multifunctional vessels. This process within the fleets of such major actors as the United Kingdom or France is either very painful or has not yet begun. Countries with more limited financial resources have reoriented their shipbuilding programs towards combining attack aircraft carriers with amphibious assault ships, since building and operating them separately appears to be too expensive. The inclusion of most European powers in the partnership program of supplying U.S. F-35 fighter jets will equip these combat units with adequate strike potential.

European Aircraft Carriers: Current State and Dynamics

Two factors have had a momentous impact on the state of European carrier forces: the gradual withdrawal of aircraft carriers of older construction (not even physically obsolete and having the potential for limited use or modernization) from the European fleets during the 2000s and their replacement by a very small number of newly commissioned vessels of the same class.

For example, Great Britain got rid of two of its three Invincible-class aircraft carriers: the lead ship HMS Invincible was decommissioned in August 2005, and HMS Ark Royal – in March 2011. Following the retirement of her fixed-wing strike aircraft Harrier II, the remaining HMS Illustrious in 2011 underwent modifications to turn her into a helicopter carrier. This has left the Royal Navy without a ship-borne strike fighter force.

France withdrew both Clemenceau-class aircraft carriers from its Navy service: the lead ship Clemenceau was decommissioned in 1997 and her sister ship the Foch was sold to the Brazilian Navy in 2005. In 2010, the helicopter cruiser Jean d'Arc was taken out of the Navy service as well. In the French Navy, they were only succeeded by the Charles de Gaulle flagship in 2001.

In February 2013, the aircraft carrier Principe de Asturias, built only at the end of the 1980s, was taken of service by the Spanish Navy due to budgetary cuts. As a result, the Juan Carlos I, commissioned in autumn 2010, appears to be only large aircraft carrier of the Spanish Navy.

Against this background, Italy looks to be quite an exception. Despite repeated declared reductions of the military budget in 2012 and early 2013, the Navy still retains in service the aircraft carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi and in 2009 added a new multi-purpose aircraft carrier, the Cavour.

Britain: “Cheap Imperialist Policy,” Second Abridged Edition

Photo: www.buquesdeguerra.com
Spanish Navy LHD ship "Juan Carlos I" (L-61)

In terms of new aircraft carriers, the British shipbuilding program appears interesting, though modest. Growing financial difficulties do not allow for a substitution of ships, as they say, in the course of work. As a result, Invincible-class ships are being withdrawn from the Navy ahead of schedule, and not being replaced by new aircraft carriers.

Britain’s CV Future or CVF project provides for the construction of a conventionally-powered aircraft carrier with an all-electric power system driven by gas turbines and with a displacement of 65,000 metric tons. Earlier it was planned to build two carriers – HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales, but spending cuts placed the construction of the latter under threat.

At the moment, the vessels are expected to be capable of carrying forty aircraft, including 12 multi-purpose fighter aircraft F-35B Lightning II, multi-purpose helicopters Merlin HAS.1 (AW.101), Wildcat (AW.159) and early warning helicopter Sea King AEW.2.

The evolution of the project’s weapons appears to be of particular interest. In 2002 the British Navy, choosing the deck fighter, opted for a short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) F-35B. However, in approximately 2009, discussions began about equipping ships with an electromagnetic catapult to launch “full-fledged” carrier-based aircraft, including those which would eventually replace the F-35s. As a result, in 2010, the planned carrier strike aircraft force was switched from the STOVL F-35B to the conventional takeoff F-35C, which the U.S. Navy intends to order to replace the deck multipurpose fighters F/A-18.

It should be noted that the C version has a better flight and performance characteristics than the B version, in particular a greater combat radius (1140 km vs. 870) and a wider range of payload. In addition, F-35C is somewhat cheaper both in price and operation, which can create significant savings when operating a flying stock of dozens aircraft.

However, the limiting factor here is the readiness of the British budget to bear the additional costs of refitting ships. If in 2010 the cost of converting one of the Royal Navy’s partly built aircraft carriers was estimated at £951 million, in 2012 the Ministry of Defense was already talking about £2 billion.

As far as we can see, in view of the increased financial difficulties of the British budget, the reduced cost of building and operating STOVL carriers has played a decisive role. Problems were aggravated by setting the commissioning date of the ship at a later time – approximately 2020. It is worth recalling that, given the withdrawal from service of the Ark Royal aircraft carrier ahead of schedule, the military was unlikely to gently tolerate the delay in the construction of HMS Queen Elizabeth. Finally, in May 2012, the MoD returned to F-35B procurement, and the Queen Elizabeth will get a springboard for short takeoff aircraft.

The weak point of the British carrier forces remains the early warning system. Neither the CVF nor the Invincible-class ships have the capacity to operate full-fledged airborne radar early warning and control systems. The catapult CVF version could be a solution to the problem, but at the moment the British military are failing to seize the opportunity. The early warning helicopter Sea King AEW.2 and ASaC.7 can hardly be considered an adequate solution to the problem.

The fate of the project’s second ship, the construction of which began in 2011 by cutting the first piece of hull, is still unclear. The final decision on the completion of construction will be made after 2015.

Thus, by the early 2020s, the UK will have, at best, two new multi-purpose aircraft carriers with F-35B. The practicable commissioning dates are as follows: HMS Queen Elizabeth – 2020, HMS Prince of Wales – a few years later. However, in the event of aggravated or just continued budget problems, the second aircraft carrier could be sold-off from the very shipyard after its completion (the most likely buyer is India) or its construction would be stopped at all.

The second option entails the necessity payoff paying cancellation fees. According to British officials, it is more profitable to build the ship than to pay the penalty to shipbuilders for cancelling the contract. In 2011 British Prime Minister David Cameron made this quite clear.

The situation is reminiscent of the interwar period when the UK, gradually losing its global leadership and in the aim of saving money, had to reduce its fleet and, more importantly, limit naval construction in line with the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922. In the 1930s, this position was called “cheap imperialist policy.”

France: a Very Special Way at the Crossroads

Photo: digilander.libero.it
Light multirole Aircraft Carrier "Cavour" (C550), Italy

France for a long time has been planning the construction of the so-called “second aircraft carrier” - Porte-Avions 2 (the first one is the nuclear-powered Charles de Gaulle). However, in April 2013, the French White Paper on Defense and National Security (Livre Blanc) actually cancelled the project by indicating in the section describing the armed forces in 2025 only one aircraft carrier.

Since there were no official comments, we may draw two conclusions: either the project of the “second carrier” was canceled (or postponed indefinitely, which in the current situation means the same thing), or the French military, realistically assessing the possibilities of the state budget and shipbuilders, decided that even with an immediate start of the work, the ship is unlikely to be commissioned in 12 years. Even leaving aside financial issues, the Charles de Gaulle example is quite revealing – under much better economic conditions, it took just 12 years from laying down the hull to commissioning. It should also be noted that the technical design of the Charles de Gaulle carrier was developed in the late 1970s, which was 10 years prior to the beginning of its construction, while the final technical specifications of the Porte-Avions 2 have not been defined yet.

However, the evolution history of the French “second carrier” project deserves attention and may prove instructive. The originally envisioned displacement of the ship was 65,000 metric tons, and then it was increased to 74 thousand, and finally reduced to 62,000 tons. It was assumed that the aircraft carrier would be a conventionally-powered ship driven by gas turbines as the problematic nuclear propulsion unit of Charles de Gaulle turned to be a real headache in operation. The PA2 was to carry up to 40 aircraft including 32 Rafale combat aircraft, three E-2C Hawkeye surveillance aircraft and five NH90 helicopters.

It should be noted that the review of CVF and Porte-Avions 2 projects in conjunction with each other is more than meaningful. The fact is that in the early stages of the French project (2005-2008), the future contractor (a consortium of Thales Naval and DCNS) intended to work with British BAE Systems shipbuilders. Moreover, the project was so close to the British CVF that it was at first even marked CVF-FR (“French”). Later, however, the project was blown out of proportion in terms of displacement, while the British side displayed little enthusiasm in implementing its program.

As a result, France de facto abandoned the CVF-FR project and the White Paper of 2008 had an interesting caveat that the change in economic conditions since 2003 required further studies to decide between the classical and the nuclear power propulsion units. Thus, the nuclear Porte-Avions 2 option was again accepted for consideration, which was quite logical. Since the UK was not building nuclear ships, and the project was drifint away from CVF, it was necessary to weigh all the pros and cons again.

British attempts to find a place, if necessary, for the second CVF project aircraft carrier, are reanimating the idea of ordering Porte-Avions 2 on the basis of the British project. France, however, is not purchasing F-35s, and is focusing on the use of Rafales as deck aircraft that immediately necessitates equipping ships with catapults (steam catapults as the Charles de Gaulle has, or CVF electromagnetic ones).

Moreover, within the framework of naval cooperation, involving the creation of integrated Franco-British aircraft carrier units and “alternate” use of ships to carry out mutual missions (such initiative was put forward in the second half of the 2000s), the French were still willing to agree with the use of F-35Cs, but not F-35Bs. But – more importantly – they could not accept the absence of launch catapults on HMS Queen Elisabeth and HMS Prince of Wales.

It seems that the fate of Porte-Avions 2 is, perhaps, the main intrigue of the European aircraft carrier programs. However, it is quite obvious that if the ship is finally built, it is likely to become the only carrier in Europe with a full-fledged air group and not just the short take-off aircraft. In fact, over the next 10-20 years, this is the only chance for Europe to build a new “genuine” aircraft carrier.

European Type of Aircraft Carrier: Unification and Ample Opportunity

Photo: Suricatafx.com
Suricatafx.com
Modern Fighter Aircraft Stats

The EU’s leading naval powers with aircraft carriers – Britain and France – in fact, have no carrier fleets even of the limited scope they used to have before the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact.

At this stage, we can single out three major points.

First, the EU’s leading naval powers with aircraft carriers – Britain and France – in fact, have no carrier fleets even of the limited scope they used to have before the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact. The operational readiness of the Charles de Gaulle is still quite low, and Britain today does not have a single carrier of deck-based aircraft. The UK may return the new ships in full readiness in 6-8 years at the earliest, while France – by the second half of the 2020s.

Second, the rear echelon powers (Spain, Italy) are actually catching up, and in some respects even surpassing the leaders, namely, in the number of units of this class, especially with regards to strike aircraft. However, this is more due to the natural course of events than to their active shipbuilding efforts. In view of the growing financial problems Italy and Spain are facing, it is premature to expect further growth or even an maintenance of the number of active units in the aircraft carrier fleets in the medium term.

Third, there is an obvious shift in the actual needs of the fleet from aircraft carriers proper to relatively light multipurpose aircraft carrying vessels, often performing the functions of assault ships. Such vessels may carry strike aircraft (STOL aircraft), or carry no aircraft and become, in fact, helicopter carriers. But in any case, they have a wide range of options for transporting landing units. Their philosophy is closer to the U.S. Wasp-class amphibious assault ships rather than to the classic aircraft carriers (such as the American Nimitz-class, French Charles de Gaulle-class, Russian Admiral Kuznetsov, Chinese Liaoning or Indian ships).

The French Mistral-class expeditionary force ship (three units), the already mentioned Spanish Juan Carlos I and the Italian Cavour illustrate this approach in the shipbuilding industry. It should be noted that they are new ships built in the last 4-9 years, and reflect current views of the Naval Staff on the priorities in military shipbuilding.

Air Groups of the new ships follow a common European approach: the earlier ships carried mostly Harrier family vertical takeoff and landing aircraft, whereas the new ones (and old after the upgrade) carry future U.S. Navy Fighter F-35Bs. France, which has used its own aircraft the Super Etendard first and the Rafale now is the traditional exception.

Thus, a common trend in the building of European aircraft carriers is the construction of multi-purpose, relatively low-cost carriers with compulsory amphibious capabilities. Alternatively, naval powers of the rear echelon consider strengthening the potential of these ships by deploying and recovering short take-off aircraft F-35Bs, which effectively is turning them into “ersatz attack aircraft carriers.”

France and the United Kingdom, trying to bear the burden of aircraft carrier might, apparently will continue, as far as their economies allow, to keep a distinct difference between the actual strike aircraft carriers and amphibious aircraft-carrying ships. And if the British under tight budgetary conditions can always resort to European type unification, switching over to the single type of aircraft-carrying amphibious assault ship, the French who have no short takeoff aircraft of their own will have to apply to the U.S. for F-35Bs. Given the established naval traditions in Navy and military procurement, this can cause serious complications.

The New Gunboat Diplomacy

Everything that happens can in principle be regarded as bringing the navies of European NATO countries in conformity with the new military-political situation established after the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact. The probability of major conflict in continental Europe (meaning with the participation of Russia) has significantly lessened since the late 1980s and resulted in the need to restructure armed forces. A new set of challenges augments the role of expeditionary forces in NATO joint operations (for example, in Yugoslavia in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, Iraq in 2003, and Libya in 2011), as well as in unilateral actions of European powers to stabilize the situation in explosive regions of the third world (for example, the French operation in Mali in early 2013).

On the one hand, this situation does not require exorbitant military spending called forth by threats to the existence of each state (for the fleet this means a dramatic limitation in the number of ships in operational readiness, and, consequently, enhanced requirements for their universality). On the other hand, this shifts the focus of naval missions from strike capabilities in a full-scale sea war to performing combined air and naval operations of the armed forces in low-intensity conflicts.

The physical reduction of aircraft carrier fleets, so painful for the ego of the major powers, can be viewed as a way to raise the efficiency of the remaining ships or those under construction. In this sense, a country with universal aircraft-carrying amphibious ships receives more opportunities for less money to use the fleet in the modern version of gunboat diplomacy.

Therefore, the reduction of classic aircraft carriers in Europe and promoting universal ships carrying STOVL aircraft should be regarded not only as diminishing naval potential of EU nations (at least in terms of quantity), but as a reasonably adequate response to the new challenges facing the naval forces in 21st century.