A Fragile Consensus: Is There a Future for the U.S.–Saudi “Nuclear Deal”?

In the second half of July 2026, the U.S. and Saudi energy ministers signed an agreement in Washington on the joint development of the Kingdom’s nuclear industry. It provides for the construction of nuclear power plants in Saudi Arabia based on U.S. technology. In addition, Washington agreed to transfer technologies and equipment for peaceful nuclear power generation to Riyadh and undertook to establish the initial legal framework for U.S. companies to participate in the development of Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program. The agreement is intended to remain in force for 30 years, with the possibility of extension by mutual consent.

The deal made a lot of noise in the world—partly because the US, for the first time, agreed to depart from the "Gold Standard" they themselves developed and weaken the control system over the development of the partner's nuclear program, thereby providing counterparties with room for possible foul play. This creates a dangerous precedent for the nuclear nonproliferation regime and international security as a whole. However, the actual prospects for implementing the agreement (and its overall viability) remain to be assessed.

Overall, the arrangements surrounding the Saudi “nuclear deal” can currently be described as shaky at best. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia understand that, in its current form, their agreement is barely viable and is intended more to demonstrate the seriousness of their intentions than to create a genuine platform for long-term cooperation. At the same time, neither Washington nor Riyadh is prepared to compromise on its core principles, and both are therefore seeking to squeeze the maximum "political points" out of the concluded deal, with the aim of reassuring their domestic audiences.

However, neither side can continue indefinitely touting “preliminary agreements.” The positive effect of the ceremony in Washington is fading more quickly than either side initially anticipated. Both Washington and Riyadh are therefore seeking to continue the negotiating process while breaking it down into smaller "components" and focusing on specific issues, such as the number of contractors to be involved in the project at the first phase. This allows both sides to buy time to calibrate their positions.

By the time the room for maneuver is finally exhausted, as Khoja Nasreddin joked in the famous parable, “either the donkey or the padishah will have died.” Either Democrats will enter the White House—most likely seeking to return to the original version of the nuclear agreement proposed during the Barack Obama administration—or moderate Republicans will do so, most of whom also favor strict adherence to the “Gold Standard.” Alternatively, Riyadh may find other sources of support for its civilian nuclear sector that do not require adherence to the American formula.

In the second half of July 2026, the U.S. and Saudi energy ministers signed an agreement in Washington on the joint development of the Kingdom’s nuclear industry. It provides for the construction of nuclear power plants in Saudi Arabia based on U.S. technology. In addition, Washington agreed to transfer technologies and equipment for peaceful nuclear power generation to Riyadh and undertook to establish the initial legal framework for U.S. companies to participate in the development of Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program. The agreement is intended to remain in force for 30 years, with the possibility of extension by mutual consent.

The deal made a lot of noise in the world—partly because the US, for the first time, agreed to depart from the "Gold Standard" they themselves developed and weaken the control system over the development of the partner's nuclear program, thereby providing counterparties with room for possible foul play. This creates a dangerous precedent for the nuclear nonproliferation regime and international security as a whole. However, the actual prospects for implementing the agreement (and its overall viability) remain to be assessed.

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A Timely Rapprochement

Despite the qualitative progress made by Saudi Arabia’s nuclear project over the past five years (especially in terms of accumulating expertise and developing the related legislative and technological base) [1], by mid-2026 the Kingdom had still failed to approach the key performance indicators (KPIs) established under the Saudi Vision 2030 strategic development program for diversifying energy sources and increasing the share of nuclear power in the overall energy mix. At the same time, Riyadh’s need to expand power generation has become more pressing with each passing year, particularly since the Kingdom joined the race for leadership in big data and artificial intelligence, causing overall energy consumption to increase severalfold, exceeding projected levels. Together with the approaching “deadlines” for implementing its strategic reforms in 2030, this prompted Riyadh to accelerate its efforts in the nuclear sector.

From the perspective of U.S. leadership, departing from the so-called “Gold Standard” in the nuclear sector in the case of Saudi Arabia in order to finalize the deal also appears largely justified. The “Gold Standard” refers to a regulatory and legal framework under which a U.S. partner country voluntarily renounces uranium enrichment and the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel on its territory in exchange for technological and economic assistance from Washington. As a rule, this arrangement is reinforced by the signing of a standard nuclear cooperation agreement, commonly known as a “Section 123 Agreement.” Supporters of the “nuclear thaw” argue that the strict framework developed by the U.S. in the early 2000s has, over the long term, failed to prevent ambitious regional actors from moving toward nuclear threshold status. In some cases, it also "eroded" Washington's influence over its partners, pushing them to seek alternatives on their own.

In the case of Riyadh, another argument is that it has long had alternative “potential donors” of nuclear technology. In addition to Russia and China, which consistently offer their partners their own solutions in the nuclear sector, Pakistan has moved to the forefront. In September 2025, Islamabad and Riyadh signed a Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement that, judging by certain indications, may also have included a nuclear component. Given the two countries’ previous and controversial record of cooperation—including allegations of covert exchanges of critical technologies—Washington prefers not to take risks and instead to establish “guardrails” for the development of the Saudi nuclear project in advance, bringing it under a degree of U.S. oversight.

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Is It Worth the Gamble?

Viewed exclusively through the lens of political symbolism, the Saudi-U.S. “nuclear deal” appears to be a win-win for both sides. The U.S., for example, has demonstrated that it maintains a consistent strategic approach toward its allies and remains prepared to invest political and strategic capital in its relations with them. It is no coincidence that the White House based the deal on arrangements reached under the Joe Biden administration and only slightly "repackaged" them to reflect the changing situation in the Persian Gulf. By making a concession to Riyadh on uranium enrichment, Washington strengthened its position as Saudi Arabia’s leading partner and expanded its long-term influence in the Saudi market.

Saudi Arabia likewise presents the current consensus as a strategic success. For the first time since 2008, the Kingdom has achieved notable progress in negotiations over its national nuclear program: its counterdemands—the right to enrich uranium independently without signing an Additional Protocol with the IAEA—were accepted by the U.S. side. In this context, U.S. consent itself is already being presented as evidence of Riyadh’s ability to negotiate from a position of strength and achieve its goals. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the Saudi press, the agreement is also presented as one of the "fulfilled mandates" of the Vision 2030 program, reflecting breakthroughs in strengthening Saudi Arabia’s regional and global standing.

However, from the standpoint of international security, the deal in its current form poses clear risks both to the region and to the international system as a whole. The most immediate concern is the blurring of the boundaries of what is permissible. The U.S. decision to abandon a rigid stance on the level of Saudi uranium enrichment (and formally allow the Kingdom to mine uranium, process it using U.S. technologies, and export it) creates opportunities for potential "corner-cutting" when preparing the foundation for a covert military program. Furthermore, given the atmosphere of mutual distrust characteristic of the Middle East, the appearance of any loopholes in the regulatory regime will automatically be interpreted by Riyadh's regional rivals as a sign of an impending shift in the balance of power and will trigger counter-steps to hedge against the emerging threat, which will not add stability to the regional security system.

Of course, the likelihood that, once the Saudi-U.S. “nuclear deal” is fully implemented, Riyadh (and subsequently Ankara, Abu Dhabi, Cairo, and other leading regional actors) will place their nuclear programs on a military footing is extremely low: the political costs of such an escapade would far outweigh any hypothetical gains. However, both Riyadh and its rivals may choose to focus on narrowing the gap for a future "decisive leap." This could also manifest itself in adjacent areas, including an expansion of the range of potential delivery systems, a sharp increase in government spending on research and development (R&D), and a severalfold increase in the number of personnel training programs. As a result of such shifts, the Middle East risks facing a race of “disassembled nuclear programs” in the coming years.

A separate risk concerns the changing strategic balance between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Following the brief “thaw” of 2023–2025, Riyadh and Tehran effectively returned to a state of cold war. By mid-2026, the two countries had come close to direct confrontation, driven in large part by the U.S. Operation Epic Fury and the periodic exchanges of strikes in the Gulf that followed.

Senior Saudi officials, including representatives of the ruling branch of the House of Saud, have repeatedly stated that they reserve the right to acquire nuclear weapons, particularly if Iran takes similar steps or if “threats of a different nature” emerge. The current tensions in the Gulf could reinforce such views and prompt Riyadh and Tehran to reassess their nuclear trajectories. At present, however, it is impossible to say with certainty what exactly could serve as a trigger for the Islamic Republic—full-scale militarization of the Saudi nuclear sector or even more limited steps, such as raising the maximum permitted level of uranium enrichment.

The range of possible escalation scenarios is further broadened by the ambiguity of new Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s position on Iran’s military nuclear option. Officially, Tehran has no present plans to revise the elder Khamenei’s prohibitive “nuclear fatwa” of 2003 or abandon the peaceful nature of its nuclear program, although some Iranian lawmakers and retired military officials periodically test public opinion with statements about the need to withdraw from the NPT and develop nuclear weapons “to spite the enemies.”

There are also economic risks. By entering the “big race” for Saudi Arabia and effectively pressing Riyadh to accept its offer, the U.S. may overestimate its capabilities. One reason is that Westinghouse Electric Company, which is expected to serve as the main architect of Saudi Arabia’s “nuclear renaissance,” is going through some difficult times; some of its technical solutions lag behind those of its competitors by ten years or more. As a result, Saudi Arabia risks ending up with a more expensive but less reliable project over whose development it would be able to exert only indirect influence. Taken together, these factors substantially reduce the overall value of the Saudi-U.S. “nuclear deal” and make it a subject not only of debate but also of information-driven speculation.

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Smooth Only on Paper

It should not be forgotten, however, that the “nuclear deal” in its current form remains largely nominal. The agreements have been put on paper but are not backed by concrete implementation mechanisms.

Furthermore, both sides have encountered clear obstacles on the path toward “cementing” the terms of the agreement. Washington, for instance, is under fairly obvious pressure (including through a section of the elites) from Israel, which does not want a sharp change in the established status quo in the Middle East. Representatives of Israeli political circles, both government and opposition, believe that the Kingdom’s civilian nuclear program—even without a military component—is unlikely to enhance regional stability and could well trigger a new arms race. Israel views the most favorable scenario as the maximum tightening of the U.S. approach, including permanent oversight of technological supply chains and Riyadh’s accumulation of nuclear expertise.

From Israel’s perspective, Saudi Arabia’s current ambitions could be adequately addressed through a regional nuclear fuel bank located on Saudi territory under U.S. and IAEA oversight. Such a model would ensure regular supplies of nuclear fuel to countries in the region, reduce the need for individual states to develop independent enrichment capabilities, and create a flexible regional mechanism based on transparency, oversight, and interdependence. In theory, it would also help mitigate the risk of a technological race. However, such a diplomatic arrangement would require time and is hardly feasible amid the current turbulence in the Middle East.

For Riyadh, the stumbling block has been normalization of relations with Israel under the framework of the Abraham Accords—a condition that the White House unilaterally added to the agreement after its symbolic signing. Although indirect indications suggest that the Kingdom has maintained behind-the-scenes contacts with Israel for several years, the House of Saud is not prepared to pursue public reconciliation, since such a step would very likely cast a shadow over its image as a “defender of Palestine” and would inevitably intensify its confrontation with Iran. Moreover, normalization of Saudi-Israeli relations would not guarantee that the U.S. would fulfill its commitments.

Moreover, the White House explicitly states that it reserves the right to terminate the “deal” unilaterally at any stage if it identifies signs that Riyadh is violating its commitments. Even if the Kingdom accepts the condition of normalizing relations with Israel, the agreement could still be terminated at a later stage. Under such an arrangement, the U.S. gains leverage extending far beyond the nuclear sector, allowing it to influence Riyadh’s domestic and foreign policy almost on a case-by-case basis throughout every stage of the nuclear project’s development. This provision does not sit well with the House of Saud, especially given that the condition was introduced after the fact, but the overall benefits still outweigh the costs. Riyadh is therefore in no hurry to terminate the previously signed “symbolic deal.”

***

Overall, the arrangements surrounding the Saudi “nuclear deal” can currently be described as shaky at best. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia understand that, in its current form, their agreement is barely viable and is intended more to demonstrate the seriousness of their intentions than to create a genuine platform for long-term cooperation. At the same time, neither Washington nor Riyadh is prepared to compromise on its core principles, and both are therefore seeking to squeeze the maximum "political points" out of the concluded deal, with the aim of reassuring their domestic audiences.

However, neither side can continue indefinitely touting “preliminary agreements.” The positive effect of the ceremony in Washington is fading more quickly than either side initially anticipated. Both Washington and Riyadh are therefore seeking to continue the negotiating process while breaking it down into smaller "components" and focusing on specific issues, such as the number of contractors to be involved in the project at the first phase. This allows both sides to buy time to calibrate their positions.

By the time the room for maneuver is finally exhausted, as Khoja Nasreddin joked in the famous parable, “either the donkey or the padishah will have died.” Either Democrats will enter the White House—most likely seeking to return to the original version of the nuclear agreement proposed during the Barack Obama administration—or moderate Republicans will do so, most of whom also favor strict adherence to the “Gold Standard.” Alternatively, Riyadh may find other sources of support for its civilian nuclear sector that do not require adherence to the American formula.

1 Detailed information regarding the history and development of the Saudi nuclear program and its technical capabilities up to 2022 is available in the PIR Center thematic report titled "The New Nuclear Nine? Assessing Nuclear Weapons Proliferation Threats in the World."