A dangerous bend on the road of democracy

Under the current political process in countries that have experienced the Arab Spring upset, the risks posed by Islamization of the society itself and the political scene should not be underestimated. Supporters of radical Muslim parties that came to power after elections are just beginning to build their social patterns. Could this reformism conceal a threat to the Arab region, or will it be an integrating factor?

Under the current political process in countries that have experienced the Arab Spring upset, the risks posed by Islamization of the society itself and the political scene should not be underestimated. Supporters of radical Muslim parties that came to power after elections are just beginning to build their social patterns. Could this reformism conceal a threat to the Arab region, or will it be an integrating factor?

Can the victory of Islamic parties be regarded as Islamization?

The wave of transformations in the Arab Maghreb and Mashreq saw moderate Islamists coming to power in Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt. In Libya, Yemen and Syria, their political position seriously strengthened and will probably continue to strengthen. However, are there real threats of the Islamization of the Arab world and the toughening of the principles of governance and social structure?

The growing popularity of the ideas of Islamic radicalism among Arab countries is a cause for alarm. Many of us have witnessed the success of the secular development of Arab countries, the more or less open nature of Arab societies and even a certain kind of liberalism in culture and social relations. Moreover, strong traditional values, commitment to religious norms (including by non-Muslim communities in these countries) and ethics were retained at the heart of these societies. However, the grassroots of societies that were once secular have witnessed a sharp rise in Islamism in the last two decades owing to different circumstances. Religious organizations professing radical methods of struggle and having their own military units came out in the vanguard of the struggle for a large-scale reform. These are primarily pro-Sunni organizations that somehow fall within the orbit of the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood network throughout the Arab world and followers of the ideology of Muslim revival, supporters of extremism in Islam – Salafism. Shiite organizations, of which Hezbollah is apparently the most prominent, remained active on the political scene. In the current climate of geostrategic advantage in favor of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, these parties relying on the support of Shiite Iran, remain somewhat in the shadow.

The idea which is rarely spoken by Russian and Western analysts, but which, in any case, deserves attention, is that the propagation of political Islam and legitimization of radical Islamic political forces, being, in fact, a consequence, rest on two grounds. The first is that a growing number of people in Arab traditional societies with enormous social stratification pin their hopes for improved living conditions on active and convinced (having, in their opinion, a clear ideological core) Islamic radicals. The second is that many regions of the world, including Europe, turned out to be pierced with Islamist ideas and social contacts of their carriers like with rhizome threads through migration and the global information space. It is this “rhizome” that gives birth to the current political phenomena, fueled by illusions about a super-potential of young Islamic reformers and extreme radicals – winning legitimate parliamentary and even presidential elections by candidates representing organizations that were once banned

“Shu sar”, or what is happening with the Islamists?

To understand what Arabs are to expect from the future, who will be to blame and what to do, it seems we must first understand what happened - “shu sar” (Arabic dial.)? The answer is not so obvious: the victory of Islamists in Arab Spring countries is a phrase, which, obviously, does not disclose the essence of what happened, but is fraught with contradictions and carries a lot of questions.

On August 12, 2012, Egypt’s President Mohamed Mursi abolished the Constitutional Declaration that gave considerable authority to the Supreme Council of Armed Forces and forced the retirement of the defense minister and the Council’s Chairman Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Sami Anan. This historic step, which effectively ended the sixty-year dominance of the military in the country’s politics, is an evidence of how confident the Muslim Brotherhood representatives feel on the Egyptian political scene. At the same time, there arose sharp differences between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis who supported them in the recent presidential election. These differences are probably already so severe that they force President Mohamed Mursi to seek support on all channels – both within the society and abroad. His visit to Saudi Arabia in July is indicative. During the visit a number of issues were discussed. Obviously, the central issue was on Saudi Arabia’s support to the Egyptian president of the Muslim Brotherhood in the context of permanent assistance provided by the same Saudi Arabia to Egyptian Salafis. A simple comparison of the two facts mentioned above illustrates the heterogeneity of the political process in Egypt. In any case, the differences in the camp of the victorious Islamists – moderate reformers and radical Salafists – speak of the versatility of the future of the Islamist regime in Egypt. After all, besides the Islamists, the country still has numerous supporters of the last prime minister in the Mubarak era and former presidential candidate Ahmad Shafiq (he slightly lost to Mohamed Mursi in the second round of elections), leftists that supported the Nasserist, Hamdeen Sabahi, and supporters of the secular candidate Amr Moussa. This situation does not allow the victorious moderate Islamists to act only in accordance with their own ideology but forces them to take into account socio-political realities.

The situation in Tunisia can be considered as a failure for Islamists. It is one thing to act in an underground or in a voiceless opposition, and it is quite another thing to take responsibility for decisions on economic, political and social issues that are vital for the country. In late July, Tunisian Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali had to sack his ministers of industry, trade, finance and development (http://iimes.ru/rus/stat/2012/02-08-12a.htm). Three of the ministers clearly could not cope with their duties. They are leading politicians from the Islamist party Ennahda, which won an overwhelming victory in the elections, and in fact came to power after the Jasmine Revolution.

There is clearly a split among the ranks of the Ennahda party caused by the discontent of the young generation of Islamists with the politics of its distinguished members. There are signs that indicate that the hard line of the party leadership will be adjusted towards a more moderate approach to the main aspects of the ideological program and possible revision of failed economic policies.

In other words, the proverbial “Islamist victory” in one specific country does not mean that that country has entered into a certain path towards development, albeit under some special model. The processes occurring in some Arab countries have little in common, moreover, the projected paths of development are so different that they do not fit into a single model. The factor common for them is the fall of former perennial and corrupt regimes, afflicted by systematic ailment, and radicalization of the society prepared to support the forces proposing fierce ideological positions rather than ideological anarchy. The social environment, historical context, economic relations and priorities, international support, domestic (including tribal) differences, political status of military elites, etc are special aspects. A serious researcher will probably have to avoid making easy generalizations such as “Islamist victory” and analyze the multidimensional situation in each country separately.

Russia and the Arab world: the new old stuff

It is impossible to deny the possible negative consequences of Islamization in Arab societies if it continues to gain momentum. Islamization potentially threatens the safety of atheists and people practicing Buddhism, Confucianism, and, apparently, even the “People of the Book” – Christians and Jews. It can lead to restriction of civil liberties of women, members of certain professions, and other population groups. Traditional cultures, such as those of Africans could be threatened. Nevertheless, Islamists in power is the conscious choice by popular majority of people in the respective Arab countries, and therefore, it must be taken into account in any case.

Russia is already in dialogue with the new leaders of the Arab countries emerging from revolutions. Official meetings and political consultations are being held at the state level. It is true, however, that at a lower level Russian diplomats and businessmen are often not understood and their initiatives are not met with positive reactions. For example, our representatives are in a “vacuum of activity” in Egypt. It seems that the Egyptian functionaries are waiting for something or are afraid of something. They are apparently waiting for stability and minimization of economic and political risks in this period difficult for Egypt. It is hoped that the commitment of new Arab political elites will gradually reduce to a level allowing establishing pragmatic relations both in business and in politics.

As for the cultural component of our relations with the Arab world, this is where Islamization (in the extreme negative aspect, which we are considering) can hurt most. Islamist intolerance to non-Muslim cultural phenomena, in whatever form it may manifest, is contrary to the very principle of coexistence of cultures, nations and religions in a globalizing world. It is quite clear that by drawing strength from the protest against non-Islamic influence, it is impossible to build a constructive relationship with the outside world. In this sense, the Islamists are simply doomed to mitigate their positions, otherwise, the growing internal destructive potential will ruin their ideological system from within.

Finally, if the post-revolutionary period may be designated as “the Arab world after 2011” (in tune with the concept of “world after September 11”), then we can suggest that this period will not be characterized by the integration of Arab countries on an ideological basis – political Islam or Islamism. It is most likely that Russia will have to deal only declaratively with partners that have a more or less coherent ideology but are united on this basis (as in general, and especially – on the idea of Arabism). Muslim reformers, radicals and extremists interpret Islamic values very differently. These groups will never find a common language with each other and will never be on a single side in a dialogue with the “Christian” civilization. Even if events in the Arab world develop in a way that is highly favorable to Sunni Islamists, they will always have oppositions represented by other Islamic denominations, and even by the “softer” Madh’habs. In addition, there will always be among them Takfir supporters that accuse their counterparts of insufficiently strict adherence to the norms of “pure Islam”.