STRENGTHENING THE OSCE
BUILDING A COMMON SPACE FOR ECONOMIC AND HUMANITARIAN COOPERATION, AN INDIVISIBLE SECURITY COMMUNITY FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE PACIFIC

16’ 2014
The dramatic developments in Ukraine in 2014 have once again demonstrated the relevance of the cooperative crisis management tools and mechanisms of the OSCE. Issues of strengthening and reforming the OSCE are once again part of the European agenda. The 40th anniversary of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe represents an important milestone in the development of the organization and provides an occasion for a frank discussion about the problems it is currently facing and ways to enhance its effectiveness in the future. The Report includes recommendations aimed at strengthening the OSCE.

The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of RIAC.

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Conference on security and cooperation in Europe.
Participating countries heads signing the Final Act – the Declaration of Helsinki.

USSR Party Leader Leonid Brezhnev signing the Final Act of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission).

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In 2014, upon an initiative of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) embarked upon a large-scale project in collaboration with the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA). Our small international consortium has set itself the very ambitious goal of drawing preliminary conclusions of the OSCE’s 40 years activities and offering recommendations for improving the effectiveness of the organization in the near future.

The project was initially intended to be presented at the 40–year anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. But the dramatic developments in Ukraine have put the future of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as we know it into question.

The Ukraine crisis has exposed the ineffectiveness of existing institutions and security mechanisms in Europe. This is true of the NATO–Russia Council, the European Union institutions and the Council of Europe. Unfortunately, it is also true of the UN Security Council, which has been unable to play a decisive role in the settlement of the Ukraine crisis. This “institutional paralysis” is not something that has appeared out of nowhere – for all intents and purposes, the European security institutions have been unable to remove the shackles of the Cold War and adapt to new realities. This is why their confusion in the face of the Ukraine crisis should hardly come as a surprise.

Against this background, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe does not look so bad. The OSCE has, of course, come under heavy criticism during the crisis for its inactivity, the extremely modest goals it has set and its supposed political bias. Nevertheless, the OSCE is the only multilateral European platform where agreements regarding concerted action aimed at resolving the crisis have been worked out, although not without difficulty. It is the OSCE that is responsible for making sure the sides in the conflict comply with the ceasefire agreed in September 2014.

Of course, the OSCE is not a panacea for everything that is wrong on the European continent. We should not just give up on the other mechanisms of European security. We must not forget that the OSCE was, and continues to be, the most representative – and, therefore, the most legitimate – security organization in Europe. The OSCE is responsible for more than just the Helsinki Accords of 1975, whose anniversary we will be celebrating next year; there is also the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, the 1999 Charter for European Security and the 2010 Astana Declaration. The OSCE has a proven track record of preventing, monitoring and de–escalating conflict situations.

The present report represents RIAC’s contribution to the joint project mentioned above. It has been prepared on the basis of a series of discussions, including the first international seminar that took place in Moscow on September 25, 2014. Further discussions will be held in Washington in November 2014 and at SIPRI in early 2015.
Our goal is not to produce a detailed Road Map for the future development of the OSCE. But we do hope that this report will contribute to the ongoing work on various levels towards the formulation of a unified position of the OSCE participating States on the most important aspects of building a new security system for Europe.

Igor Ivanov
President of RIAC
RAS Corresponding Member
The dramatic developments in Ukraine in 2014 have once again demonstrated the relevance of the cooperative crisis management tools and mechanisms of the OSCE. It became evident that it is premature to skip the organization from the list of the key elements of the wider European security architecture. Issues of strengthening and reforming the OSCE are once again part of the European agenda.

The 40th anniversary of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe represents an important milestone in the development of the organization and provides an occasion for a frank discussion about the problems it is currently facing and ways to enhance its effectiveness in the future. The decisions the participating States may take as they mark the anniversary may either enhance the role of the OSCE or speed up its marginalization within the European security architecture. A series of discussions organized by RIAC in 2014 allowed us to formulate the following recommendations aimed at strengthening the OSCE.

1. **Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis**
   
The first and foremost task is the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis based on respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. Without this, it is impossible to restore mutual trust. It is in the interests of all OSCE participating States to prevent the emergence of another protracted conflict in Europe. Joint promotion of the Minsk Process and the coordination implementation of mutually acceptable agreements among the parties could in the short term be a major joint project for Russia and the West within the framework of the OSCE.

2. **High-Level Meeting**
   
Sooner or later (preferably sooner, of course) a high-level or summit meeting of representatives of the OSCE participating States should take place. Whether it happens in 2015 or later is a matter for a negotiation, the outcome of which will depend, inter alia, on the progress in resolving the Ukraine crisis through the Minsk process. But such a meeting is necessary in order to extract the more significant lessons of the Ukraine crisis, agree upon the necessary corrections to the European security architecture and outline a blueprint for strengthening the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

3. **OSCE Principles and Commitments, the Security Community**
   
Against the background of the 2014 Ukraine crisis, it is crucial that the OSCE participating States reconfirm the relevance and equal significance of the fundamental principles of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the 1990 Charter of Paris
for a New Europe and the 1999 Charter for European Security. It is important that they reaffirm their commitment to the OSCE principles and commitments. No less important is the confirmation of the continued commitment of the OSCE participating States, as agreed by the heads of state or government at the 2010 Astana meeting, to the goal of creating a free, democratic, common and indivisible Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok and rooted in agreed principles, shared commitments and common goals.

4. Measures to Give Effect to the OSCE Principles

However, simply declaring one’s renewed commitment to these general principles, commitments and goals is not enough, especially in the current context of mutual mistrust. For this reason, the main emphasis of the OSCE’s work in 2015 and the foreseeable future to resolve the problem should be placed on discussing measures that are aimed at giving effect to the OSCE principles and putting them into practice more effectively. In particular, this could mean: agreeing upon a code, or codes, of conduct for the OSCE participating States in the most problematic areas; resuming and pursuing conventional arms control and improving the effectiveness of existing confidence and security-building measures, modernizing them and broadening their scope; and strengthening cooperation in the search for joint responses to transnational threats to security in the OSCE region.

5. Drafting the OSCE Charter (Constituent Document)

Drafting and adopting the OSCE Charter (constituent document) would mark an important step towards reforming the Organization. The Charter would reaffirm, in a legally binding form, the modus operandi of the Organization, its structures and institutions. During the work on the Charter, it would make sense to review the powers, role and functions of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Secretary General.

6. Convention on the International Legal Personality, Legal Capacity, and Privileges and Immunities of the OSCE

In parallel with an agreement on the Charter (constituent document), the OSCE should put an end to a long-pending issue and adopt a Convention on the International Legal Personality, Legal Capacity, and Privileges and Immunities of the OSCE, which was agreed upon by the participating States a long time ago.

7. OSCE Crisis Management

Proposals concerning the need to improve substantially the human and financial resources available to the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre in order to expand
its monitoring of the current situation and prepare conflict settlement proposals need to be thoroughly considered. It would be worth considering the feasibility of dispatching, under modern conditions, previously adopted peacekeeping or peacebuilding missions under its mandate.

8. Conventional Arms Control in Europe

The OSCE is the only forum for dialogue on military–political aspects of European security. In discussing these issues, the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) plays a key role. It would be useful to launch, within the framework of the Forum, technical consultations of military experts at forming a “security matrix” determining the inter–connections between – and degree of influence of – various types of weapons in combat missions.

9. Confidence and Security–Building Measures

As part of the ongoing OSCE discussions on the modernization of the Vienna Document on confidence and security–building measures, it would be advisable to focus in the short term on measures to improve the effectiveness of verification activities. In parallel with talks on modernizing the Vienna Document, it would be useful to conduct, within the FSC framework, a systematic review of the practices and effectiveness of the implementation of established confidence and security–building measures, especially in crisis situations.

10. Transnational Threats

In the context of developing joint responses to new challenges and threats, the OSCE participating States should, first of all, establish a practice of consultations and coordination of common positions on a broader range of issues going beyond the geographical OSCE area. Such consultations could lead to decisions on joint action to counteract transnational threats, including joint project activities outside the OSCE area.

11. Convergence of Integration Processes

In collaboration with the UN Economic Commission for Europe, the OSCE could become a forum for wide–ranging expert and political dialogue on a number of issues related to harmonization and the convergence of integration processes in wider Europe.

12. Reforming the Human Dimension of the OSCE

The OSCE can help overcome the disagreements pertaining to the human dimension by depoliticising the problems and issues that arise in this sphere and establishing a dialogue mechanism based on cooperation and not rhetoric, without duplicating the multilateral mechanisms for protection of human rights
and fundamental freedoms that already exist and are successfully functioning in Europe.

13. Parliamentary Dimension of the OSCE

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly occupies a special place in the structure of the Organization’s main institutions. It plays an important role in promoting the values and achieving the goals of the OSCE in all dimensions of its activities, including the military-political, economic, environmental and, last but not least, the human dimension of the OSCE.

While preparing for the 40th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, due attention should be paid to the improvement of the mechanisms of interaction between the Parliamentary Assembly and the decision-making and other structures and institutions of the OSCE, with the goal to make this interaction more systemic and systematic.
INTRODUCTION

The 2014 Ukraine crisis has once again highlighted the need for cooperative crisis management instruments and mechanisms of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This is unsurprising against the background of predominantly unilateral steps of other, more exclusive European organizations, often taken with little regard for the positions and interests of non-member states. As a result, the issue of a comprehensive reform and strengthening of the OSCE is back on the agenda. Granted, the OSCE participating States pursue different, often diametrically opposed visions of what steps are needed to strengthen the OSCE. This lack of cohesion has prevented the Organization over the past 10 years from arriving at a consensus as to the necessary directions and measures to reform the OSCE, without which options for strengthening the OSCE cannot be discussed seriously.

The relevance of the OSCE manifested itself primarily in the fact that, against the background of the escalation of the most recent crisis, it was the only multilateral platform where cooperative crisis management measures were discussed and adopted in an inclusive manner. The OSCE Chairman-in-Office (CiO) of 2014 (Switzerland) has made a significant contribution to the search for political solution to the current crisis.

The Organization was quick to deploy a Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. A trilateral contact group was set up under its auspices that currently acts as the primary international mechanism for ensuring compliance by all parties with the ceasefire agreement and the continued search for political solutions to the conflict. The deliverables of the contact group include the signing of the Minsk protocol establishing ceasefire in South-East Ukraine on September 5, 2014.¹ A number of the Protocol’s provisions were further elaborated in greater detail in a memorandum agreed by the contact group on September 19, 2014.² It is with the OSCE that hopes lie for ensuring the proper monitoring and verification of compliance with the agreements reached by the parties to the conflict.

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly is the sole inter-parliamentary platform where a dialogue aimed at a political resolution of the Ukraine crisis is taking place with the participation of all concerned parties. The Inter-Parliamentary Liaison Group on Ukraine created under the auspices of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly following its 2014 Annual Session in Baku is designed to serve this very purpose.³ It is within the framework of this Liaison Group that the dialogue between the Russian and Ukrainian parliamentarians is taking place.

¹ Protocol on the Results of Consultations of the Tripartite Contact Group with Respect to the Joint Steps Aimed at the Implementation of the Peace Plan of the President of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko, and the Initiatives of the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin. URL: http://www.osce.org/ru/home/123258?download=true (in Russian).
The Ukraine crisis is yet far from a settlement, just as it is premature for the OSCE to rest on its laurels. The implementation of the Minsk agreement on a ceasefire and urgent measures to resolve the crisis is lagging behind the unilateral steps made towards the consolidation of a quasi-state in South-Eastern Ukraine. The risk of the emergence of a new protracted conflict in Europe is high.

Such a development is not in the interest of any of the OSCE participating States. The participating States should demonstrate the political will and empower the OSCE to take operative measures in order to consolidate the Minsk Process. They should provide comprehensive support for OSCE activities aimed at resolving the crisis. In the short term, cooperative crisis management in Ukraine could become the major joint political endeavour by the participating States and substantially contribute to the restoration of mutual trust between Russia and the West, which is indispensable for any meaningful reform or strengthening of the Organization.

Today, the OSCE is facing a serious challenge. The results that the OSCE participating States take with them to the anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe next year will in large part depend on how they meet this challenge. The upcoming anniversary provides an opportunity for an honest review of the current state of affairs in Europe and within the OSCE, and the examination of measures necessary to improve the cohesion of the participating States and achieve progress towards the formation of a common space of economic and humanitarian cooperation from the Atlantic to the Pacific on the basis of firm guarantees of indivisible security, stability, respect for sovereignty and non-intervention in one another’s internal affairs.

All of these issues are subject of consideration within the OSCE, in particular within the Helsinki +40 Process initiated in 2012. As a consequence of the Ukraine crisis, however, this process is faltering. In these circumstances, the contributions by political and expert community, the members of Parliaments of the OSCE participating States to the current debate are of particular importance.
1. THE PAST

The signing in 1975 of the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was the culmination of détente in Europe. The agreement on the basic principles guiding relations between the European states, military relevant confidence-building measures, freer movement of people and information across borders were called upon to mitigate the consequences of confrontation and to overcome the division of the continent.

The Helsinki principles have withstood the test of time and remain relevant to this day. The ongoing discussion of compliance, non-compliance or improper compliance with these principles and other OSCE commitments stands as the best proof for their relevance in today’s Europe.

The Helsinki process has lived through good and bad times. Yet, the Conference and later the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe have invariably been associated with the prospects for establishing and maintaining the political dialogue between states belonging to different blocs and organizations, and gradually overcoming old and new dividing lines.

The Helsinki Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States

Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty

II. Refraining from the threat or use of force

III. Inviolability of frontiers

IV. Territorial integrity of states

V. Peaceful settlement of disputes

VI. Non-intervention in internal affairs.

VII. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief

VIII. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples

IX. Cooperation among states

X. Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law


The OSCE was not the sole or central European security organization either during or after the Cold War – it was part of broader arrangements and decisions on a wide range of issues relating to relations between the East and the West. However, it always was an important part of those broader arrangements.

Not least for this reason, at every stage, the Organization has been a hostage to the relations among its participating States. Each time, complications and rising tensions led to stagnation and failures in its work. During such periods, the question of whether or not the participants needed the OSCE was asked more than once. On every occasion, the question was answered in the affirmative. The reason is that whenever the states exhibited the will jointly to tackle the problems facing them, they rediscovered the OSCE and used it in the search for common responses to the challenges of the time. This is precisely what happened in 2014 with the Ukraine crisis.

The 1990s marked a special period in the development of the OSCE. During this time the strengthening of the organization and the formation of pan-European institutions, including those designed for crisis management, was closely associated with the prospects for establishing an inclusive European security order. Between the signing of the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe and the adoption of the 1999 Charter for European Security, the OSCE formed all-European cooperation structures and institutions, determined the main competences of the Organization in managing the processes of change in Europe, preventing and resolving conflicts and crises, as well as post-conflict rehabilitation.

Since 1990, the number of the OSCE participating states has grown on a number of occasions. In 1975, the Helsinki Final Act was signed by the leaders of 34 states. As of 2014, the Organization counts 57 countries among its participating States, including Mongolia, which was recently admitted to the OSCE.

The way in which the OSCE operated has withstood the test of time over the past 40 years.

The principle of consensus, which has been the foundation of the CSCE’s work since 1972, guaranteed its decisions to address equally the interests and positions of all its participants. At the same time, following this principle makes it much more difficult to arrive at agreed decisions each time the states are either not ready to make a compromise or abuse the consensus rule. This peculiarity of the CSCE decision-making manifested itself already at the early stages of the preparations for the pan-European Conference.

The main breakthroughs within the CSCE–OSCE occurred, however, when the participating States were ready to look for a comprehensive compromise inte-

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grating their different interests and priorities. In the most successful periods of its work, the overall balance within the OSCE was maintained due to progress in implementation by the participating States of all their OSCE commitments. It was also particularly due to parallel progress in addressing the issues of ensuring equal and indivisible security and development of cooperation in the human dimension: respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, adherence to the rule of law and democracy based on political pluralism.

Although the Organization and its activities have changed radically over the 40 years of its existence, its comprehensive approach to security and cooperation in Europe continuously shapes its decision–making processes and the operation of the field missions of the OSCE.
2. THE PRESENT

Europe has changed dramatically in the years since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. Many practical issues that shaped the agenda of the first decade in the development of the Helsinki process have been resolved. The process of cooperation and convergence of the OSCE countries has been ongoing in spite of failures and setbacks.

The threat of a large-scale armed conflict in Europe is gone, but the potential for regional and local conflicts is still there. OSCE participating States still disagree on many issues, but those disagreements are no longer antagonistic.

Although all the OSCE participating States face new transnational threats, they do not make full use of the OSCE’s potential for cooperation and effective response to them.

Today, nearly all the OSCE participating States are market economies, although their economic structures and regulatory practices sometimes differ significantly from one another. The level of their interdependence has increased markedly.

At the same time, recent years have seen deepening differences in the participating States’ approaches to a wide range of issues, including their views on the Organization’s future. Institutional fragmentation between different parts of the OSCE region – the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian communities – is growing. The split and mutual distrust within the Organization is now deeper than it has been at any time in the past 25 years. The culture of searching for a consensus and compromise solutions has taken a back seat. A number of countries and groups of OSCE states increasingly rely on unilateral action. Unilateral policies prevail over the efforts to achieve concerted action, thus condemning the OSCE to a secondary role in the European security architecture. The zero-sum game logic increases mutual mistrust.

In spite of the declared adherence to the principle of indivisible cooperative security, the levels of security in different parts of the OSCE area remain different. The conventional arms control regimes, which in the past decades ensured reductions in armed forces and armaments unprecedented in the history of Europe, have gone into decline.

Substantial differences persist in the implementation of OSCE commitments by individual states.

The OSCE has contributed to the positive changes that have taken place in Europe since the end of the Cold War. In the past decade, however, its activities have become the subject of intense debates. Diametrically opposed proposals have been put forward about what steps should be taken to reform the Organization in order for it to adapt to the ongoing changes in Europe and the world.

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Doubts have been expressed about the ability of the OSCE to cope with the unifying mission of building a “Europe whole and free”\textsuperscript{10}. The deepening of the old and the appearance of new dividing lines give cause for concern in the region. The OSCE is criticized for applying double standards, and for geographical and thematic imbalances in its activities. Some believe that the Western states have “captured” the organization and use it exclusively in their own interests. Others criticize the OSCE for addressing peripheral topics and lacking a clear focus in its activities, which is not surprising considering how difficult it is to achieve consensus of all participating States. Experts and politicians acknowledge a lack of political will to use the Organization’s toolbox for addressing the pressing security problems on the continent. All this, rather than enhancing the role of the OSCE, tends to marginalize it within the context of security and cooperation in Europe.

In 2005, a Panel of Eminent Persons appointed by the Ministerial Council presented a final report and recommendations on strengthening the effectiveness of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe\textsuperscript{11}. Many of its recommendations have been put into practice. Nevertheless, controversies over the OSCE and ways of reforming it continue.

The OSCE today, being a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, has much stronger operational capabilities than it had in the 1990s. Its activities are based on a broad mandate and a comprehensive approach to cooperative security. A major advantage of the OSCE is its inclusive membership and years of experience working in the field in troubled regions. Along with an extensive normative acquis, the OSCE has a wide range of tools to assist the participating States in the process of the implementation of their commitments and obligations, including those under the universal UN conventions; prevent conflicts and manage crises, as well as assist post–conflict rehabilitation\textsuperscript{12}.

The scale of the Organization’s activities has increased significantly. Early in 1995, when the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was transformed into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, it maintained eight field missions with 79 people serving on their international staff\textsuperscript{13}. In 2013 (i.e. prior to the deploy-

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\textsuperscript{10} 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe.


However, \textbf{there is much less demand today for OSCE capabilities and competences than there was in the 1990s}, while at the same time demand for other European organizations involved in security issues – above all, demand for the European Union – has increased steadily.

The use of the OSCE toolbox is hampered not only by the difficulty in reaching consensus, but also by the fact that, unlike in the 1990s, other European security organizations have developed similar competences in such areas as crisis management, international police activities and strengthening the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, elections monitoring. This development increasingly challenges the OSCE’s competitive advantages in the contemporary European security architecture.
Over the past ten years, the role of the OSCE has been discussed against the background of the major changes that have had an impact on its activities. During these years, various suggestions have been made on ways to reform and strengthen the Organization in order to adapt it to the ongoing changes. Even so, a consensus on prospective areas for its activities has yet to be reached.

The peak of OSCE activities in conflict resolution and post–conflict rehabilitation was reached in the 1990s. These activities concentrated in South-Eastern Europe – in the former Yugoslavia and Albania. This is where the Organization deployed its largest missions in the late 1990s. The OSCE also played a notable role as part of broader international presences in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.

As the situation stabilizes, the OSCE field operations in South-Eastern Europe irreversibly size down. The total budget of the Organization’s missions and presences in the region has dropped by more than half since the early 2000s, from 120 to 50 million euros. The share of their funding in the OSCE consolidated budget has fallen from 69 per cent in 2002 to 35 per cent in 2012 (see Fig. 1). The OSCE mission in Croatia has been terminated and its office in Zagreb closed. The number of international staff deployed by the OSCE in the region is steadily declining, falling by more than two times from nearly 900 in 2003 to 400 in 2013 (see Fig. 3). Meanwhile, the European Union has considerably expanded its activities in the region over the same period. The number of staff currently deployed on EU missions to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo far exceeds that of the OSCE (see Fig. 5).

At the same time, the reduction of the OSCE’s work in South-Eastern Europe has not been compensated for by expanded activities in other regions. Missions in Latvia and Estonia were terminated in the early 2000s. Although activities in the countries of the former Soviet Union – mainly in Central Asia (see Figs. 1–4), but also in Ukraine in 2014 – have increased, they are the subject of heated debates. The OSCE mission in Georgia and the office in Minsk have been shut down because a consensus to extend their operations could not be reached. The level of presence in Azerbaijan has been downgraded to a Project Coordinator’s Office in 2014. The OSCE Centre in Astana is also expected to be transformed into a project office.

Not counting the 2014 OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, the number of international personnel deployed by the Organization in the former Soviet Union countries has dropped by roughly a third over the past ten years (see Fig. 3). This is in stark contrast to the number of field officers currently working in Central Asia, which has more than doubled over the same period of time (see Fig. 4). Meanwhile, the European Union’s presence in former Soviet countries is growing, particularly in Georgia, and now also in Ukraine.

The deployment of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine in 2014 has helped focus attention on the complex developments in Eastern Europe and alter the overall picture of the geographical distribution of the OSCE’s activities. Expenditures on operational activities in the former Soviet Union countries have almost doubled in 2014 as a result of extra-budgetary resources being directed...
towards the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, while the number of staff in the region has tripled and continues to grow.

However, this does not necessarily mean a break from the trend that has been developing over the past 20 years. At this stage, the question remains as to whether the decisions taken in response to the acute crisis in Ukraine reflect a long-term tendency in the OSCE’s activities in Europe, or whether the expansion of its operations is a temporary phenomenon, little more than a blip in its 40-plus year history.

The answer to this question is uncertain against the background of the strained discussions that are ongoing with regard to the organization’s budget for 2015 and beyond, where a number of participating States are calling for the preservation of the zero budget growth policy in the Permanent Council (the main decision-making body of the organization in between the annual meetings of the OSCE Ministerial Council). The continued reduction of operations in the foreseeable future might thus lead to a situation where the Organization is reduced to the work of the Vienna based Permanent Council, the Secretariat and OSCE executive structures. The result would be a waning of interest in the OSCE among most of its participant States.

While preserving the status quo of the past ten years will further marginalize the organization in the European security architecture – despite the OSCE having stepped up its activities in Ukraine – the need to stand together against new transnational threats of the 21st century generated in other regions and the persisting danger of local conflicts in Europe will require greater cohesion of the participating States and resolute measures to strengthen the OSCE.

The Ukraine crisis has highlighted the importance of **timely and prompt collective reaction to the persisting challenges in Europe, primarily conflict situations and political crises.** Timely not only in the sense of mobilizing the necessary financial and human resources, but also in terms of decision-making and initiating the OSCE’s various instruments. The deployment of the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine has not faced any serious problems in terms of funding or staffing. It could have been deployed even more quickly if the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre had not been forced to wait for the Permanent Council to form a final consensus on its mandate.

Over the past decade, the OSCE has been discussing the issue of **shifting the geographical focus of its operations**, including project activities, to beyond its “area of responsibility” in a number of countries that are partners of the OSCE. Specifically, the eventual contribution of the OSCE to international efforts to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan, especially in light of the withdrawal of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and to assist democratic transformations in the “Arab Spring” countries, was the subject of consideration in the past years. There is still no consensus, however, on the issue of project activities in Afghanistan and the Southern Mediterranean. The decision adopted at the 2007 Madrid meeting of the Ministerial Council regarding the OSCE’s contribution to stabilization in Afghanistan constituted a compromise and restricted its activities to the territories of the participating States.15

In view of the cross-border, indeed global nature of the modern transnational threats and challenges common to all the participating States, it would make sense to revisit this issue, considering the need not only to harmonize individual responses to the new challenges and threats, but also to develop joint measures to counter them, including OSCE-backed project activities outside the “OSCE region”, whenever and wherever the participating States deem such activity appropriate.

In general, further marginalization of the OSCE does not appear to be in the interest of the Russian Federation. This much is apparent not only from the experience of the Ukraine crisis. For all its complexities, the OSCE (with the exception of the Council of Europe, whose competencies are far narrower) remains the single most important multilateral institution for Russia’s participation in European affairs. The efforts of the last two decades aimed at developing strategic partnerships of Russia with the European Union and NATO in order to supplement (or replace) Russia’s participation in the OSCE have thus far not yielded any substantial fruits. Given the deep crisis in relations between Russia and these two organizations that evolved against the background of the Ukraine crisis, it seems unlikely that a fully fledged partnership will be formed with them in the medium term, although it would also a mistake to abandon long-term efforts to build cooperative relations with them.

A significant increase in the capability of the OSCE to promptly react to an unfolding crisis by expanding the independence of its relevant structures and institutions would enhance its competitiveness within the broader European security architecture – particularly in the event of a dispute or conflict situation between Russia and the West in the post-Soviet space. Proposals to this effect have been repeatedly discussed within the OSCE, starting with the informal discussions that took place within the Corfu Process in 2010.¹⁶ However, a consensus on these proposals has not been reached due to the sensitivity of the issue of an eventual erosion of the principle of consensus.

Summing up the interim results of this discussion after the most recent informal retreat of the Ambassadors to the OSCE held in the summer of 2014, the Swiss Chairman of the Permanent Council acknowledged the impossibility and inadvisability of revising or restricting the principle of consensus, while at the same time calling for a creative solution to be found so that the OSCE can act more quickly in crisis situations and respond to requests from the participating States.¹⁷ Agreement on even the most modest steps in this area would contribute significantly to strengthening the competitiveness of the OSCE in the contemporary European security architecture.


4. HELSINKI +40

Building a Common Space for Economic and Humanitarian Cooperation, an Indivisible Security Community from the Atlantic to the Pacific

The 40th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act is an important milestone in the development of the OSCE. It provides an opportunity not only for open discussion of the problems the Organization faces today, but also of ways to enhance its effectiveness. The decisions the participating States will take as they approach the anniversary may either enhance the role of the OSCE or speed up its marginalization within the broader European security architecture. The Ukraine crisis has certainly left its mark on preparations for the 40th anniversary of the Final Act.

The range of possible OSCE decisions in the commemorative year of 2015 is fairly wide. Although the participating States are yet far from a consensus on the possible package of agreements, the following steps are worth considering:

1. Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis

The first and most important step towards restoring mutual trust among the participating States – without which any reasonable reform of the OSCE or increasing its effectiveness in any significant way is impossible – must be a political settlement of the Ukraine crisis based on respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. This requires full support of the Minsk Process, organized under the auspices of the OSCE and aimed at the consolidation of the ceasefire and the search for a political settlement. The common goal of all OSCE participating States is to prevent the emergence of another protracted conflict in Europe.

Full support and joint promotion of the Minsk Process until it reaches its final end, i.e. the achievement and implementation of mutually acceptable agreements among the parties, could in the short term become a major joint project for Russia and the West within the framework of the OSCE.

2. High-Level Meeting

It would be advisable at some stage – and the matter should not be postponed indefinitely – to hold a high-level or a summit meeting between representatives of the OSCE participating States. Whether or not this meeting can take place in 2015 is a matter of a negotiated decision. The outcome will depend on the course of efforts to resolve the Ukraine crisis and the extent to which the progress of the Minsk Process can prevent the consolidation of a quasi-state in South-Eastern Ukraine and the emergence of yet another protracted conflict in Europe.

Such a meeting is necessary in order to, against the background of the lessons learned from the Ukraine crisis, agree on essential and mutually acceptable adjustments to the contemporary European security architecture and map out the main areas and measures for strengthening the OSCE.
3. OSCE Principles and Commitments. The Security Community

Against the background of the 2014 Ukraine crisis, it is crucial that the OSCE participating States reconfirm the relevance and equal significance of the fundamental principles of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe and the 1999 Charter for European Security. It is important that they reaffirm their commitment to adhere to these principles and to fully implement all OSCE commitments.

At the 2010 OSCE Summit Meeting in Astana, the heads of state or government of the participating States confirmed that overcoming the danger of a new division in Europe was in strict adherence with the vision of a “free, democratic, common and indivisible Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok, rooted in agreed principles, shared commitments and common goals.”

The resulting Astana Declaration promotes the concept of a comprehensive, cooperative, equal and indivisible security “which relates the maintenance of peace to the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and links economic and environmental cooperation with peaceful inter-State relations.” According to the Declaration, the OSCE security community should be “aimed at meeting the challenges of the 21st century,” based on “full adherence to common OSCE norms, principles and commitments across all three dimensions,” and “unite all OSCE participating States across the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian region, free of dividing lines, conflicts, spheres of influence and zones with different levels of security.”

Renewed commitment from the participating States to the formation of a security community is no less important than their confirmation of the OSCE principles and commitments.

4. Measures to Give Effect to the OSCE Principles

Simply declaring one’s renewed commitment to the general principles, commitments and goals of the OSCE is not enough to restore mutual trust. Reaching this objective will require time and the concerted efforts of the participating States. For this reason, the main emphasis of the OSCE’s work in 2015 and the foreseeable future should be placed on discussing measures that are aimed at giving effect to the OSCE principles and putting them into practice more effectively.

In particular, this could mean agreeing upon a code, or codes, of conduct for the OSCE participating States in the areas they define as most problematic. For this purpose, it would be also important to resume the dialogue on and further pursue conventional arms control in Europe, improve the effectiveness of and modernize the existing, and agree on new military relevant confidence and security-building measures.

Particular attention must be paid to considering joint measures to address new transnational threats, such as international terrorism, illegal drugs trafficking, human trafficking, and cyber security.

5. Drafting the OSCE Charter (Constituent Document)

Drafting and adopting of the OSCE Charter (constituent document) would mark an important step towards transforming the Organization from a regional arrangement into a fully fledged treaty-based regional organization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The Charter would reaffirm, in a legally binding form, the modus operandi of the Organization, its structures and institutions, as it has been established to date by relevant decisions of the OSCE decision-making bodies.

Informal discussions on the “technical” version of an OSCE constituent document have taken place over the past five years. If not actual adoption of the Charter (agreeing its text, let alone ratification, would take time), an agreement in principle on the desirability of drafting the Charter as soon as possible could be an important decision within the framework of the Helsinki +40 process.

During the work on the Charter, it would make sense to review the powers, role and functions of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Secretary General, as well as the long-mooted question of creating the post of Deputy Secretary General of the OSCE.

6. Convention on the International Legal Personality, Legal Capacity, and Privileges and Immunities of the OSCE

In parallel with an agreement on the Charter (constituent document), the OSCE should put an end to yet another long-pending issue and adopt a Convention on the International Legal Personality, Legal Capacity, and Privileges and Immunities of the OSCE.

The decision on the desirability of preparing such a Convention was adopted 21 years ago at the CSCE Council of Ministers meeting in Rome in 1993. Work on the text of the Convention was finalized in 2007, but its adoption was delayed by discussions regarding the rationale of drafting of the OSCE Charter.
7. OSCE Crisis Management

The OSCE is expected to make a significant contribution to the resolution of crises and engage in crisis management in Europe. To this end, it should make better use of the instruments at its disposal, including measures for stabilizing the situation in conflict zones.

In this context, and taking the OSCE’s experience in resolving the 2014 Ukraine crisis into account, proposals concerning the need to improve substantially the human and financial resources available to the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, expand its role as regards the monitoring of the current situation and submitting conflict resolution proposals need to be thoroughly considered.

It would be worth considering the feasibility of dispatching, under modern conditions, OSCE peacekeeping or peacebuilding missions under the provisions of the 1992 Helsinki Document, or dispatching such missions under its mandate.21

8. Conventional Arms Control in Europe

The OSCE is currently the only forum for dialogue on military-political aspects of European security. In discussing these issues, the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC), particularly the Security Dialogue conducted within its framework, plays a key role. The OSCE Security Days devoted to conventional arms control (CAC) in Europe attract prominent politicians, scientists and independent experts.

In the absence of substantive consultations or negotiations on CAC or clarity regarding the eventual parties to an agreement and the area of its application, and with the aim of determining the possible parameters of a forthcoming CAC regime in the interests of “military stability, predictability and transparency,”22 it would be useful to launch, under the auspices of the OSCE and within the framework of the FSC, technical consultations of military experts to form a “security matrix” determining the inter-connections between and degree of influence of various types of weapons in combat missions. Such consultations could be held in Vienna and involve not only delegations of interested participating States but also representatives of defence ministries.

9. Confidence and Security-Building Measures

During the past four years, the OSCE has passed a number of decisions to modernize the Vienna Document on confidence and security-building measures. Most of these decisions, however, are of a “technical” nature. A more substantial modernization of the Vienna Document depends, in many ways, on an eventual CAC agreement.

As part of the ongoing discussions within the OSCE on the modernization of the Vienna Document on confidence and security-building measures in the near fu–
ture, it would be advisable to focus on measures to improve the effectiveness of verification activities under the Document: increasing the number of inspections and assessment groups, as well as the duration of verification missions and the timeframe for demonstration of new types of the major weapon and equipment systems (to once in five years).

In parallel with talks on modernizing the Vienna Document, it would be useful to conduct, within the framework of the FSC, a systematic review of the practices and effectiveness of the implementation of established confidence and security-building measures, especially in crisis situations.

10. Transnational Threats

The OSCE can and must contribute to a coordinated response to contemporary transnational threats to security, particularly terrorism and illegal drugs and human trafficking. It shall assist the participating States in implementing the already agreed-upon and engage in developing further cyber security confidence-building measures.

The OSCE should contribute actively to harmonizing the policies for responding to new challenges and threats, including through ratification by the participating States of the relevant universal instruments, in particular those dealing with counter-terrorism, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and, whenever necessary, to assist states in the implementation of their obligations.

In the context of developing joint responses to transnational threats, the participating States should, first of all, establish a practice of consultations and coordination of positions on a broader range of issues going beyond the geographical OSCE area. Such consultations could lead to decisions on joint action to counteract transnational threats, including joint project activities outside the OSCE area.

11. Convergence of Integration Processes in the OSCE Region

The OSCE, as an umbrella organization for the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian communities, can contribute to greater compatibility of economic integration processes in the region for the purpose of minimising the gap between these processes and eventually forming a common economic space from the Atlantic to the Pacific and creating a common free trade area with free movement of goods, services and people.

With this aim in mind, the OSCE, in collaboration with the UN Economic Commission for Europe, could become a forum for a broad dialogue among experts as well as for political dialogue on a number of issues, such as:

- Promoting mutual trade and investment, including investment protection, to ensure sustained development of the OSCE states on the basis of non-discrimination, transparency and good governance.
- Removing barriers to trade and movement of labour.
• Creating new opportunities for economic operators by establishing common, harmonized or compatible regulatory systems and by developing interconnected infrastructure networks.

• Increasing and maintaining the competitiveness of OSCE economies in the world.

12. Reforming the Human Dimension of the OSCE

The human dimension has been and will remain an inalienable part of the Helsinki process and a key element of the OSCE identity and mandate. “Peace and security in our region is best guaranteed by the willingness and ability of each participating State to uphold democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights.”

The OSCE can help overcome the disagreements pertaining to the human dimension of the Helsinki process by depoliticizing the problems and issues that arise in this sphere and establishing a dialogue mechanism based on cooperation and not rhetoric, without duplicating the multilateral mechanisms for protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms that already exist and are successfully functioning in Europe.

The creation of such a mechanism would help to optimize the review of the implementation by the participating States of their commitments in the human dimension. In particular, this might include reducing the length of the OSCE Annual Human Dimension Implementation Meetings, as proposed in 2005 by the OSCE Panel of Eminent Persons, and in the 2012 report “Towards a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community” presented by think-tanks of four countries (Germany, Poland, Russia and France).

13. Parliamentary Dimension of the OSCE

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly occupies a special place in the structure of the Organization’s main institutions. Representing the elected legislative authorities, it is designed to provide two-way communication between the citizens of the participating States and the Organization itself.

The Parliamentary Assembly plays an important role in promoting the OSCE’s core values and achieving its fundamental objectives. It contributes significantly (and can contribute yet more) to the three main dimensions of the Organization’s activities, including the military-political, economic and environmental and, last
but not least, the human dimension of the OSCE. The Parliamentary Assembly can provide assistance to the OSCE at all phases of the conflict cycle.

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly is of great importance is discussions pertaining to the reform of the Organization at all levels, including discussions within the framework of the Helsinki +40 Process.

One of the most important areas in the preparations for the 40th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act is the improvement of the mechanisms of interaction between the Parliamentary Assembly and the structures and institutions of the OSCE, with the goal to make this interaction more systemic and systematic.
Twenty years ago, the leaders of the OSCE participating States solemnly promised that the Organization would “be a forum where concerns of participating States are discussed, their security interests are heard and acted upon.”27 In the years passed, the OSCE has only moved further away from achieving this goal.

It stands to reason that large, medium and small states that may or may not be part of other, more exclusive multilateral European security institutions have differing views about the role and aims of the OSCE and have different expectations of it with regard to ensuring their own security interests. But they all have one thing in common: if the OSCE is for some reason unable to listen to their concerns — not to mention take action to protect their legitimate interests — they will seek other means by which to do so. As a rule, large states prefer to act unilaterally in such instances. Smaller countries seek the protection of various economic, military and political alliances.

The future of the OSCE, therefore, depends on more than the settlement of the current crisis in Ukraine. It depends on the ability of the Organization, following reforms, to listen to the concerns of its participating States, regardless of size or political clout and, more importantly, to protect their legitimate interests. If the OSCE continues to depend purely on the level of negotiability of its participating States, then, in light of the current split within the Organization, it will not be able to satisfy this condition. As a result, OSCE participating States, particularly those that are not members of any military-political alliances, will increasingly turn to other multilateral European security organizations, be it NATO or the European Union.

There are three possible solutions to the problem of the further marginalization of the OSCE within the modern European security architecture:

1. Radically increase the commitment of the OSCE participating States to seek for negotiated solutions. This would enable the Organization to operate on a consensus basis without experiencing significant discomfort. However, the current situation in Europe as a whole, and within the OSCE in particular, suggests that there is no reason to expect this goal to be achieved in the short or even medium term.

2. Make the OSCE less dependent on the availability of consensus among its participating States by empowering its institutions to act independently and take prompt action within the framework of a clearly defined mandate. OSCE discussions over the past five years point to the fact that a consensus on this option is unlikely to be achieved in the short term either.

3. Combine increased independence of the OSCE’s structures and institutions within the framework of their mandate (and budget) with an increased commitment of the participating States to seek consensual decisions. At first glance, this proposal seems even more utopian than the previous two. However, even modest steps toward increasing the independence of the OSCE’s structures and institutions probably may encourage the participating States to more actively engage in consensus building.

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APPENDICES

Fig. 1. OSCE Missions Budgets in South–East Europe and Former Soviet Union Countries (2002–2014 Million Euros and % of OSCE Consolidated Budget)

2014 – Not including the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine.


Fig. 2. Budget of OSCE Missions and Presences in the Former Soviet Union Countries (2002–2014 Million Euros)

2014 – Not including the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine.

Fig. 3. International Personnel on OSCE Missions and Presences (2003—2013)

2014 – Not including the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine.

Sources: OSCE Annual Reports 2003–2013, URL: http://www.osce.org/node/66000

Fig. 4. International Personnel on OSCE Missions and Presences in Former Soviet Union Countries (2003—2013)

2014 – Not including the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine.

Sources: OSCE Annual Reports 2003–2013, URL: http://www.osce.org/node/66000
Fig. 5. International Personnel on OSCE and EU Missions to Former Soviet Union Countries in 2014

Sources: OSCE Annual Reports 2003–2013, URL: http://www.osce.org/node/66000;
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