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The Working Paper includes analytical papers on building the concept of Greater Europe. The papers are prepared by RIAC and partner organizations in the framework of a research project “A Cooperative Greater Europe by 2030”. The Working Paper analyzes the concept of Greater Europe, its structural principles, and mechanisms of cooperation among the countries involved.

The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of RIAC.

The full text is published on RIAC’s website. You can download the Working Paper or leave a comment via this direct link — www.russiancouncil.ru/en/paper17

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I. Ivanov, D. Browne, A.D. Rotfeld
Moving Europe Beyond Divisions on Ukraine¹

More than two decades after the Cold War ended, Europe still stands divided. This has been proven in the last few days by the zero-sum logic being used to describe the situation of Ukraine, where the people apparently have to make a choice between a “European” and “Eurasian” future. Such an approach seems short-sighted. It is beyond doubt that Ukraine and all other countries on the continent should be free to choose their partners for closer cooperation, but our focus should be on the necessity of pan-European cooperation, instead of rivalry and confrontation between the West and the East.

The divisions in Europe concern more than Ukraine. The relationship between NATO and Russia is characterised by mutual mistrust. The EU–Russia relationship has not delivered on the promise of a genuine partnership. Several conflicts in south-eastern Europe remain frozen rather than resolved and represent a continuing risk of military conflict. And people to people movement between the EU countries and several others in Europe, especially Russia, remains difficult, and limited.

As Europeans, we now have a choice. We can either work together to address the real differences between us, in pursuit of our common interest in security and prosperity, and work together to manage pressing international issues, as we are now doing on chemical weapons in Syria or on Iran’s nuclear program, or we can allow divisions to persist and weaken all of us, even as new powers rise outside of Europe and Europe risks being increasingly marginalized in international affairs.

We believe the time is right to pursue cooperation. To be more specific, we believe a new cooperative European project is called for, one that conceives of Europe in its broadest sense geographically and politically, from Norway in the north to Turkey in the south and from Portugal in the west to Russia in the east. Its goal should not be the creation of a single institution, but the creation of a Greater European zone of overlapping and deepening security, economic, political and cultural cooperation between all countries and institutions in the region.

We believe it is possible to begin laying the foundations of such a zone today and that such a zone is compatible with ongoing efforts to deepen Transatlantic and Eurasian cooperation. Applying a Greater European framework should be useful in overcoming the bitter resentments over the situation in Ukraine. Enhanced stability, rule of law and better prospects for economic development should all be possible for Ukraine if it pursues improved relations both with the European Union and with Russia.

¹ URL: http://www.russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=2759#top (November 28, 2013).

Igor Ivanov, RIAC President, Professor of MGIMO–University of the RF MFA, RAS Corresponding Member; Des Browne, Executive Board Member of the European Leadership Network, Former British Defense Secretary; Adam Daniel Rotfeld, Co-chairman of Polish–Russian Group on Difficult Matters, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland.

The article was published within the joint trilateral project on a Cooperative Greater Europe launched by the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), the European Leadership Network (ELN) and the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM).

Beyond the controversy surrounding the Vilnius Summit, the priorities for cooperation are clear.

First, the current work by global powers on Syrian chemical weapons and Iran's nuclear program should be capitalized on for wider cooperation across the old Cold War divide. We need joint efforts to advance the Geneva II diplomatic process on Syria and cooperation to overcome the Jihadist threat there which if left unchecked may become a threat to us all. Joint action to stabilize post 2014 Afghanistan, and to shore up wider efforts at nuclear non-proliferation, including but going beyond Iran, are all priorities too.

Second, we need to build Greater Europe as a meaningful security community. This is where the trust-building challenge is the greatest and where it is most important. In the short-term, making progress will require persistent efforts to come to an agreement between the US/NATO and Russia on missile defence; continued dialogue on nuclear reductions; and finding a way to reinvigorate arms control discussions on conventional force issues in Europe.

Third, we need to build Greater Europe through deepened trade and investment links. The EU accounts for just over half Russia's foreign trade turnover and about 70 percent of its accumulated foreign investment. Over the past decade Russia has become the EU's third largest trading partner, just after the United States and China, accounting for 7 percent of the EU's exports and 11 percent of its imports. However, the trade relationship is asymmetrical. The oil trade accounts for 63 percent of total Russia-EU trade turnover and bilateral EU-Russia trade talks are stalled. There is huge potential to broaden and deepen ties in this area.

Fourth, we need improved energy cooperation. Despite the politicization of the energy relationship in recent years, cooperation in this area is in the interests of everyone. European companies are now suffering a significant competitive disadvantage compared to businesses in the US, which is benefitting from the shale gas revolution. If businesses choose to move to or invest in the US instead of Europe as a result, this will undermine the economic prospects for Europe as a whole.

Fifth, we need increased people to people contacts. Today, the ease of travel within the Greater European space differs enormously depending on one's departure and destination points. This constrains opportunities for our citizens to travel for either business or leisure purposes and limits their ability to see how other Europeans live.

If current political leaders across the continent are willing to work on this agenda, we can put the significant differences of the past and the present behind us and leave the next generation of Europeans better placed to prosper, and to meet the global challenges of the future.

European Leaders Call for a New Approach to Security

Joint Statement by the European Leadership Network²

1. Context

As members of the European Leadership Network (ELN), we have committed ourselves to working toward a world without nuclear weapons. Such a world will only come about as a result of a joint enterprise involving leaders and peoples from every continent. It will only be achievable if the practical steps required to reach this goal are seen as contributing to every country's national security as well as to global security. And it will only come about if leaders in every country and region take their share of the responsibility to act.

The Euro-Atlantic region, which includes the United States, all the countries of Europe, and Russia is home to more than 95 percent of all the nuclear weapons on earth, four of the five declared nuclear weapon states in the NPT, and nine of the fourteen states in the world with nuclear weapons on their territory (namely the US, Russia, UK, France, Germany, Italy, Turkey, Belgium and the Netherlands).

While the likelihood of a devastating conventional or nuclear conflict in the Euro-Atlantic region has dramatically declined, it is a region still scarred by the experience of 20th century conflict and by a deep and persisting legacy of Cold War mistrust. Cold War era security concepts and many of their associated weapons and military postures continue to dominate.

In particular, the currency of nuclear deterrence and mutual assured destruction continues in circulation. Large strategic nuclear forces remain deployed on prompt launch, ready to be fired in minutes; thousands of tactical nuclear weapons are still stockpiled in Europe; and a decades-old missile defence debate remains stuck in neutral. In addition, new security challenges associated with prompt-strike forces, cyber-security, and space remain contentious and inadequately addressed. The status quo is dangerous and potentially destabilizing, undermining the trust necessary for cooperative efforts to meet emerging security threats in Europe and across the world.

Our publics are paying the price. In addition to raising their security risks, the current situation increases the costs of defence and misdirects resources away from fiscal demands, domestic priorities and other emerging security challenges and threats. In the area of nuclear weapons alone, the looming price tag in the region is at least \$500 billion.³

² URL: http://www.russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=2865#top (December 17, 2013).

The European Leadership Network (ELN) was originally established to promote an idea of the world without nuclear weapons. Former European political, military, and diplomatic leaders are involved in ELN work. ELN produces independent research in the sphere of international relations as well as provides a platform for discussing current international events and challenges.

³ The United States is poised to embark on programs to build new nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines and strategic bombers at a cost of more than \$400 billion, and to extend the life of nuclear weapons deployed in Europe at a cost of more than \$10 billion. Russia reportedly plans to spend 1.9 trillion rubles, or \$61 billion, over the next decade to modernize its strategic nuclear forces, while very conservative estimates of the United Kingdom's possible Trident renewal put the cost at £25 billion, or \$38 billion.

We do not pretend that a new and improved security climate in the region would save all this expenditure but over time the savings could be substantial — and they could multiply in the non-nuclear areas of security policy.

2. A Call for Change

For both the security and economic well-being of our citizens therefore, we urgently need to start a new, continuing and dynamic process of Euro-Atlantic security dialogue to address this situation. This dialogue must be politically mandated from the highest level and must involve senior civilian and military leaders.

In particular, we call for the following:

2.1. Process:

- The formation, at the request of leaders in a core group of countries in the region, of an informal Euro-Atlantic Security Contact Group to develop recommendations to leaders on the principles that should underpin the dialogue, the kind of civilian and military leadership that should be tasked with conducting it, and the issues to be addressed. Whatever the specifics of the process, it must be capable of encompassing a discussion of security that is both comprehensive and focused on practical steps.
- New tracks for dialogue on specific issues to be set up bilaterally, multilaterally and in sub-regions of the Euro-Atlantic region as deemed necessary within the wider process, and existing entities such as the NATO–Russia Council and the OSCE to be used as venues for discussing specific issues. National leaders and members of the Contact group would continue to be involved as the dialogue progresses.

2.2. Core Principles:

In our view, the core principles shaping the dialogue should be:

- To consider all elements of offence and defence, nuclear and conventional weapons, and cyber-security and space in a new security construct;
- Reducing the role of nuclear weapons as an essential part of any nation's overall security posture without jeopardising the security of any of the parties;
- Creating robust and accepted methods to increase leadership decision time during heightened tensions and extreme situations;
- Transitioning from the remnants of mutual assured destruction to mutual understanding to mutual early warning to mutual defence to mutual security;
- Enhancing stability through increased transparency, cooperation and trust. The fear of any short-warning attack should be taken off the table.

2.3. Practical Priorities:

Within this flexible framework for dialogue, we believe the following should be seen as immediate priorities:

Nuclear Forces:

- Practical steps to increase decision time and crisis stability for leaders, in particular with respect to U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces. Even under

the latest nuclear arms treaty, each country will maintain thousands of nuclear warheads on hundreds of ballistic missiles ready for prompt launch and capable of hitting their targets in less than 30 minutes. This status increases the risk that a decision to use ballistic missiles will be made in haste based on false warning, as well as the risk of an accidental or unauthorized missile launch. The US and Russia should take steps now to remove a percentage of their strategic forces off prompt launch status as a priority;

- Further cuts in U.S. and Russian deployed strategic nuclear forces;
- Reciprocal transparency, security and confidence building measures on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, including bold reductions in these weapons.

Missile Defence:

- The establishment of a Missile Defence Cooperation Centre to share data from early warning radars and satellites;
- Reciprocal transparency measures with regard to missile defence systems and capabilities, including annual updates;
- Continued joint missile defence exercises;
- Written political commitments not to deploy missile defences that would undermine strategic stability.

Conventional Forces in Europe:

- Strengthened confidence and security building measures through increased evaluation visit quotas under the Vienna Document;
- An expanded Open Skies Treaty to include not only the current 34 states to which the Treaty applies but all 57 states in the OSCE and a wider range of technical data collection capabilities than currently permitted under the Treaty;
- Regardless of the current status of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, pursue agreement on provisions that extend leadership decision time. Additional transparency could be provided on data and activities related to military forces out of garrison and increased clarity on deployment of forces.

Conventional Prompt Global Strike Forces:

- Conceptual discussions on possible programmatic and operational transparency and confidence building measures and other steps, should such weapons eventually be developed and deployed.

Cyber-Security:

- Begin discussing and implementing a process of early sharing of information on cyber-threats, shared approaches to defence of networks, and joint responses to cyber-attacks. This collaboration could include discussions relating to the development of international agreement or agreements that would limit cyber war.

Space:

- Exchange of information relating to a proposed draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space activities, to help facilitate future agreement on such a Code.

This new approach for building mutual security in the Euro-Atlantic region can lead to a more secure and promising future for all our citizens. We have a historic but perhaps fleeting opportunity to act. Our leaders must do so.

Signed by:

Des Browne, former Secretary of State for Defence, United Kingdom.

Wolfgang Ischinger, Chairman of the Munich Security Conference, former Parliamentary State Secretary of the German MFA, former Ambassador to the United States and to the United Kingdom, Germany.

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James Arbuthnot, serving Member of Parliament, Chair of the Defence Select Committee, United Kingdom.

Aytuğ Atici, serving Member of the Grand National Assembly, Turkey.

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Ingvar Carlsson, former Prime Minister, Sweden.

Hikmet Çetin, former Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, Turkey.

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Vahit Erdem, former Member of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Chief Adviser to President Süleyman Demirel, Head of the Turkish Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and Vice-President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Turkey.

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Geoffrey Howe, former Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, United Kingdom.

Douglas Hurd, former Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, United Kingdom.

Jaakko Itoniemi, former Ambassador to the CSCE and Ambassador to the United States, Finland.

Juhani Kaskeala, former Chief of Defence, Finland.

Jan Kavan, former Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, Czech Republic.

Katja Keul, serving Member of the Bundestag and the Defence Committee, Germany.

John Kerr, former UK Ambassador to the US and the EU, United Kingdom.

Tom King, former Secretary of State for Defence, United Kingdom.

Pierre Lellouche, former Minister of European Affairs and Minister of International Trade, France.

Budimir Lončar, President of the Foreign Affairs and International Relations Advisory Committee to the President of the Republic of Croatia, former Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia, Croatia.

Ruud Lubbers, former Prime Minister, Netherlands.

Mogens Lykketoft, Speaker of the Folketing, former Foreign Minister, Denmark.

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Evgeniy Maslin, retired Colonel General and former Director of the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defence, Russia.

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David Owen, former Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, United Kingdom.

Ana Palacio, former Foreign Minister, Spain.

Boris Pankin, former Foreign Minister and Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Russia.

Paul Quilès, former Defence Minister, France.

Elisabeth Rehn, former Defence Minister, Finland.

Malcolm Rifkind, serving Member of Parliament, former Secretary of State for Defence and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, United Kingdom.

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Volker Rühle, former Defence Minister, Germany.

Konstantin Samofalov, serving Member of Parliament, Serbia.

Özdem Sanberk, Director of the International Strategic Research Organisation, former Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey.

Rudolf Scharping, former Chairman of the Social Democratic Party and Defence Minister, Germany.

Javier Solana, former Foreign Minister, Secretary General of NATO and EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Spain.

John Stanley, serving Member of Parliament and Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls, United Kingdom.

Thorvald Stoltenberg, former Defence Minister and Foreign Minister, Norway.

Goran Svilanović, Secretary General of the Regional Cooperation Council and former Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia, Serbia.

Boris Tadić, former President, Serbia.

Carlo Trezza, Chairman of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), former Special Envoy for Disarmament and Non-proliferation and Ambassador to the Republic of Korea, Italy.

Vyacheslav Trubnikov, former Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service, Deputy Foreign Minister and Ambassador to India, Russia.

Raimo Väyrynen, former President of the Academy of Finland, Finland.

Alan West, former First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff, United Kingdom.

Shirley Williams, member of the House of Lords, former leader of the Liberal Democrats in the House of Lords, United Kingdom.

Kere Willoch, former Prime Minister, Norway.

It is Time to Pursue a Cooperative Greater Europe

Position Paper by the Task Force
on Cooperation in Greater Europe⁴

1. Why Greater Europe?

We believe recent divisions between the EU and Russia over the future of Ukraine demonstrate the urgent need to pursue a new European cooperative project: one that conceives of Europe in its broadest sense geographically and politically, from Norway in the north to Turkey in the south and from Portugal in the west to Russia in the east. A project that has as its goal not the creation of a single institution, but the creation of a Greater European zone of overlapping and deepening security, economic, political and cultural cooperation between all countries and institutions in the region.

Creating such a zone will not be easy but drawing on the work of an impressive coalition of think tanks from the UK, Poland, Russia, Turkey and elsewhere in Europe, the signatories of this paper believe not only that we should try but that it is possible to lay the foundations of such a zone in the next decade by pursuing a series of distinct but well-coordinated initiatives in a number of areas. We also believe that such a zone is compatible with ongoing efforts to deepen transatlantic cooperation in the west and efforts to create a Eurasian Union in the east, and that the long-term vision can be linked to specific and incremental steps that leaders can begin working on today.

The rationale for pursuing such cooperation is strong.

More than two decades after the Cold War ended, and as the case of Ukraine has demonstrated, Europe still stands divided. The relationship between NATO and Russia is characterised by real disagreements, exacerbated by mutual mistrust. Thousands of nuclear weapons remain central to the security arrangements of the continent, many of them on short notice to fire. The EU-Russia relationship has not delivered on the promise of a genuine partnership. Several conflicts in south-eastern Europe remain frozen rather than resolved and represent a continuing risk of military conflict. And people to people movement between the EU countries and several others in Europe, especially Russia, remains difficult, and limited.

⁴ URL: http://www.russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=3055#top (January 30, 2014).

About the Task Force: the Task Force brings forward proposals to allow all countries of the region to decisively break with the costly legacy of the Cold War and focus more effectively on meeting the emerging political, economic, and security challenges of the 21st century. It addresses the causes of current levels of mistrust between key countries and actors in the region, has trust-building as a central theme in its deliberations, and sets out a rationale and vision for a cooperative Greater Europe and a range of practical steps necessary to move the international relations of the continent in that direction.

The Task Force is supported by, and draws on, independent analytical work by the European Leadership Network (ELN), the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), and the International Strategic Research Organization in Ankara (USAK).

This is despite the fact that all countries of the region share a common interest in the pursuit of security, prosperity and development, and all countries share some common challenges, be they related to countering terrorism and climate change, the need to find new paths to sustainable economic growth, or the need to cooperate, as is now happening in Syria, on the fight against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

At a time of deep budget cuts across the entire region, the status quo is expensive and damaging to all of us. Valuable resources that could be used to meet social need and to promote economic innovation and cooperation are being invested in security arrangements and military modernization programmes that reflect the collective failure of our leaders to put European security on a more stable and cooperative footing. Military suspicion also holds back economic cooperation across the region.

While a key trend in modern international relations is the diffusion of power to many levels and actors, moreover, and an accompanying trend is to cross border coalition building to address problems that are no respecters of borders, the Greater European space as a whole risks being dragged back into a struggle over spheres of interest and influence with the EU/ NATO and Russia on either side and countries like Ukraine and to some extent Turkey, sitting uncomfortably alongside or between both as they try to pursue more nuanced and multidimensional diplomatic strategies.

More widely still, as economic power and demographic momentum shifts from the global north and west to the global south and east, ushering in a poly-centric world, the additional danger is that such continued divisions on our continent will condemn the countries of Europe to global irrelevance or at least to peripheral status.

2. Why Now?

It is time to do something about this situation.

Europe is a continent under economic stress and is already undergoing institutional and architectural transformation. This transformation presents a moment of strategic opportunity.

The crisis in the Eurozone and the developing institutional response to it is changing the institutional landscape of Europe. The future relationship between members of the Eurozone and other, non-euro members of the EU, such as the United Kingdom, is unclear. The trauma of the Eurozone crisis and the requirements of internal change to deal with it are also limiting the appetite and capacity of the EU to contemplate a further expansion of EU membership. There remains deep uncertainty over the longer-term nature of the relationship between the EU and Turkey, partly as a result, and also over the future of relations between the EU and the countries of the Eastern Partnership, such as Ukraine. NATO is beginning to grapple with what its own future will look like after the departure from Afghanistan in 2014. Again, an appetite for further enlargement is missing and it therefore remains unclear what the NATO relationship with the Europe beyond its current institutional borders will look like in future. How Russia ultimately relates to the

rest of the continent and to these and other institutions is one of the biggest uncertainties of all.

Our contention is that a declaration of intent to pursue a Greater European zone of cooperation, building on but not replacing the existing and overlapping institutions of cooperation that already exist, could help to fill what is currently a strategic vacuum where a vision for the future of the whole of Europe should be. It could also provide a focal point for efforts to progress cooperation on multiple tracks simultaneously.

3. Paving the Way for a Cooperative Greater Europe

As we have already acknowledged, translating this commitment into policy practice and concrete outcomes is not an easy task, but it is also not undoable. The priorities and perspectives of the different states and actors in the region may differ but common ground can be found. Greater Europe should develop not as an event but as a process enabling dialogue and cooperation among different but increasingly interdependent powers and actors.

3.1. The Process

The process for building a cooperative Greater Europe must have multiple characteristics:

3.1.1. *It must be open and inclusive. It must provide an opportunity for all states and institutions in the region to describe their vision of what the future should look like.* Several states, such as Ukraine, Turkey and the countries of the Caucasus have distinct perspectives and reject the notion of a binary division between the EU and Russia or NATO and Russia. It is important that in pursuing the long-term goal, the full diversity of views is heard.

3.1.2. *It must include sustained efforts to build habits of cooperation, especially with regard to challenges of mutual interest.* Syria has shown the potential benefits of this approach. Iran might, over the medium-term, do the same. It is also vital that the many areas of good cooperation that already exist are publicized and enjoy higher profile.

3.1.3. *It must include a systematic focus on trust and the requirements of trust-building in the Greater European area.* The concern with a lack of trust applies across the security, economic and energy fields yet focused work on the kinds of substantive policy changes and processes that might contribute to enhanced trust remains scarce.

3.2. Content

In terms of practical steps, we believe cooperative initiatives need to be developed and given greater momentum in the following priority areas:

3.2.1. *Security cooperation on threats common to us all.* This should prioritise cooperative work to address the jihadi threat in Syria, to stabilize post-2014

Afghanistan, to address emerging cyber and bio-security challenges and to deal with drug and human trafficking problems and with illegal migration. It should involve continued joint diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term, comprehensive, deal with Iran on the latter's nuclear programme and use that as a platform to build further cooperation on countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction more widely.

3.2.2. Building Greater Europe as a security community. This should pursue a state of affairs where war between states in the region is excluded and all disputes are resolved peacefully. It should prioritise efforts to come to an agreement between the US/NATO and Russia on missile defence; continued dialogue on nuclear reductions; finding a way to reinvigorate arms control with regard to conventional force issues in Europe; increasing transparency and predictability with regard to military deployments, manoeuvres, and exercises, and discussion of NATO's future enlargement plans.

It will also be vital to make progress on the four "frozen" ethno-territorial conflicts that play a vital role in the EU-Russia relationship. These frozen conflicts are a tragedy for the peoples concerned and represent one of the major barriers to the realisation of the Greater European concept. We need an effective joint approach to one or more of them and on the basis of that positive experience we could in the future think of a more joint approach to civil/military crisis management.

3.2.3. Building Greater Europe through deepening trade and investment links. The EU accounts for just over half of Russia's foreign trade turnover and about 70 percent of its accumulated foreign investment. Mutual trade has grown steadily: over the past decade Russia has become the EU's third largest trading partner, just after the United States and China, accounting for 7 percent of the EU's exports and 11 percent of its imports. However, the trade relationship is asymmetrical. The oil trade accounts for 63 percent of total Russia–EU trade turnover and bilateral EU–Russia trade talks are stalled. There is huge potential to broaden and deepen trade and investment links. Some actors in the Greater European region have an advantage in access to capital and technology and others have a need for injections of technology and for massive infrastructure investments but can provide commodities, access to a well-educated workforce and to a potentially large additional market for European goods and services in return. There is an economic win-win on offer in Greater Europe but we are not currently grasping it. It is in all our interests to do so.

3.2.4. Building Greater Europe through Improved Energy Cooperation. 36 percent of the EU's total gas imports, 31 percent of crude oil imports and 30 percent of coal imports come from Russia. In turn, the share of oil, gas and coal deliveries to the European Union accounts for 80 percent, 70 percent and 50 percent (respectively) of Russian energy exports. Thus, energy interaction with the EU involves a significant revenue stream for Russia's national budget and Russian supplies are a matter of national energy security for many EU members. The result is an energy relationship between the EU and Russia that is characterized by high levels of interdependence and politicization.

It will not be possible to build a cooperative Greater Europe unless mutual confidence and trust can be built on the issue of energy. Long-term measures to

widen the economic relationship between the EU and Russia, so Russia is less dependent on energy exports for revenue, and to diversify supplies of energy to the EU, so the EU is less dependent on Russian supplies, are necessary, in the interests of a more stable and depoliticized relationship, and should be pursued in parallel.

3.2.5. Building Greater Europe through Increased People to People Contacts. Today, the ease of travel within the Greater European space differs enormously depending on one's departure and destination points. Regimes such as the Schengen Area and arrangements within the EU provide great ease of travel in some areas but travel between the EU and several of the countries outside of the EU, especially Russia, is difficult, time consuming (in terms of visa requirements and applications) and administratively costly. This constrains opportunities for our citizens to travel for either business or leisure purposes and limits their ability to see how other Europeans live.

The building of a cooperative Greater Europe requires more open arrangements and active pursuit of a visa free travel regime throughout the entire area. The differing views on this goal within Europe must be reconciled and concerns managed, not only for the sake of people movement itself, but also because of the valuable contribution visa-free travel could make to economic development, reduced suspicion, and to the goal of a cooperative Greater Europe as a whole.

3.2.6. Building Greater Europe through Sub-regional and Transborder cooperation. The importance of this level of cooperation in Europe is sometimes underestimated but it can be vital in preventing deeper divisions and in offering a path through which to ease relations when tensions are high. It is also an arena in which many different local, regional, NGO and other actors can play a role in building practical cooperation, alongside state governments and supranational actors like the EU. Successful cooperative practices in one sub-region or locale can offer lessons and models that can be replicated elsewhere, serving as a laboratory on how best to build cooperative relationships in practice.

It is clear that the current distribution of this sub-regional cooperative fabric across Europe is highly asymmetric: in some places (for example at the Russian–Finnish border or within the framework of local border traffic between the Kaliningrad oblast and certain Polish districts) it is quite dense, while in others it is too thin. Building a Greater European Cooperative Zone will require a major expansion of cooperative activities at this level. There is a need and opportunity to expand cooperation in the framework of the Northern Dimension and the Baltic Sea Region, and to pursue deeper cooperation in the Black Sea and Caspian regions, as well as to explore how the concept of transnational Euro regions could be expanded to play a role in bridging old divides.

3.3. The Institutional Architecture of Cooperation

In today's Europe, there is already no shortage of institutions that are supposed to enable cooperation but in practice, the results of many of them have been limited. We do not believe that the solution is to create new institutions but rather to get more cooperative value out of the institutions that already exist. At a minimum, this means examining how the NATO–Russia Council, the OSCE, the Council of

Europe and the EU–Russia relationship, are currently working. There is also an urgent need to discuss how existing institutions can work together to strengthen and maximize, in the short to medium term, the economic relationship between the EU, the EU Eastern Partnership countries, the members of the emerging Eurasian Union, and Turkey.

4. Alternatives to Greater Europe and Their Costs

While we acknowledge that the building of a cooperative Greater Europe in the way we have described will be difficult, the likely alternatives are worse. The absence of a vision for Europe's future as a whole increases the risk that the current sense of drift will become a fundamental drifting apart. This could embed a conflictual and competitive dynamic in Europe rather than a cooperative one and in turn limit the ability of Europeans to build a common economic space to the benefit of all. It could also entrench the divisions that already exist, be likely to require higher levels of defence spending to deal with intra-European security challenges than otherwise would be the case, and limit the ability of Europeans to work together collectively to address the global challenges of the 21st century. If European leaders take a passive approach in current circumstances, they radically increase the chances that this will in fact be the outcome.

5. Greater Europe: the Cooperation Dividend

If we can avoid this trajectory however, the benefits could be enormous. In particular:

Mutual suspicions on the European continent could be reduced and levels of trust substantially increased. The prevalence of thousands of nuclear weapons in European security arrangements could be addressed and levels of military predictability, transparency and confidence increased;

The combination of finance, technology, people and natural resources contained within Greater Europe could be combined and put to more innovative and efficient use to the benefit of all of our peoples, easing the domestic economic pressures being faced in many European countries;

All the peoples of Europe would be able to experience ease of travel to practice commerce and to experience the rich diversity of culture, history and ways of life on the continent; Instead of being distracted by internal differences, the countries of Greater Europe would be able to work more productively and collaboratively together in helping to meet the global challenges facing us all.

In coming months, drawing on independent analytical work being conducted at the European Leadership Network (ELN), the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), and the International Strategic Research Organisation in Ankara (USAK), among others, we intend to set out specific proposals on each of the inter-locking dimensions of the Greater European idea in more detail, in pursuit of these benefits. We encourage a wide range of other actors and institutions to contribute to and further develop the concept and to advocate for its adoption. In our view, all our futures depend on it.

Signed by:

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D. Browne, W. Ischinger, I. Ivanov, S. Nunn, A.D. Rotfeld

Ukraine Must Not Become a New Berlin Wall⁵

Today Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov and U.S. Secretary of State Kerry will meet in London to discuss the Ukrainian crisis. The situation that we now see in Ukraine graphically demonstrates the inadequacies of the current Euro-Atlantic security system. More than twenty years after the end of the Cold War, the states of the Euro-Atlantic region have yet to define, agree or implement an approach to security that can ensure peace, independence, and freedom from fear of violence for all nations.

No nation benefits from this persistent inaction to find an inclusive way to ensure mutual security for all. Events around Ukraine today are the latest confirmation of this grim reality and in the long run will be detrimental to Russia, Europe, the United States, and the citizens of Ukraine.

The heart of the problem is a corrosive lack of trust among nations in the region, exacerbated by a list of persistent, difficult issues that endanger regional security. This “deficit of trust” within the Euro-Atlantic community undermines cooperation, increases tensions, raises costs, and ultimately puts our citizens at unnecessary risk.

Ukraine’s circumstances today present a grave danger and create a necessity for joint action. Ukraine must not become a new Berlin Wall in Europe. Dividing Ukraine would mean dividing Europe again. The crisis should be a lesson for us all — a call to unite our efforts to assist Ukrainians in reaching a lasting accommodation among themselves, and to lay the foundation for a new comprehensive Euro-Atlantic security community.

In the interests of overcoming the crisis in Ukraine, we support efforts by governments to form a Contact Group comprised of foreign ministers from Russia, the United States, and key European countries. This Contact Group should work to reduce tensions and prepare a detailed program of action to resolve the present crisis. That program could include the employment of international monitors in Ukraine, support for free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections, and programs and means to protect the rights and ensure the safety of all people living in Ukraine.

Any long-term settlement of the present Ukrainian crisis should include respect for Ukrainian independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, as well as respect for the rights and aspirations of all ethnic groups in Ukraine.

On the basis of these principles the Contact Group could also support plans for

⁵ URL: http://www.russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=3290#top (March 14, 2014).

Des Browne, former British defense secretary; Wolfgang Ischinger, former German deputy foreign minister; Igor Ivanov, former Russian foreign minister; Sam Nunn, former U.S. senator; Adam Daniel Rotfeld, former Polish foreign minister.

immediate political, economic, and social measures to assist Ukraine's recovery from its present economic and political crisis. The implementation of these plans could also be closely monitored by the Contact Group.

In addition to the Contact Group, assistance from other international and regional institutions would be welcome, including in particular the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

By working together on the immediate crisis, we will not only assist the Ukrainian people in their desperate situation but will also lay the foundation for the trust needed to build an effective, new Euro-Atlantic security community.

A much-needed new approach to security in the region must include a new dialogue among Euro-Atlantic states on building mutual security. The dialogue must be mandated by political leaders and must address core security issues through a dynamic process that directly deals with key divides. Looking ahead, such a mandate could help create the essential, positive momentum for discussions that would further boost what must be a systematic effort to deepen cooperation and mutual understanding and avoid future conflicts.

Today's leaders have a responsibility and opportunity to apply a fresh approach to Euro-Atlantic security. We believe this new approach for building mutual security can move Europe, Russia, and the United States towards a safer and more stable form of security with decreasing risks of conflict and greater cooperation, transparency, defense and stability.

The world is watching. Resolving this dramatic crisis in Ukraine could chart a new path for Euro-Atlantic relations.

Crisis Management in Europe in the Context of Events in Ukraine

Position Paper by the Task Force on Cooperation in Greater Europe⁶

1. Introduction

In a previous paper⁷, this Task Force argued that if Europeans did not begin pursuing a new, Greater European cooperative project, then divisions between the EU and Russia over Ukraine and between NATO and Russia on other issues could create a new period of confrontation in Europe.

That fear has now, sadly, become a reality.

As a result, while we believe the goal of a cooperative Greater Europe is still worth pursuing in the long-term, the circumstances now make it much harder to envision. If the goal is to have any validity and credibility in future, the road to its attainment must start with managing the current crisis effectively.

In this paper, we set out measures aimed at stabilizing and improving the international environment within which the current crisis is taking place. In doing so, we address the minimum conditions necessary for any notion of wider and deeper cooperation between Russia and the West to be treated seriously in future.

2. The current crisis and its inherent dangers for all participants

It is a statement of the obvious that Russian and Western perspectives on the crisis in Ukraine are divergent. But the tragedy involving the Malaysian aircraft in the airspace above Ukraine has highlighted just how dangerous current circumstances are and the potential for the crisis to escalate further still.

In recent weeks, a cycle of bitter accusation and counter-accusation and stalled diplomatic initiatives has contributed to the worsened atmosphere.

Russian military forces have been stationed near and have exercised close to Ukraine's borders. NATO has announced additional force deployments in Eastern Europe.

⁶ URL: http://www.russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=4143#top (July 31, 2014).

About the Task Force: The Task Force brings forward proposals to allow all countries of the region to decisively break with the costly legacy of the Cold War and focus more effectively on meeting the emerging political, economic, and security challenges of the 21st century. It addresses the causes of current levels of mistrust between key countries and actors in the region, has trust-building as a central theme in its deliberations, and sets out a rationale and vision for a cooperative Greater Europe and a range of practical steps necessary to move the international relations of the continent in that direction.

The Task Force is supported by, and draws on, independent analytical work by the European Leadership Network (ELN), the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), and the International Strategic Research Organization in Ankara (USAK).

⁷ URL: http://www.russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=3055#top (January 30, 2014), see pp. 12–18 of this Working Paper.

The situation inside Ukraine remains highly volatile, with the level of violence escalating, evidence of armed militias operating on both sides, and increasing signs that populations in both east and west are being radicalized.

In this context, we of course recognize and welcome the efforts of OSCE negotiators and others to reach some sort of negotiated settlement. We remain deeply concerned, however, that the situation on the ground may yet escalate, putting the security of everyone in Ukraine, and Europe, at risk.

To avoid this outcome we urge all sides to recognize some of the potential costs and inherent dangers in the current situation. We also urge policy-makers to remember some of the basic lessons of crisis management learned during the Cold War.

3. Limits to the effectiveness of unilateral action by outside actors

An important place to start is in recognition that while the main international parties to the crisis have policy options they could pursue unilaterally, all such options have severe limits to their likely effectiveness and have substantial costs associated with them in practice.

There has been much Western speculation, for example, about Russia exercising a direct military intervention option in eastern Ukraine. Such an intervention is of course theoretically possible, though its intention is heavily disputed by the Russian signatories to this document and by the Russian government in Moscow. Such an intervention, even if it were to take place, would present very significant and potentially serious consequences for Russia itself. It would disrupt major economic ties between Ukraine and Russia; there would most likely be refugee flows to handle; and since many in Ukraine would blame Russia for inciting separatism it would also most likely mean a Ukraine that was hostile to Russia for the long-term.

Far more significant EU/US Sanctions on Russia on the other hand are possible and many of the non-Russian signatories to this document have not only supported their introduction but support their further strengthening. Such sanctions may well inflict costs on the Russian economy. But all signatories to this document also recognise that wider sanctions could have a negative effect on the economies of several EU countries too. There is also wide recognition that such measures could further incite more nationalist opinion in Russia and could harden pro-Russian opinion in eastern Ukraine, worsening the crisis there.

In addition, neither Russia nor the EU has the resources or capacity to unilaterally bail-out the Ukrainian economy and support its transformation to a fully functioning state. It would be less costly and better for all, including for Ukraine, if a way could be found to integrate its economy with both that of Russia and of the EU.

Whatever our disagreements on other issues, the lesson the signatories to this document draw from all this is that none of the unilateral measures available to any of the parties are optimal as a way forward. If a more cooperative solution could be found on terms acceptable to all, that would be preferable.

Within Ukraine, it is now important that the OSCE negotiation process is supported and respected by all sides. Internationally, however, while this negotiation process is ongoing, we need additional measures to create an external environment capable of being an aid to, and not a problem for, those negotiations. We also need to take steps to ensure there are no unintended escalations in the crisis.

4. The Inadequacy of current NATO/EU–Russia Crisis Management Arrangements

This latter concern is a major one because both NATO–Russia and EU–Russia crisis management arrangements are inadequate. The NATO–Russia Council has barely met since the crisis in Ukraine erupted. Despite recent phone contact between senior Russian and NATO military officials, there are also currently few, if any, effective exchanges of information on military deployments in the Euro-Atlantic region. EU–Russia crisis management arrangements also do not exist.

This is a particularly worrying situation given recent incidents both in the Black Sea and in Slavyansk in eastern Ukraine. In the former, a Russian military aircraft and a US warship came into very close proximity. In the latter, forces on the ground seized international military observers and held them for several days, increasing the chances that external actors might be drawn into events in an unintended and unplanned way.

5. Crisis Management Recommendations

We therefore call upon NATO, the EU and Russia, to:

- Exercise full military and political restraint and to take steps to encourage and ensure the military and political restraint of all of their relevant allies and partners in the wider region;
- Embrace increased military to military communication, information exchange and transparency measures in the interests of all and;
- Engage in direct dialogue with each other as an accompaniment to dialogue between the parties inside Ukraine and between Ukrainian parties and other actors outside the country.

We develop each of these suggestions in more detail below.

5.1. Crisis Management through the Exercise of Military and Political Restraint

The incidents in the Black Sea and Slavyansk illustrate, in their different ways, the potential for a loss of control of events on the ground and the potential for an unintended escalation in the crisis. To avoid this, political leaders on all sides should review their military rules of engagement and ensure clear guidance in favour of restraint is passed through the military chain of command.

In addition, political leaders in the entire Euro-Atlantic region must remember and recognise that Ukraine is not the only potential flash-point in Russia–West relations. There are unresolved conflicts surrounding Moldova/Transnistria;

Georgia/South Ossetia/Abkhazia; and Armenia/Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh.

It is in no one's interest that one or more of these should erupt, adding a new dimension to the current crisis. NATO and its members, the EU and Russia must therefore not only exercise maximum restraint in their own policies and activities in relation to each of these disputes but must be alert to, and use all their influence to avoid, any of the local actors involved taking steps that could trigger an unintended escalation or widening of current tensions between Russia and the West.

This will require a high-level of attentiveness and political leadership with regard to policies in the shared neighbourhood and clear messaging about the need for restraint to all local political and military leaders and other relevant actors on the ground.

5.2. Crisis Management through Improved Military to Military Communication and Transparency

In the wake of the crisis in Ukraine the level of military suspicion and fear in Europe has increased. We believe we also urgently need to address this in a way that both reassures NATO countries and others about Russian intentions and that similarly addresses Russian concerns over NATO. Measures that enhance military transparency, predictability and stability are vital. Such measures can reinforce the independence and support the interests of all states in the Euro-Atlantic region. We therefore urge all sides participating in the Vienna Document process to support increases to the evaluation visit quota and to consider introducing regional military liaison missions — that is, reciprocal agreements between nations that would permit small numbers of officers to monitor activities in defined regions in the Euro-Atlantic area. Additional information exchanges and data on activities of military forces out of garrison, as well as clarity on the deployment of forces would also be welcome.

In the context of the current crisis, such measures would help take off the table any fear of a short warning military attack by one party on another. There are few measures that could contribute more to increased stability in current circumstances.

5.3. Crisis Management through Dialogue

It is also important that NATO, the EU and Russia should engage in wider dialogue. One does not have to believe that business as usual is possible to think that this is necessary.

The NATO–Russia Council should meet more frequently, not less, given current circumstances.

Beyond that, there is a need for a fundamental dialogue on issues at the heart of the Helsinki Final Act. It is clear that on issues related to national sovereignty and the right to intervene on the one hand and on matters of territorial integrity and the right to secede on the other, a chasm of differing interpretations and understandings has opened up between Russia and the West. This needs to be discussed and debated seriously. If it is too difficult to address this in formal diplomatic channels at the moment then the leaderships of all relevant parties should support robust Track II activities to ensure serious dialogue takes place.

In addition, and as noted earlier, it seems clear that Ukraine's economy is ultimately going to have to be helped by, and integrated with, the economies of both the EU and Russia. Given this reality, the EU and Russia should continue a quiet dialogue on the future creation of a possible common economic space from Lisbon to Vladivostok. As we said in our initial Task Force paper, we believe this idea can be complimentary to, and not in conflict with, both the idea of a Eurasian Union on the one hand and a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership on the other. We know we are a long way from seeing such a common economic space today but there is no reason why detailed technical work on this issue should not continue, to allow quick movement in this direction should the political environment improve.

The road to overcoming the current crisis also goes through dialogue on the common concerns of all sides. Dialogue can itself be achieved by better addressing the need to respect and protect fundamental human and minority rights. It has been clear from the very beginning that concerns over violations of fundamental human and minority rights have been a driver of the crisis in Ukraine, and have featured as an element of disagreement between Russia and the West. We therefore urge all sides to display more sensitivity to, and respect for, basic human and minority rights in the context of the international frameworks and agreements to which all relevant parties are signatories.

6. Containing the Damage: Continuing cooperation in other important areas

Finally, we believe it is important that the damage from this crisis be contained. Despite the seriousness of the disagreements over Ukraine, (and none of us doubts just how serious these are), both Russia and the West have important shared interests and it must be remembered that even during the Cold War the parties were able to make agreements to manage and contain the confrontation between them.

If the long-term goal of building a cooperative Greater Europe is to be resuscitated from the near death experience the current crisis represents, we must work to achieve something similar again.

Cooperation on Afghanistan remains important, both before and after the major part of the ISAF has departed the country. Cooperation on the Iranian nuclear programme in the context of the E3+3 framework is also vital. Beyond that, Russia the EU and NATO must find ways to work together on countering radicalism and terrorism in Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East as well as in Central Asia. None of these pressing 21st century challenges is going to go away. The current division between NATO, the EU and Russia will only increase economic costs to, and potentially damage the ability of, all sides to respond to other 21st century threats effectively. No matter how difficult the task, it is in all our interests to at least strive for a future that avoids that outcome.

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The Task Force position paper is issued in the names of the signatories and not on behalf of the ELN, PISM, RIAC and USAK organisations as a whole.

I. Busygina

The Foundations of Greater Europe⁸

Analytical report

1. Why Do We Need a Greater Europe?

The modern world is exceedingly complex: it is a global polycentric post-bipolar system. This global system sets a context, where various actors interact with each other in vast and extremely heterogeneous spaces of the European continent. The rational aim of such interaction is to change one's position in the system in accordance with one's own values, interests and priorities, which are often very different from those put forward by other players.

In a volatile international situation, the position on key issues of leading world powers, as well as that of countries claiming regional status — and even of those that occupy a more modest place — takes on great importance. Besides, it is not just states, but also international organizations that contribute to the structuring of the European space. These organizations, of course, vary in the level and scale of their activities, and the tasks they set themselves. The diversity of subjects gives rise to significant problems by making the structure of international relations increasingly uncertain. All this describes the situation on the global level; in the format of a “large region”, in respect to Greater Europe, there are potentially higher chances of determining the principles of structuring space and the interaction of players.

We believe that all European states, like European organizations, share an overriding task, and that is ensuring the security, prosperity and further development of Europe. This is our duty, and for that reason the fulfillment of this task should be considered as work to enhance the common good for the entire European continent.

Achieving this goal is a challenge because of the heterogeneity of the European space. Thus, in Europe we are witnessing the emergence of three poles of power: the European Union, the Russian Federation and Turkey. While they all play key roles in shaping the European security system, they differ strikingly from one another and are increasingly becoming rivals. The European Union is the world's biggest market and an economic power. Russia seeks to gain the recognition of its real and ever more visible role in European politics, while at the same time being a nuclear superpower. Turkey, as a rising power, is already a considerable and influential force with potential as a great “soft power” in the Western Balkans and the Middle East. Turkey is increasingly pursuing an independent policy and seeking a greater role in international affairs. Neither Turkey nor the European Union (with the exception of France and Britain) possesses nuclear weapons. Turkey is a member of NATO and a candidate to join the European Union. In the midst of these poles, the “new” independent states, formerly parts of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia,

⁸ Irina M. Busygina, Dr. of Political Science, Professor of the Comparative Politics Department, MGIMO University.

are now seeking mechanisms that would enable them to exist and build effectively functioning states.

Such diversity, combined with varying degrees of commitment to “the old way”, engenders asymmetric multi-polarity in Europe. This structure of space, based on division into spheres of influence, however, leads Europe away from the path to security and prosperity. Today, maintaining the status quo effectively means preserving a dysfunctional system that is conducive to instability. Moreover, further divergence of the poles and their competition with one another for spheres of influence (some of which are located in Europe) may lead to the strategic marginalization of the European continent as its competitiveness in the global world gradually diminishes.

A key prerequisite for changing the status quo is to counteract the emergence of dividing lines on the European continent and to integrate various parts of this space into a common format.

We advocate the idea of Greater Europe not in the sense of creating a “supra-institution” that would replace the existing ones, but in terms of a more flexible approach — seeing it as a space where other regional institutions, sometimes with overlapping membership, are also active. We support a Greater Europe not as an exclusive project aimed at separating the European space from the rest of the world, because even though it would focus on eliminating the dividing lines in Europe, it would create new lines of division along its boundaries.

Well-functioning institutions can accomplish a great deal, but they are not omnipotent. Furthermore, Greater Europe cannot be created through a formal institution for a number of objective reasons. It can only be embodied in a set of fundamental principles (that will be set forth at the end of this text) to which all the participants in the project would voluntarily subscribe.

Putting this approach into practice is a difficult, but not impossible, task. Although there may be various priorities, it is important to seek common ground. Greater Europe should develop as a territory where dialogue and cooperation of diverse, but increasingly interdependent forces, is ensured. This is a multi-level and a multi-purpose concept that includes both bilateral and multilateral tasks. Building Greater Europe implies the search for new solutions that meet the interests of European states and at the same time implies the fundamental task of strengthening the role of Europe in an increasingly global world.

The project of building a Greater Europe has recently attracted the interest of experts and politicians. The imperative precondition for changing the situation is the prevention of the emergence and consolidation of new dividing lines in Europe. This is the aim of the project proposed by the Russian International Affairs Council. We are talking about a roadmap for the development of Greater Europe by 2030, while taking into consideration the political and economic challenges as well as the security risks.⁹ A special emphasis is on confidence-building measures in relations between Russia and the European states, as well as on overcoming the legacy of the Cold War. The statement of the Task Force for the project “A Cooperative Greater Europe” stresses that today “...the Greater

⁹ URL: http://www.russiancouncil.ru/en/projects/project/?PROJECT_ID_4=25#top

European space is facing the danger of being drawn into the struggle for interests and spheres of influence once again.”¹⁰ This struggle is unfolding between the European Union, NATO and Russia on the one hand, and countries such as Turkey, which follow a parallel or middle path seeking to pursue a diversified diplomatic strategy, on the other.

Thus, the main purport of this document is not to propose an “ideal” concept of Greater Europe or outline a desirable (but hardly feasible) scenario, but to identify what is feasible under the current conditions, considering various objective constraints.

2. Greater Europe: Trends and their Causes

When speaking about Greater Europe, it is important to understand to what extent the project corresponds to current trends and processes in the development of international relations and global politics. There are, in our opinion, at least two major trends which suggest that Greater Europe is not a “greenfield project”. First, we are referring to the formation of alliances (including informal alliances) and their characteristics in the multi-polar world, and second, to multi-level governance.

2.1. The Importance of Building Alliances

At the present time, one of the main ideas in the study of international relations is the recognition of the importance of formal and informal associations between sovereign states — ranging from coalitions to communities to federations. These possible forms of association between sovereign states are often referred to in academic literature as “alliances”.¹¹ An alliance is interpreted as a formal or informal commitment that binds several sovereign states to enter into relations of cooperation in certain areas and for certain purposes. Although such cooperation may take various forms, they all require that the parties assume certain obligations.¹² Notably, the role of coalitions (alliances) in the modern world has not diminished, but, on the contrary, has increased compared with the preceding bipolar system of confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Even the theories that deny the special significance of international agreements and institutions in relations between sovereign states (primarily from various schools of realism) nevertheless pay great attention to the role of alliances among countries. Alliances enable independent sovereign states to pool their influence and resources in the search for answers to common threats, challenges and imbalances of forces arising in the world system. In other words, alliances enable their member countries to respond jointly to the challenges posed by states (players) that are not part of the alliance. In addition, alliances to some extent shape the behaviour of the members with regard to each other.¹³

¹⁰ URL: http://www.russiancouncil.ru/inner/?id_4=3054#top (in Russian).

¹¹ Snyder G. *Alliance Politics*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1997.

¹² Walt S. *Alliances in a Unipolar World*. *World Politics*, 61 (1), 2009: pp. 86–120.

¹³ Gelpi C. *Alliances as Instruments of Intra-Allied Control or Restraint*. In: *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space* / Eds. H. Haftendorn, R. Keohane and C. Wallander. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

It is worth noting that the problems associated with forming alliances have changed since the collapse of the bipolar system. In the bipolar world, the position of a state in the system of international relations largely depended on which of the “big” allies it chose, which made it extremely difficult to exchange one alliance for the other. This is not the case in a multi-polar system. On the one hand, world war has become less likely because no single state or coalition can threaten the security of the sole superpower and because war is no longer an instrument of revising the structure of the world order. On the other hand, the global situation has become far more complicated and multi-dimensional.

Traditional military balancing is now called “hard balancing”, which means the building of an alternative coalition against the dominant force, opposing it in all possible areas with the ultimate goal of changing the distribution of world influence. Unlike “hard” balancing, “soft balancing” is aimed at achieving the best possible result for the “balancing” alliance in a concrete area of foreign policy.¹⁴ Thus, alliances have become more “flexible”; one and the same country may come out against a “big” power on one concrete issue and join the camp of its allies on another issue.

The “soft balancing” strategy enables weaker countries to avoid being excessively dependent on potential regional hegemony while leaving open the opportunity to turn to a “big” power for help in case of need. Indeed, the formation of an open military “hard dominance” is today more likely to be directed against regional “great powers” and their threats. Thus, the unchallengeable military superiority of a great power guarantees neither its military dominance in the world, nor its supremacy in all areas of international relations. Acting in defiance of a great power (even on limited issues), however, is something that only other great powers — states that have proven their attractiveness as partners with whom it is worth cooperating and forming alliances — can afford. It is necessary to prove your attractiveness as a coalition partner on every issue where the interests of other great powers diverge.

Having similar values and ideologies generally contributes to the forming of alliances, but only if it does not lead to its members giving up their sovereignty. An undying commitment to the ideas of liberal democracy, for example, may contribute to the formation of alliances. Ideological principles, however, imply total unity and the guidance of one of the countries and make it more difficult to achieve agreement on the underlying principles of forming a coalition.¹⁵ A common ideology is often less important than pragmatic considerations. Thus, liberal democracies often enter into alliances with non-liberal regimes. In this case, alliances may be based not on ideology, but on shared principles.

It is important to note that attempts to influence the formation of alliances exclusively by granting military and economic aid on preferential terms, in the absence of a common interest (threat), are on the whole unlikely to be successful.¹⁶ In the absence of a common interest, the attempts of great powers to induce potential

¹⁴ Pape R. Soft Balancing against the United States. *International Security*, 30 (1), 2005: pp. 7–45; Paul T. Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy. *International Security*, 30 (1), 2005: pp. 46–71; Pempel T. Soft Balancing, Hedging, and Institutional Darwinism: The Economic–Security Nexus and East Asian Regionalism. *Journal of East Asian Studies*, 10 (2), 2010, pp. 209–38.

¹⁵ Walt S.M. 1990. *The Origins of Alliances*. Cornell: Cornell University Press, pp. 35–81.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 35, 249.

allies to increase cooperation by influencing their internal policies are also largely ineffective. Indeed, if the political leaders do not seem to be willing to cooperate, the attempts of external forces to manipulate internal politics are often counter-productive.¹⁷

An informal strategic alliance (which would be one definition of Greater Europe) is based on: (1) the preservation of complete sovereignty of all its members, and (2) additional benefits for every member of the association (these may be different for different players, but they have to be added benefits). The strategic choice underlying such an alliance is determined not by assessing the costs involved, but by the expectations of future benefits. In short, the decision to create a strategic alliance is based not so much on the assessment of the current situation as on the expectation of future results.

The case for a Greater Europe as a strategic alliance depends to a large degree on the issue of expanding the formal community that already exists in Europe (the European Union). In our opinion, grounds for such an expansion already exist: first, the external environment (meaning its geographically close part, above all, Russia and Turkey) would become more predictable, and second, the risks involved in the interaction with the global environment would be shared (risk-sharing).

2.2. Multi-Level Governance and its Practical Implementation

The decision-making mechanisms in the era of globalization have become more complicated and involve more participants, that is, the process involves various government structures and non-governmental organizations. The results of the activities of state and non-governmental participants in the process are felt beyond national borders.¹⁸ Besides, the authorities at the subnational (regional) level enter into direct contacts with supranational and even global institutions, and vice versa. For these reasons obviously, private individuals and organizations are beginning to play a bigger role in shaping the foreign policies of states.

Expanding the decision-making process in this way and the need to implement these decisions on territories under different jurisdictions is more effective because it takes place on different levels and different scales and takes into account the diverse options depending on the territory and externalities. This is because the remote effects of generating a public product may range from the global scale, as in the case of global warming, to the local level, when the operation of urban utilities is at stake. A multi-level system of governance is necessary in order to adapt political decisions to the situation in territories under different jurisdictions, while at the same time taking into account the local conditions in decision-making.

Multi-level management arose as a real process almost spontaneously. It was not thought up by theoreticians (explanations came later), but rather developed as the sole practical possibility for deeper integration as an alternative to state models. The Westphalian approach to the issue of sovereignty in international re-

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 259–260.

¹⁸ Transnational corporations, international rating agencies, transnational NGOs, etc.

lations has transformed into shared sovereignty, i.e. multi-level governance. The reason is that the Westphalian approach has not turned out to be entirely suitable for explaining what is happening in the European system of state governance given the complex configuration of multi-level institutions. A good example of the emerging system of multi-level governance is the Northern Dimension initiative, in which subnational regions and states (both members and non-members of the European Union, the European Commission and the business community) are involved as equals. The implementation of that initiative shows impressive practical results (notably in environmental protection and healthcare) that can be achieved through a non-hierarchical networking approach. The development of multi-level networking relations contributes to a higher quality of social capital.

Although, in our opinion, the problem of governance acquires new scope in the context of the increasingly “multi-layered” character of political institutions and bodies of power, the transition to multi-level governance cannot be abrupt or automatic because the European state systems outside the European Union (in Russia and Turkey, for example) are ill-prepared for adopting such an approach. Therefore, the practice of multi-level solutions and methods can only be disseminated by way of gradual development, where existing institutions still play the key role in governance.

To reiterate, it should be stressed that we are not advocating the introduction of some new formal “code” of interaction that would be mandatory for the members of Greater Europe. On the contrary, we are talking about an emerging new type of structures in the development of Greater Europe, where government bodies and agencies are complemented by other subjects acting on a multiple and cross-border basis. This approach makes it possible, among other things, to combine the ambitions of the parties interested in building a Greater Europe with other interests and aspirations (that may or may not be directly connected with the project).

3. Working towards United Europe. Lessons for the Future

The idea of Greater Europe is not new: even during Soviet times, politicians were interested in integrating various parts of the continent. Thus, the expression “Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals” was first used in the international domain by the French President Charles de Gaulle in autumn 1962, provoking an angry reaction from Nikita Khrushchev because the words were uttered during the French leader’s state visit to West Germany. In this way, de Gaulle seemed to put the organization of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals in the context of the rapprochement between France and West Germany.¹⁹ There are several competing explanations as to why de Gaulle defined Europe in such a way. Perhaps, it does not matter so much anymore, since de Gaulle himself would later drop the phrase due to its political incorrectness. The expression, however, acquired a life of its own and became a political cliché. There could be no talk, of course, about a “Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals” in the 1960s and later (until the second half of the 1980s).

In the late 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev began to build a Common European Home. Subsequently, during negotiations in Moscow on November 17, 1989, the Presi-

¹⁹ Dubinin Yu. Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals // Russia in Global Affairs, no. 5, 2007 (in Russian).

dent of the French National Assembly told Gorbachev that “France and West Germany, which together initiated the first phase of European construction connected with West European integration, are convinced that they must, in very close cooperation, be among the first in the upcoming stage of all-European construction. And this process began, partly, thanks to you and your new policy.”²⁰ In reply, Gorbachev stressed not only the need to build a common European home, but also the principles on which it was to be built: “not to destroy the system of relations created in Europe, but to transform the existing institutions on the basis of mutual understanding that turns them into genuine instruments of cooperation.”²¹ Gorbachev saw the development of integration processes in the Western and Eastern parts of the continent, with their gradual synchronization, and their merging as steps towards a United Europe. For Gorbachev, an imperative of success was an unchanged number of countries constituting the greater European region. For obvious reasons, Gorbachev hoped that the reforms in the East European countries would be overseen by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the reformed communist parties of these countries (including East Germany) would still play a big, if not the dominant, role in politics.²²

History has shown, however, that Gorbachev’s plan of building “a common European home” at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s was not successful. It could not happen without bringing down the partitions between, and within, states (East and West Germany for the former, and Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia for the latter). Instead, the political algorithm of Chancellor Helmut Kohl prevailed. While we do not discuss the reasons for this, it is important for our purposes here to stress that: (1) the number of states in the greater European continent did not remain the same, it increased; and (2) instead of synchronizing integration processes in the two parts of the continent, one of the poles of integration (the Soviet Union) collapsed and the East European states sharply distanced themselves from the post-Soviet space (above all Russia) and simultaneously made the strategic choice in favour of joining the European Union. Thus, Gorbachev’s idea of a “common European home” began to turn into another project of “eternal peace” which “sounds good, but is hardly feasible in practice” (this was the assessment implicit in the statements of practically all the Western and Central European leaders).²³ Moreover, some Europeans believed that the Soviet Union/Russia, as a superpower, could not in principle propose “an idea for Europe”. Thus, the famous sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf wrote: “If there is a common European home to be sought, this is not Gorbachev’s aspiration, but the yearning of the crumbling empire of his and his predecessors to the West. Europe ends on the Soviet border wherever it may be.” Dahrendorf considered Europe to be a community in which “small and medium-sized countries are trying to determine their destiny together. There is no place among them for a superpower, even if it is no longer an economic or indeed a political giant.”²⁴

²⁰ The Gorbachev Foundation Archive. Stock 1. Inv. 1. Transcript of M.S. Gorbachev’s conversation with Bundestag President Rita Süßmuth and French National Assembly President Laurent Fabius. November 17, 1989.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Asmus R.D. *A United Germany*. Foreign Affairs. Spring 1990.

²³ Zadorozhnik E.G. *Eastern Bloc Countries in 1989: Outlines of a New Political Vector* (based on archive materials) (URL: http://www.gorby.ru/activity/conference/show_338/view_27377) (in Russian).

²⁴ Dahrendorf R. *After 1989. Morality, Revolution and the Civil Society. Reflections on the Revolution in Europe*. Moscow: Ad Marginem, 1998.

It is worth noting that the idea of a United Europe ceased to be a subject of discussion precisely when irreconcilable ideological differences between its two parts disappeared. Nevertheless, there were other things to think about at the time. For the European Union, the 1990s was a time of reformatting, deepening integration, discussing, and adopting new treaties. For Russia, the European choice was sealed in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the European Union, and it was implied that Russia would not seek to form an integration association around itself, but would gradually draw closer to the European Union economically and politically (without, of course, becoming a member). The situation changed dramatically in the first decade of the 2000s: Russia signalled its strategic choice, positioning itself as a “Eurasian”, rather than a “European” power. In terms of domestic policy, there was a clear tendency to avoid a Western (above all European) orientation, but to build its own model of social development. In Russia-European Union relations, the transformation was articulated as a pivot from “common values” to “common interests”. In other words, Europe again saw the emergence of two poles that were ever closer bound together economically, but were drifting apart politically. Clearly, there was no room for United Europe projects in this situation.

The idea of European unification was revived in 2010. By that time, the Russian leadership had fully embraced the premise that Russia was an independent centre of power. But how should relations with the European Union be built? One option was for Russia to become a rival of Western Europe and a competitor in the global world; the other was to become a fully-fledged member of Europe on a par with Brussels, that is, effectively a second (not in terms of significance) centre of power within the common European home.²⁵ Significantly, arguments in favour of one or the other alternative had to do with the global world. If a “union with Europe” is chosen, both the European Union and Russia may avoid being marginalized in global politics, that is, they can avoid a situation where major global events unfold “somewhere else”. This thesis looked particularly convincing against the background of the rapid rise of Asia and its growing role in world affairs.

The new wave of interest in a united Europe saw the expansion of its boundaries (compared with de Gaulle’s definition) and a more precise definition of its spatial parameters (compared with Gorbachev’s approach). Greater Europe was “enlarged” to cover the space from Lisbon to Vladivostok. As a result, the project’s main “selling points” were now that it would be “apolitical, open to different civilizations, and organically linked with the concept of Europe without Borders: ‘no outlying areas, the centre is everywhere.’”²⁶ As the editor-in-chief of the journal *International Affairs*, Armen Oganessian, stressed, “Greater Europe, of course, is not seen by its protagonists as a fortress, bristling against the surrounding world. On the contrary, it is about an expanding sphere of cooperation with Asia and the Asia-Pacific Region, which is of special interest today, as Vladivostok, of course, is not in Central Europe.”²⁷

The analytical paper “Towards an Alliance of Europe” published by the Valdai International Discussion Club in autumn 2010 painted a grim picture: the influence of Russia and the European Union in global politics and the world economy is

²⁵ Lukyanov F. Gorbachev’s Abandoned “European Home”. *The Moscow Times*, March 17, 2010.

²⁶ Oganessian A. Europe: From Lisbon to Vladivostok. URL: <http://www.interaffairs.ru/read.php?item=8029> (in Russian).

²⁷ *Ibid.*

steadily diminishing as the balance of power in the world is changing faster than ever before. “The Age of Asia” is coming: “There emerge conditions for a new system of global governance based on the China–U.S. diarchy.” Furthermore, there is a competition for world resources, such as food and water, while international governance institutions — the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, NATO, the OECD and G8 — are growing weaker. The G20 is not the prototype body of new global governance. This report suggests that the main prerequisite for (apparently the last) unification of Europe is negative. “Russia and the European Union are destined to be second- or even third-rate players in the new world”: Europe will become a monument to its past grandeur and Russia will become a raw materials backyard, most probably of Asia now. In other words, the stimulus for unification comes from outside and is determined by the international context: Europe and Russia are incapable each by itself to “do the homework assigned by the external environment.” They will inevitably be marginalized until the question of their survival comes to the forefront. It has to be stressed that one of the premises of this report is the idea of a new rise of the nation state.

The answer is to mobilize the political will of the parties and develop a long-term (essentially integrationist) project. The proposed foundation of the “new community” is a Treaty on the Alliance of Europe that would “not merely set down the rules of behaviour, but make it binding on the parties to work out a common position on key international issues.” Attached to the Treaty would be a system of sectorial agreements — roadmaps of access to factors of the production of goods and services throughout the continent and their free circulation. Thus, the future Union of Europe would be based on the principles (some, but not all of which are known to the authors of the paper) of “freedom of movement, shared decisions on key international issues, etc.”²⁸

Simultaneously, the idea of a United Europe is back on the Russian political agenda. Subsequently, in late 2010, (then Prime Minister) Vladimir Putin, addressing a forum of the heads of leading German companies organized by *Suddeutsche Zeitung*, shared his vision of a united Europe as a “harmonious community of economies from Lisbon to Vladivostok. And in the future, perhaps a free trade zone and even more advanced forms of economic integration.” The result of such a community would be “a common continental market worth trillions of euros.”²⁹ The Russian Prime Minister at that time believed that the idea of “creating a single energy complex of Europe” was also feasible. The main obstacle in the way of these plans is the visa regime between Russia and the European Union, which should be lifted if real integration of the continent is to begin³⁰.

In the summer of 2011, the leader of the Right Cause (*Pravoye Delo*) party Mikhail Prokhorov unveiled a key point of his programme: his party is depending on the Greater Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok project, with Russia becoming integrated into the Schengen Area and the Eurozone. Prokhorov believes that the return to the idea of Greater Europe would within seven to ten years make Russia

²⁸ See *Towards an Alliance of Europe. Analytical Report by the Russian Group of the Valdai International Discussion Club*. Moscow: SVOP, 2010.

²⁹ Putin V.V. *A United Europe: From Learning the Lessons of the Crisis to a New Partnership Agenda*. *Suddeutsche Zeitung*. November 25, 2010 (in Russian).

³⁰ *Ibid.*

a leading European economy, enable the euro to stand on its feet, strengthen Europe's sovereignty and help to overcome the systemic crisis facing the global economy in a timely manner.³¹ Prokhorov thinks that "Europe and Russia should become a strike force capable of holding its own against the two other global systems — China and India (Asia) on the one hand, and the United States plus Latin America on the other."³²

We see that there has been no shortage of projects to unite Europe. Nevertheless, none of them have been successful. Moreover, some experts quickly changed tack: "Moscow can no longer assume the inevitability and desirability of a strategic partnership with the aim of creating a future establishment of a single international and political community. The focus of this new strategy should be the idea of Europe as a secure rear of Russia in the west, a relationship which would ensure the resources needed to meet the main challenges facing the nation's foreign policy and foreign economic policy in the 21st century. Most of these challenges come from the south and the east."³³

Our main premise is fundamentally different. Granted, the projects of building a common Europe have failed, but they are far from useless. One reason is that their analysis enables us to formulate several cautionary "lessons" for the future, showing us "what not to do".

First, the project of Greater Europe cannot be implemented in parallel with the large-scale geopolitical restructuring of the continent when both the interests of the main players, and the circle of players itself, is not defined (this is illustrated by the collapse of the Common European Home project Gorbachev initiated on the eve of the dissolution of the Soviet Union).

Second, it hardly serves any useful purpose to define the boundaries and space of Greater Europe in terms of "from" and "to", be it from the Atlantic to the Urals or from Lisbon to Vladivostok. In this case, the very definition draws the potential lines of division, something that should be avoided.

Third, in conceptualizing Greater Europe, the idea of the rise of the nation state is unproductive (the idea is voiced in the report "Towards an Alliance of Europe"); it is not that the idea is wrong in principle, but giving it prominence today is perceived as an obstacle in the way of unification efforts.

Fourth, the argument on the need to oppose other world power centres, primarily the United States and China, is not helpful. Such arguments are to be found in many projects and they usually boil down to the reasoning that: (1) objectively, these centres of power (above all the United States, of course) are not interested in the economic recovery of Russia or Western Europe; and (2) there are serious grounds for a confrontation between Europe and the United States. It has to be noted that contradictions between the United States and major Western European countries do arise from time to time in the political and economic spheres. It would be naïve, however, to believe that they are important enough to prompt

³¹ URL: <http://www.forum.nnov.org/gorodskaya-zhizn/novosti/76429-m-prohorov-predlozhiil-koncepciyu-bol-shoi-evropy.html> (in Russian).

³² URL: <http://www.inosmi.ru/russia/20121023/201290505.html> (in Russian).

³³ Bordachev T.V., Romanova T.A. How to Make Europe a Secure Rear? // Russia in Global Affairs. December 16, 2013 (URL: <http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/Kak-sdelat-Evropu-nadezhnym-tylom-16255>) (in Russian).

European Union countries to seek closer relations with Russia in order to shore up its positions in relations with the United States. Consequently, this argument is likely to be counter-productive for the purposes of building a Greater Europe.

Fifth, the patently unfeasible plans, whose inevitable failure could devalue the very idea of unification, create inflated expectations and are clearly doing a dis-service to Greater Europe. And yet such impossible plans are made not only by politicians (which is understandable), but also by experts (which is much worse). Besides, Greater Europe cannot be built on principles proven to be unworkable in “little” Europe (i.e., in the European Union). I am referring to the Treaty on the Alliance of Europe which, according to its authors, should not only set down the rules of conduct of the parties, but also oblige them to work out a common position. Within the European Union, foreign policy is based exclusively on a voluntary (not binding) basis, with the players having the right of veto on key issues. This is the only way to make slow but steady progress. Therefore, the suggestion that the Treaty (which would in any case be seen as a very risky undertaking) should oblige anyone to do anything automatically makes it unworthy of any serious analysis or examination.

Finally, Greater Europe cannot be based only on the declarations of leaders and the efforts of experts. The project needs a stronger fabric, that is, demand from “below” coming from the citizens.

4. Greater Europe: Three Levels of Interaction and Cooperation

Today, we are witnessing a radical transformation of the very nature of international diplomacy: high-level politics, while still important, is combined with the growing intensity of horizontal networking, with the horizontal links between state and non-state actors determining the political agenda and its implementation. A multitude of players of various natures, interests and priorities coexist within Greater Europe and interact at a number of levels. Some of these actors focus on the relationship between Russia (or Turkey) and the European Union as a whole, while others are more interested in good bilateral ties. Similarly, some participants concentrate on specific issues, for example, security, the environment, energy supply or democratic development. Thus, Greater Europe will (and must) develop at various levels: at the level of big-time politics; at the medium level (meso-politics), where business groups play the key role; and at the “lower” political level (and all of them are strategically interconnected). It is important to note here that these levels develop asymmetrically. Presumably, progress in this or that area is also likely to be asymmetric. Very slow progress at certain levels of cooperation or in certain areas will tend to increase the speed of development at other levels.

4.1. “High-level” Politics

Progress at this level warrants discussion about Greater Europe as an existing or emerging space. The aim at the high level is to find a common denominator (which naturally cannot be too high) for all the states within the boundaries of Greater Europe. Under the current conditions, the central point around which the

components of the common denominator revolve can only be the concept of security, which serves as an indicator: Greater Europe is a community based on security (or a security community). In building a security community, we create a situation where war among its members is ruled out as a political instrument, so that all participants are fully confident that the differences between them would be resolved only through instruments that exclude the use of force.

The functioning of a security community presupposes (at least as a goal to be worked towards) a sufficient level of trust among the members of the association, with this trust supported by institutions that formulate the obligations of the members. Nowhere in the world are peace institutions as numerous and developed as they are in Europe. When observing the institutional structure of modern Europe, however, we have to note that, while the number of institutions is sufficient, their quality (in terms of the level of trust they ensure) is questionable.

That is why promoting a discussion on the institutional architecture of a Greater European space (including the effectiveness of the current mechanism of the NATO–Russia Council, the OSCE and the Council of Europe) should be an important step. We are aware that the institutional architecture of Europe at present is a confusing system, as neither the future relations between the participants of the Eurozone and the rest of the European Union, nor the relations between Turkey and the European Union are clear.

The profound political crisis in Ukraine is undermining this most important level of links. It is not our task to dwell on what caused the escalation of the situation. Let us merely note that the internal conditions for the crisis had been building up for a long time due to growing financial problems, economic mismanagement and corruption at the government level. The latent crisis erupted into the open after President Viktor Yanukovich refused to sign an Association Agreement with the European Union. This provoked a wave of protests called Euromaidan (protests on Kiev's main square, Maidan Nezalezhnosti), whose duration and persistence the Ukrainian President misjudged and as a result effectively lost his grip on the country. (It is worth noting that the scale of the crisis would have been far less severe had the European Union agreed in advance its proposal to Kiev and the approach to Ukraine's further relations with Russia, the Customs Union [the Eurasian Union], as well as the demands of the IMF and the norms and rules of the WTO.)

The Geneva accords between Russia, the European Union, the United States and Ukraine, aimed at the de-escalation of the crisis, proved to be more a declaration of intent than a binding document. Ukraine, however, is still in desperate need of assistance and the key tasks are: to achieve agreements between Russia, the European Union and the United States to end the violence and defuse the crisis, to work out common measures to bail out the country's economy, and to hold democratic, transparent and fair elections. Unfortunately, the European Union sanctions against Russia envisage, among other things, cancelling the Russia–European Union summit which could have tackled all these complicated political and economic issues.

Obviously, the process of overcoming the crisis will not be smooth: agreements will be signed, disrupted and signed again. It is important that the participants of the process (above all the European Union and Russia) do not approach the

negotiations with the initial premise that the future can only be “a second Cold War”. It is, of course, a clear and simple approach, but it is strategically wrong.

4.2. A Meso-Level of Interaction

This is the level of the most dynamic and at the same time the most complicated and diverse kind of interaction in Europe. We are looking at the huge and constantly growing scale of cooperation, but here, too, tensions and contradictions increase. Moreover, this level is very asymmetric: the intensity of interaction between different subjects in different areas still varies greatly. We are aware that getting rid of asymmetries is neither a declared goal, nor a feasible task, because asymmetries are immanent to this level.

Trade and economic cooperation between Russia and the European Union forms the basis of interaction at the meso-level. Big business is the main driver of this level. It has the resources to lobby its projects effectively with government structures, which helps to create and maintain incentives for these structures to form a business-friendly environment and thus increase cooperation.

The focus of relations at this level is energy. What looks like a purely economic sphere inevitably has political effects, not least because it is directly linked to state security. Furthermore, the energy sphere is highly sensitive to the character of relations in “high-level politics” and reacts accordingly. For this reason, the high probability of political bargaining and confrontation in the energy field is understandable, though undesirable.

De-politicizing the energy sphere is not possible (although Russia and the European Union have declared this goal), at least for the foreseeable future. One can merely hope to reduce the degree of politicization, which would be a substantial but hard-to-achieve improvement. The degree of politicization could be lowered by further developing the legal framework of relations and broadening the circle of actors involved by bringing in energy companies, environmental groups and the expert community.

It has to be stressed that this level of interaction, for all its shortcomings due to objective and subjective causes, is one of the key elements in the structure of Greater Europe. Since we cannot expect any sudden and radical change of the situation, the key question is how to derive maximum benefits under the current conditions. Therefore, the task at this level with regard to the Greater Europe plan is to seek the greatest possible interaction while minimizing its politicization.

4.3. The Third Level: “The Fabric” of Greater Europe (Regional Development and Cross-Border Cooperation)

The importance of cooperation in Europe at this level is sometimes underestimated and, indeed, it is not seen as a tool for solving complicated political and economic problems. And yet, in a certain sense, this is the key level: it implies flexible decisions, a great diversity of forms and, as a consequence, quick results. This level of interaction not only allows, but also encourages various

actors — from representatives of states and supra-national bodies (the European Union) to business, regional and local authorities and non-governmental organizations — to be involved in the process. Good practices developed in one place can easily be borrowed for use in other areas. Besides — and this could be the decisive factor — cooperation at the “lower” level forms the “fabric” that keeps the European space together even in periods of tension and conflict at the higher levels of interaction.

The density of this fabric, of course, is very unevenly distributed in Europe: in some places (for example, on the Russian-Finnish border) it is a fairly dense network, while in other cases the links are tenuous or non-existent. But, on the whole, the existence of this framework is a major prerequisite for cooperation at other levels. It is also important that tensions and conflicts at the level of “high politics” need not diminish the potential for practical interaction at the “lower” political level. Moreover, successful cooperation at the lower level may potentially change the situation or the approach of one of the sides. Thus, the overall task at this level (in terms of the future of Greater Europe) is to launch as many functionally and practically significant projects as possible. One of the necessary conditions for progress at this level is a favourable investment climate that would attract small and medium-sized businesses.

In fact, we can identify two main areas at the regional and local levels: region-building and cross-border cooperation.

Region-Building

For Russia, the European Union and Turkey, one of the best ways to develop cooperation in border territories and involve neighbouring countries in multilateral projects may be the building of regions with a view to strengthening institutional complexes.

For various reasons, the regions in the European space are at different stages of development. Although the process of forming regions is developing in a highly asymmetric manner, we can speak about the Northern area (Northern Europe in the broader sense), the Baltic, the Black Sea and the Caspian regions (in the latter case, we are talking about a potential, rather than a concrete, project).

There may be various grounds for creating regions, the most obvious one being a “common identity” (historical, cultural, etc.) that is cut across by the state border. The situation in the Baltic region, however, shows that even in the absence of a common identity it is possible to build a region when there are common models and rules. For example, areas of mutual interest in the Baltic region may include the joint management of one or several energy projects and the revival of the concept of Kaliningrad as a pilot project in relations between Russia and the European Union.

In the Black Sea region the common denominator for Russia, the European Union and Turkey may be a strategy aimed at relieving tensions (de-securitization). In the Caspian region, the outlines of a common agenda for the European Union and Russia remain unclear. However, the parties could combine their capabilities to prevent military conflicts in that part of the border territories.

Cross-Border Cooperation

Growing political tensions between players may be (partly) offset by cooperation at other institutional levels, first and foremost by developing cross-border cooperation. To achieve success, it is crucial to separate the context of cooperation from the problems of “high politics”. Cross-border and inter-regional cooperation programmes will be more effective if concentrated around local non-political issues. We admit that this kind of programme is ill-suited for the development of such “highly” politicized issues as democracy in Russia, freedom of the press, human rights, security and energy supply. At the same time, practice has shown that projects concerned with the environment, infrastructure development, education and culture, urban utilities and housing sector can be very promising at this level.

The substantial progress made in the development of cross-border interaction between the European Union and Russia is worth noting. Cross-border cooperation programmes set the following tasks: (1) developing border regions economically and socially; (2) tackling those problems and challenges that may be important for territories on both sides of the border (environment, energy, health-care, etc.); (3) ensuring the effectiveness and security of borders; (4) developing people contacts. Russia is currently involved (on a joint financing basis) in five programmes: Kolarctic, Karelia, South-East Finland–Russia, Estonia–Latvia–Russia and Lithuania–Poland–Russia.

5. The Central Axis: Russia and the European Union (Conditions, Constraints, Institutions)

In recent years, relations between Russia and the European Union have been paradoxical: while their interdependence in trade has been growing steadily, cooperation in the political sphere, far from developing, has actually been curtailed. The biggest tensions between the European Union and Russia have been connected with energy security.

Both Moscow and Brussels see their problematic character of relations as a sustained trend. Today, it would seem that no other country worries the European Union more than the geographically close Russia. Criticism is levied at Russia primarily for the regime’s unpredictability in foreign policy (which has had negative consequences for investors), widespread systemic corruption, excessive centralization and “the vertical power structure”. Russia takes a similarly critical position. Its main complaint is that the actions of the European Union are aimed at spreading not only the market mechanisms to its partners, but also its legal norms and values. Moreover, these rules do not necessarily provide the most effective solutions. The European Union stands to gain from extrapolation of its legislation because it simplifies cooperation with third countries and facilitates the activities of European companies. As a result, the European Union leads the way, while its partners tag along and their specific needs are ignored. All this runs counter to the principle of equality of partners, which is the key principle of Russia’s foreign policy.

The institutions that link the two sides (for example, the summits that take place twice a year) become routine and do not make any real difference. Any potentially

divisive issue (even of a purely practical character) is immediately politicized. Relations are becoming “virtual”. All this may indicate that Russia and the European Union have totally different trajectories and philosophies on development, which lead them to distancing themselves from one another more and more. The world financial and economic crisis added to the uncertainty. Thus, a weariness of inflated expectations and disenchantment were building up even before the Ukrainian crisis.

In terms of the prospects for building a Greater Europe, relations between Russia and the European Union are the central axis of interaction. When assessing the links between Russia and the European Union, one should bear in mind a number of objective and fundamental conditions that could act as constraints on cooperation and determine its very character.

5.1. The High Level of Interdependence and its Asymmetric Character

Trade and economic relations between Russia and European Union countries look highly dynamic (especially against the deteriorating political background). European countries are traditionally Russia’s most important partners. The European Union accounts for slightly more than half of Russia’s foreign trade, and about 70 percent of accrued foreign investments. Mutual trade is growing steadily. The past decade has seen Russia rise to third place in the list of the European Union trade partners behind the United States and China, accounting for 7 percent of its exports and 11 percent of its imports.

However, these relations are markedly asymmetric. There are still major imbalances in the structure of trade. Three-quarters of Russian export is energy; low-added value goods form the bulk of exports, while machines and equipment account for less than 1 percent. European Union countries provide Russia with equipment (about 45 percent); industrial equipment accounts for a mere 8 percent, which attests to the slow pace of modernization of the Russian industry; chemicals account for 18 percent; and food accounts for 10 percent. There is a similar imbalance within individual sectors: for example, Russia supplies the European Union with chemicals and mineral fertilizers, i.e. products with low added value, in exchange primarily for medicines and perfumes. Trade in services is modest in scale and unfavourably structured.

Mutual investments are massive and growing steadily. Most investments come in the shape of credits, however, and a significant part of portfolio investments can be regarded as speculative. Direct investments in the Russian economy only account for around 20 percent and are mainly aimed at import replacement (the food and automobile industry) and retail trade, or at gaining access to raw materials (oil mining and the power industry). Only a few companies from the European Union invest money in Russia to organize production for export.

High energy prices and the growing importance of trade in fuel (above all natural gas) make for a special relationship. This is due to the high share of revenues from the export of natural resources creating specific incentives for Russia’s economic development and growth, and for the shaping of its political system and foreign policy. Thus, in the 2000s, which saw rising energy prices, there was a growing divergence between the economic and political spheres in relations

between the Russian Federation and the European Union: as the European Union became more dependent on supplies from Russia, political relations deteriorated steadily. Meanwhile, Russia in the 2000s did not earn the reputation of a reliable supplier of energy resources, but instead that honour went to the Soviet Union and Russia in the 1990s. Moreover, that reputation was put into question by a series of “energy wars” between Russia and some post-Soviet states.

We should bear in mind that the dependence of European countries on Russian supplies of energy is far too often presented as being one-sided: Europe has no option because two-thirds of Russian energy exports go to the European Union. However, relations between Russia and the European Union are characterized by bilateral, rather than one-sided, dependence. Russia simply has no other markets where it can sell its natural gas and it has to rely on European demand. Moreover, the market prices that European consumers pay for Russian gas are much higher than what Russia could expect to get on any other potential market.

5.2. Geographical Proximity and Competition for the Post-Soviet Space

Russia and the European Union are geographic neighbours: they have a common border. Furthermore, both Russia and the European Union have their own interests in the former Soviet states between them, which they propose to pursue in fundamentally different ways. It is important for Russia to understand that the way in which the European Union is formatting the space outside its borders reflects the special nature of that association. The formatting process develops through the spread of the system of institutions (rules of the game) — political, economic and socio-cultural. The numerous European Union initiatives are aimed not so much (or largely) at national governments as they are at regional and local authorities, as well as civil society and business structures.

The only exception was the Eastern Partnership initiative (2009), which targeted six post-Soviet states (excluding Russia). The initiative drew a sharp reaction from Moscow, which saw it as a challenge in the region that Russia considers to be its zone of interests. Russia claimed that the initiative effectively forced the states concerned to make a strategic choice between the European Union and Russia, and was evidence of the increasing use of double standards: while paying lip-service to the removal of dividing lines in Europe, the European Union was actually seeking to create and strengthen them with the aim of isolating Russia strategically. It was the Eastern Partnership, as well as the extremely wobbly position of the Ukrainian leadership (right up to the Vilnius summit in November 2013) on the issue of Ukraine’s rapprochement with the European Union that resulted in the Ukrainian crisis growing and getting out of control.

The post-Soviet space factor will undoubtedly be one of the elements that will determine the character of Russia–European Union relations in the future. In the common neighbourhood space, the problem of crisis settlement is elevated to the strategic level; the problems of Russia–European Union interaction in the common neighbourhood region are the biggest source of tension. It is this most sensitive component of the relations that should be treated as the priority, with the proviso that negotiations should continue until a real result acceptable to all parties is achieved. It is no secret that there are some players who think they

would benefit most if no result is achieved. It is necessary to bring in the very best practical experts — people who are capable of quickly formulating new proposals, and just as quickly and flexibly reformulating them.

5.3. Russia and the European Union: Institutional Dynamics

Official relations between the USSR and the European Economic Community (EEC) were established in August 1988. Work began at once on formalizing the legal treaty relations; the EEC proposed a Trade and Cooperation Agreement which was signed in Brussels on December 11, 1989. The negotiations revealed the differences between the Soviet and European positions. Moscow expected that a rapprochement with the EEC would in itself be a major factor for reform within the country. Therefore, the Soviet “negotiators” tried to make the future agreement as broad as possible, and were eager in particular to rid the USSR of the label of “a country with state-controlled trade”. The EEC, on the contrary, sought to make the agreement as narrow as possible, regarding the USSR as “a country with state-controlled trade”.

The first 1989 agreement was undoubtedly a breakthrough in relations between the Soviet Union and Western Europe, but it was inherently a temporary document. It proceeded from the existence of different socio-economic systems in the USSR and Western Europe and to some extent reflected the (justified) mistrust on the part of the EEC towards the ongoing changes in the USSR. In any case, the Soviet Union was dissolved two years later, and the EEC experienced a serious transformation, making obvious the need for creating a different legal framework for relations between the two entities.

A new document, Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), was signed on June 24, 1994 by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, the European Union heads of state and government and the ECC chairman. The Agreement came into force on December 1, 1997, the delay of ratification by the European side having been caused by the fact that the intervening period saw the fourth wave of European Union enlargement (Austria, Sweden and Finland joined the Union) and the agreement with Russia had to be signed and ratified by the three new member states. The PCA played a very important role in the development of ties between the European Union and the Russian Federation because it sealed the transition from strictly bilateral relations between Russia and the various European Union member countries to relations with the European Union as a whole, provided the political and legal basis for them, and established institutions for political dialogue. Article 106 of the Agreement stated that it was to be extended automatically every year.

By the mid-1990s, it became clear to the European Union that the PCA was not sufficient for building relations with Russia. Therefore the European Union proposed enlarging the tools of common foreign policy. The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) for the first time introduced a new instrument in the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union called Common Strategies. The first Common Strategy (CS) with regard to Russia was developed and adopted by the European Union in 1999 practically without discussion. Under that document, the European Union put forward two strategic goals for relations with the Russian Federation: (1) to seek a stable, open and pluralistic democracy in Russia;

and (2) to maintain European stability, global security and respond to the common challenges for the continent through intensive cooperation with Russia.

However, turning the Common Strategy on Russia into an effective instrument of the European Union's foreign policy met with serious difficulties and the initiative, adopted in 1999 for an initial four-year period and extended in June 2003, was curtailed by the middle of 2004. First, the adoption of a Common Strategy on Russia was complicated by the situation in Russia because it was launched during the last months of Boris Yeltsin's presidency, when the outlines of a new political regime had not yet taken shape. Second, it was not essentially a strategic document. There was a consensus within the European Union on the great importance of links with Russia, but the member countries were unable to agree on the real priorities of the Union in its relations with Russia. Thus, the document was the result of a struggle of national interests and inter-governmental approvals; it could not but set a very low "common denominator" — only the most general provisions (support for democracy, pluralism and the market economy) on which there were no differences.

In connection with the preparation of a large-scale expansion of the European Union (2004), the EU Commission issued a report entitled *Wider Europe — Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours*. This document set forth the European Commission's position on future relations with Russia, the "Western Newly Independent States" (Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova) and the southern Mediterranean countries,³⁴ all of which were defined as states with no immediate prospects of joining the European Union. The European Commission's proposals became the official policy of the European Union towards the neighbour states. Border and inter-regional cooperation became a very important component. The new "neighbourhood policy" was met with little enthusiasm on Russia's part, obviously more work was needed to build common institutions.

The new concept of common spaces was born at the time of rapidly growing disenchantment and discontent with the architecture of existing relations both in the European Union and in Russia. Moscow was fiercely critical of the *Wider Europe* concept, which put Russia on the same footing as the European Union's other neighbours; the European Union, for its part, was disappointed with Russia's departure from the course based on "common values" as declared in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. At the EU–Russia Summit held in St. Petersburg in May 2003, the two parties reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening partnership and developing cooperation, with the aim of creating, in the long term, four common PCA spaces, including: the Common Economic Space;³⁵

³⁴ The South Mediterranean region includes Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, the Palestine Authority, Syria and Tunisia.

³⁵ The idea of creating a common European economic space was put forward as early as May 2001 by the European Commission President Romano Prodi. To work out the idea, a High Level Group was created under the First Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Viktor Khristenko and the European Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten (the Khristenko–Patten Group). Economic space means a territory on which there are common and/or similar rules of activity for all the economic actors, a system of institutions ensuring the free movement of goods, services, capital and people. The term is used to characterize relations between the European Union and the European Free Trade Association countries — Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. In the case of Russia, we are talking about creating a common, not a single economic space. This means that the parties retain their sovereignty and do all they can to promote "the four freedoms", but the degree of freedom depends on the concrete political and economic conditions.

the Common Space on External Security; the Common Space of freedom, security and justice; and the Common Space on research, education and culture. This practically signalled a transition from cooperation on the basis of “common values” to a more pragmatic project, the deepening of selective interaction. The EU–Russia Summit, where four roadmaps on common space were signed, was held in Moscow in May 2005.

The most important of the four Common spaces is the Common Economic Space — the space where, in spite of the Russian negotiators’ efforts, the structure and meaning (“bringing legislations closer together”) was retained in the form proposed by the European Commission. The only fundamental difference of the road maps from the neighbourhood programmes was a substantial reduction of the extent to which various measures aimed at harmonizing Russian legal norms with those of the European Union were binding on Russia. It should be noted that the road maps are not international legal documents, which effectively turns them into “declarations of intent”.

Meanwhile, the initial ten-year PCA expired on December 1, 2007. Russia first raised the issue of the “2007 factor” as early as 2005. At the Russia–EU summit in Sochi in May 2006, a political agreement was reached to start working on a new framework agreement between the Russian Federation and the European Union.

Negotiations on the signing of a new document were due to begin at the next Russia–EU Summit in November 2006, but the process was held back first by Poland and then by Lithuania. It was not until June 2008 that Russia and the European Union officially announced in Khanty–Mansiysk, Russia the start of negotiations on a new agreement. The European Union’s main aim was to secure guarantees that Moscow’s policy would not affect oil and gas supply. The European side was pressing Russia to ratify the Energy Charter Treaty that would put an end to Gazprom’s monopoly on pipelines.

It should be noted that in 2010, the European Union and Russia launched the Partnership for Modernisation initiative, which was a practical outcome of the dialogues on Common Spaces and served as an instrument for its implementation, as the parties stated when announcing the creation of the Partnership. Initially, great hopes were pinned on the new institution (Partnership), but so far it has yielded very modest results.

The prolonged pause in the talks on a New Framework Agreement between the European Union and Russia arose due to the fundamentally different approaches of the two sides to some key issues. One of the pivotal, and still unresolved, issues concerns bilateral trade and the economic regime. The European Union interprets the declared “WTO+” concept as something more than a classic free trade zone. Europe insists on the liberalization of trade in services, the regulation and liberalization of investments, limited mutual access to the market of state procurements, and increased cooperation in the sphere of competition policy and intellectual property protection. Obviously, given the current structure of the Russian economy and its export activities, a free trade zone in this format does not match Russia’s interests. The expectation was that Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization would give a push towards talks with the European Union on a New Framework Agreement. The opposite happened: Russia’s acces-

sion to the WTO created a new framework for talks with the European Union, but nevertheless made it harder to reach an agreement.

Even before the Ukrainian crisis, there were ample grounds for expecting tension between Russia and the European Union to continue because the leaders of both sides did not see much point in seeking a compromise. On the contrary, they saw the continuing tensions as a mechanism for achieving internal accord (within Russia and the European Union) in the face of possible transformations of their political systems.

While recognizing that Russia was a “special case” and that the European-Russian subsystem of international relations was important, the European Union nevertheless tried to “shoehorn” the Russian case into its common foreign policy up until the mid-2000s, avoiding the development of special instruments for Russia. Indeed, partnership and cooperation agreements were signed with all the post-Soviet republics, with the exception of Tajikistan and the Baltic countries. The European Union is developing Common Strategies with all the countries/regions, where the member states have common interests. The neighbourhood policy is addressed not only to Russia, but also to the eastern and even southern Mediterranean border areas of the European Union. Even the Common Economic Space (the first of the four declared Spaces) as an instrument of rapprochement was first tested by the European Union through its policy towards the European Free Trade Association countries. This approach failed, however, because the Russian side insisted on the specific character of its strategic partnership with the EU and showed no desire to be in “the system of coordinates” of the European Neighbourhood Policy, which eventually led to the formation of the “four spaces” concept.

The persisting tensions, misunderstandings and finally conflict with Russia provide “fertile” ground for raising the unifying issue of forging a consensus on the need to have a common foreign policy. The strategy of confrontation with Russia became the only consensus option for the EU institutions, notably for the European Commission and the European Parliament. Naturally, this state of affairs is at odds with a Greater Europe.

Today, the “old” institutional balance between Russia and the European Union (which existed, for all its flaws) has been destroyed and we are in the midst of an institutional vacuum, at least at the level of “high politics”. The challenge is to make sure that after the de-escalation of the political crisis the establishment of a new equilibrium follows the most favourable of all objectively possible scenarios.

6. Turkey: Prospects of European Union Membership and Participation in Building Greater Europe

One of the key prerequisites for the creation of Greater Europe is that each pole has to find its place within it, understand it and find the project attractive — not only (or largely) in terms of enhancing the common good of Europe as whole, but first and foremost in terms of the benefits for its own country. In other words, each pole should be clearly aware of the rationale of its participation in Greater

Europe. This prompts questions that are far from idle: what does Greater Europe mean for Turkey? What is better for that country: to take an active part in building Greater Europe or to limit its European agenda to the prospect of European Union membership and focus only on that goal?

6.1. Turkey: Great Achievements and Deep Divisions

Turkey today is receiving ever more attention. Located at the crossroads of Asia and Europe and linking the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, the country occupies a key geostrategic position. The pace of Turkish development is amazing: in the last decade its economy grew almost threefold; and on average Turkish people are now just 30 percent less wealthy than average EU citizens. Turkey is called “the most important political experiment,” referring to the project of building a Muslim, democratic, secular, and economically stable country that links the EU with the Middle East. Turkey (alongside Brazil, India and Indonesia) is considered a “global swing” state. Each of these four nations possesses a large and growing economy, a strategic location in their region and a commitment to democratic institutions. One crucial factor is that each nation’s international role is not yet defined, and fluctuates. It is these mixed political orientations that lend more weight and significance to these countries than one might assume judging by the size of their population and economy.³⁶

But, this is only part of the story. Despite this significant progress, Turkey remains politically divided. It has yet to make the strategic choice between becoming a global power and taking a more parochial path. The split within Turkey is deep and has many dimensions. Most experts view it as the latest stage in the long struggle between Islamism and Kemal Ataturk’s secularism. Others point to the traditional split between conservative Anatolia and modern Istanbul, between egalitarianism and elitism, between democratic and authoritarian political choice.³⁷

In addition, a “fresh” territorial split caused by relatively new processes in the private sector, i.e. the impressive growth of the so-called “Anatolian Tigers,” is gaining momentum. Anatolian Tigers is a term used to refer to conservative-minded middle-class people who live mainly in Turkey’s southeast regions. For this group, EU membership is not a priority. On the contrary, they support the reorientation of Turkish foreign economic strategy toward the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. The Tigers consider this area to be the most promising for intensified market development. Geographically nearby — this territory is also close culturally, and the level of competition there is still relatively low. The Anatolian middle class is in fact acting as a kind of promoter of Turkish rapprochement with its eastern and southern neighbors. Not only is the image of the European Union in Turkey deteriorating — it is deteriorating fast. For this reason, it is important to understand that the continuation of this trend in the long term could pose a serious problem, not only in terms of the country’s accession to the EU, but also to prospects of attaining a less ambitious goal, namely the development of political cooperation between Turkey and the EU.

³⁶ Kliman D., Fontaine R. *Global Swing States: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Turkey and the Future of International Order*. Report: German Marshall Fund of the United States. November 2012.

³⁷ Cagaptay S. *Turkey at the Crossroads*. Los Angeles Times. March 6, 2013.

6.2. What's at Stake for Turkey Outside of the EU?

Turkey's attitude towards Europe has traditionally been influenced by the country's prospects for EU membership. Indeed, Turkey's accession to the EU is in every respect an extraordinary process. The question of Turkey's full membership of the European Union is undoubtedly a key issue for the country's future and its strategic choice in both foreign and domestic policies. In recent decades a number of countries have joined international organizations, but the problem of choosing a strategic path has never been as acute as it is in Turkey.³⁸

At the same time, Turkey's failure to join the EU has often been viewed as fraught with problems. First, there is talk that it would be accompanied by a significant "brain-drain" affecting the creative class, i.e. people who value freedom of speech, media, assembly and association, as well as personal freedom. This "creative class" regards Turkey's EU accession — in reality and not just on paper — as a default guarantee that the country has prioritized and will uphold these values. Second, the non-membership of the EU could not only see reforms rolled back, but could also fuel the popularity of hard-line anti-EU views. Moreover, since formally democratic institutions are already operating in Turkey, the country risks falling into the trap of a hybrid regime, faced with the difficult task of balancing between the existing formal democracy and weak authoritarianism.

In Brussels, of course, there is an understanding that, should the negotiating process run into delays, the disappointed leaders of Turkey will continue to dissociate the country from the European Union both politically and ideologically. Other considerations aside, the absence of significant achievements and the lack of clear signals on the timing of a positive completion of the negotiation process will have serious negative consequences for the perception of the EU among Europe's own Muslim community. For this community, the outcome of negotiations on Turkey is a kind of test on the place and role of Muslims on the continent.

6.3. What's at Stake for the EU if It Embraces Turkey?

On the other hand, Turkey's accession is fraught with numerous problems for the EU. Indeed, Turkey's membership would undoubtedly have a profound impact on both the material (the inevitable redistribution of financial resources) and conceptual components of how the EU operates. Therefore, the decision to admit the country cannot be made solely on the basis of progress on meeting the Copenhagen criteria. There are at least three additional factors that will play a major role: the material costs of the country's EU membership, the perception of its "European character" and the internal dynamics of EU development.³⁹

The specific nature of Turkey's accession as an issue manifests itself in the negotiation process. For the first time in EU enlargement history, negotiations are defined as "an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaran-

³⁸ Arvanitopoulos C., Tzifakis N. Introduction. In: *Turkey's Accession to the European Union: An Unusual Candidacy* / Ed. C. Arvanitopoulos. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2009, p. 1.

³⁹ Miftler-Ba M. Turkey's accession to the European Union: The impact of the EU's internal dynamics. *International Studies Perspectives*, 9 (2), 2008, pp. 204–205.

teed beforehand.⁴⁰ Thus, the EU actually reserves the right to withdraw from negotiations on Turkey's membership.⁴¹ It is important to take into account the nature of the EU's decision-making process on the admission of new members. Turkey's main task and key priorities are to develop a political dialogue with all EU member-states (playing, naturally, its own game), rather than adapting to the *acquis communautaire* (i.e. accumulated legislation, laws, and court decisions which constitute the body of European Union law). It is an extremely difficult task to overcome hundreds of possible vetoes, which potentially could be imposed by any EU country on any issue. For this reason, the accession negotiations with Turkey, regardless of what is discussed, are unequivocally shaped by politics and politics alone. The negotiations will, after all, result in a political decision.⁴² To reiterate, the key to the negotiation process lies in the sphere of inter-governmental relations between Turkey and each individual European Union member.

In addition, the degree of uncertainty associated with the process of Turkey's EU accession highlights the need to overcome the impact of the global financial and economic crisis and to discuss the Eurozone's future.

Inside the EU, the issue of Turkey's accession causes a split within the elites and within society more broadly. The EU member-states' national elites are very far from reaching consensus on Turkey's accession to the EU: some support its full integration, while others advocate a "privileged partnership" format. In 2009, Nicolas Sarkozy spoke directly against the country's accession to the Union, arguing that Turkey should not expect full membership, but should be closely linked to the EU both economically and through security institutions.⁴³ Opting for "privileged partnership" is rather problematic. While there is no agreed definition of the term, it is clear that this status puts Turkey somewhere between association (the status Turkey currently has) and full membership. Of course, the EU can set a goal of increasing Turkey's role in its institutions and policies, but this enhanced participation (in a limited scope of activities) is unlikely to be viewed as an attractive proposition by a country that has long been striving for full membership, not some kind of intermediate form.⁴⁴ EU citizens are less than eager to support Turkey's accession. According to opinion polls, 78 percent of Austrians, 63 percent of Germans and 61 percent of the French oppose this project. These figures indicate that any political decision taken at the elite level (even if many potential vetoes are overridden) would not suggest that "Turkey is already in Europe." The issue of Turkey's application for EU membership must be resolved in such a way that factors in both the institutional component and the EU citizens' perception of their common identity.⁴⁵

⁴⁰ European Commission. Negotiating framework. Luxembourg, October 3, 2005. Available at URL: http://www.ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/st20002_05_TR_framedoc_en.pdf

⁴¹ Nugent N. The EU's response to Turkey's membership application: Not just a weighing of costs and benefits. *Journal of European Integration*, 29 (4), 2007, pp. 494–495.

⁴² Jørgensen K.E., LaGro E. Conclusions and Perspectives: Whither Turkey's Accession? In: *Turkey and the European Union* / Ed. E. LaGro and K.E. Jørgensen. UK: Palgrave, 2007, p. 222.

⁴³ Sakva R. *Russia and Turkey: Rethinking Europe to Contest Outsider Status*. Russia/NIS Centre, Ifri, Paris, 2010, p. 18.

⁴⁴ See Jørgensen E. Privileged partnership: An alternative final destination for Turkey's integration with the European Union? // *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 8 (4), 2007, pp. 415–438.

⁴⁵ Dost I P., Akal E. and Antonsich M. (2011). Turkey's Bid for European Union Membership: Between "Thick" and "Thin" Conceptions of Europe // *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 52 (2), 2011, p. 214; Turkey and the European Union: Domestic Politics, Economic Integration and International Dynamics. Ed. by A. Carkoglu and B. Rubin. London: Frank Cass, 2005.

Everything we have said above suggests the following conclusions. First, the current stage in the development of the European Union itself is anything but favourable for a positive decision on Turkey: the issue creates huge additional problems — political, economic and cultural — for unification, whose future trajectory is unclear and needs to be discussed. Second, the favourable moment (from Turkey's standpoint) has been missed: the country should have been admitted to the European Union earlier when there was a relative consensus in the country in favour of the European ("EU") choice and efforts to promote democratic reforms were at their most effective. Studies show that this was the period between 2000 and 2005 (before the start of accession talks). Subsequently, reforms in the country slowed down and became less consistent.⁴⁶ Today, the European Union does not have real instruments to speed up democratic reform in Turkey.⁴⁷

To reiterate, the country is already polarised and full membership in the European Union definitely no longer meets the interests of a large section of the elite and the interests of significant social groups. The European Union for its part does not have instruments that could render the process of further democratization of Turkey irreversible. Thus, there is an extremely high degree of uncertainty about the issue of accession, the process of accession and even its consequences (if it is implemented).

6.4. Greater Europe as a Multilateral, Pragmatic Agenda for Turkey

It would be an obvious error to narrow Turkey's relations with Europe down to the issue of the country's EU membership. Turkey needs a more pragmatic and multilateral agenda, especially since the last decade has witnessed significant diversification of Turkey's foreign economic policies, in the sense that Turkish firms operating in different sectors have started to pursue comprehensive internationalization strategies.⁴⁸

Building Greater Europe could become just such an agenda and the driving force of further development of the "Turkish experiment." (It is important to note that building Greater Europe does not close the door to Turkey's EU membership: these are two different, but not mutually exclusive, agendas.)

Turkey's active participation in creating a Greater Europe will allow the country to address a number of important problems. Hence, the concept of a Greater Europe makes it possible for Turkey to free itself from the historical burden of marginality and create a positive agenda of accession to and involvement in affairs on the European continent.⁴⁹ The Greater Europe project organically removes the issue of Turkey's cultural and religious differences that make EU citizens so anxious. It enables Turkey to fully realize the benefits of its unique geopolitical location as a bridge between the EU and Russia.⁵⁰ Turkey has a clear interest in developing

⁴⁶ Kubicek P. Political conditionality and European Union's cultivation of democracy in Turkey. *Democratization*, 18 (4), 2011, pp. 910–931.

⁴⁷ Ananicz S. *The Sultans of Swing: Turkey's Stance on Integration with the European Union*. Centre for Eastern Studies. *Point of View*, no. 37, November 2013, Warsaw, p. 5.

⁴⁸ Kutlay M. *Skating on Thin Ice: The Political Economy of Turkish Foreign Policy over the Last Decade*. ISPI Analysis, no. 226, December 2013, p. 3.

⁴⁹ Sakwa, p. 21.

⁵⁰ Cohen S. Turkey's Emergence as a Geopolitical Power Broker // *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 52 (2), 2011, p. 225.

relations with both of these poles, due to the geopolitical reality (and specificity) of this regional power. These other poles, however, are also interested in Turkey because of its prime position for playing a key role in structuring the whole of Greater Europe.

The most promising approach for Turkey rests on the following considerations:

(a) Building Greater Europe would defuse tensions over the country's EU membership and show Brussels that Turkey has alternative ways of becoming involved in developments on the continent.

(b) Participation in Greater Europe could help vanquish skepticism about Turkey in a number of European countries and promote the development of informal ties and stronger relations with individual member-countries.

(c) The sooner Turkey becomes actively involved in discussions on the Greater European project, the more likely it is that the project will meet its particular aspirations and interests. The project could develop in several ways, and the outcome (i.e. which option is realized) depends, in part, on Turkey's participation.

(d) For Turkey, the concept of a Greater Europe is not just an abstract common good, but something concrete that offers the country particular benefits at this particular moment.

7. Greater Europe: Losses as a Result of Inaction and Dividends from the Right Strategy

When looking at the status quo in Europe from a historical perspective, one has to admit that the current situation is not so bad. It could have been far worse: just think of the two World Wars which both engulfed the European continent. More recently, Europe was divided by the Iron Curtain, which seriously impeded the continent's development and created security threats.

Even so, it has to be stressed that strategically maintaining the status quo (let us imagine that the current crisis has been overcome and we are back to a "pre-crisis" situation) is not in the interests of Europe as a whole, or any European state individually. Unless the role of Greater Europe in the international system is reappraised, there is a real danger that Europe will soon be relegated to the world's periphery.

What prompts us to make this sad conclusion? Let us leave aside the fact that the global balance of power is shifting towards the Asian leaders (China and India) and the fact that China's rapid growth generates far-from-idle questions regarding the foundations of a new world order. Let us put forward a more modest proposition: non-Western scholars criticizing Western theories (and practices) of international relations and proposing other concepts are becoming more prominent.⁵¹ Alas, there is no room for Greater Europe in these concepts. Besides, the globalization reveals systemic flaws on the global political level, for example, in

⁵¹ See, for example, *Non-Western International Relations Theory. Perspectives on and Beyond Asian* / Eds. A. Acharya and B. Buzan. UK: Routledge, 2010.

such areas as financial markets and the policy on climate change. It follows that these flaws should be offset on the macro-regional level.

Thus, by preserving the status quo in Europe, we are increasing the risk of the situation developing under one of two scenarios:

(a) Drifting in opposite directions: Russia towards Asia (reorientation to the East and the South) and Europe towards the United States;

(b) A tri-polar Europe (Russia, the European Union and Turkey).

The first scenario spells the reappearance of a line that would cut across the European continent and divide it into two parts and complicate its development. That would effectively mean that we have not learned the lessons from history and are back to the Cold War equilibrium with its “realpolitik” and the potential threat of a global conflict.

The second scenario suggests that Europe is divided among poles. These poles are obvious enough: Russia, the European Union and Turkey. The result would be further fragmentation of the European space and the inevitable struggle to impose one pole’s development model on its neighbours. Border territories would become another problem that would generate interminable conflicts. The shape of a multipolar Europe would increasingly be determined by the rivalry between the three regional forces — the European Union, Russia and Turkey — for influence on the adjacent spaces formed by the new states that emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Each of the main poles would have its own strategic plan concerning the fate of these neighbouring territories, but their interests would increasingly intersect and overlap, posing the risk of classic competition between great powers. Since it would in this case be almost impossible to work through official channels, the three main powers on the continent would seek to bypass these institutions. The rivalry of three forces, however, would have another consequence: the situation would enable the neighbouring states to make a choice à la carte on conditions of intertwining political trends in a given territory, which poses significant difficulties for the great powers in promoting their own political goals.

Under current conditions, it is tempting to take measures to preserve the status quo in regards to the “do no harm” formula. Such a policy, however, does not lead to solving existing problems, but rather leads to the accumulation of further problems. Moreover, the preservation of the status quo poses the risk of drifting towards the above-mentioned scenarios, i.e., the “big schism” or fragmentation. Maintaining the status quo is pushing Europe into a trap because of the conflict between short- and medium-term priorities on the one hand, and long-term priorities on the other. The former priorities consist of the preservation of stability (less change and fewer upheavals of the existing system) and the latter (strategic priorities) call for change that ensures development and strengthens Europe’s role in an increasingly global world.

In other words, by choosing the passive approach, European leaders are effectively contributing to increased multi-polarity, or to a deep split of Europe. In this case, Europe’s potential in solving various problems would inevitably be very limited and consist of symbolic policies (good intentions) that would never be replaced by real policies.

Even if the cost of building Greater Europe turns out to be very high and the process would require additional efforts, the price of abandoning this project would be higher and the strategic consequences more dire.

No European state would deny the need to create a more structured global multi-lateral system. The European continent also needs an adequate level of organization in the face of new global challenges. To achieve this ambitious goal, Europe has to solve many pre-existing problems — partly by stepping up the activities of existing institutions and partly (perhaps) by creating new ones. The most pressing concern, however, is the need for new ideas based on new thinking. We believe that the best way to avoid a divided or multipolar Europe — an undesirable consequence of the inadequacy of the existing institutions — is to start a discussion about the role of Greater Europe as a fully-fledged centre (pole) in the modern world and a guarantor of the security and prosperity of the entire European population.

The creation of Greater Europe is a long-term strategic goal. For this reason, the benefits from this project should be expected not in the near future, but in the longer term as a result of the purposeful activities of all the stakeholders.

One of the most important results of the successful implementation of the Greater Europe project would be the gradual process of Europeanization (in the sense of belonging to Greater Europe). Such identification may take shape as a framework structure that would have to be supranational due to the diversity of European citizens. Such Europeanization would be the logical outcome of the strategic steps taken by governments (and other actors) conscious of their interdependence and their responsibility for the future of Europe and the world.

8. The Structural Principles of Greater Europe

Given the current political situation, there is the temptation to abandon the Greater Europe project acting (or rather being inactive) in accordance with the principle of “time will tell.” We believe, however, that today it would be equally irresponsible to renounce the very idea of Greater Europe or guarantee its creation. There can be no guarantees. The current political crisis, however, does not automatically turn Greater Europe into a project that cannot be implemented. Yes, our efforts today are objectively limited, but we can (and must) at least try to indicate the principles on which Greater Europe can become a viable concern:

The strategic character of the project. This means that we deliberately do not set a timeframe for the project. Besides, we understand that as the project is implemented there may be advances and rollbacks and reverses. The strategic goal, however, remains unchanged. The strategy (and this is its essence) proceeds not from the current state, but from the desired result which, in our view, can be achieved.

The openness of the project. Greater Europe does not have a “closed list” of participants. Additionally, membership in Greater Europe does not preclude the participation of its members in other integration associations and projects.

The voluntary character of the project. All countries, without exception, see their participation in the project as voluntary, while being fully aware of their own interests and the benefits of joining Greater Europe.

The consensual character of the project. Greater Europe does not, and cannot, have any one participant (or group of participants) unilaterally setting the rules of the game or imposing them on others. All the rules are set down with the consent of all the participants in the project.

The multi-level character of the project. Greater Europe cannot be based solely on the agreements and declarations of top government officials. Greater Europe represents several interconnected levels of cooperation from the level of “high politics” to people-to-people interaction.

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