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Global Gateway



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Connectivity Competition: The EU's Global Gateway Initiative



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As the world order is undergoing a major transformation, key players in the international arena are reconsidering their foreign policy tools. Connectivity emerges as a new instrument of geopolitical competition, creating not only networks of railroads, digital and energy infrastructure, but also lasting recipient dependencies of respective investments from donors. The following working paper is looking at the European Union as a connectivity provider, assessing the potential of its Global Gateway Initiative in becoming a viable alternative to China's Belt and Road Initiative.

The opinions expressed in this working paper reflect solely the personal views and analytical outlook of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Russian International Affairs Council NP (Non-profit Partnership).

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Table of Contents

Introduction	4
Chapter 1. Connectivity: A New Competition Tool	5
Chapter 2. The Global Gateway Initiative: Institutional Design and Areas of Operation	10
Chapter 3. Regional Priorities of the Global Gateway	16
Analysis Limitations	22
Conclusions: What Might this Mean for Russia?	25
Supplement	27
About the Authors	56
Acknowledgements	57

Introduction

Ever since the end of the Cold War, the world order has been undergoing a major transformation, where global great powers and key actors have been actively defining and redefining their respective foreign policy strategies. The common objective for these actors is to preserve, if not expand, their sphere of influence in international affairs. In turn, such influence would secure them a central position in the emerging multipolar world order. The early twenty first century has been marked by the intense externalization of national economic policies, as well as a growing role of transnational corporations, non-governmental institutions, and other new actors. As a result, the idea of promoting state interconnectedness in an increasingly multicultural and international environment appeared. As today's world is witnessing the comeback of realist rationale and growing geopolitical competition and rivalry, the previous structure of international relations finds that it must gradually give way to an entirely new format.

One particular concept that has emerged in light of adjusting state competition strategies is the notion of “connectivity”. To a certain extent, it proceeds from the legacy of globalization, linking multiple actors across various realms. However, its scope and goals differ from its predecessor – interconnectedness. Connectivity has recently gained prominence in the political discourse of several key international players, most notably China and the European Union. Whereas research is plentiful regarding China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), its economic model, achievements, political objectives and world order implications, the EU's Global Gateway Initiative, announced in 2021 as the response to China's growing presence in regions of common interest, remains yet to be studied in such detail. This working paper aims to define the Global Gateway and present a preliminary assessment of its efficiency and ability to promote European influence in certain areas as a competitive alternative to China's BRI.

Chapter 1. Connectivity: A New Competition Tool

Essentially, “*connectivity*” refers to the ability and ease of states to connect product origins to its consumption destinations.¹ Being a rather technical term prior to the mid-2010's, connectivity mostly referred to the economic and digital domain. Now, the term has been adopted by international relations scholars and practitioners when discussing networking as a part of a state's foreign policy strategy.² Still, connectivity as an international relations concept is neither well-defined nor universally acceptable in terms of its meaning and scope. Although this paper does not aim to elaborate the term theoretically, it should be noted that such an important concept does require further research and clarification. Afterall, without a clear definition, all research regarding connectivity and its influence on economic development and efficiency may prove to be rather limited.

There are at least three conceptual approaches to connectivity that stand out in existing literature. These approaches highlight either the ontological (connectivity as a state of affairs among actors), normative (connectivity as a vision for organizing the world) or dynamic/procedural (connectivity as a type of foreign policy action) aspects of the term. The first approach broadly defines connectivity in international relations as “all the ways in which states, organizations and societies are connected to each other and interact across the globe”.³ The second, elaborated in Parag Khanna's *Connectography*, the most comprehensive conceptual study of the phenomenon today, nearly equates connectivity to interconnectedness, claiming it to be the ultimate condition for future economic development.⁴

The third approach can be found in papers and articles examining specific connectivity projects, although they are not always explicit. Today's global actors do not hesitate to speak of “connectivity strategies”.⁵ China and the EU position themselves as the frontrunners in this regard:⁶ the former was the first to view connectivity as a foreign policy tool, and the latter succeeded in officially labeling it as such, thus, hijacking the narrative of what constitutes as connectivity.

¹ Understanding the theory of international connectivity // Oxera. April, 2010.
URL: <https://www.oxera.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Theory-of-international-connectivity.pdf>

² Sommerer, T., Tallberg, J., Diffusion Across International Organizations: Connectivity and Convergence // International Organization. 2019. Vol. 73 (2). P. 399-433. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818318000450>

³ Ries, T. Security Aspects of Connectivity // The Royal Institute for International Relations. Security Policy Brief. September, 2019. URL: <https://www.egmontinstitute.be/security-aspects-of-connectivity/>

⁴ Khana, P. *Connectography: Mapping the Future of Global Civilization*. NY: Random House, 2016. 496 p.

⁵ For example, EU must offer alternative to Russia and China, Borrell says // EURactiv. 26.09.2022. URL: <https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/interview/eu-must-offer-alternative-to-russia-and-china-borrell-says/>; Biden, Modi and G20 Allies Unveil Connectivity Project Linking India to Middle East and Europe // The Diplomat. 10.09.2023. URL: <https://thediplomat.com/2023/09/biden-modi-and-g20-allies-unveil-connectivity-project-linking-india-to-middle-east-and-europe/>

⁶ Gaens, B., Sinkkonen, V., Vogt, H. Connectivity and Order: an Analytical Framework // East Asia. 2023. Vol.40. P. 209–228. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-023-09401-z>

The EU was the first to come up with the official procedural definition of connectivity. During the 2017 Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), foreign ministers from twenty-six Asian and twenty-eight European countries agreed on the following: *“connectivity is about bringing countries, people, and societies closer together. It facilitates access and is a means to foster deeper economic and people-to-people ties [...]. Additionally, it covers all modes of transport [and also] institutions, infrastructure, financial cooperation, IT, digital links, energy, education and research, human resources development, tourism, cultural exchanges as well as customs, trade and investment facilitation”*.⁷ This description ultimately depicts the role and purpose of connectivity for the EU. It also hints that, on the surface level, connectivity provides developmental assistance, primarily in the form of investments towards infrastructure, railroads and highways, or digital channels. On a deeper level, however, aside from the economic benefits that the recipient may receive, investments usually serve as a transmission belt not only for commercial interests, technological advancement, and regulatory frameworks, but also for constructing the political narratives of the investor. They also create long-lasting dependencies, affect future economic and political preferences of recipients, and establish strategic, at times excessive, interdependence.

Thus, connectivity, as opposed to its predecessor, interconnectedness, has a regional and subregional scope, rather than simply a global one. It also presupposes the centrality of state actors in building connections or providing resources for it. According to various studies, there are two features of connectivity:⁸ one is the existence of strategic intent, as actors connect themselves solely based on their individual strategic interests; and two covers its geo-economic nature, as connectivity reflects growing geopolitical competition throughout the world.⁹ Naturally, connectivity projects have become central to leading actors foreign policies as they provide the tools to influence and shape regions and connect them via instruments that are at the disposal. Consequently, agency in modern international relations requires actors to master the ability to connect,¹⁰ thereby mitigating the risks of global archaization and shaping the future world order.

China's Belt and Road Initiative: Setting the Stage for EU Connectivity Projects

As already mentioned, today's most distinctive connectivity project is China's Belt and Road Initiative. Launched in 2013, the program has amassed over 150 partners around the world. With six land routes of the Silk Road Economic

⁷ ASEM Connectivity Inventory // European Commission. URL: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31705/annex-i.pdf>

⁸ Kacperek, M. (Re)defining connectivity // Warsaw Institute. 21.10.2020. URL: <https://warsawinstitute.org/redefining-connectivity/>

⁹ According to some experts, this geo-economic nature takes on different forms. What matters most is the amount of connections throughout the world, their diversity in terms of partners, sectors of economy and logistical links and agency – the ability to manage these connections in accordance with the interests of the actor. The last aspect particularly reflects, how connectivity is turning into a political tool. Gaens, B., Sinkkonen, V., Vogt, H. Connectivity and Order: an Analytical Framework // East Asia. 2023. Vol. 40. P. 209–228. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-023-09401-z>

¹⁰ Gaens, B., Sinkkonen, V., Vogt, H. Connectivity and Order: an Analytical Framework // East Asia. 2023. Vol. 40. P. 209–228. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-023-09401-z>

Belt, and Maritime Silk Road, China has already invested in numerous infrastructure projects that range from South-East Asia to Africa and Central Europe. China has succeeded in not only acquiring new economic profits, but also by gaining a hold over the minds of the region's political elites. The rapid spread of Chinese investments has almost immediately stirred a reaction from the West, who started second-guessing the transparency and security of the BRI.

The main reasons why Chinese investments are considered potentially dangerous to other actors are hidden in the way China provides its loans to states under the BRI framework. These loans oblige the recipient to use Chinese banks to operate the credit line, Chinese equipment and labor force to implement the project, and (mostly) Chinese state companies to carry out construction, thereby creating an alarming, in the eyes of China's competitors, dependencies. Another reason for such concern is the possible loss of "know-how": Chinese companies might gain access to Western innovations if operating together with the European companies or through M&A deals, as was the case in the EU. Unsurprisingly, the BRI was labeled by the West as a tool to enhance China's global presence, sidelining Washington and Brussels in their respective spheres of influence. This caused severe criticism towards EU Member States, who were actively engaged in BRI projects, particularly those from Central and Eastern Europe, members of "16+1" format.¹¹ Another region, where the BRI has allegedly challenged the EU's influence is in the Western Balkans and Mediterranean. EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen warned against turning neighborhood regions into the so called "Silk Road stopovers" that diffuse the common cultural heritage of the region.¹²

However, China's presence via the BRI in Central and Eastern Europe is not as alarming as it is portrayed by Brussels officials. There are few big projects that stand out, such as Budapest – Belgrade railway or Pelješac bridge in Croatia, but most projects that were initially discussed under the auspices of a "16+1" format were either abandoned or stalled.¹³ Yet in regions that are geographically further away from the EU, China's track record has proved quite impressive: it has been most active in Pakistan, ASEAN countries, specifically Laos and Indonesia, as well as across Africa.¹⁴ Such an outreach strategy pushed the EU to come up with an answer to compete with China, providing a vivid example of how connectivity projects may either exert real political influence or gain one through politicalized acts from the competing actors.

¹¹ The format was established in 2012. After Greece joined it in 2019 it turned into "17+1", but after Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia left in 2021-2022 it exists as "14+1", although most of activities have been put on hold.

¹² Von der Leyen: Western Balkans are part of Europe, not just a stopover on the Silk Road // European Western Balkans. 16.09.2020. URL: <https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2020/09/16/von-der-leyen-western-balkans-are-part-of-europe-not-just-a-stopover-on-the-silk-road/>

¹³ Bolgova I., Mel'nikova Y., Lisjakiewicz R. The EU China Policy in the Making: The Role of Central and Eastern Europe // World Economy and International Relations. 2022. Vol. 66. No. 6. P. 79-90. URL: <https://doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2022-66-6-79-90>

¹⁴ Malik, A., Parks, B., Russell, B., Lin, J., Walsh, K., Solomon, K., Zhang, S., Elston, T., and S. Goodman. Banking on the Belt and Road: Insights from a new global dataset of 13,427 Chinese development projects. Williamsburg, VA: AidData at William & Mary. 2021. URL: <https://www.aiddata.org/publications/banking-on-the-belt-and-road>

The EU and Connectivity

Meanwhile, the European Union has also been developing its own connectivity agenda since the early 2010s. Its flagman projects are Trans-European networks – on transport (TEN-T), energy (TEN-E), and telecommunications (eTEN) – aiming to link infrastructure within the Union together to strengthen the common market. The Connecting Europe Facility, a fund that mobilizes resources from both public and private sources, was created to facilitate the initiatives.¹⁵ At first, China was seen as a potential partner for Europe's connectivity projects. For instance, in 2015, the EU-China Connectivity Platform was established with a list of common initial projects.¹⁶ However, not long after, EU-China relations began to slowly deteriorate, causing a significant politicization of China's actions in areas that were once considered to be of mutual interest, prompting the EU to focus on its own connectivity strategy. Interestingly enough, ASEM, which was created to support the EU's pivot to Asia in the mid-1990s, the cradle of the EU-China High-Level dialogue,¹⁷ became a platform to counter China's connectivity initiatives. After the parties produced a common connectivity definition in 2017, the EU presented the Connecting Europe and Asia strategy at the meeting the following year. In the concept, Brussels offered its own vision of regional connectivity, building on democratic principles of transparency, leveling out the playing field, reciprocity, and promoting open networks. This presented the EU approach as a more attractive global alternative, be it to the Chinese project or independently.¹⁸ Since then, the EU became proactive in advancing its own connectivity strategy.

However, there were no practical projects initiated until after the COVID-19 pandemic, when connectivity was promoted as a recovery tool. The EU Indo-Pacific Concept of 2021 offered connectivity partnerships in various domains, listed in detail in the 2017 communique, as a form of collaboration with the region's countries, also aiming to overcome pandemic-related challenges, apart from the rest.¹⁹ That very year, India was the first country to sign such a partnership with the EU.²⁰ According to a later-published European Commission paper, the European connectivity strategy will help build back the economies "in a way that is fit for the 21st century" and become "an efficient strategic communication mechanism that will make the EU connectivity brand recognizable worldwide".²¹ In this

¹⁵ Read more: Connecting Europe Facility // European Commission.
URL: https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/programmes/connecting-europe-facility_en

¹⁶ The EU-China Connectivity Platform // European Commission.
URL: https://transport.ec.europa.eu/transport-themes/international-relations/eu-china-connectivity-platform_en

¹⁷ The dialogue was established on the sidelines of the 1998 ASEM Meeting.

¹⁸ Connecting Europe and Asia - Building blocks for an EU Strategy // European Commission. 2019.
URL: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/joint_communication_-_connecting_europe_and_asia_-_building_blocks_for_an_eu_strategy_2018-09-19.pdf

¹⁹ Joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council. The EU Strategy in the Indo-Pacific. JOIN(2021)24 final // European External Action Service. 16.09.2021.
URL: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/joint-communication-indo-pacific_en

²⁰ EU-India Connectivity Partnership // European Council. 08.05.2021.
URL: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/49508/eu-india-connectivity-partnership-8-may-2.pdf>

²¹ The EU Connectivity Strategy: Putting Words into Action // European Institute for Asian Studies. Briefing Paper, No. 02/2021. URL: <https://eias.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/The-EU-Connectivity-Strategy-.pdf>

context of brand-building, the EU came out with its ultimate proposal – the ambitious Global Gateway Initiative.

The Global Gateway is not a singular campaign overseen by the European Commission, but a collection of new and old projects supervised by different institutions, who manage a specific task in selecting, financing, and monitoring of their implementation, depending on their role and area of jurisdiction. Thus, the Global Gateway acts more as an umbrella covering a plethora of initiatives and projects who have the common objective to connect, as well as strengthen the European Union's reach and increase its presence around the world. To assess Global Gateway's efficiency in pursuing connectivity, it is pivotal to first comprehend the "who, what, where, and how" of the Global Gateway, as it proves to be a complex mix of institutions, programs, project successions and actors, rendering it necessary to separate and examine each aspect independently.

Chapter 2. The Global Gateway: Institutional Design and Areas of Operation

Global Gateway Protagonists

The Global Gateway initiative was announced in late 2021 with an ambitious promise to mobilize up to 300 billion euro until 2027 to sponsor an EU vision of connectivity around the world.²² Given the unique composition of the EU, the first obstacle to this goal is institutional interplay. There are too many stakeholders involved in the Global Gateway, who adhere to various time-consuming bureaucratic procedures, leading to scattered responsibilities and ambiguity during negotiations.

The main agent of the Global Gateway is the EU Commission, since it was the institution who promoted and set the objectives and strategy for the initiative, and is ultimately responsible for the achievements produced. The Commission manages different parts of the Global Gateway through its various Directorate-Generals (DG), departments, executive agencies, and services. Among these, the role of DGs in the European Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations (NEAR), Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) and International Partnerships (INTPA) are compelling: they supervise many key initiatives that fall in their field of expertise. The European Commission works closely with the European External Action Service (EEAS), setting the direction of particular regional initiatives based on a respective foreign policy strategy. In terms of representation, naturally, the individuals associated with the Global Gateway are the President of the EU Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, and lastly the European Commissioner for International Partnerships, Jutta Urpilainen. However, the role of the EU Council is also important, which is reflected in the composition of the board that supervises the implementation of the initiative: in December 2022 Ursula von der Leyen presided over the first meeting of the board, consisting of foreign ministers from all EU member states, thereby highlighting the geopolitical nature of the project.²³

Even more complex than the institutional mayhem surrounding the Global Gateway is the system of financing the individual projects. Whereas the Commission oversees agenda-setting and program management, most of the financial support, via soft loans and (less often) grants, comes not from the EU budget per se, but from the European Investment Bank (EIB), who allocates and distributes the resources to the various initiatives and projects.²⁴ In some cases

²² "The Global Gateway". Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank JOIN(2021) 30 final // EUR-lex. 01.12.2021. URL: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52021JC0030>

²³ First meeting of the Global Gateway Board // European Commission. 11.12.2021. URL: https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/first-meeting-global-gateway-board-2022-12-11_en

²⁴ The EIB Group Operating Framework and Operational Plan 2018 // European Investment Bank. 22.01.2018. URL: <https://www.eib.org/en/publications/operational-plan-2018>

the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) shares the costs as well.

The EIB provides resources both directly (as a deal party) and indirectly, funneling the money via unique instruments of fundraising and allocating EU Commission DG funds, such as the *Neighborhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument* (NDICI) for DG NEAR or *European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus* (EFSD+) and *External Action Guarantees* (EAG) for DG INTPA. In such cases, the funds of the EIB or EBRD might be combined with money directly coming from the EU budget. Though the EIB share in project investments could be identified via open sources, the rest of the sum is usually untraceable, since EFSD+ or NDICI rarely provide this information. This partially complicates any further analysis on the matter.

There are also a series of other EU instruments and programs, whose budgets serve Global Gateway purposes separately, without them being combined with the EIB or the EBRD. Among them, the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) stands out, which specifically was created to support connectivity projects within Europe and those linking Europe to priority regions, operating under the European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency. CEF's involvement is particularly visible in the Western Balkans. Other examples are Horizon Europe under the Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (DG RTD), the EURO-CLIMA+ program under the DG for Climate Action (CLIMA), the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), the Erasmus+ program and many others. Their budgets are part of the Multiannual Financial Framework, a six-year, long-term budget allocation that is arranged in advance and revised based on contingencies and new challenges. This makes the budgets particularly vulnerable to changes in the international environment as its reserve funds maybe readjusted and used for other purposes in times of crisis.

The present MFF covers the period of 2021-2027 and was approved in December 2020, one year before the announcement of the Global Gateway initiative and the beginning of Ukraine conflict. As the initiative appeared later, the budgets of DGs that may want to support it are essentially constrained by the framework's limitations. Moreover, they are not exempt from budget reallocations, since MFF shares are not fixed for each DG and program. For example, the mid-term revision of the MFF²⁵ has already announced a few changes: three quarters of the budget's unallocated margins as well as other existing programs have been reallocated to support Ukraine and address the fallout of the ongoing crisis. How these changes impact individual programs and GG projects, however, remains unknown, as there is no available information on individual projects. The EU Commission has not declared whether the previous promise to mobilize a €300 billion budget will also be updated based on the new challenges or whether it will

²⁵ Commission Staff Working Document. Accompanying the document: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and Committee of the Regions. Mid-term revision of the multiannual financial framework 2021-2027. SWD(2023)336 // European Commission. 20.06.2023.

URL: [https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=SWD\(2023\)336&lang=en](https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=SWD(2023)336&lang=en)

remain untouched. However, most of the allocations refer to projects within the EU, so the amount the MFF allocated to areas outside of the EU is comparatively marginal, as they represent less than 10% of the total amount.

The MFF is also complex in terms of tracing investment flows that complement money coming from the EIB or the EBRD. Individual DG offices track and monitor total cash flows, and project development and implementation. However, they do not detail every step of the money transfer. For example, according to its official website, the 2021-2027 budget for the NDICI is now allocating its money entirely to “financial programming”, with no amount coming from NextGenerationEU, as it used to be in the previous budget, and €39.1 million coming from “contributions from other countries and entities”.²⁶ It is thus not always possible to track the channels through which the projects of the GG are financed, both in terms of the allocated budget and in terms of the executing institution, both financially and politically speaking. Many of the projects are covered by the EU Commission’s press, who only mentions the amount mobilized, but never indicates the source and overseeing institution.

The problem of limited transparency is most visible in the case of the EIB. The Bank introduces its own categories of investment, such as “credit lines” or “infrastructure”, without sticking to those listed in the initiative.²⁷ Regardless of whether these investments fall under the GG umbrella or remain outside of it, there is a clear discontinuity in terms, creating difficulties for measuring the overall effort the EU puts into its connectivity strategy, as well as assessing the efficiency of the Global Gateway outreach and Team Europe approach in attracting money.

This being said, while the EU certainly acts as a mobilizing institution for the GG, it is not the main financier. A distinguishing feature of the EU’s Global Gateway governance and money allocation is that it uses a so-called “Team Europe” approach in accomplishing its projects. This means that investments can be raised from various sources, including the EU budget, development institutions and programs together, in addition to attracting funding from individual member states, national development banks and private capital on a case-by-case basis. Sure, political bargaining is often used in this process, as the EU’s individual national priorities are also reflected in it, providing an opportunity for big players, such as France in Africa or Spain and Portugal in Latin America, to pursue their own connectivity agendas under the EU umbrella.

The expected €300 billion budget for the Global Gateway will not be entirely composed of EU funds, but rather, it will be only partially provided by the EU (through one of the above-listed channels), with the rest pooled from individual member state development banks, regional and local financing institutions, as well as other international organizations. More specifically, most of the resources are going to be made available from the EU’s two main development banks, the

²⁶ EU spending and revenue 2021-2027 // European Commission.

URL: https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/eu-budget/long-term-eu-budget/2021-2027/spending-and-revenue_en

²⁷ The data can be accessed at: Our projects // European Investment Bank. URL: <https://www.eib.org/en/projects/index.htm>

French *Agence Française de Développement* (AFD) and the German *Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau* (KfW). Both of these financial institutions publish limited data regarding money origins and transfers, but when information is provided, they mostly discuss projects that these banks fund independently from the EU, and nothing specific about the projects that fall under the umbrella of the GG. Among the financiers, there are also regional and local development banks where the projects are implemented, as well as international organizations such as the World Bank with its International Finance Corporation and International Development Association, the UN, and ultimately private investors. It is particularly evident in Latin America, where the role of regional development institutions, such as Inter-American Development Bank or Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean, dominates over EU institutions.

Global Gateway Sectors

There are two ways to proceed when analyzing the different sectors and objectives of the Global Gateway initiative. The first one is to follow the list of sectors as laid out in the Joint Declaration of December 2021,²⁸ introducing that the Global Gateway and its investments priorities include the digital sector, climate and energy, transport, health, education and research. The second approach is to look at the reported cash flow of the categories pertaining to each financed project, and from there, follow the money and see first-hand what sectors are truly prioritized. However, given the lack of transparency regarding cash flows, this working paper uses the first approach, and looks at investment priorities in the same order as is in the Declaration. Although the order could be taken as an approximate EU sector ranking, this is not stated explicitly, nor does further analysis support this assumption.

Hard infrastructure is the main requirement to successfully connect countries around the world in a digital domain. In GG it is represented by submarine and terrestrial fiber-optic cables, used for communication systems and for cloud and data storage. One distinct example is the BELLA II program, a submarine cable that connects the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean, hence expanding the regional digital ecosystem, which is to receive €13 million from the EU via NDICI.²⁹ Remarkably, the EU used to invest in the first phase of the program, which ended in 2016-2019, revealing the connection between its earlier development assistance strategy and the GG. Digital connectivity is an investment opportunity that was previously not included in China's Belt and Road initiative,³⁰ becoming a distinguishing feature of the EU approach to connectivity.³¹

²⁸ "The Global Gateway". Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank JOIN(2021) 30 final // Council of the European Union. 01.12.2021. URL: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52021JC0030>

²⁹ BELLA II: Building the Europe Link to Latin America and the Caribbean // BELLA Program. URL: <https://bella-programme.redclara.net/index.php/en/>

³⁰ Yet, at the third forum of the Belt and Road Initiative, China announced that it will also expand its connectivity initiatives into more various domains. This is partly proof of Beijing adapting to increasing competition from the EU and other players.

³¹ "The Global Gateway". Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank JOIN(2021) 30 final. Section 2.1 // Council of the European Union. 01.12.2021. URL: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52021JC0030>

Moving on to the second sector, climate and energy, the Global Gateway offers many initiatives to promote a global “green” agenda. This is mainly tied to the EU’s vision of being a leader in this endeavor and having a “comparative advantage” over other countries in pushing green policies. For example, Brussels promises to mobilize €2.4 billion for Sub-Saharan Africa and €1.08 billion for North Africa to support renewable energy and energy efficiency alone. It will also join forces with other initiatives such as Power Africa.³² Advancing this sector is key in Asia, Latin America, and the Pacific region, with projects ranging from small investments like e-buses and parks in Chile to grander ideas of establishing green taxonomy for subregions, and aiding in the construction of wind and hydro power facilities.³³ In terms of money pledges, the energy sector already appears to be more heavily invested in compared to the digital sector, but not as much as the third sector: transport.

In fact, since “transportation is a key sector in the fight against climate change and the development and introduction of digital technologies”, the EU announced an “additional €4.6 billion to enhance sustainable transport connections”.³⁴ Brussels also highlighted the importance of maintaining partnerships, including the Trans-European Transport Network to the Western Balkans, Turkey, the Eastern Partnership and the Southern Neighborhood regions, as well as Sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia. Although transport-related projects are usually pricy, they create the most visible connectivity links and present direct competition to BRI investments, especially in the Western Balkans. Hence, it is no wonder why the region has attracted the greatest number of investments in this domain.³⁵

The fourth sector listed in the Joint Declaration of December 2021 is health. Here, collaborations were announced to counter the COVID-19 pandemic and issues stretching far beyond it, in addition to tackling challenges pertaining to the diversification of pharmaceutical supply chains and global surveillance. Unfortunately, there are no serious resource pledges in this sector. Since the panic of the pandemic has subsided, attention given to this area has decreased as well.³⁶

Finally, the fifth sector, which has never been part of the BRI and further adds to the Global Gateway’s competitive advantage over other connectivity projects, is that it supports education education and research as a way to ensure long-term economic success. It is not only institutional cooperation but also student mobility, which is crystallized in the Erasmus+ program: from 2014-2020 a total of 1.8 billion was allocated for it, and the international arm of Erasmus+ 2021-2027

³² “The Global Gateway”. Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank JOIN(2021) 30 final. Section 2.2 // Council of the European Union. 01.12.2021. URL: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52021JC0030>

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Szczepański, M. The Global Gateway Taking stock after its first year // European Parliamentary Research Service. January, 2023. URL: [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2023/739296/EPRS_BRI\(2023\)739296_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2023/739296/EPRS_BRI(2023)739296_EN.pdf)

³⁵ “The Global Gateway”. Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank JOIN(2021) 30 final / Section 2.3 // Council of the European Union. 01.12.2021. URL: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52021JC0030>

³⁶ Ibid. Section 2.4

was scaled-up with a total funding of €2.2 billion³⁷. At the same time, the number of respective projects remains marginal.

This being said, it appears that transport is by far the most important sector in terms of real connectivity, followed by the energy, digital, education, and health sectors. Nonetheless, the examples given are simply anticipations and representations of EU intentions to expand connectivity, since there are currently only a few projects that are at the implementation stage. This is an applaudable feat, given that only two years have passed since the initiative was first formed.

³⁷ The new Erasmus+ programme for 2021-2027 has launched // European Education and Culture Executive Agency. 25.03.2021. URL: https://www.eacea.ec.europa.eu/news-events/news/new-erasmus-programme-2021-2027-has-launched-2021-03-25_en#:~:text=The%20Erasmus%2B%20programme%20budget%20for,%2C%20more%20digital%2C%20and%20greener

Chapter 3. Global Gateway Regional Priorities

The Neighborhood and Western Balkans

The closest GG region to the EU, geographically, historically and psychologically speaking, is the Neighborhood and Western Balkans. This covers an area where the European Neighborhood Policy – both Eastern Partnership and Southern Neighborhood branches – used to target.

Seven non-EU countries are expected to benefit from a few projects: North Macedonia in the Balkans, Georgia in the Caucasus, Israel and Jordan in the Middle East, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt in Northern Africa. Three projects from the list are seen as transregional, contributing to the connectivity in the Black and Mediterranean Seas and across the Balkans. Although the number of projects is far from record-holding, as many more could be expected in EU prioritized regions, they predominantly represent the most practical sectors: four projects fall under the transport sector, seven advance digital connectivity in the area, and three are related to climate/energy initiatives. The initiatives are legally under DG NEAR's authority as they constitute a part of the Economic and Investment Work Programs of the DG. Accordingly, some of them were discussed before the GG was announced and were previously declared as Projects of Common/Mutual Interests by the EU and its partners.

All projects focus on hard infrastructure development. This includes, above all, the construction of electricity cables between Italy and Tunisia (undersea HV), linking Greece, Cyprus and Israel (via submarine cables), as well as a Black Sea Connectivity cable from the EU to South Caucasus (via submarine cable); and the Trans-Balkan Electricity Corridor, connecting Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina with Croatia, Hungary, Romania and Italy in the EU. Electricity projects are the only in the region, where the construction has either been started or is expected to start soon, with all necessary grants, loans and documents already in place. The EU is also sponsoring a famous Medusa optical fiber cable from Europe to Northern Africa and Black Sea Digital Connectivity submarine cable to increase the digital resilience of the region. The transport sector offers the extension of a tramway network in Morocco, the modernization of the Alexandria Area Control Centre in Egypt, as well as the construction of the Corridor 8 Rail Interconnection from North Macedonia to Bulgaria.

In terms of financing, most projects use funding from the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, European Investment Bank and Connecting Europe Facility, via loans and grants. Transport projects are additionally supported by direct grants from the EU. In some cases, the Recovery and Resilience Facility (EurAsia Interconnector), the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument and the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) are involved, where projects have long been discussed. National funding is used in all Northern African projects, as well as the in Jordan and in the Balkan countries. Interested member states cover the expenditures for the projects

in Morocco (France and Germany), Egypt (Greece), Jordan (Sweden), and the Trans-Balkan Corridor (Germany).

Complex projects reflect the determination of European institutions in expanding connectivity. For example, the Euro-Asia submarine electricity interconnection cable linking Greece, Cyprus and Israel has received the largest CEF grant ever, being worth a whopping €657 million in 2021. The ELMED HV cable ate half of CEF's budget in 2022 with a €300 million donation,³⁸ and Corridor 8 Rail Interconnection, if launched successfully later this year, will be an exemplary case of the Team Europe approach in action, as it collects financing from all possible institutions – the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank, the North Macedonian government, the EU's initiative Western Balkans Investment Framework (WBIF), EU grants, as well as IPA money.

However, the majority of projects in the region are still in the survey or feasibility study stages. The emphasis on network projects and hard infrastructure echoes EU sentiments on fulfilling the obvious gaps that exist between the central parts of the EU's influence, as well as by extending the EU's outreach via hard infrastructure interdependencies.

Africa

The African region has been the target of 36 GG flagship projects and initiatives, including some of the costliest ones. Apart from the beneficiary countries of Northern Africa, who belong to the Mediterranean region and were covered in the previous section, the EU focuses specifically on West Africa. In fact, from projects involving individual countries to collective regional programs, the area from Mauritania to the Republic of Congo hosts more than half of the total number of regional projects. Single-country projects in this area mostly deal with energy production and fulfilling transport gaps and infrastructure failures. As for transport, there are examples such as constructing roads in Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Benin, Chad and Cameroon, as well as the development of ports in the Gambia and the Republic of Congo. Energy projects, on the other hand, focus on enhancing renewable energy capabilities in Ivory Coast, Benin, Nigeria and Niger. The EU mainly finances these projects, through the MFF, EIB and EFSD+, and the French Development Bank, with amounts ranging from €3.5 million to fix the road from Bissau to Safim, to €166 million to restructure the transport network in Dakar, Senegal. Estimates for single projects in the energy sector are more difficult to monitor, as they are embedded in a much larger initiative called the West African Power Pool (WAPP), who IRENA estimates is above €50 billion.³⁹ Similarly, extra resources are provided to many other collective regional initiatives in different sectors.

In terms of health programs, many COVID-19 vaccines were allocated to this region, with total funding going over the €1 billion threshold. Instead, Africa's

³⁸ Connecting Europe Facility: over € 600 million for energy infrastructure in support of the European Green Deal and REPowerEU // European Commission. 08.12.2022. URL: https://energy.ec.europa.eu/news/connecting-europe-facility-over-eu-600-million-energy-infrastructure-support-european-green-deal-and-2022-12-08_en

³⁹ Renewable Energy Market Analysis. Africa and its Regions // International Renewable Power Agency. 2022. URL: https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2022/Jan/IRENA_Market_Africa_2022.pdf

Great Green Wall initiative has surpassed the €17 billion mark.⁴⁰ Also relevant are the Sub-Saharan Africa Data Governance, NaturAfrica and Education regional initiatives. Finally, projects such as the Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience in Africa and Youth mobility for Africa go from €1 billion each but are not limited to the Western African region. While it is unclear if these projects have been already completed or are still under implementation, they still appear in the databases of the DGs that manage them, alongside projects from the same region.

The most concerned institutional investors in the region are the French Development Bank and the German Development Bank, who partake in the financing of GG projects as well as other projects, especially related to social movements and education, sometimes as a leading investment party. France has historically been politically and economically tied to this area, so its participation does not come as a surprise. The German Development Bank, on the other hand, is likely to be interested in laying its foundation for establishing a stable provision of raw materials for its own national industries in the future. In fact, they are especially involved in the energy and resource deposits of Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Congo.

The remaining African projects are sparsely distributed in the rest of the region and mostly deal with the energy sector, with the construction or increase of renewable energy infrastructure such as in Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Madagascar and Mozambique. Transport projects are located in Djibouti, Kenya and Malawi, aiming to improve airports and bus systems. A few other regional initiatives are present in this region in terms of education and health, but, as previously mentioned, the Northern and Western African areas are the main protagonists and beneficiaries of the EU Global Gateway.

America and the Caribbean

Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) lead in terms of the number of projects added to the Global Gateway list. After the initiative was launched in 2022, around 30 projects received flagship status and remained the only GG agenda in the region until the EU – CELAC summit in July 2023. Since then, the list was vastly expanded, and the renewed investment agenda included over 130 projects. EU participation in their implementation, however, remains rather marginal. The summit was held after an eight-year break, which in a way, is a marker of the EU's renewed ambition to put its foot into the region to maintain its global status. According to Ursula von der Leyen, the European Commission president, the EU-LAC “strategic partnership is now more important than ever” as they are “key partners to strengthen the rules-based international order”, which leaves room for Global Gateway to boost investment cooperation. Hence, the connectivity agenda earned a prominent position during the EU – CELAC summit, with Brussels adding its support to an impressive number of previous regional initiatives in all six priority spheres.

⁴⁰ EU-Africa: Global Gateway Investment Package - Africa's Great Green Wall Initiative // European Commission. 28.11.2022. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/fs_22_1121

Thanks to the summit, the plans for the projects in Latin America have been quite well-developed. An investment overview is listed out in detail, and is divided per country, showing the donor parties and those absent in other GG regions. It was declared that the EU will invest €10 billion and mobilize more money from either interested member states, or the private sector. The Team Europe investment track expanded to record up to €45 billion until 2027.⁴¹ However, the exact amount allocated for each project and the specific transaction shares per party are still very difficult to track.

Nevertheless, several common features of the GG investment policy in Latin America and the Caribbean stand out: first of all, EU input, as already briefly mentioned above, is secondary to both global (World Bank) and regional (primarily Inter-American Development Bank and the Development Bank of Latin America) investment institutions. Investment is mostly represented by the EU budget donations and EIB's loans and grants. Secondly, there are many stakeholders among member states, with Spain, Portugal, apart from traditional actors like Germany and France, clearly standing out and being present in almost all projects. In some cases (particularly those regarding the climate/energy sectors) transactions from member states are not direct, but reach the recipients via EU programs, such as Euroclima+, where they are main investors.

As for the regional investment agenda, there is very particular focus in Latin America that differs from the Mediterranean, but also Africa. Naturally, the EU is less eager to invest in hard infrastructure, transport projects and various networks this far away from its borders. Instead, it primarily supports green transition and sustainability projects, including those aimed at developing renewable energy, biodiversity, saving resources. Other sectors, such as healthcare, issues related to the social agenda, and digitalization are all of secondary importance. Together, they have less projects than in the climate/energy sector. Here, digitalization is meant less in terms of network building, and more in terms of technology access, sustainable internet connections, etc. This makes it easier for the EU to enter markets and label formerly launched projects GG, but has less to do with connectivity per se. Even region-scale initiatives create fewer interdependencies than hard infrastructure, with the extension of the BELLA cable from Europe to Central America being the only specific connectivity project.

Finally, if to consider all the GG projects in Latin America, the majority of them were launched long before the EU initiative was created. Between the late 2000s and early 2010s, local and national programs, projects and development plans were put in place. National governments were seeking help from various foreign investors, including the U.S., so these states were surely eager to receive more investment from the EU. However, the fact that all these projects have been stalled for years, hint that it is more than a lack of funding that is responsible for such delays.

⁴¹ EU-CELAC Summit: towards a closer, stronger and renewed partnership between both regions // European Commission. 18.07.2023. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_3929

Asia and the Pacific Region

The EU groups Asia and the Pacific region into one giant body, stretching from the Middle East to Central Asia and then to South-East Asia. This categorization is controversial at best. Unlike in the other mentioned regions, it is nearly impossible to establish a transport or digital network communication system over such a vast area with distinct separate regional clusters, in the classic connectivity sense. The outreach of the GG here is thus doomed to be sectoral, at least at the first stages of the initiative's implementation. Another factor that complicates the advancement of the EU initiative, especially in South-East Asia, is that this is the precise area of interest for China's Belt and Road Initiative, meaning heavy investments have already been made and many infrastructural projects launched, including those regarding transport connectivity.

Therefore, the number of projects in the region is limited to only around twenty flagships. Secondly, there are few national beneficiaries – Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Mongolia, Nepal, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Indonesia, Fiji and Papua New Guinea – and five regional projects. This highlights the third feature of GG in Asia and the Pacific – its rather fragmented character. Also noteworthy is that nearly half of the projects were already launched in 2010s, but the EU only joined some of them after the GG plans appeared.

In terms of sectoral priorities, 16 out of 20 projects fall into climate/energy sector, implying hard infrastructure investments, such as the construction of Rogun Dum and Sebzor Hydropower Plant in Tajikistan, the Choir-Sainshand double circuit 220kV transmission line in Mongolia or hydropower plants and wind farms in Vietnam and Fiji. Two projects, Regional Railway Surabaya in Indonesia and the Europe – Central Asia transport corridor, relate to the transport sector, and just one – the Central Asia Satellite Connectivity – seeks to boost digital development in Asia.

The EU's most systemic approach within the region focuses on Central Asia, following the EU Strategy on Central Asia of 2019, where connectivity was declared one of the main pillars of future prosperity,⁴² and trying to create a system of interlinkages both among regional countries and between them and the EU. This practice is highly contested, as Russia and China consider the region as part of their backyard. Yet, the EU has its own history there,⁴³ in addition to its future ambitions, as recently increased institutionalization of relations reveals.⁴⁴ Regional leaders have great interest in attracting European investment, with Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan focusing on energy security efficiency, including that in

⁴² Council Conclusions on the New Strategy on Central Asia // Council of the European Union. 17.06.2019. URL: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/39778/st10221-en19.pdf>

⁴³ Joint press communiqué by Heads of State of Central Asia and the President of the European Council // European Council. Council of the European Union. 02.06.2023. URL: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/06/02/press-communicue-by-heads-of-state-of-central-asia-and-the-president-of-the-european-council/>

⁴⁴ On November 18-19, 2022, Samarkand hosted the EU-Central Asia Connectivity Conference as well as 18th EU-Central Asia Ministerial Meeting. On February 23-24, 2023, the EU-Central Asia High Level Conference under the EU-Central Asia Platform for Environment and Water Cooperation took place in Rome. On March 10, 2023, the parties gathered at the Civil Society Forum in Tashkent. The highlight of the year was EU – Central Asia Economic Forum on May 2023 in Almaty.

construction, and enhancing their position as regional logistic hubs, and Uzbekistan prioritizing digital connectivity.⁴⁵

It is here where the EU seeks to become a solution for the region's problems. Apart from the two already mentioned projects in Tajikistan, Brussels assists Kazakhstan in producing batteries, renewable hydrogen and securing sustainable access to raw materials for a circular economy transition as part of a broader EU – Kazakhstan partnership.⁴⁶ Thus, the EU exploits its capacities as a leader of the global “green transition”. More importantly, however, the EU is trying to establish network connectivity via projects such as the Water-Energy-Climate Change in Central Asia, Central Asia Satellite Connectivity and Central Asia Transport. As part of the first phase in establishing transport connectivity projects, in 2021–2023, the EU conducted a Study on Sustainable Transport Connections between Europe and Central Asia,⁴⁷ identifying 33 objects for further hard infrastructure investment and soft connectivity measures, placing priority on the Trans-Caspian transport route. If successful, this approach could create visible interdependences and – in the long run – the platform to compete with China's and Russia's regional transport projects,⁴⁸ even if it may seem like a wishful thinking for Brussels.

Unsurprisingly, much investment in Central Asia comes in the form of EU grants, with loans from the EIB and EBRD complementing the total amount. The Team Europe approach is also widely used in the region, with many member states and national development banks (AfD and KfW among them) joining in on the projects. The number of initiatives in Central Asia is highly likely to grow in the near future, whereas in other sub-regions it can be expected to remain limited due to high regional coverage by China.

⁴⁵ The Results of the Central Asia-EU Summit // ANKASAM. 21.06.2023.
URL: <https://www.ankasam.org/the-results-of-the-central-asia-eu-summit/?lang=en>

⁴⁶ The EU is the main trading partner for Astana, with the new Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed in 2020, and a bilateral Cooperation Facility of € 9 million for 2021-2024 allocated to implement it.

⁴⁷ Study on sustainable transport connections with Central Asia // European Commission. URL: https://transport.ec.europa.eu/transport-themes/international-relations/study-sustainable-transport-connections-central-asia_en

⁴⁸ North – South International Transport Corridor, China – Mongolia – Russia railway, China – Kazakhstan – Kyrgyzstan Transit

Analysis Limitations

The following data analysis available via open sources or with online registration has indeed provided an opportunity to define the Global Gateway initiative and form a basic understanding of the practical foundations for European ambitions in the sphere of connectivity, thereby successfully reaching the objective stated in the introduction of this paper. However, an important aspect of this analysis are the various limitations that the authors encountered while studying the EU initiative. Not only do these limitations cause difficulties for an in-depth understanding of certain elements within the GG, but also indicate key areas for future research.

The first limitation is the unclear distinction between the GG and previously existing programs that have been included under the GG umbrella. Although the initiative is branded as a strategic response to the Chinese BRI, the prevalence of old instruments reveals that the EU still relies on its previous practices and approaches. The GG is thus to be seen more of an etiquette to apply in the EU's foreign policy, than an actual unique initiative. One of the most remarkable examples supporting this is the connection between the previous European Neighborhood Instrument (ENI) which transformed into the Neighborhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument, also referred to as Global Europe, which has become a part of the GG institutional infrastructure.

Another limitation, similar to the first one, is that many of the projects launched under the GG have actually been previously part of other programs, hindering the understanding of how their implementation proved effective, including in terms of fundraising mechanisms. Projects from different initiatives can of course be passed from one umbrella to the next, but the reasons for choosing a project follow the rules and objectives of the previous initiative, not the new one. Sometimes, some of the projects appear completely arbitrary to the GG. Thus, the GG has yet to solve the infamous BRI problem: it is hard to understand which Chinese projects have fallen in the sphere of connectivity and which do not. The EU is following a similar path and is mixing numerous fields and multiple projects from various eras under the same banner.

Thirdly, limitations in identifying GG projects arise in the financial sphere, particularly while tracking the sources of investment. This is especially a problem with the EIB: as previously stated, the EIB is the main financial lender of the EU and collaborates with DGs for funding and guarantees. Yet, in the list of projects published by the EIB, there are many that fall in the same regions as the GG but are labeled differently. Whether these are to be identified under the same umbrella or not remains unknown. If not, then the GG forms a different perspective: instead of being the main tool to counter the Chinese BRI, it becomes just one of many; if it is to be seen as part of the GG, there is yet another obstacle in the analysis of GG potential, since it becomes even trickier to identify others that are also not included in the list of flagship projects. In fact, the flagship list itself does not capture the Team Europe approach when engaging with each country, as stated

in data provided by the EU. Indeed, various European development banks and other initiatives, such as the EU's Economic and Investment Plans, are already in place in the same regions as the GG. Nonetheless, it becomes more and more difficult to calculate the possible impact of the GG amid so many additional and yet separate investments.

Fourthly, there is the problem of transparency and information accessibility. As previously noted, institutions (apart from the EIB) do not provide the precise amount of funds they are investing, and even when amounts are mentioned, the terms themselves are open to many interpretations about the identity of the investors. Member state national development banks do not publish information about the projects they participate in, only their own personal projects. Leaving aside the intricacy of what constitutes EU institutions, organs and roles, projects are not explained, but usually simply mentioned in a network of links throughout EU websites, with factsheets containing very few actual facts. The news section within EU websites sometimes serve as the only source of information, but even there much remains inconclusive. Searching for these projects online frequently results in poorly gathered information, and at many times it even provides misinformation in terms of actual amounts and timetables, thus needing to find other sources to confirm information. In other cases, predominantly Latin America, no information is disclosed, with the only mentions of the projects existing on EU websites. Most probably, this absolute lack of transparency and reliable information is the reason for the lack of research on the Global Gateway initiative: only a few think tanks have published work on this topic, and the extent of their analyses mostly speculates on the declarations made by the EU Commission.⁴⁹

Yet, it is extremely relevant to know and to factor into the analysis the type of financing, since the GG sets itself the purpose of countering the BRI and its allegedly insidious tendency to trap countries into debt. The traceability of EU forms of financial support is important to see if the EU truly has a “competitive advantage” over the BRI in financial transparency, as well as to understand whether EU member states or private enterprises are the main stakeholders in the GG. According to official sources, the €300 billion is to be made possible by €135 billion worth of investments by the EIB and EFSD+, €18 billions of grant financing by external programs and €145 billion of planned investment volumes by European financial and development finance institutions.⁵⁰ Apart from this, it is supposedly using other instruments such as guarantees and blending facilities, but again, depending on the circumstances and what proportion they are used in the case *ad hoc*. Some projects are already in various institutional programs under UN SDGs programs, the IMF and World Bank, meaning that while the GG is indeed mobilizing money, in some cases it does not do so alone and will not be the only one reaping the benefits and influence of a project.

⁴⁹ See one of the most well-elaborated papers of its kind: Ricart, R., Esteban, M., Armanini, U. Development aid and geopolitics: the EU's Global Gateway initiative // Real Instituto Elcano. Policy Paper. 2023. URL: <https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/policy-paper/development-aid-and-geopolitics-the-eus-global-gateway-initiative/>

⁵⁰ “The Global Gateway”. Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank JOIN(2021) 30 final // Council of the European Union. 01.12.2021. URL: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52021JC0030>

Overall, the lack of transparency regarding the GG initiative was vividly reflected at the 2023 Global Gateway Forum. The event was held on an invitation-only basis and collected selected private investors who support the EU Commission, with limited media coverage and generalized interpretations of what had occurred at the event.⁵¹

⁵¹ Global Gateway Forum: A closed-door gathering which fundamentally changes the EU's development landscape // European Network on Debt and Development Asbl. 26.10.2023. URL: https://www.euodad.org/global_gateway_forum_a_closed_door_gathering_which_fundamentally_changes_the_eu_s_development_landscape

Conclusions: What Might this Mean for Russia?

The Global Gateway initiative is a significant attempt by the EU to gain and maintain its influence around the world by framing a rather comprehensive state-of-the-art connectivity strategy. Whether the EU eventually mobilizes the full promised sum of €300 billion or falls short of it, does not take away from the fact that the GG is an ambitious development initiative, one of the first of its kind, especially for the regions that are in serious need of investments and funding. This lays the bedrock for the EU's return as a global influence or, at the very least, establishes or strengthens the EU presence in its designated priority areas, creating an additional competition factor for other actors who want to work at the respective markets or offer alternative projects in the field of transport and infrastructure. This is how the Global Gateway should be taken into account by all foreign policy analysts, including those in Russia, given that Central Asia has become a region of common interest.

The main EU competitor in all of the announced target areas – Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as Neighborhood and Western Balkans zone – is China. Using alternative funding mechanisms, the EU exempts the initiative from previously widespread political character of its development assistance, highlighting purely economic nature of the GG to counter China's rising influence, most visibly in Africa. Another competitive advantage that Brussels prides itself in is a diverse understanding of connectivity, encompassing digital, energy/climate, health, education, and transport sectors. Expanding the agenda provided an opportunity for the EU to put its foot into more areas around the globe, similar to China and the BRI, thus linking them together. Moreover, the digital and green sectors are the fields of European global superiority, with both standards and resources of the EU serving nearly as examples for other actors.

At the same time, the outreach itself is so far limited. As for Africa, the GG is poised to achieve great work in the upper half of the continent, as part of an extension of the EU Southern Neighborhood area, but its influence is marginal for the rest of Africa, providing scarce resources for a few programs. China's initiative in the Sub-Saharan Africa, on the other hand, is much more comprehensive and the region is already well connected to China. Asia is also firmly under Chinese influence, which limits the number of the EU initiatives there. The real dilemma comes when analyzing the American continent, which is politically and economically equidistant from the EU, as well as China. Surely, BRICS favors China's cooperation with Brazil and is a door into the region, but the real competitor there as of right now is the USA. Ongoing EU projects in Central and South America, including the Caribbean, are seen as a PR feat, which could offer future collaborations, but not on a scale that would tip the absolute balance to the benefit of the EU.

The most elaborate GG regions are the Western Balkans and the Mediterranean, where the EU exercises the greatest political influence, but may also use internal funding mechanisms, such as TEN-T and Connecting Europe Facility. This

is the key area that counters China's BRI outreach, prompting the EU not only to offer alternative projects, but already to start investing in them, be it on the survey stage or actual construction. Another area, where the outreach is quite well-structured is in Central Asia, where Brussels is already showing a systemic approach of investment and targets the sectors where neither Russia, nor China have the upper hand – climate and energy security. The prospect of sparing significant sums of money for transport development in the region, following the targeted Sustainable Transport Connections 2023 study of the EBRD is an important spoiler for Russia's and China's connectivity projects in the region, if not a crucial one.

Overall, the Global Gateway Initiative has great potential in regions that are close in proximity to the EU and could also hamper Chinese advancement in northern Africa. However, there remain various variables that can limit or impede EU global connectivity outreach due to the institutional and financial complexity of its design.

Supplement

Dataset 1. Neighborhood and Western Balkans

Year (Launch)	GG Year	Project Name	Quantity in Millions	EU Transaction Party	Other Transaction Parties	Framework Programs	Sector	Country	Stage of Implementation
2007	2022	Tramway Rabat III (37 km extension of the tramway network Rabat-Salé-Témara agglomeration)	\$ 109.7	European Investment Bank, EU grant	AFD (Agence Française de Développement), G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment	Global Gateway Green Transition Team Europe Initiative	Transport	Morocco	Grant approved
2023	2023	P2X hydrogen power plant	Up to € 100	Public Private Partnership	Germany	Global Gateway African-EU Green Energy Team Europe Initiative	Climate & Energy	Morocco	Call for proposals
2017	2022	Construction undersea hv electricity cable interconnection (ELMED) IT-TU	€ 850	Connecting Europe Facility (€ 300m), European Investment Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	World Bank (\$ 268m loan to Tunisia), KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau), Government of Tunisia	Connecting Europe Facility	Digital	Tunisia	Under construction
2021	2021	Construction high-voltage undersea electrical interconnection EG-GR (GREGY)	€ 3 500–4 200	Connecting Europe Facility	Elica S.A (Copelouzos Group)	Connecting Europe Facility	Digital	Egypt	Feasibility study
2023	2023	Modernisation of the Alexandria Area Control Centre	€ 54.7	European Investment Bank	AFD (Agence Française de Développement)	Global Gateway Team Europe Initiative "Connected Economy and Society in Egypt"	Transport	Egypt	Under construction

Year (Launch)	GG Year	Project Name	Quantity in Millions	EU Transaction Party	Other Transaction Parties	Framework Programs	Sector	Country	Stage of Implementation
2023	2023	Global Maritime Green Corridor (Production of Methanol for green shipping)	€ 450	–	The Alexandria National Refining and Petrochemicals Company (ANRPC), Scatec+ Egyptian Bioethanol Company	–	Transport	Egypt	Feasibility study
2019	2022	Medusa Optical Fibre Cable	€ 342	European Investment Bank Grant – € 40m	AFR-IX Telecom, Orange	Connecting Europe Facility	Digital	–	Grant agreement preparation
2018	2022	Trans-Balkan Electricity Corridor	€ 154	Connecting Europe Facility – € 31.2m	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) – € 82.8m, Serbia – € 40m	Connecting Europe Facility	Digital	–	Under construction
2010	2021	EuroAsia Interconnector (Euro-Asia submarine electricity interconnection cable linking Greece, Cyprus and Israel)	€ 1 570 (1 st phase), € 2 500 (total)	CEF – € 657m, Recovery and Resilience Facility – € 100m	Nexans (France), national budgets of Cyprus and Israel	Connecting Europe Facility, EU's Recovery and Resilience Facility	Digital	–	Under construction
2022	2022	Aqaba Amman Water Desalination and Conveyance project	\$ 352	European Investment Bank – € 200m loan	Government of Jordan	Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument	Climate & Energy	Jordan	Loan approved
2018	2023	Rehabilitation and upgrading of Al Salt sewage treatment plant	–	EBRD loan – € 41.3m, EIB grant – € 30m	–	–	Climate & Energy	Jordan	Loan approved
2022	2022	Black Sea Connectivity submarine electricity cable to export green energy from the South Caucasus to the EU	€ 2 300	–	–	Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument	Digital	Georgia	Feasibility study

End of the Dataset 1

Year (Launch)	GG Year	Project Name	Quantity in Millions	EU Transaction Party	Other Transaction Parties	Framework Programs	Sector	Country	Stage of Implementation
2021	2021	Black Sea Digital Connectivity submarine digital cable to support digital transformation and increase the digital resilience of the region	€ 45	EIB loan – € 20m	–	Connecting Europe Facility	Digital	–	Feasibility study
2022	2023	Corridor 8 Rail Interconnection North Macedonia – Bulgaria	€ 569	EBRD loan – € 175m, the European Investment Bank loan – € 299m, IPA – € 61m, EU grant	Government of North Macedonia – € 4.2m, WBIF – € 82m	The EU's initiative Western Balkans Investment Framework (WBIF), the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance programme (IPA)	Transport	North Macedonia	Grant agreements, construction contracts to be signed

Dataset 2. Latin America

Year (Launch)	GG Year	Project Name	Quantity in Millions	EU Transaction Party	Other Transaction Parties	Framework Programs	Sector	Country
-	2023	Water Security and Sustainable Water Management in urban areas	-	EU Budget (through EUROCLIMA+ program)	Germany (co-sponsor of EUROCLIMA), France (FDA), Spain (Agency for International Development Cooperation, AECID), IDB, Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean, World Bank, IFC	EUROCLIMA+ Program	Health	Peru
2020	2023	Urban Mobility Plan Arequipa: construction of the Urban Light Train	€ 0.5	-	Germany, France (AFD), Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean	EUROCLIMA+ Program	Transport	Peru
2017	2023	Urban Mobility Plan (Bus rapid transit) in the town of Trujillo	-	-	Germany (GIZ), France (AFD), Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean	-	Transport	Peru
2020	2023	Climate Action Framework Loan: Green energy investments, including decentralised energy grids in rural areas.	€ 702.8	EIB	Germany, Spain/IFC, IDB, World Bank	-	Climate & Energy	Peru
-	2023	National Parks and Protected Areas Investment Proposal. Promoting sustainable tourism and economic development.	-	-	Germany, Spain, Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean	-	Climate & Energy	Peru
-	2023	Fondo MiVivienda, phase 4: sustainable social urban housing	-	-	Germany, France, IDB	-	Climate & Energy	Peru
-	2023	Team Europe Initiative: Circular Economy and value chains	-	EIB	Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Netherlands, Austria, IDB, World Bank, IFC	Team Europe Initiative on circular transition	Climate & Energy	Peru
-	2023	Infrastructure electricity transmission in Peru-Ecuador	€ 250	EIB (\$ 125m)	Spain, IDB (\$ 125m), Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean	-	Climate & Energy	Peru
2011	2023	Strengthen regional energy integration of the Andean Electricity Interconnection System	-	-	Spain, IDB, Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean	-	Climate & Energy	Peru

Year (Launch)	GG Year	Project Name	Quantity in Millions	EU Transaction Party	Other Transaction Parties	Framework Programs	Sector	Country
-	2023	Issuance of Green Bonds	€ 4 250	-	UK PACT assistance	-	Climate & Energy	Peru
-	2023	Development of critical raw materials value chains for lithium and copper	-	-	-	-	Climate & Energy	Chile
-	2023	Development of renewable hydrogen, Global Gateway Renewable Hydrogen Fund	€ 225	European Investment Bank (EIB) – up to € 100m, EU Latin America and Caribbean Investment Facility (LACIF) – € 16.5m	KfW Development Bank (up to € 100m), Corporación de Fomento de la Producción (CORFO), Chilean Ministry of Finance	Team Europe Renewable Hydrogen Funding Platform for Chile	Climate & Energy	Chile
-	2023	Production of carbon-neutral fuels using wind energy (HARU ONI project in southern Chile).	€ 8	-	Germany, Siemens Energy, HIF Global	-	Climate & Energy	Chile
-	2023	Establishment of a Regional Copernicus Centre in Santiago	€ 4	-	-	-	Digital, Education & Research	Chile
2016-2021	2022	BELLA cable extension	€ 15	DG INTPA of the European Commission (EC), through the Neighbourhood, Development and International	RedCLARA	-	Digital, Education & Research	Chile

Year (Launch)	GG Year	Project Name	Quantity in Millions	EU Transaction Party	Other Transaction Parties	Framework Programs	Sector	Country
				Cooperation instrument – Global Europe (NDIC), under agreement number 438-964, signed in December 2022, € 13m from EU				
2021	2022	Development of vaccine production and health systems resilience	–	European Commission	Spain, Denmark	–	Health	Mexico
–	2023	Industrial parks, renewable energy, value chains for development of solar plants, electric vehicles, battery production and water systems (focus 'Plan Sonora')	–	EIB, European Commission	AFD(French), CFE (Mexico), Spain, Denmark	–	Climate & Energy	Mexico
–	2023	Development of the green bond market, interoperability of EU and Mexican taxonomy, access to finance	€ 160	EU, EIB	Latin American Green Bond Fund (LAGreen) is funded by the EU and Operadora de Servicios Mega (GF Mega), Germany, France, Spain, Italy	–	Climate & Energy	Mexico
–	2023	Implementation of the Five Great Forests of Mesoamerica initiative: conservation and restoration of forests	€ 22.5	EU, EIB	WGS, AMPB, CCAD, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden	–	Climate & Energy	Mexico
–	2023	Integrated Water Resources Management including: efficient water supply systems, sanitation projects, and flood and protection and storm water management	–	EU, EIB	–	–	Climate & Energy	Mexico

Year (Launch)	GG Year	Project Name	Quantity in Millions	EU Transaction Party	Other Transaction Parties	Framework Programs	Sector	Country
-	2023	Last km connectivity. Investment in Connectivity Infrastructure to foster digital transformation	-	EU	Sweden, IDB	-	Digital	Guatemala
-	2023	Drinking water supply to Guatemala City	-	EU	Spain, IDB, BCIE	-	Health	Guatemala
-	2023	Comprehensive Intervention Strategy for the Motagua River Basin to fight contamination	-	EU	Spain, IDB, BCIE	-	Health	Guatemala
-	2023	Social and economic green transition around Lago Petén Itzá	-	EU	Sweden, IDB	-	Climate & Energy	Guatemala
-	2023	Support the development of the green bond market in LAC, thus mobilising capital to finance a sustainable transition	-	EU, EIB	Germany, Spain, France, Italy, IFC	-	Climate & Energy	Jamaica
-	2023	Renewable Energy Production	-	EU	IDB, CAF, CDB	-	Climate & Energy	Jamaica
-	2023	Targeted investment to position Jamaica as a global logistics hub	-	EU	IDB, World Bank	-	Transport	Jamaica
-	2023	Improvement of solid waste management in the Harbour area and urban renewal	-	EU	IDB, World Bank	-	Transport	Jamaica
-	2023	Island-wide broadband access	-	EU	IFC, CDB, World Bank, IDB	-	Digital	Jamaica
-	2023	Inclusive access to digital technologies in education and MSMEs	-	EU	IFC, CDB, World Bank, IDB	-	Digital	Jamaica

Year (Launch)	GG Year	Project Name	Quantity in Millions	EU Transaction Party	Other Transaction Parties	Framework Programs	Sector	Country
-	2023	Issuance of Green Bonds	-	-	-	-	Climate & Energy	Dominican Republic
-	2023	Development of vaccine production and health systems resilience	€ 60	-	-	-	Health	Barbados
2022	2023	Build a regional Copernicus centre	€ 12	European Space Agency	European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites, the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts, EU Agencies and Mercator Océan	-	Climate & Energy	Panama
2023	2023	Conversion of urban bus fleet to electric: 40 public e-vehicles contributing to a reduction of 5000 CO2 ktons/yr	-	-	-	Team Europe	Climate & Energy	Costa Rica
2023	2023	Development of vaccine production and health systems resilience	-	-	-	-	Health	Costa Rica
2023	2023	Construction of drinking water plant and sanitary sewage systems, as well as the construction of pluvial drainage and collection systems in the Portoviejo municipality of Manabí	-	-	-	-	Health	Ecuador
2023	2023	Drinking Water and Sewerage Programmes in Ecuador	-	-	-	-	Health	Ecuador
2023	2023	Ecuador Team Europe Initiative: 'A Green Deal for Ecuador'	€ 15.5	-	-	-	Climate & Energy	Ecuador
2023	2023	Conversion of urban bus fleet to electric (1000 electric buses in the next 3 years)	-	European Investment Bank	IBRD/IDA / BCIE/ CAF/ IDB/ Spain/ France/ Italy/ Portugal	Team Europe	Transport	Costa Rica

Continuation of the Dataset 2

Year (Launch)	GG Year	Project Name	Quantity in Millions	EU Transaction Party	Other Transaction Parties	Framework Programs	Sector	Country
2020	2023	Electric Passenger Train of the Greater Metropolitan Area	–	European Investment Bank	IBRD/IDA / BCIE/ CAF/ IDB/ Spain/ France/ Italy/ Portugal	–	Transport	Costa Rica
–	2023	Limón Electric Freight Train (TELCA)	–	European Investment Bank	IBRD/IDA / BCIE/ CAF/ IDB/ Spain/ France/ Italy/ Portugal	–	Transport	Costa Rica
–	2023	Train line connecting to Caldera region	–	European Investment Bank	IBRD/IDA / BCIE/ CAF/ IDB/ Spain/ France/ Italy/ Portugal	–	Transport	Costa Rica
–	2023	Sustainable agriculture and fishing	–	–	France	–	Climate & Energy	Costa Rica
–	2023	Sustainable finance, access to green and development of the green bond market, thus mobilising capital for financing and sustainable transition	–	European Investment Bank	IBRD/IDA / IFC/ BCIE/ Luxembourg/ Italy/ France/ Spain/ Germany	–	Climate & Energy	Costa Rica
–	2023	Deployment of 5G infrastructure to foster digital transformation, including last km connectivity	–	–	IBRD/IDA / IDB/ Estonia/ Spain/ France/ Finland	–	Digital, Education & Research	Costa Rica
–	2023	Development, testing and production of medicines and medical devices	–	–	CAF/ Portugal	–	Health	Costa Rica
–	2023	Adequate legal frameworks, human talent and e-health	–	–	CAF/ Portugal	–	Health	Costa Rica
2022	2023	Expansion and improvement of drinking water and sanitation systems in Quito, Portoviejo Municipality and Guayaquil. Water management projects in areas	€ 100	European Investment Bank	IBRD/IDA / CAF/ IDB/ Spain/ France	–	Health	Ecuador

Year (Launch)	GG Year	Project Name	Quantity in Millions	EU Transaction Party	Other Transaction Parties	Framework Programs	Sector	Country
-	2023	with highest prevalence of chronic childhood malnutrition	€ 100	European Investment Bank	IBRD/IDA / IDB/	-	Health	Ecuador
-	2023	Childhood vaccination campaign to improve future pandemic preparedness, the long-term resilience of the healthcare system and the delivery of essential public health services	-	European Investment Bank	IBRD/IDA / IDB/ Spain/ France/ Germany	-	Transport	Ecuador
2022	2023	Team Europe Initiative - A Green Deal for Ecuador: innovations and investments at decentralised level	€ 15.5	European Investment Bank	IBRD/IDA / IDB/ France/ Germany	-	Climate & Energy	Ecuador
-	2023	Support the development of the green bond market in LAC, thus mobilising capital for financing a sustainable transition and access to finance.	-	European Investment Bank/ European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	IFC/ IDB/ France/ Germany/ Spain/ Italy	-	Climate & Energy	Ecuador
2022	2023	Renewable energy and infrastructure electricity transmission Ecuador-Peru	€ 113	European Investment Bank	IDB	-	Climate & Energy	Ecuador
-	2023	Strengthen regional energy integration of the Andean Electricity Interconnection System	-	European Investment Bank	IDB	-	Climate & Energy	Ecuador
-	2023	Ukumari EU-Ecuador Forest Partnership promoting sustainable	-	-	IDB/ Spain/ Germany/ France/ Italy/ Hungary/ Netherlands	-	Climate & Energy	Ecuador

Year (Launch)	GG Year	Project Name	Quantity in Millions	EU Transaction Party	Other Transaction Parties	Framework Programs	Sector	Country
-	2023	use of forest biodiversity and knowledge on agroforestry and forest recovery	-	-	IDB/ Spain/ Germany/ France/ Italy/ Hungary/ Netherlands	-	Climate & Energy	Ecuador
-	2023	Supporting Colombia's plan to increase connectivity to 85% of the population by 2026	€ 145	Team Europe	IBRD/IDA / IFC/ CAF/ IDB/ Spain	-	Digital	Colombia
-	2023	Bogotá metro line 1 & 2	€ 480	European Investment Bank (EIB)	IBRD/IDA / IFC/ CAF/ IDB/ Spain, France, Empresa Metro de Bogotá S.A	-	Transport	Colombia
-	2023	City level displays to test diverse innovative e-mobility solutions and engage a wide range of highly committed actors	€ 0.23	URBAN ELECTRIC MOBILITY INITIATIVE (UEMI) GGMBH (Germany), Global Environment Facility (GEF), European grant	Municipality of QUITO	-	Transport	Colombia
-	2023	Development of taxonomy for economic activities considered environmentally sustainable (Global Green Bond Initiative) and access to finance	-	European Union Climate Dialogues Project	Colombian Superintendency of Finance	-	Energy	Colombia
-	2023	Waste water management "Planta de tratamiento de aguas de Canoas"; circular economy	-	European Investment Bank (EIB)	Germany/Spain/Denmark/france/Italy/ Portugal/IFC/IDB	-	Infra-structure	Colombia

Year (Launch)	GG Year	Project Name	Quantity in Millions	EU Transaction Party	Other Transaction Parties	Framework Programs	Sector	Country
-	2023	Development of green hydrogen production and renewable energy	-	European Investment Bank (EIB)	Germany/Spain/Denmark/france/Italy/Portugal/IFC/IDB	-	Energy	Colombia
-	2023	Nature based solutions for climate change adaptation	-	Euroclima +	Germany/Spain/Denmark/france/Italy/Portugal/IFC/IDB	-	Energy	Colombia
-	2023	Construction of four multipurpose dams "El Tablon", "Los Llanitos" and "Jicatuyo" and "Morolica" to reduce environmental vulnerability to floods, generate sustainable energy and develop the surrounding areas.	€ 5	-	Spain, The Central American Bank for Economic Integration,	-	Energy	Honduras
-	2023	Sustainable recovery of the Yojoa Lake	€ 1	-	Spain, The Central American Bank for Economic Integration, IDB	-	Climate & Energy	Honduras
-	2023	Construction of three hospitals to improve access to health services	€ 0.6	-	Spain, The Central American Bank for Economic Integration	-	Health	Honduras
-	2023	Framework Loan to part-finance a series of climate action projects in the state of Minas Gerais, Brazil, including solar photovoltaic (PV), small-scale hydropower and other renewables	€ 160	-	Spain/Denmark/Germany/France/Italy/Netherlands/Portugal, IDB, IFC, Banco de Desenvolvimento de Minas Gerais	-	Climate & Energy	Brazil
-	2023	Infrastructure projects in Brazil in the renewable energy, water and sewerage sectors, and in solutions for carbon emission reduction, energy storage and energy efficiency	€ 52.5	-	Vinci Infraestrutura Gestora de Recursos Ltda.	-	Climate & Energy	Brazil
-	2023	Construction and operation of port infrastructure	-	-	Spain/Portugal/Netherlands/IFC	-	Transport	Brazil

Continuation of the Dataset 2

Year (Launch)	GG Year	Project Name	Quantity in Millions	EU Transaction Party	Other Transaction Parties	Framework Programs	Sector	Country
-	2023	Framework loan to modernise the water supply and sewage services of CASAN, a public water utility provider to municipalities through concessions within the state of Santa Catarina	€ 100	-	Spain/Denmark/Germany/France/Italy/Netherlands/Portugal, IDB, IFC, COMPANHIA CATARINENSE DE AGUAS E SANEAMENTO CASAN	-	Climate & Energy	Brazil
-	2023	The financing of projects on renewable energy and energy efficiency and promotion of green hydrogen	€ 2 000	Global Gateway, European Investment Bank (EIB)	The Central American Bank for Economic Integration	-	Climate & Energy	Brazil
-	2023	The financing of solar energy investment in Brazil	€ 200	European Investment Bank (EIB)	Sicredi	-	Climate & Energy	Brazil
-	2023	Small-scale solar energy investments	€ 300	European Investment Bank (EIB)	Banco Santander	-	Climate & Energy	Brazil
-	2023	Production of renewable energy	€ 86 600	European Union Spain, France, Italy	IDB (Inter-American Development Bank), CAF (Development Bank of Latin America), IFC (International Finance Corporation)	Argentina's National Energy Transition Plan	Climate & Energy	Argentina
-	2023	Expansion and modernisation of the electricity transmission network covering 23 provinces nationwide following the Transmission Network Investments federal plan	€ 1 000	European Investment Bank – € 100m, France	IDB (Inter-American Development Bank), CAF (Development Bank of Latin America), The World Bank	-	Climate & Energy	Argentina
-	2023	Support to SMEs leading investments in energy efficiency, renewable energy and bioeconomy	-	Green Climate Fund – \$ 100m, European Investment Bank – € 60 m	Green Climate Fund, Banco de Inversión y Comercio Exterior S.A. (Banco de Inversión y Comercio Exterior), IDB (Inter-American Development Bank), The World Bank, IFC (International Finance Corporation)	National Development Plan of Argentina	Climate & Energy	Argentina

Year (Launch)	GG Year	Project Name	Quantity in Millions	EU Transaction Party	Other Transaction Parties	Framework Programs	Sector	Country
-	2023	Commercialisation of green low-carbon technologies of European SMEs and companies	-	European Union, European Investment Bank – € 60 m	Green Climate Fund, Banco de Inversión y Comercio Exterior S.A. (Banco de Inversión y Comercio Exterior), IDB (Inter-American Development Bank), The World Bank, IFC (International Finance Corporation)	-	Climate & Energy	Argentina
-	2023	Development of Norte Grande region, with special focus on Gran Chaco Americano. Activities on territorial planning, forestry management and sustainable farming, and climate change	-	European Union, Germany, Republic of Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, Slovenia, Sweden, EIB	IDB (Inter-American Development Bank), The World Bank (\$ 400m)	Argentina Strategic Plan for Territorial Development, Innovation Network for the Rural Development of the Gran Chaco Americano in the Context of Climate Change (ATN/RF-16112-RG)	Climate & Energy	Argentina
-	2023	Investments in rural roads, irrigation, rural electrification, fire risk management, rural internet connectivity and rural marketplaces (Rural Development Programme – PROSAP V)	€ 285.75	EIB, European Union, France	IDB (Inter-American Development Bank), The World Bank, CAF (Development Bank of Latin America)	Rural Development Programme – PROSAP V	Climate & Energy, Digital and Transport	Argentina
-	2023	Waste management improvement. Chubut Province (Mar Patagónico)	€ 7	European Union, EIB, Spain	IDB (Inter-American Development Bank), The World Bank	Plan de Manejo y Conservación	Climate & Energy	Argentina
-	2023	Euro-Argentina academic alliance on scientific cooperation	-	European Union, Belgium, Germany, Republic of Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, Latvia, Poland	IDB (Inter-American Development Bank), The World Bank	Argentina Agreement with the European Research Council 2015	Digital	Argentina

Continuation of the Dataset 2

Year (Launch)	GG Year	Project Name	Quantity in Millions	EU Transaction Party	Other Transaction Parties	Framework Programs	Sector	Country
-	2023	Legislation, regulatory frameworks, and policies on the introduction of artificial intelligence	-	European Union, Belgium, Germany, Republic of Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, Latvia, Poland	IDB (Inter-American Development Bank), The World Bank	-	Digital	Argentina
-	2023	Last km connectivity/Internet for All	€ 110	European Union, Belgium, Germany, Republic of Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, Latvia, Poland	IDB (Inter-American Development Bank), The World Bank	-	Digital	Argentina
-	2023	Production of renewable hydrogen, including the construction of 350 MW wind and solar farms, an on-site electrolyser and conversion facilities, and adaptation of Montevideo Port infrastructure	-	Germany, Spain	IDB (Inter-American Development Bank), CAF (Development Bank of Latin America), IFC (International Finance Corporation)	Tambor Green Hydrogen Hub	Climate & Energy	Uruguay
-	2023	Support the development of a National Programme for the Promotion of Electric Urban Mobility	-	European Union, Germany	IDB (Inter-American Development Bank), CAF (Development Bank of Latin America)	-	Transport	Uruguay
-	2023	Infrastructure and management of the water resources in Santa Lucia river basin to make drinking water available to 60% of the country's population	€ 110	Spain	IDB (Inter-American Development Bank), CAF (Development Bank of Latin America), IFC (International Finance Corporation)	EUROCLIMA+ project 'Adaptation in Action - Santa Lucia Basin'	Climate & Energy	Uruguay
-	2023	Deployment of 5G connection to foster digital transformation	€ 47	European Union	European Investment Bank	-	Digital	Uruguay

Year (Launch)	GG Year	Project Name	Quantity in Millions	EU Transaction Party	Other Transaction Parties	Framework Programs	Sector	Country
-	2023	Reduce methane and CO2 emissions for climate action, environmental preservation and energy efficiency in Monagas State	€ 1 420	-	-	-	Climate & Energy	Venezuela
2021	2023	Decarbonisation of the Panama Canal by 2030 to protect water resources, ensuring water security for 2.5 million inhabitants	-	European Investment Bank	IBRD/IDA / IFC/ CAF/ IDB/ Spain	-	Climate & Energy	Panama
2020	2023	Energy Transition: power generation, universal access, energy efficiency and sustainable mobility, green hydrogen	-	European Investment Bank	IBRD/IDA / IFC/ CAF/ IDB/ Spain	-	Climate & Energy	Panama
2022	2022	Build a regional Copernicus centre	€ 12	European Space Agency. Partnership with the EU Member States, the European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites, the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts, EU Agencies and Mercator Ocean	-	-	Digital, Education & Research	Panama
-	2023	Digital Coverage, digital business, innovation and education ecosystems	-	-	CAF/ Spain	-	Digital, Education & Research	Panama

Continuation of the Dataset 2

Year (Launch)	GG Year	Project Name	Quantity in Millions	EU Transaction Party	Other Transaction Parties	Framework Programs	Sector	Country
-	2023	Regional Innovation for Centre Vaccines and Biopharmaceutics	-	-	IDB/ CAF/ Spain	-	Health	Panama
2023	2023	Pacific Train: corridor One linking the port of Acajutla with San Salvador (108 km train)	-	European Investment Bank	BCIE/ France	-	Transport	El Salvador
-	2023	Surface Metro Line One: electric passenger transportation system	-	European Investment Bank	CAF/ Spain/ France	-	-	El Salvador
-	2023	Aerocable lines, part of the mass transportation system in the Metropolitan Area of San Salvador, helping reach highly populated areas	€ 300	European Investment Bank	BCIE/ France/ Spain/ Sweden	-	Transport	El Salvador
-	2023	Last km Connectivity providing broadband connectivity to public schools and health centres in non-served areas	-	European Investment Bank	CAF/ BCIE/ IDB/ Spain/ Sweden/ Finland/ Luxembourg	-	Digital	El Salvador
-	2023	Pacific optical fibre submarine cable	-	European Investment Bank	CAF/ BCIE/ IDB/ Spain/ Sweden/ Finland/ Luxembourg	-	Digital	El Salvador
-	2023	Deployment of 5G	-	European Investment Bank	CAF/ BCIE/ IDB/ Spain/ Sweden/ Finland/ Luxembourg	-	Digital	El Salvador
-	2023	Water and sanitation project in Asuncion to improve the access to sanitation and sewerage and to upgrade water and sanitation quality services	€ 161	-	IDB/ CAF/ Spain	-	Health	Paraguay

Year (Launch)	GG Year	Project Name	Quantity in Millions	EU Transaction Party	Other Transaction Parties	Framework Programs	Sector	Country
–	2023	Renewal of the transmission network of electricity: support to Administración Nacional de Electricidad.	–	European Investment Bank	IDB/ CAF/ Germany	–	Climate & Energy	Paraguay
–	2023	Green-field pulp mill and forestry plantation project on fighting deforestation, formal jobs, vocational training, energy generation, etc.	–	–	IDB/ CAF/ Spain	–	Climate & Energy, Education & Research	Paraguay
–	2023	Stronger linkages among academia, research and business, better responding to education, innovation and labour market needs	–	–	–	–	Education & Research	–
2016–2022 (EURO-social+)	2023	Partnerships to reduce inequalities and reinforce social policies, accountable public institutions, and inclusive investments to foster just transitions	€ 60	EU	–	Team Europe Initiative	Education & Research	–
2022	2023	Support the development of local medicines and vaccine manufacturing and health systems resilience, including regulatory frameworks	€ 4	EU	Spain Pan-American Health Organisation (PAHO)	–	Health	–
2016–2021	2022	Extension of BELLA cable to Central America and the Caribbean countries	€ 28	EU (DG INTPA)	RedCLARA (the coordinating institution that will accumulate € 15m through the alliance with governments, private companies, banks and others)	The Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument	Digital, Education & Research	Peru, Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras

Continuation of the Dataset 2

Year (Launch)	GG Year	Project Name	Quantity in Millions	EU Transaction Party	Other Transaction Parties	Framework Programs	Sector	Country
–	2023	Regional policy dialogues on cybersecurity, connectivity, e-governance, data governance and Artificial Intelligence	€ 5.4	EU	Germany	EU-LAC high-level political dialogue on digital policy and regulation (EU-LAC Digital Alliance Regional Team Europe Initiative)	Digital, Education & Research	Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Argentina, Mexico
2022	2023	Establishment of two regional Copernicus centres for LAC	€ 19.85	EU	Panama	The Copernicus Central America Initiative	Digital, Education & Research	Panama
–	2023	Establishment of two regional Copernicus centres for LAC	€ 300	EIB	–	The Copernicus Central America Initiative	Digital, Education & Research	Chile
–	2023	EU-LAC Digital Accelerator, supporting at least 100 joint ventures between EU and LAC innovative start-ups, SMEs and corporations	–	–	–	Team Europe Initiative	Digital, Education & Research	–
–	2023	Support the development of the green bond market in LAC, thus mobilising capital for financing a sustainable transition.	€ 20 000	EIB, EBRD	Italy, France, Germany, Spain, IDB, the Green Climate Fund	The Global Green Bond Initiative	Climate & Energy	Mexico, Jamaica, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic
–	2023	Leveraging public and private investment to foster electro-mobility and transport with main focus on train, metro, and electric buses	€ 225	EU	–	–	Transport	Chile

Year (Launch)	GG Year	Project Name	Quantity in Millions	EU Transaction Party	Other Transaction Parties	Framework Programs	Sector	Country
-	2023	Regional Amazon Basin aims to reduce deforestation, prevent wildfire impact, and empower indigenous communities in decision-making processes	€ 35	EU	France, Germany, Italy, Hungary, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden	Team Europe Initiative	Climate & Energy	Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname, Venezuela
-	2023	Support LAC countries in achieving a climate-neutral economy and resilient society in harmony with nature, with a focus on fair and inclusive transition	€ 35	EU	France, Germany, UNDP Spain, France, ECLAC, UNEP, FILAPP as implementing parties	EUROCLIMA+ Program	Climate & Energy	all 33 countries across LAC
-	2023	Reinforcing the regional electricity market and its dedicated transmission line as well as critical national transmission infrastructure	-	-	-	-	Climate & Energy	-
2021	2023	Five Great Forests of Mesoamerica initiative Corredor Seco: Ecosystem-based Adaptation and innovative financial mechanisms to increase resilience to extreme climate events	€ 25	EU, EIB	France, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain, Sweden	Team Europe Initiative	Climate & Energy	Mexico, Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama

Year (Launch)	GG Year	Project Name	Quantity in Millions	EU Transaction Party	Other Transaction Parties	Framework Programs	Sector	Country
-	2023	Reinforcing the regional electricity market and its dedicated transmission line as well as critical national transmission infrastructure	-	-	-	Team Europe Initiative	-	Latin America and the Caribbean
2021	2023	Five Great Forests of Mesoamerica initiative Corridor Seco: Ecosystem-based Adaptation and innovative financial mechanisms to increase resilience to extreme climate events	€ 25	EU, EIB	France, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain, Sweden	Team Europe Initiative	Climate & Energy	Mexico, Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama

Dataset 3. Asia and Eurasia

Year (Launch)	GG Year	Project Name	Quantity in Millions	EU Transaction Party	Other Transaction Parties	Framework Programs	Sector	Country	Stage of Implementation
2022	2022	Implementation of partnership on raw materials, batteries and renewable hydrogen	–	Part of € 700m, € 200m – from EU budget	–	REPowerEU	Climate & Energy	Kazakhstan	Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Strategic Partnerships on Sustainable Raw Materials, Batteries, and Renewable Hydrogen Value Chains, 2023–2024 roadmap
2016	2022	Construction of Rogun Dam (hydropower plant) to double the energy production capacity of the country and advance the decarbonisation of the region	\$ 8000	Part of € 700m, € 200m – from EU budget + Italy (Webuild), EIB	World Bank – \$ 65m, Islamic Development Bank – \$ 250m, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank – \$ 500m	–	Climate & Energy	Tajikistan	–
2017	2021	Construction of the Sebzor hydropower plant (HPP)	€ 39.7	EU (grant – € 18.6m), KfW (€ 17m)	World Bank	European Union and Central Asia Strategy for a New Partnership, Connecting Europe and Asia – Building blocks for an ED Strategy	Climate & Energy	Tajikistan	–
–	2022	Water–Energy–Climate Change in Central Asia	–	Part of € 700m, € 200m from – EU budget + EIB, EBRD, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia, European Fund	–	Team Europe Green Transition	Climate & Energy	Regional (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan)	–

Year (Launch)	GG Year	Project Name	Quantity in Millions	EU Transaction Party	Other Transaction Parties	Framework Programs	Sector	Country	Stage of Implementation
–	2022	Central Asia Satellite Connectivity: Building satellite connectivity “earth stations” with integrated data centres	–	EIB (€ 40m), EBRD, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia	–	–	Digital	Regional (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan)	Comprehensive satellite connections, with a specific focus on low earth orbit (LEO) satellites
–	2021	Central Asia Transport: Construction of sustainable transport corridors between Europe and Central Asia.	If Trans-Caspian Corridor – around, € 1 850	EU, EBRD	–	–	Transport	Regional (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan)	Study on sustainable transport connections with Central Asia
2013	2022	Construction of the 220 km Choir-Sainshand double circuit 220KV transmission line	–	EBRD – loan \$ 70.4m to national government	–	–	Climate & Energy	Mongolia	–
–	2021	Implementation of Forest partnership	–	–	–	Aimag and Soum Centers Green and Resilient Regional Development Investment Program (ASDIP), EU Forest Partnership Program	Climate & Energy	Mongolia	Memorandum of Understanding and Roadmap signed 2023
–	2021	Implementation of Team Europe Initiative on Green recovery	€ 300	EU (€ 142m), EIB, FMO (Dutch Development Bank), Germany,	–	Team Europe Initiative	Climate & Energy	Nepal	–

Year (Launch)	GG Year	Project Name	Quantity in Millions	EU Transaction Party	Other Transaction Parties	Framework Programs	Sector	Country	Stage of Implementation
2017	2022	Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETP): Construction of Bac Ai hydropower pump storage (1,200 MW)	\$ 909.73	Finland – together over € 60m	–	–	Climate & Energy	Vietnam	–
–	2022	Upgrading of Hydro-power plant Tri An by 200MW to increase peak capacities	\$ 170	–	–	–	Climate & Energy	Vietnam	–
–	–	Construction of the Vinh 48 MW nearshore wind farm	–	Netherlands, Norway	Climate Fund Managers – € 71.5m; USAid	–	Climate & Energy	Vietnam	–
2021	2022	Pacific Islands – Climate Strengthen the climate resilience of Pacific Islands' ecosystems, economies and communities (KIWA Initiatives)	€ 57	EU – € 20m, Agence française de développement (AFD) – € 8m	Global Affairs Canada (GAC), Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT)	–	Climate & Energy	Regional	–
2019	2022	South East Asia – Transport corridor Upgrade of the Laotian national highway n° 2.	–	–	World Bank – \$ 132m, Australia – \$ 10m	–	Transport	Regional	–
–	–	Development of solar and wind power energy investments	–	–	–	–	Climate & Energy	Bangladesh	–

End of the Dataset 3

Year (Launch)	GG Year	Project Name	Quantity in Millions	EU Transaction Party	Other Transaction Parties	Framework Programs	Sector	Country	Stage of Implementation
-	-	Rehabilitation of the port of Rabaul	-	-	-	-	Climate & Energy	Papua New Guinea	-
-	-	Development of economic corridors and agricultural trade	-	-	-	-	Climate & Energy	Papua New Guinea	-
-	-	Strengthening integrated sustainable landscape management in Enga province	-	-	-	-	Climate & Energy	Papua New Guinea	-
2021	2021	Construction of Qalawana and Vatukotoko hydro power plants in Viti Levu	-	EIB, EU	Energy Fiji Limited	-	Climate & Energy	Fiji	Feasibility Study
-	2022	Investment plan via the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) to expand renewable energies, phase down on and off-grid coal-fired electricity generation	-	-	-	-	Climate & Energy	Indonesia	-
-	-	Double tracked upgrading and electrification of suburban train, Regional Railway Surabaya	-	-	-	-	Transport	Indonesia	-
-	-	Green Energy Transition in Bangladesh	€ 70	-	-	Team Europe Initiatives on Green Energy and Decent Work	Climate & Energy	Bangladesh	-

Dataset 4. Africa

Year (Launch)	Year GG	Receiving Investor	Quantity in Millions	EU Transaction Party	Other Transaction Parties	Sector	Country
2021	2023	Construction of data centre in Nouakchott and submarine cable	€ 8.39	–	–	Digital	Mauritania
2019	2022	Construction of Bus Rapid Transit system in Dakar	€ 280.90	–	World Bank	Transport	Senegal
2018	2022	Development of Dakar Bus Public Transport Network	€ 354	€ 167m from EIB	EIB	Transport	Senegal
2022	2023	Expansion & rehabilitation of Port of Banjul	€ 121	€ 60m from EIB	EIB, World Bank, Afdb	Transport	Gambia
2020	2023	Construction of Pump and Storage Facility in Santiago island	€ 0.35	–	–	Climate & Energy	Cape Verde
2018	2023	Rehabilitation road Safim – Sao Domingos – Mpack – Senegal 115 km	€ 3.50	–	–	Climate & Energy	Guinea-Bissau
2017	2023	Development of solar power plant in Boundiali, Sarébou and Kossou	€ 40	€ 27m from KfW, € 9.7 from EIB	KfW, EIB	Climate & Energy	Ivory Coast
2022	2023	Rehabilitation Allada-Dassa road	€ 439	–	–	Transport	Benin
2011	2023	Upgrade solar power plant photovolt by West African Power Pool (WAPP)	€ 75	–	World Bank	Climate & Energy	Benin
2022	2023	Devpmt generation evacuation infrastructure on-grid renewable energy	€ 16	–	–	Climate & Energy	Nigeria
2014	2023	Construction of Yaounde bypass	€ 513	–	World Bank	Transport	Cameroon
2019	2023	Extension upgrading infrastructures autonomous Port of Pointe-Noire	€ 180	–	–	Transport	Republic of Congo
2012	2023	Establishment green digital corridor Port of Sines-Port of Barra Do Dande	€ 392	€ 30m from EU Horizon in 2020	APLOP	Transport	Angola
–	2023	Expansion biogas plant (Bio2Watt project) producing biogas from waste	€ 38.50	–	–	Climate & Energy	South Africa
–	–	Just Energy Transition Partnership	€ 8 500	–	–	Climate & Energy	South Africa

Continuation of the Dataset 4

Year (Launch)	Year GG	Receiving Investor	Quantity in Millions	EU Transaction Party	Other Transaction Parties	Sector	Country
2021	2023	Constir hybrid solar power plants (Gorou Banda) – ext energy network	€ 104	€ 23.5m from AfD, € 5m from EU	–	Climate & Energy	Niger
–	2022	Construction of Bus Rapid Transit system in Nairobi	€ 432	–	–	Transport	Kenya
–	2023	Doubling capacity desalination plant, construction of a solar energy plant	€ 79	€ 79m from EIB	EIB, AfD	Climate & Energy	Djibouti
2022	2023	Construction of 85 MW solar PV plant combined with electrolyzers	€ 181	–	AfD	Climate & Energy	Namibia
–	2023	Implementation partner raw materials value chains renewable hydrogen	€ 500	–	–	Climate & Energy	Namibia
2018	2023	Rural electrification in Madagascar with AfD	€ 73.2	–	AfD	Climate & Energy	Madagascar
2023	2023	Construction of Kakono Hydropower Plant with AfD	€ 321	€ 36m from EU, € 110m from AfD	–	Climate & Energy	Tanzania
2022	2023	Construction of National Control Centre for Energy Infrastructure, improvement of the reliability and sustainability of the power supply	€ 57.7	€ 18.2 from EU, € 15m from KfW	KfW, AfDB	Climate & Energy	Mozambique
–	2023	Creation of employment opportunities in the energy industry for youth in Cabo Delgado (pilot vocational training initiative + EMPREGO)	€ 3	–	–	Education & Research	Mozambique
–	–	Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience in Africa	€ 1 000	–	–	Climate & Energy	Regional
2007	2022	Africa's Great Green Wall	€ 17 700	–	–	Climate & Energy	Regional
–	2021	Global Forests Finance Pledge	€ 1 000	€ 1bn from EU	–	Climate & Energy	Regional
–	2022	Africa Europe Digital Innovation Bridge	€ 5.22	€ 4.88m from EU	–	Digital	Regional
–	2022	Team Europe Initiative on Data Governance in Africa	€ 58	€ 3m from EU	–	Digital	Regional

Year (Launch)	Year	Receiving Investor	Quantity in Millions	EU Transaction Party	Other Transaction Parties	Sector	Country
-	2023	Regional Teachers' Initiative in Africa and for Africa	€ 100	-	-	Education & Research	Regional
-	2021	Global Partnership for Education (GPE)	€ 700	€ 700m from EU	-	Education & Research	Regional
-	2021	Manufacturing access to vaccines medicines health technologies (MAV+)	€ 1 000	-	-	Education & Research	Regional
-	2022	Flood prevention and informal settlements, Kigali inclusive and resilient	€ 10	-	-	Climate & Energy	Rwanda
-	2022	Team Europe Initiative for Green Economy in Senegal	€ 1 000	-	EIB, KfW, AfD	Climate & Energy	Senegal
-	2022	Sustainable Cocoa in Ivory Coast	€ 450	-	-	Climate & Energy	Ivory Coast
-	2022	EU's response to the global food security crisis	€ 600	-	-	-	-
-	2022	Just Energy Transition Partnerships with South Africa	€ 3 000	-	-	Climate & Energy	South Africa
-	2022	Low carbon transition of Ivory Coast	€ 1 000	-	-	Climate & Energy	Ivory Coast
2018	2022	Expansion modernisation port of Ingles in Maio – port of Palmeira in Sal	€ 17	-	AfDB	Transport	Cape Verde
2017	2022	Rehabilitation Mano River Union Road from Sanniquellie to Loguatu	€ 20.2	-	AfDB	Transport	Liberia
2021	2022	Rehabilitation of a 596km road from N'djamena to Koutere and Moundou	€ 283	€ 176m from EIB	EIB	Transport	Chad
-	2022	Youth mobility for Africa	€ 970	-	-	Education & Research	Regional
-	2022	Women Entrepreneurship for Africa (WE4A)	€ 20	-	-	Education & Research	Regional

End of the Dataset 4

Year (Launch)	Year GG	Receiving Investor	Quantity in Millions	EU Transaction Party	Other Transaction Parties	Sector	Country
–	2022	Developing employment in Senegal "Tekki Fil"	€ 40	–	–	Education & Research	Senegal
–	2021	Stability and security human capital sustainable inclusive digital growth	€ 300	–	–	Digital	Niger
–	2022	Build irrigation infrastructure in Northern Ghana	€ 44.7	–	–	Climate & Energy	Ghana
–	2023	improve water network boost resilience climate empower women girls	€ 14	–	–	Education & Research	Sao Tome
–	2023	Renewable energy on-off grid generation transmission distribution prog	€ 100	–	–	Climate & Energy	Gambia
2022	2023	The Green African Agricultural Value Chain Facility	€ 200	€ 200m from EIB	EIB	Climate & Energy	Regional
–	2023	ACP Trust Fund for small renewable energy power plants in off-grid areas	€ 500	–	EIB	Climate & Energy	Regional
–	2023	Develop agro-industries enhance the management of natural resources	€ 30	–	–	Climate & Energy	Togo
–	2023	Access to basic social services, agriculture, decentralisation process	€ 40	–	–	Education & Research	Togo
–	2023	Four road projects expand the northern corridor and neighbour countries	€ 275	–	–	Transport	Kenya
–	2023	Contrat pour la Résilience et la Reconstruction	€ 195	–	–	–	Niger
2019	2023	Nexus Trois Frontières	€ 50	–	AfD	Transport	Niger
–	2023	Support for aeduction and creation of employment	€ 50	–	–	Education & Research	Niger
–	2023	Fund for facilitating technical cooperation	€ 5	–	–	Education & Research	Niger

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