Rereading my 1984 article “Misperception, Ambivalence, and Indecision in Soviet Policy-making,” for the first time in many years, most of the analysis strikes me as just as valid today as it was in 1984 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1903573.
There is, however, an important blind spot in the article. I did not fully appreciate the panic of hardliners among the leaders of the Soviet Bloc concerning the Prague Spring. It was clear that the Czechoslovak reform movement...
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/germany-concerned-about-aggressive-nato-stance-on-ukraine-a-1022193.html#sp.goto.blogcomment=8148
The huge gaps between General Breedlove's allegations and the facts provided by the German intelligence service (Bundesnachrichtendienst), lead one to wonder why he continues to make such allegations. He is not stupid, and would not be acting without approval from his superiors, or at least being convinced that they would not contradict him.
Breedlove...
What makes the foolishness of US Russia policy so mind boggling is that there have been so many serious warnings. US policy took its Russophobic turn despite powerful warnings from many of our most respected experts. Said George Kennan, architect of the doctrine of containment of the Soviet Union, in a 1998 interview, "I think it is the beginning of a new cold war ... I think the Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will affect their policies. I think it is a tragic mistake....
... speaks for much of the US foreign policy establishment, writes Walter Laquer, “when he says that ... ‘It is totally unrealistic . . . to think that the West can gain desired Russian restraint and cooperation without dealing with Moscow as a great power that possesses real and legitimate interests, especially in its border areas’.”
In contrast to Gelb, Cold Warrior Laquer contends that: "[t]he problem with this 'realist' analysis is that it is filled with ...
... mission, and they have been emphasizing that it will be very limited in time and scope.
Regardless of all other explanations of Russian aims and objectives in Syria, I think the main driver of Russian policy in Syria is to be taken seriously as a great power. In 1992, I took a group of students to Moscow for a course on Russian politics. The FSB, successor to the KGB, had just opened an office for relations with the public. I contacted them, and they agreed to meet with our group. I asked the ...
