The EU-Russia Strategic Partnership was destined to fail from the start

The establishment of the Strategic Partnership between Russia and the EU back in 1994 was perceived as a huge step in their bilateral relationship. In the early 2000s it even seemed to move forward: in 2003 four EU-Russia ‘common spaces’ were formulated at a summit in Saint Petersburg as Moscow and Brussels agreed to cooperate on the economic issues, freedom, security and justice, external security as well as research and education[i]. However, today, more than twenty years after the initiation of the Partnership, it is effectively frozen. While it seems natural to blame recent events in Ukraine for the deterioration of the relationship that appeared so promising once, the Strategic Partnership has in fact been stagnating for years, as Russia and the EU had been walking a fine line between false friendship and poorly concealed mutual discontent long before 2014.

Russia’s gas disputes with Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 that led to the disruption of supplies to several member states, its conflict with Georgia in 2008 and constant disagreements with the West over the situation with civil and political rights had elevated the mistrust between Brussels and Moscow to an unprecedented level, and the conflict in eastern Ukraine, serious as it has been, was merely a trigger that opened Pandora’s box of antagonisms that both sides had been harbouring for quite some time. The question that ought to be asked though is whether the Strategic Partnership Agreement failed because of the systemic unresolved problems in Russia-EU relations that have been accumulating over the years or due to its framework that was unworkable from the start, and the answer is that it is both.

Current problems rooted in the past

AFP 2017/ THOMAS KIENZLE

According to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s remarks made at the 2015 Munich Security Conference, ‘Russia-EU Strategic Partnership did not pass the stress test’ because ‘the EU chose a path of confrontation over the development of mutually beneficial interaction mechanisms’[ii]. These words almost exactly mirror those of Frederica Mogherini, who described Russia as ‘the EU’s strategic partner no longer’ having never abandoned the ‘Cold War mindset’[iii]. It might seem remarkable how much the relationship has deteriorated since the 1990s when Russia almost immediately responded favourably to the EU’s proposal of formalising the bilateral links through the Strategic Partnership Agreement, but actually it was precisely the precipitancy with which the latter was concluded that predetermined the current status quo. While legal frameworks are established between the EU and its strategic partners,

Strategic Partnerships are, first and foremost, political statements. Because of this, they are arguably an exercise in idealistic rhetoric rather than a genuine tool for resolving conflicts should they arise, and this is true of the EU-Russia Strategic Partnership more than of any other Partnership. Failure to address numerous tensions on the regional and international level in the 1990s has not only eventually resulted in the breakdown of political collaboration but also overshadowed pragmatic economic cooperation that was supposed to be the cornerstone of the Energy Dialogue, the key aspect of the Agreement.

After the end of the Cold War both Russia and the EU rushed to institutionalise their newfound friendship seeking to secure the benefits it potentially presented them with. For Russia, it was the chance to ensure investment flows from the EU it required so much at the time, and the EU embraced the opportunity to act as a beacon of political, civil and economic freedoms or ‘normative power’, and Russia’s mentor. They were so caught up in the euphoria of the potentially historic moment that the simple truth was swept under the rug: unless Strategic Partnerships are based on truly common values, there is virtually no purpose to them. As a result, the Agreement contained no reference to the EU and Russia adopting a joint response to global challenges – because they did not have not one, - just as it did not provide a sufficient basis for economic integration, even in the energy sector. In regards to the latter, vague statements were made to the affect that the EU would ‘support Russian efforts … to develop its economy and to complete the transition into a market economy … and provide a basis for economic … cooperation founded on the principles of mutual advantage’[iv], but no detailed strategy was laid out as to precisely how this would occur. The outcome is well-known, as the close connection between political power and the energy market in Russia and the ambiguous relationship between Gazprom and the state coupled with the de-facto departure from the goals, officially declared in the 2000s (for instance, openness to trade liberalisation) have resulted in the emergence of the ‘energy weapon’ narrative. Ultimately, portrayal of Russian supplies as a threat – so widespread in the recent years - can be attributed to the EU’s initial failure to engage Russia in a constructive dialogue over energy regulations and guidelines. It should have been either acknowledged from the start that Russia and the EU favour divergent market structures, or more effort should have been made on the part of the EU to ensure that its norms were taken seriously by Russia. This applies not only to the Energy Dialogue but to other aspects of the bilateral relations as well.

Instead, the half-baked nature and overall superficiality of the Agreement has led to in the situation where as soon as Russia, that transitioned relatively fast from the state that sought guidance from the

West to the one with its own voice in the international political arena, started to cast aspersions on the EU’s values, there simply was no adequate framework that could help them to engage in a conversation and settle their differences. The Partnership, from the very beginning intended to be a political declaration and a symbolic gesture, proved to be unviable.

Deficiencies in the framework

Back in the 1990s the architects of the Strategic Partnership obviously failed to foresee that any of these problems (including the Ukrainian crisis and the ongoing disagreements about the Syrian settlement), all too reminiscent of the Cold War era, would arise and Russia and the EU would define themselves as rivals once again. It is, however, extremely disappointing that at that crucial stage, when the relationship was not yet plagued by animosities, the parties did not engage in frank dialogue about the issues that had already been brewing at the time, such as the EU’s enlargement and its possible consequences, or divergent market structure that has resulted in the extreme politicization of the energy trade between Russia and the EU.

Lack of strategy in the supposedly ‘Strategic’ Agreement casts doubt on its very purpose. It is, of course, unclear whether even then, in a relatively weakened state, Russia would have committed itself to a Partnership that would have potentially encroached on its sovereignty, but as history has demonstrated, in this particular case, no deal would have been better than a bad deal - a set of vague generalised statements the Agreement ended up being.

Another puzzling aspect of the Agreement that was supposed to be broad and overarching is its lack of influence on the composition and structure of the EEAS (European External Action Service). For instance, despite the prominent place of the Energy Dialogue in the Strategic Partnership the EU Delegation to Russia does not include a structure in charge of fostering and promoting the energy trade. Arguably, this has to do more with the half-hearted implementation of the 2010 Lisbon Treaty rather than any particular issues between Russia and the EU, but the fact the EU did not shape the EEAS division in Russia in accordance with the Strategic Partnership Agreement once again underscores the irrelevance of the latter. Furthermore, as Giovanni Grevi from the European Policy Centre argues, Strategic Partnerships require ‘unity of purpose, focus, sometimes hard bargaining … and always political

authority’[v]. They can hardly exhibit any of these if the EU has half-baked foreign policy advanced by Delegations with no significant responsibilities. Bilateral summits – high-level as they may be - are not enough as they require extensive preparations and therefore can hardly be held on a regular basis. And

in the current situation, when even the thought of the possible EU-Russia summit seems blasphemous, an effective EEAS Delegation to Russia could have been a great asset not only for the EU but for Russia as well, as it has long been advocating for a platform that would enable the parties to work out a comprehensive joint agenda and eventually get on with it.

Is there a future for ‘Strategic Partnerships’?

Despite the label, Russia-EU relationship has never been a strategic one – the easiness with which in 2014 Donald Tusk referred to Russia as the EU’s ‘strategic problem’[vi] demonstrates just how declarative rather than obligatory the Partnership actually is. Should Russia and the EU eventually overcome the current crisis and move towards drafting a new Agreement (as had been planned prior to the events of 2014), only mutual recognition of the existing difficulties could create a solid base for constructive and cooperative relationship. Moreover, politicians and diplomats must endeavour to find a compromise between European idealism and Russia’s pragmatic approach to foreign affairs.

At the moment, however, it is just as unlikely that there will be another Agreement any time soon, as it is unclear whether Strategic Partnership frameworks are, in fact, relevant in today’s unpredictable and chaotic international arena. The ever-changing global order as well as the difficulties that are being experienced by the EU itself make their very necessity questionable. The very word ‘strategy’ implies long-term approach based on a solid ground of common values, economic interdependence or both. The rise of populism in the West, the election of the unpredictable president in the US, Brexit and other challenges confronting the EU have made the durability of even seemingly the most stable Partnerships debatable. It might therefore be better for the EU to approach various aspects of its relationships with third countries on an ad hoc basis to avoid the disappointment it had to go through with Russia.