Russia and the Asia-Pacific Region

Andrey Gubin: Is there a naval arms race in the Asia Pacific?

September 22, 2014
Print

According to the classical ‘arms race’ theory by Lewis Richardson, military preparations of one’s side are directly proportional to rival’s potential and inversely – to its own accumulated arsenals. However differential equations don’t leave space for political choice as mathematically there can be only three possible scenarios: arms race, mutual disarmament or parity. The one valuable note made by Richardson after the World War I that nations tend to accumulate arms because of mutual fear. Like in pre-war Europe we have a lot of mistrust and aggressive postures in the contemporary Asia-Pacific.

 

Also ‘prisoner dilemma’ came from the game’s theory can explain some ongoing processes. Strengthening one’s defence is seen as a threat by neighbor therefore most actors gradually involves into regional competition.

 

James Fearon from Stanford University offered a concept of ‘threshold levels’ in arms’ quantity and quality as well as in military expenditures. Nations are able either to stop at some crucial point sufficient for containment or to overcome it and ignite conflict. By all meanings arms race cannot occur per se and is strongly dependent from political will. It’s considered that arms race not always can lead to a war; opponents can reach some pivot point and review their intentions. Upmost important are some decisive military technologies that makes direct coercion too expensive as well as adjoint with many casualties and material losses. So even aggressive behavior of some player isn’t a casus belli, as the price will be too high for both sides.

 

 There’s very good example of decisive naval technology in the history. The name is HMS Dreadnaught commissioned in 1906 who opened the ‘dreadnaught era’ in the High Seas. New capital ships of advanced design superseded traditional ironclads in 5 years as they were able to operate effectively for breaking communications and destroying enemy flotillas. Even minor countries as Nederland, Turkey, Greece and Argentina tried to possess dreadnaughts.

 

The another example from the WWI is connected with using asymmetric strategy  - in 1912 Germany canceled extensive dreadnaught plans in favor of building submarines (U-boot). This measure resulted in sinking 1/3 of British commercial tonnage and a dozen of warships.

 

Today East Asia is acknowledged to be the region of the most acute naval tensions. Noting Barry Buzan and Ole Waever concept of ‘securitization’, strengthening Navies of major Pacific nations is perceived among others as a clear and present danger and indicated conflictual potential. We witness the revival of Alfred Mahan’s and his followers ‘sea power’ and ‘anaconda’ strategies backing on new elementary basis.

 

Today we can consider Aegis-equipped ships to be neo-Dreadnaughts as they present the decisive technology and extremely effective in task forces formed under the main battle task: anti-aircraft and ballistic missile defence; anti-submarine and surface ships warfare; supporting the amphibious operation or suppressing enemy’s military and economic infrastructure. In the Asia Pacific Aegis-equipped ships are deployed by the USA, Japan and Republic of Korea. There are plans in Australia, Canada, Taiwan to build such destroyers. Moreover China and Russia have Aegis analogs of indigenous design. It’s notable that Aegis-equipped ships are the backbone of the Japanese and Korean BMD programs, furthermore Korean Sejon Taewan is loaded also with cruise missiles with the range of 1 500 km. Tokyo now is restricted from possessing striking capabilities but considering postures around Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and promoted idea of collective defence cruise missile on JMSDF Atagos can be expectable. Australia isn’t bind by any limitations so its Hobart-class can enhance Allied Fleet in the Pacific loaded with Standarts-3 and potentially Tomahawks.

 

As for China, actually they still have coastal defence forces with limited nuclear deterrence component – not Hoch Zee Flotte. PLA Navy can conduct anti-access and area denial operations but cannot rise fast qualitatively. Beijing combines strategies developing visible sea power symbols like Aegis-copy ships, aircraft carriers and landing ships integrated under C4ISR principle simultaneously with stealth submarines and small boats, anti-ship ballistic missiles etc. Realized that Taiwan is not a crucial issue today China concentrated on the following priorities. First of all, obtaining dominance in East and South China seas maritime domains. Secondly, preventing any foreign activity within EEZ. Thirdly, securing strongly sea lanes using for hydrocarbons importing. Finally, diminishing American influence in the nearby Pacific.

 

Obviously, China will pretend to gain all the profits in Yellow, East and South China Seas in the nearest 2-3 years. Then, up to 2020 it’s presumed to obtain capabilities to operate freely in seas of Okhotsk and Japan as well in domains reaching Marianas and Carolinas. After 2020 China may have potential strong enough to oppose the USA near Hawaii and wherever in the Pacific. Today, PLA Navy doesn’t even train to attack USSs however rising naval power is considered to be a threat by key actors. In spite of above mentioned we cannot draw a direct analogy with American-Chinese and British-German opposition, forcing naval build up is stipulated generally by economic reasons then military.

 

Remembering the German asymmetric strategy now we can see Vietnamese attempts to use it. Hanoi focuses on submarines and mosquito fleet equipped with supersonic anti-ship missiles of Russian design. These measures can contain any major aggressor from the unreasonable behavior.

 

India, being the part of the Indo-Pacific region, is seriously interested in participating in all processes within East Asia. The most worrying is the nuclear potential containing even Arihant submarine with nuclear missiles. Also Chakra submarine rent in Russia and Vikramaditja carrier (finally under commissioning by Indian Navy after a decade of stalling on Russia) are rather impressive. New-Delhi doesn’t claim officially to undermine anyone’s interests but we can guess who will be deterred and disappointed primarily.

 

The most mysterious are Russian plans of naval build up. Mistral-class landing ships are to come to Vladivostok in spite of sanctions and pretend to be the only new large surface ships in Russian Pacific Fleet. Moscow is likely to concentrate on coastal and EEZ areas securing, anti-pirate missions (results in the Gulf of Aden were brilliant!) and nuclear deterrence. It seems to me that Russia cannot pretend for the greater role in the East Asia without clear naval doctrine and real ships and it’s a big deal for Moscow to elaborate it in time.

 

Presentation was made at Temple University, Tokyo. July 14,15 - 2014 at Academic Symposium “Lessons of 1914 for the future of Asia”

Share this article

Poll conducted

  1. In your opinion, what are the US long-term goals for Russia?
    U.S. wants to establish partnership relations with Russia on condition that it meets the U.S. requirements  
     33 (31%)
    U.S. wants to deter Russia’s military and political activity  
     30 (28%)
    U.S. wants to dissolve Russia  
     24 (22%)
    U.S. wants to establish alliance relations with Russia under the US conditions to rival China  
     21 (19%)
For business
For researchers
For students