Andrey Gubin: Shall we secure DPRK to be secured?
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Recent 2 years there were some rumors in world media and blogosphere that North Korean leadership had been conducting remarkable economic reforms. However this hardly is true – perhaps we can say only Labour Party elite recognizes crisis of command administrative system and tries to enhance export production as well as ease burden of obligatory labour.
North Korean regime doesn’t care much on economic development mostly due to ideological limitations. Acting economy pattern cannot improve level of living conditions. All the hopes on successful transferring of Chinese economic experience didn’t approve. Contemporary DPRK’s economy is far closer to the Soviet one – 60% of gross production derives from military industrial complex and last 30% - from agriculture. Notably, its own agricultural production is insufficient for proper domestic nutrition. Development of civil segment is impeded by weak internal demand and lack of market instruments. Most of economic activity is highly corrupted simultaneously shadow sector is flourishing. In some cases interests of new oligarchy and state authority can collide.
If we examine possibilities for doing business in North Korean for foreigners, they are extremely blurred. Pyongyang claims to provide investors with easy taxation and custom regime nevertheless they never gave solid guarantees to production means, assets and intellectual property furthermore risk of nationalization still preserves. We witnessed an example of Egyptian cell operator which had lost all property.
The most of exports were originated from Kaesong special economic zone and Rajin sea port. After the 4th nuclear test and satellite launch the future of these projects is uncertain as Seoul rejected from financing and support. Russian side became silent on Trans-Korean initiatives (TKR and TSR linkage, pipeline and electric grids). It should be remarked that Moscow proposed state-to-state pattern partnership that is considered to be more secured and reliable.
After Chang Sung-taek execution economic cooperation with China was nearly stopped. It was as well affected by nationalizing property of some Chinese businessmen in DPRK. Subtle attempts to revive ties using Chinese Koreans are still being performed however officially Beijing waits and formulates new stance.
From one side China pause introduces new chance both for Russia and ROK for restoration relationship with DPRK as pro-China lobby took place during 6PT in 2003-2007 disappeared. We can assume that Beijing keens to be ready for a sort of compromise – abort military buffer in exchange for broader economic cooperation with the USA and Japan. The fact that united Korea with developing market economy today fits “One Belt – One Road” concept is evident. China is considered to rebalance its strategy to shaping favourable economic and political environment according to New Silk Road operational demands.
Talking on unification is possible and rational from the perspective of market-democratic ingestion. North Korean idea of confederation is fully fantastic – unchanging regime and economy pattern is considered to be harmful for the entire region. However, taking to the account recent Pyongyang hostile gestures the unification right away seems even useless to discuss. Perhaps, more utilitarian issues like families ties, DMZ functioning and limited economic cooperation can be more fruitful. The one we should memorize - costs in currency are nothing comparing to costs in lives so any scenario of military operation against North Korea should be totally excluded. The real reason to worry is regime collapse but according to the possessing information it is still stable, riots occurs seldom only on casual ground.
Basing on DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs development it seems evident that Pyongyang will continue to arm. The activity is to be concentrated on making device more mobile for being launched by existing missiles. Developing new delivery vehicles like submarine-based and intercontinental range missiles is linked with serious technical difficulties. Experiments with fusion warhead can be doubled as well as some tests of guided launch using satellite. All those actions would be performed within Kim Jong-un’s course on forming effective deterrence mechanism for maintaining national security militarily. This course is determined by Cold War prejudices as DPRK is politically immature and sensitive to provocations from states they consider being aggressive. It can be assumed that the USA intentionally provokes and allows some money and technology leakages to keep DPRK hot.
Pyongyang nuclear and missile programs are not aimed for advancing military operations or unprovoked counter-potential and counter-value strikes on ROK and Japan. Those programs are dangerous as they create speculations and disseminate instability. The USA claimed enhancing its strategic presence in the Asia-Pacific and intentions on deploying more troops, weapon and facilities on ROK’s territory. Japanese leadership tends to justify all the military policy by threat from the North Korea. Such gests ruin regional stability and lead to unpredictable consequences as affect interests of China and Russia. The other stance is an ecological one – North Korean nuclear facilities are rather obsolete; qualification of specialists isn’t very high so without proper IAEA monitoring the risk of extraordinary situation still exists.
Moscow traditionally claims on impermissibility of non-proliferation regime violation and following the UN Security Council restrictions. Russia advocates for DPRK returning to NPT-1968 and spreading IAEA guarantees on all the nuclear facilities as well as gradually implementing 1992 denuclearization declaration. If it occurs Pyongyang can start peaceful energy and space programs with international support.
Some experts suppose the crisis to be regulated in Iranian pattern – 5 responsible stakeholders can elaborate position and press the DPRK to follow. Apparently, Iran didn’t conduct nuclear tests and was interested in economic cooperation primarily with the EU. Also this country is situated geographically closer to Europe moreover Teheran still is rather influencing in the Middle East. Furthermore if the problem is attempted to be solved externally DPRK’s reaction will be unpredictable. More fruitful format is presumed to be cameral like 3P+1 – Russia, China and ROK as the most interested states. After trilateral consultation positions can be offered to Pyongyang. Cooperation with the USA and Japan on this occasion is justified to be limited as they seems to make profit from deterioration on the Korean Peninsula and tend to build up military reply and break regional balance. Definitely, Pyongyang isn’t attractive to the EU so we cannot expect much assistance from them.
Russia is still interested in implementation of Trans-Korean projects within the framework of its new oriental diplomacy joined with Chinese “One Belt – One Road” plan and probably Korean “Eurasian Initiative”. Nonetheless, feasible economic and investment activity is possible only after normalization of DPRK’s political behavior. Perhaps, multilateral security guarantees based on agreement including the USA is enough as the initial step. Washington should contain from enlarging contingency and deploying threshold arms like BMD systems and tactic nukes. More complex issue is that Pyongyang is to offer reciprocally. Like India and Pakistan it can reject from having operational ready warheads, stocking all assembled nuclear munitions until further regulations.
The one thing we should realize – only when DPRK leadership is feeling secured, economic cooperation can be started. Improving living conditions and emerging new values within the society on the North make peaceful resolution more tangible.
Andrey Gubin, Ph.D, Head of RISS Asia-Pacific Regional Center, FEFU Associate Professor
