In today’s globalized world system, barely any issues can be considered a matter of concern for only one country. Developments in all spheres of international relations - be it nuclear proliferation, climate change, epidemics and diseases, financial instability, or cyber security - affect the whole world in one way or the other. Today’s international setting suggests that the world order to which we are used to, based on the principle of the sovereignty of states, needs to be updated in order to reflect the changes of the post-Cold War era. An updated version of the world order is the main theme that Richard Haass, the President of the Council on Foreign Relations, explores in his recent book A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order.
The book begins by reviewing how the concept of ‘world order’ has evolved throughout history, beginning with the famous Treaty of Westphalia, which solidified the concept of sovereignty as the guide towards the international relations system, and then throughout the twentieth century. A particular emphasis is made on the period of the Cold War, which, according to Haass, showed a significant degree of order, despite the great power rivalry. The US and the USSR maintained order through mechanisms such as diplomacy, mutual deterrence, and a limited degree of involvement in each other’s spheres of influence. At the same time international institutions, norms, conventions, laws and rules introduced after the Second World War also maintained a certain order in the world. While these institutions may have a mixed record, they make up the structure of what Haass calls ‘World Order 1.0’, the world’s operating system during the Cold War.
Post-Cold War Disorder
The events that came after the Cold War destabilized this world order. However, unlike the crises that led to the two world wars of the twentieth century, the destabilization of the post-Cold War era is not caused by competition between great powers. According to Haass, relations between major powers have been relatively peaceful, partly because of greater focus on internal development and partly because of globalization. Indeed, greater interdependence limits the great powers’ desire to lead an expansionist foreign policy. For instance, in contrast with realists’ predictions of an inevitable conflict between the US and China, the Sino-American relationship has escaped falling into the ‘Thucydides trap’, at least for now. This impression was reinforced with the recent meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping, which suggested that the relationship might be a more pragmatic one than a confrontational one.
Haass points out that the world order began to change when challenges came from civil wars, failed states and chaotic situations such as the ones in Iraq, Somalia, Yugoslavia and Rwanda. These cases raised serious debates about sovereignty - particularly the question of what to do in cases when the government does not respect the basic rights of citizens. The debate led to the emergence of the R2P (Responsibility to Protect) concept, subsequently used multiple times to justify interventions in other states’ affairs. The major change of the post-Cold War international order is the scrutinization of states’ external as well as internal behavior policies and actions.
Yet, to this day there remain major disagreements about R2P. In many cases, humanitarian intervention led to more conflict than anything else, as the example of Syria still shows today. The world is in disarray not only because it lacks consensus on the legitimacy of violating sovereignty for humanitarian purposes, but also because there are serious gaps in all spheres of global governance. In sum, there is no consensus on what to do, who should do it, and how to do it.
The author comes to the conclusion that it has become more and more difficult to understand what constitutes a legitimate action, as there is no unanimity on norms, rules and practices in the world order.
Rebooting the System
Haass suggests rebooting the world operating system and creating a ‘World Order 2.0’, which would be defined by the concept of sovereign obligation. In contrast to R2P, sovereign obligation is about a government’s obligations not to its own citizens, but to other governments. While this concept includes respect for sovereignty, it expands the concept of sovereignty in order to better reflect the realities of the globalized world.
Prioritizing sovereign obligation would require states to come to a consensus on their responsibilities in all spheres of international relations, which without doubt will be a difficult task given the anarchical nature of the system and the absence of any force that could supervise states’ compliance with their responsibilities. Haass suggests that deciding upon sovereign obligation will be a bottom-up process, with states deciding the agenda. This complicates the matter even more and brings the question of how much effort and time are required for the implementation of a ‘World Order 2.0’ (if it is achievable at all), and what is required from each actor in the world, particularly great powers such as the US and Russia.
Implications for the US and Russia
Despite the somewhat tragic title of the book, Haass does not prescribe fatalism for the future of international relations. He suggests that current and future challenges can be met by discouraging rivalry between great powers. For Washington, this means “integrating” countries such as China and Russia into the global order. The US should therefore use diplomacy in order to get Beijing and Moscow more involved, but it should begin by looking at its own actions. Indeed, in his advice to US policy makers, the author points out that if Washington wants other states to respect their responsibilities, it must also show its dedication to its obligations. In relation to Russia, Haass advocates that Washington should put NATO expansion on pause and revive the arms dialogue with Moscow. It would also mean giving Russia the chance to “define what constitutes legitimacy”.
The current situation shows that it is increasingly difficult for Moscow and Washington to maintain cooperation in any sphere and that any attempt to agree on legitimacy is likely to fail. At the moment, Haass’ recommendations are being ignored, as the Senate recently approved Montenegro’s bid to join NATO, and no effort is being made to engage in a dialogue on arms control.
From Russia’s side, the concept of sovereign obligation is unlikely to gather support unless Moscow sees the US’ willingness to engage on equal terms. Russia places a high value on sovereignty and on being considered an equal partner by the United States. As Foreign Minister Lavrov recently stated, Moscow disliked the Obama administration’s tendency to “rely on a superiority complex” and to “impose [its] ideas on others”.
Moreover, Moscow advocates for a multipolar strategy to solving global problems, or as Sergey Lavrov described it at the Munich Security Conference 2017, a “post-West world order in which each country will strive to find a balance between its own national interests with those of their partners”. While in principle Russia would not be against a ‘World Order 2.0’, it will insist on this new order not being dictated by the US and its allies.
Haass acknowledges that the process of finding consensus will be long and arduous, and that states will have to be very pragmatic and less idealistic in this process. It does not seem that pragmatism can overcome conflict in US-Russia anytime soon, but if it does, then perhaps we could start talking of a slow path towards a new world order.
