Peace is at Hand

The four-year negotiating process between the Colombian Government and FARC guerrillas was crowned with the signing of a comprehensive and definitive peace agreement in Havana on August 24, 2016. The agreement is to put an end to the longest armed conflict in South America. The parties shook hands and put their signatures to a truly historic document. Does it mean that the long-drawn-out bloody conflict is over? Of course not. Can the signed document be underestimated? Of course not.

Where does Strength Lie?

Years of talks, painstaking work, guarded optimism and periodic attempts to wreck the talks. Millions of dead nerve cells for the President of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, who initiated the peace process. The confidence of the ruling elite that they were doing the right thing, even as Santos’ approval rating was falling and disenchantment with the peace process was growing. All this has been rewarded many times over: at last Colombia has the chance to break out of the grip of internal conflict thanks to the nearly 300-page agreement between FARC and the Government of Colombia. There are at least two positive points in the document.

REUTERS/John Vizcaino

Eduar, a member of the 51st Front of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), is seen wearing a cap with badges showing images of Che Guevara and FARC's late founder Manuel Marulanda at a camp in Cordillera Oriental, Colombia, August 16, 2016. Picture taken August 16, 2016.

First, it is comprehensive, covering six areas: full-scale agrarian reform; political participation and the inclusion of the guerrillas in the legal political process; the end of hostilities and the laying down of arms; the fight against the production and trafficking of drugs; the development of a definition of the category of victims of the conflict and their status; and the establishment of a set of measures to verify and comply with the agreements reached. In other words, the agreement reflects all the issues of fundamental importance for the parties. Of course, some provisions are more important for the FARC and some are more important for the government. But compliance with one set is impossible without complying with the other. The interconnection is very important.

Second, it leaves considerable room for manoeuvre for both sides, which is vital for further progress and the implementation of the accords. This is not about being able to dodge obligations under the agreement; rather, it is about a successful compromise wording of many provisions, which each delegation can consider to be a victory. For example, the inclusion of the FARC in the political life of the country by granting the organization seats in parliament – a constant demand of the guerrillas – had been fiercely criticized. As a result, a compromise formula was found: the FARC will be guaranteed five seats in the upper and lower houses in the next two legislatures; however, they are intended exclusively for further discussion of the peace process and legislative initiatives within the framework of that process. After this, the political party built on the basis of the FARC’s revolutionary forces will have to fight their on path in the political sphere by itself.

Political Ravines

Meanwhile, even the most well-thought-out and laboured documents invariably face realities of the political process which are not always favourable. Moreover, the mechanisms of treaties may contain time bombs; it is common knowledge that things are smooth only on paper. We should keep this in mind before hailing the end of the conflict in Colombia.

Hurdle number one is the mechanism approving the signed agreements. In Havana, the agreements were signed by the heads of delegations. The final signing ceremony by the President of Colombia and the head of the FARC is due to take place in September in the presence of foreign leaders, including the King of Spain. The peace treaty will then be put to a nationwide referendum on October 2, 2016. During the talks, this plan of approving the agreements was thought to be a point scored by the government delegation, because the FARC insisted on another mechanism. It is already clear that the victory is somewhat controversial: the anti-treaty campaign led by former President Alvaro Uribe is gathering momentum. Although it cannot be compared to the “for” campaign, behind which the government machine has thrown its weight, there are fears that there will be many “no” voters in the regions least affected by the conflicts, especially in major cities, where a large portion of the Colombian population lives.

The second snag is some of the more debatable provisions of the peace treaty. The compromise, unfortunately, does not mean that the final document meets the demands of all the parties to the conflict. The most difficult part has to do with the trial and punishment of guerrillas guilty of crimes of varying gravity. This is an involved procedure including the creation of a Special Tribunal that stands above all the other judiciary bodies in Colombia. The Tribunal will include foreigners and its decisions, some experts believe, may have a “conveyor belt” character. But the main thing is not even the tribunal itself, but those who will manage to escape it: the top FARC leadership has practically bargained a pledge of personal safety, as well as the possibility of being active in legal political space. This cannot but anger much of the population, especially the victims of the conflict and their relatives. For many Colombians, the agreement does not bring justice; on the contrary, it leaves a sense of impunity of those who were directly involved in the bloodiest pages of the country's history.

Two More Flies in the Ointment

In addition to the above-mentioned problems with the peace accords, there are a number of difficulties that are not directly linked with the Havana Process and the signed agreement. Thus, it is still unclear whether the FARC leadership has enough clout to persuade all the guerrilla units to comply with the provisions of the agreement. This was highlighted by the episode I described in July, when one of the guerrilla “fronts” failed to back the ceasefire agreement.

We should also remember that peace in Colombia and peace with the FARC are not synonyms. The FARC is a truly large group that has terrorized the country for more than half a century. But it is not the only one. The National Liberation Army (ELN), the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) and the Golfo Clan (el Clan del Golfo) are still active within the country, and they have no plans to follow the legal route. This not to mention smaller groups. None of these groups is likely to send “doves of peace” to the Santos government.

Summing up, I should stress that the agreement signed under the watchful eyes of the guarantor countries can and must be seen as historic. But history has yet to be made and turned into reality, which will require a great deal of effort and a lot of patience from the Colombian people.