Mosul in Iraq. How Will al-Hashd Al Shaabi Respond?
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Ph.D. in History, Scientific Advisor of The Evgeny Primakov Center for International Cooperation, Senior Research Fellow, Center for the Arab and Islamic Studies, Institute of Oriental Studies RAS
On October 17, Prime Minister of Iraq Haider al-Abadi announced that an operation to return to Mosul had begun. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) had completed a serious campaign before launching the offensive. However, if the logic of war states that the city must be surrounded before the operation is set in motion, then we must clarify the specific features of Iraq here.
The Iraqi Army and the People’s Mobilization Forces (al-Hashd Al Shaabi), which have recently been integrated into the country’s armed forces, were stationed to the south and southeast of Mosul before the Mosul operation began. Reinforcements arrived along the Baghdad–Mosul highway. Kurdish Peshmerga forces were located to the east and northeast, thus cutting off Islamic State’s access to Turkey across the northern border. Consequently, the villages to the west of the Baghdad – which the Iraqi government is holding down against Islamic State – remain under their control (although much of the territory is desert). And despite the fact that the direct route between Mosul and Raqqa via Sinjar has been cut off, Islamic State is still able to bring food and possibly other material and human resources to the city via bypass routes.
Clearly, lengthy negotiations were held between Baghdad and the Sunni tribal sheikhs, who had previously been loyal to Islamic State because of their widespread discontent with the political centre. The tactic of bribing and influencing tribes played a key role last time, when in 2009 the Americans were able to drive the Al-Qaeda in Iraq (the forerunner to Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and now Islamic State) back from the positions it held. Perhaps the desire of the Americans to take Mosul even quicker could force them to resort to the very same tactic, but this time through the Iraqi Army and its Sunni representatives (to refresh our memory, the former Minister of Defence of Iraq, Khaled al-Obaidi, is a member of one of the country’s more influential tribes).
The sides are not equal, of course, in terms of the firepower they possess. The numbers tell the story: between 2000 and 6000 Islamic State fighters, and up to 60,000 troops fighting against them. The vast majority of troops involved in the operation serve in the Iraqi Army or the People’s Mobilization Forces. They are joined in the offensive by members of the Kurdish Peshmerga forces, the Iraqi federal police and a number of anti-Islamic State Sunni groups. The frontlines are primarily taken up by the Iraqi Army and the federal police. The People’s Mobilization Forces provide support, maintaining positions on the outskirts of the city to avoid unnecessary carnage. The roles of the United States, Turkey and Iran are worth noting here.
Almost immediately, the Americans started to issue intelligence on the events in Iraq, saying, “we are there too, almost on the frontlines in the battle with Islamic State.” We have to give credit where it is due here, as they really do have advisors working with the Iraqi Army and the Peshmerga. What is more, nobody has cancelled the U.S.-led aerial operation. Earlier, President Obama had issued an order to send up to 5000 U.S. troops, which, apparently, was intended to give the Americans a louder voice in decisions on the ground. It is vital for the current administration in the White House to show the world that they, along with the forces they are backing, are at the forefront of the war against evil – that they are the ones who defeated Islamic State. The fact that Islamic State came into being as a result of a series of strategic errors made by the United States is conveniently forgotten. It should also be noted here that the Iraqis are no less to blame for the current crisis in Iraqi statehood. Unlike the Iraqis, however, the U.S. administration is in need of a resounding victory over Islamic State, and the quicker the better.
The diplomatic crisis that is unfolding between Turkey and Iraq has not led to the expulsion of ambassadors. Turkey has sent a delegation to resolve the disputes between Ankara and Baghdad. The hysteria surrounding the Turkish presence in Iraq, which, according to various sources, could be as many as 2000 Sunni troops, was perhaps aimed at pushing Baghdad to launch the operation as soon as possible. And that would have been in the interest of the United States as well.
Even though a number of groups within the People’s Mobilization Forces are financed and directed by Iran as well, both the Americans and, despite their rhetoric, the political forces that support Haider al-Abadi are trying to minimize their role in the operations. At the same time, there is a direct line of communication between al-Hashd Al Shaabi and the Prime Minister: al-Abadi received representatives of the group at his official residence on October 15. On October 18, news broke that representatives of the People’s Mobilization Forces – such prominent names as Qais Khazali, Hadi Al-Amiri and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis – had also visited Muqtada al-Sadr at his home in Najaf. We have no way of understanding exactly what is discussed in the domestic political vicissitudes in Iraq; however, we can make certain conjectures based on declared, although not always proven, facts. The pro-Iranian Kata’ib Hezbollah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq groups have already announced plans to redeploy their fighters from the Syrian province of Aleppo to Mosul. Clearly, al-Hashd Al Shaabi sees an opportunity here, if the operation is delayed and certain agreements fall through. Should difficulties arise, the Iraqi Army will need support, and Baghdad will need to turn to the People’s Mobilization Forces. The People’s Mobilization Forces will, in turn, see room for manoeuvre and for increasing their role in the liberation of Mosul.
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