Iraq at a Crossroads. Crisis within the Sunni Bloc and the Return of Nouri al-Maliki

On August 25, Prime Minister of Iraq Haider al-Abadi congratulated the people on the liberation of the town of al-Qiyyarah from Islamic State terrorists. Fighting for this place (which includes an air base) had been going on for several weeks and is seen as part of the preparation for an offensive on Mosul, Islamic State’s capital in Iraq. But the operation to retake one of Iraq’s largest cities will now be led by another man, as a new minister of defence is expected to be appointed.

That same day saw the end of yet another long-running Iraqi drama, one that entered its final stretch in the last two weeks. The country’s Minister of Defence, Khaled al-Obaidi, a Sunni who had held the job for the last two years, was sacked. Since he took office in 2014, al-Obeidi tried to reform the army to improve logistical supplies, purge it of “dead souls” (i.e. thousands of nominal soldiers), train personnel, promote international cooperation and, of course, to fight corruption. It was a corruption case that caused the rift between al-Obaidi and Speaker of the Council of Representatives of Iraq Salim al-Jabouri (also a Sunni). In August, al-Obaidi accused al-Jabouri, along with other officials and business people, of corruption – specifically, of attempting to force him to rescue a number of contracts and reinstate certain individuals who had also been discharged from the army for bribe-taking. One major corruption case involved the purchase of 1,300 American Humvee jeeps lobbied in parliament.

EPA/SHEHAB AHMED

Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki speaks during the 88th Police Day celebrations at the Police Academy in Baghdad, Iraq, 09 January 2009. About 1,553 police officers from all over Iraq graduated during a parade attended by Maliki and Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani.

Following the decision to sack him, Khaled al-Obaidi said: “Those who brought Iraq to where it is now have triumphed.” Al-Obaidi is thought to be a supporter of the current Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi. The former minister of defence could be considered to be technocrat, the kind of people al-Abadi would like to see heading up government ministries.

Khaled al-Obaidi studied engineering in Yugoslavia and then in Baghdad. A professional pilot, he personally led the Iraqi Air Force unit, piloting F-16 during the bombings of Islamic State positions near Fallujah. In Iraqi politics, al-Obaidi represented the parliamentary Union for Reform (al-Muttahidoon) party. Al-Muttahidoon is led by Osama al-Nujaifi, an influential Sunni politician who has served as Speaker of the Council of Representatives and Vice President.

The Council of Representatives (Parliament) of Iraq was to discuss a motion of no confidence in the Minister of Defence on August 23, but failed to muster a quorum because two political forces, the Al-Ahrar Bloc (supporters of Muqtada al-Sadri) and the Islamic Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq staged a walkout. The issue was raised again on August 25. It was by a fluke that the Minister of Defence survived to see the vote of no confidence, because on August 8, his convoy was attacked by Islamic State militants on the way to the al-Qiyyarah airbase.

On August 25, the motion of no confidence received 142 votes, with 102 MPs supporting the minister and the remaining 263 abstaining. Under Iraq’s constitution, a minister can be dismissed by an absolute majority of votes. Thus, the decision to remove al-Obaidi is unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the Minister of Defence was sacked by Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi after the parliament vote. Although the media point to the Speaker of the Council of Representatives Salim al-Jabouri, the mastermind of the process to oust Khaled al-Obaidi is thought to be former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, leader of the State of Law coalition (the largest political party in the country) and head of the new parliamentary coalition Reform Front (Jabhat al-Islah). What are the implications behind all this?

After the parliamentary crisis in Iraq in April 2016, the “shadow” coalition Reform Front was formed under the leadership of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. It was on his watch that Islamic State gained control of 40 per cent of the country’s territory and moved towards Baghdad. Mismanagement at almost all levels, serious lapses at the Ministry of Defence and in the economy, numerous scandals and, perhaps most importantly, the loss of support on the part of Iraq’s Shia community leader Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and his State of Law bloc led to the ouster of al-Maliki and the appointment of al-Abadi, a member of the same party. The latter set about promoting the ideas of reform and a government of technocrats, which revealed flaws in Iraqi society. The reforms stalled, whereas al-Maliki, who wields great influence in the top echelons of power, continued the struggle to regain his positions. Apparently, he could no longer rely on his own party, so he started cobbling together a new political group in parliament called Reform Front.

Al-Maliki is trying to stage a comeback by weakening his rivals. The case of Khaled al-Obaidi revealed a conflict within the Ittihad Sunni political parliamentary bloc, where al-Obaidi represents the al-Muttahidoon coalition led by Osama al-Nujaifi and their opponent, Salim al-Jabouri, represents the Iraq Islamic Party (the Iraqi branch of the Muslim Brotherhood long represented in the councils of provinces and in the parliament). The Institute for the Study of War notes that the conflict within the Sunni camp was fuelled by the Reform Front secretly headed by Nouri al-Maliki. The former Prime Minister thus weakens the position of Haider al-Abadi and, in the medium term, of the Speaker of the Council of Representatives al-Jabouri as well.

The crisis within the Sunni bloc is coming to a head. Earlier this month, the leader of al-Muttahidoon, Osama al-Nujaifi called for the removal of the Speaker of the Council of Representatives Salim al-Jabouri. After his supporter, former Minister of Defence Khaled al-Obaidi was sacked, the al-Muttahidoon coalition declared that the motion of no confidence in the Minister of Defence was engineered by corrupt politicians and that it would challenge the sacking.

With the approaching new phase of the offensive on Mosul, these developments undermine the process and have a negative impact on the future of Iraq after Islamic State. The Iraqi media bristles with opinions about the “post-Daesh” phase, but no adequate strategy has emerged because of constant contradictions between the sides. The offensive is now likely to slow down in spite of the assurances from various parties that the Minister of Defence did not play a serious part in the struggle against Islamic State militants. In any case, changes will follow and they are unlikely to be positive. Earlier, on July 5, Iraq lost its Minister of Interior Mohammad al-Ghabban, who resigned after the tragic death of hundreds of people in the Baghdad district of Karrada as a result of an Islamic State attack. Thus, on the eve of the offensive on the Islamic State capital of Mosul, the country is without its ministers of interior and defence, whose duties are now being fulfilled by their deputies.

While the sacking of the Minister of Defence has tactical implications for Iraq, the crisis within the Sunni camp has already acquired a strategic importance. The recovery of Sunni territories calls for a strategy of rehabilitation of these regions and their re-integration into Iraqi society. It is unclear how this will be done – through the creation of a secular technocratic government involving all the ethnic and confessional groups, or through the creation of a Kurdistan-style Sunni autonomy within Iraq. The decision rests with the Iraqi people themselves. But the fact that the few legitimate Sunni forces in Iraq are at loggerheads among themselves, which is studiously instigated from outside, has a direct impact on the concept of the strategy with regard to the regions in the “post-Daesh period.” The strategy has yet to be formed and is unlikely to be so until the political crisis is resolved.

Frictions within the Sunni camp will increase. The fact that Ministers can be removed by a simple majority enables al-Malikis Reform Front to influence decision-making and undermine the authority of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi while limiting his powers. The Iraqi security forces, left without the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Interior, will slow down their offensive on Mosul. The offensive will now be spearheaded by the recently legalized People’s Mobilization Force (Al-Hashd al-Shaabi), which represents mainly Shia paramilitary groups.