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Dmitry Stefanovich

Research Fellow at the Center for International Security, Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, co-founder of the Vatfor project, RIAC Expert

Rhythmical changes between war and peace have been quite normal for the greater part of the European history. Authors of the report "Frontline Allies: War and Change in Central Europe" produced by Center for European Policy Analysis on the results of the U.S.-Central Europe Strategic Assessment Group believe that the period of “long peace” after the close of the Cold War has ended. The report suggests drawing the "new frontline" along the eastern border of Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. NATO is mentioned much more often than the EU, and the OSCE is totally neglected, as well as the late CFE Treaty.

Valuable Advice from Washington and Warsaw

In November 2015, Washington-based Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), which also has an office in Warsaw, published a report titled "Frontline Allies: War and Change in Central Europe" produced by the U.S.-Central Europe Strategic Assessment Group [1] devoted to foreign and defense policies of the CEE countries [2] , implications of the recent developments for U.S. national security interests, and American policies aimed at influencing the CEE states for "longer-term regional geopolitical results."

There seem to be several reasons why both theoreticians and practitioners in the Russian military-political establishment may find this analysis helpful, among them:

— The July 8-9 NATO summit in Warsaw that should make a decision on the deployment of rotational multinational battalions in Poland and the Baltic [3].

— The resumption of the Russia-NATO Council sessions.

— Continued mutual accusations about planned and surprise exercises by both sides.

The End of the Long Peace

Rhythmical changes between war and peace have been quite normal for the greater part of the European history. The authors cite two exceptions, i.e. the "long peace" from the Congress of Vienna to the First World War and a peaceful period after the close of the Cold War. They believe that by expanding NATO and the European Union, the West has created a zone of stability stretching from the Pacific Ocean to Poland's eastern border, thus obviating the need for diplomatic jockeying and arms race. They also point out that the arrangement was sealed by the weakness of Russia and the military and political involvement of the United States in European affairs.

The CEE states have gained from this "historical pause" more than other party, while the return of Russia to the global scene (the interpretation of this indisputable fact notwithstanding) has considerably altered the layout.

The report suggests drawing the "new frontline" along the eastern border of Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania.

Interestingly, along with Russia, Poland is the most frequently cited country, with NATO mentioned much more often than the EU, and the OSCE totally neglected, as well as the late CFE Treaty.

The New Russian Threat and Responses

According to the Strategic Assessment Group (SAG), the Ukraine events indicate that change has occurred along two lines:

— Politically, the war in Ukraine displayed a new type of threat – quick, stealthy, low-intensity, and limited land conquests, perfectly engineered to exploit divergences of threat perception among NATO’s western and eastern members, isolating vulnerable frontline states by impeding the process of political consensus needed for the Article 5 Collective Security guarantee to function.

— Militarily, the “limited war” tactics with an emphasis on fast territorial faits accomplis are a form of warfare well-designed to defeat NATO’s security posture characterized by weak perimeter states reliant upon distant reinforcements. Hence, while NATO plans a defense-in-depth, Russia threatens to rewrite the map around the extremities. Backed by an “escalate-to-deescalate” nuclear doctrine and growing Russian control of air superiority assets, these techniques represent a formidable strategic problem.

Thus, the CEPA suggests getting back to territorial defense, which is viewed by CEE countries somewhat differently. Poland is launching a military buildup program, the Baltic states demand deployment of foreign troops or permanent stationing of weapons and military hardware in their territories, Hungary and Czech Republic are cautiously searching for opportunities beyond NATO and the EU. At that, each of these tactics would not exclude other ways.

The processes underway imply several potentially negative aftereffects:

  1. Greater division in NATO and the EU.
  2. New openings for Russian influence emerge because of excessive accommodation displayed toward some countries.
  3. Reduced military interoperability because national defense programs may fall out of sync with NATO.
  4. Increased nationalism within the CEE increases doubts that supranational bodies can offer them security.
  5. A perennial NATO crisis related to the potential vulnerability of CEE countries in the absence of materialized guarantees for collective defense.
While NATO plans a defense-in-depth, Russia threatens to rewrite the map around the extremities. These techniques represent a formidable strategic problem. Thus, the CEPA suggests getting back to territorial defense.

The SAG describes the cornerstone of the U.S. policy as diminishing Russia's control over escalation and congruent minimization of the potential consequences of "military adventures" in the CEE region.

What we are doing now is attempting to classify the suggested ways to support the "frontline allies" and bolster their defenses.

The Political Dimension

Fig. 2
Regional allied structures (NBP 9 – informal
association of Scandinavian and Baltic states
and Poland)
Frontline Allies: War and Change in Central
Europe

The SAG recommends that the United States render comprehensive support to boost cooperation between same-thinking countries, first of all between Poland, Sweden, Finland and the Baltic states.

Notably, disagreements exist even between states that share values and aspirations, as seen by the SAG, among other things in view of the prospects for peaceful cooperation with Russia [4]. If the formation of a "unified front" in Northern and Central Europe becomes a reality, outside actors, i.e. the United States, will have to get deeply involved, which should bring the need for additional economic, technological and human resources.

The SAG underlines the contradictions within the Visegrád Group, as Poland insists on the military containment of Russia jointly with NATO, while the southern states see NATO membership as potential irritant for Russia and would not like to concentrate on security. The V4 is advised to place more priority on interactions in regional defense, and put trade and economic relations with Russia or national minorities' issues on the backburner.

The SAG also points out the need for deeper U.S. engagement with Poland irrespective of domestic politics and intra-EU relations, which means all-out support of Warsaw, primarily in defense which should be the key for "countering Russian aggression." Should the Polish forces and other resources be elevated to a new level, the U.S. could theoretically hand over the banner of defender against the Russian barbarians to Poland and focus on other regions.

The SAG also points out the need for deeper U.S. engagement with Poland irrespective of domestic politics and intra-EU relations, which means all-out support of Warsaw, primarily in defense.

A lot of importance is given to economic and technological cooperation between the U.S. and the CEE, to a great extent in view of breaking their ties with Russia, primarily in the energy area.

Quite fascinating is the SAG strategy implying an attack against the enemy's political system intended to force the adversary into a political collapse and make him give up on the attempted aggression and agree to concessions. The authors admit that this strategy is hardly feasible if taken on by minor frontline states, but they may be in the know of the adversary's domestic vulnerabilities due to common history, language, cultural, trade and economic ties, thus providing the allies with an opening and a tool for damaging the domestic politics of the "resurging enemy."

Military-Technical and Organizational Measures

Fig. 3
Estonian Defence Forces
Estonian soldiers with the Javelin antitank
system

In this sphere, the efforts must be focused on creating an environment that would make an attack on a "frontline state" too costly for the aggressor, thus providing either containment or punishment.

Among other things, containment could occur by dragging the enemy into counterproductive costs, for example the development of wasteful military systems, or through solutions that would enhance the defense capabilities of a potential victim state.

First of all, the "frontline states" must be equipped with advanced antitank and antiaircraft weapons, counter-battery radars, artillery (including rockets), as well as cruise missiles, depending on the country's operational capabilities.

The report also names the topographically vulnerable regions, among them the Suwałki gap in Poland, Lithuania’s land corridor between Kaliningrad and Belarus, the Danish island of Bornholm, the Finnish island of Aland, Romania’s Moldovan frontier and eastern Estonia.

The "frontline states" must be equipped with advanced antitank and antiaircraft weapons, counter-battery radars, artillery, as well as cruise missiles, depending on the country's operational capabilities.

Vulnerabilities are to be compensated by the permanent deployment of U.S. forces up to a full brigade in each country, as well as by readiness of other allies for forward deployment.

The territorial defense of the CEE states should be central to NATO military planning, while Washington would work hard to develop the CEE capabilities, which appears quite a theme to be watched during the NATO summit in Warsaw next July 8-9.

The report gives much attention to countering "limited nuclear escalation." Fortunately, the CEE countries will hardly find a nuclear weapons provider, but within the nuclear exchange program, all relevant states [5] are recommended to swiftly purchase nuclear-capable aircraft. On the whole, the SAG regards the issue of a limited nuclear strike as underdeveloped, hence national and NATO headquarters should step up their cooperation, including holding appropriate exercises. More than that, authorized persons should be appointed for a permanent duty in case "limited nuclear retaliation" is required.

The View from Russia

Fig. 4
Vulnerable areas, author's map

The very emergence of this report only illustrates the failure of the U.S. and EU economic sanctions against Russia. Had those been effective, different hypothetical threats would have been needed to substantiate the described complicated and costly defense efforts.

The SAG focuses on the CEE but at the same time repeatedly underlines the key role of the United States in maintaining and strengthening their security. As a result, the illusory Russian threat to the CEE sovereignty is materialized in their "voluntary" offering of the sovereignty to the cause of anti-Russian struggle.

Using data from the media, the SAG and CEPA seem to be promoting a pointedly twisted vision of Moscow's foreign and defense policies. However, their opinions and proposals are taken up both by politician and government officials. For example, Hillary Clinton, the presumptive Democratic candidate for U.S. presidency, believes the Baltic countries may change their foreign policies if Washington becomes less active [6].

As far as the military solutions are concerned, former EUCOM Commander Philip Breedlove said that next February an additional tank brigade is to be redeployed preferably to the CEE countries bordering with Russia.

Another confirmation has come from one of the first statements made by Poland's President Andrzej Duda upon his election in 2015: "We need more NATO in this part of Europe." [7]

The SAG recommends that the United States render comprehensive support to boost cooperation between same-thinking countries, first of all between Poland, Sweden, Finland and the Baltic states.

Logistical training within operations for redeployment of even minor contingents with equipment does help to improve readiness and capabilities for responding to new threats.

One should say that the combatant value of a U.S. contingent in the CEE countries seems minor against the very fact of the U.S. military presence and the threat to American lives. Still valid appears the 100-year-old statement of General Foch who in 1910 replied to General Wilson's question on the minimum number of British soldiers to be deployed in Europe for a war with Germany: "One will do, and we make sure he is killed." [8]

Many of the SAG proposals are described as "non-provocative" and intended for peacetime. Some of them seem quite suitable for Russia's foreign and defense policies, although Moscow should hardly apply them only to the East European non-military theater:

  1. Supplies of the A2/AD systems (air defense units, cruise missiles taking into account of the MTCR limitations) to friendly countries in regions vital for defense, positioning and economic development of Russia, among them the CSTO and SCO states, Syria and Iran.
  2. Temporary or permanent bases to support friendly regimes in their territories.
  3. Building of bilateral and multilateral international cooperation on the basis of common goals, with the differences left behind.

Just as in the case of the "hybrid war," these activities appear hardly unique for Russia as well.


Fig. 5
Russian Defense Ministry, Syria.mil.ru
S-400 missile defense system guarding
the Russian aerospace contingent in Syria

Weapons deliveries to Iraq, the Kurds and Syria have made Russia a key fighter against the Islamic Stateb [9] and immensely expanded its resources in the overall Middle East region. In fact, the terrorists have been denied access mostly with help of conventional systems like attack aircraft and heavy flame throwers that were used in Iraq [10].

Apart from attacking the terrorists, the air forces and other formations in Syria have helped Russia to prevent a "closed sky" planned by the opponents of Damascus and established control of the Syrian airspace similar to effective NATO mission Baltic Air Policing.

The establishment of the Information Center in Baghdad and various formats for interaction with other forces opposing terrorism offers one more example of cooperation for a common cause that cannot be affected by differences on other issues.

However, there is also a reverse trend. For example, interdiction used to be related to the capabilities of Russia, China and Iran to prevent projection of the U.S. force [11] within the A2/AD strategies.

The SAG regards the issue of a limited nuclear strike as underdeveloped, hence national and NATO headquarters should step up their.

Of major interest appear proposed activities in the nuclear area. It may seem sensible to step up the Russia-U.S. dialogue with the possible involvement of other countries and discuss theater nuclear weapons for creating a single conceptual apparatus in view of future talks on their control and reduction. It would be of help to achieve a minimally transparent level in the technical and organizational matters related to the use of tactical nuclear weapons, and also specify the conceptual basics for its use. The problem is all the more urgent because of the nonstop accusations of violations of the INF Treaty by Russia, as well as because of the U.S. plans to deploy the B61-12 in Europe.

The foreign and defense approaches of the "resurging Russia" are studied under he microscope in various circles, with the scrutinized results directly affecting the effectiveness of Moscow's policy. The dissemination of true and exact information on the aims and methods used by Russia (naturally, with room for maneuver) may reduce misinterpretations, with a solid step in this direction made by the recent coverage of the Syria operation by the Russian Defense Ministry, regular briefings of the Russian Foreign Ministry and official statements of Russian leaders.

1. Frontline Allies: War and Change in Central Europe, U.S.-Central Europe Strategic Assessment Group Report, November 2015, the Center for European Policy Analysis, Warsaw, Poland, http://cepa.org/index/?id=87c7574c5d15873bb3e824068262daa6

2. Bulgaria, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Romania

3. "NATO defense ministers will prepare the grounds for decisions to be taken at the Warsaw summit." http://nato.int/cps/ru/natohq/news_132275.htm

4. Compare the opinion of Finnish President Sauli Niinistö expressed after meeting President Vladimir Putin on March 3, 2016. "We observe joint decisions, and in this case it goes about sanctions. But we also observe the principles of neighborhood and act as is proper for a good neighbor." (http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51551) and that of Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite in an interview with the The Daily Beast on March 18, 2016 : "The Kremlin conducts confrontational policy, violates international law, destroys the global and regional security architecture, and seeks to divide Europe and weaken trans-Atlantic structures. For the Kremlin, silence signifies consent. We cannot be complicit or create a climate of impunity that encourages dangerous behavior." http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/03/18/the-president-who-dared-to-call-putin-s-russia-what-it-is-a-terrorist-state.html

5. Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy

6. "I think we cannot obtain from NATO countries what we need if we behave as if the U.S. may leave any moment. With this approach, politicians and forces will emerge in the Baltic that are sympathetic with Russia, for example the Russian speakers that will tell their leaders: "Hey, you know, America is away. Let's start talking with Russia," said Hillary Clinton. RIA Novosti 31.03.2016, http://ria.ru/world/20160331/1400730693.html#ixzz44ZuaKZYq

7. New Polish President Makes NATO Bases in Central Europe a Priority for Warsaw Summit Atlantic Council, 06.08.2015, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/new-polish-president-makes-nato-bases-in-central-europe-a-priority-for-warsaw-summit

8. Tuchman B., The Guns of August, P. 59. New York: Ballantine Books, 2009.

9. Organization prohibited in Russia

10. Pukhov R.N., Denisentsev S.A., Our Weapons Back in Iraq// Independent Military Review (Internet version), 03.07.2015, http://nvo.ng.ru/nvo/2015-07-03/1_iraq.html

11. The Emerging Anti-Access/Area-Denial Challenge, Center for Strategic and International Studies https://csis.org/publication/emerging-anti-accessarea-denial-challenge

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