The second century of the “Juche Era”- Pyongyang keeps calm?

The change of leadership in North Korea has been smooth so far; and dramatic changes in its internal and foreign policies are unlikely in the medium and short- term perspective. At the same time, in order to survive and ensure the regime’s security the ruling elite needs to carry out economic reforms and modernization. North Korean partners should take advantage of a new leader in power for normalizing the situation around this country, and starting a constructive discussion of the sore problems with respect of legitimate interests of North Koreans and reaching compromise which will allow to ensure stability on the Korean peninsula and lay the groundwork for reforms in the North of Korea. It is this vision that Russia should promote in its diplomatic efforts within the six-party talks framework while maintaining neighborly relations with North Korea.

The change of leadership in North Korea has been smooth so far; and dramatic changes in its internal and foreign policies are unlikely in the medium and short- term perspective. At the same time, in order to survive and ensure the regime’s security the ruling elite needs to carry out economic reforms and modernization. North Korean partners should take advantage of a new leader in power for normalizing the situation around this country, and starting a constructive discussion of the sore problems with respect of legitimate interests of North Koreans and reaching compromise which will allow to ensure stability on the Korean peninsula and lay the groundwork for reforms in the North of Korea. It is this vision that Russia should promote in its diplomatic efforts within the six-party talks framework while maintaining neighborly relations with North Korea.

The dynasty successor (The dynasty to be continued)

Sudden death in December 2001 of North Korean Leader Kim Jong Il who had ruled the country for seventeen years came as a surprise for its leadership. Many in the country and abroad expected the “Great Leader” to rule some more years and oversee the celebrations of the 100th anniversary of the dynasty’s founder Kim Il Sung’s birth. According to some sources, it is by that time that the preparation for the succession could have been completed.

The idea of the succession has long been on the agenda. It is reported that Kim Jong Il chose his younger son to be his heir when he was only nine years old after he had identified leader’s qualities and firmness in his character.

Over the last year or two Kim Jong Un in the capacity of the “Great Successor” (in September 2010 he was officially introduced to the world and the nation) started to be actively engaged in ruling the country thus acquiring necessary experience and connections among the ruling clique. Despite his young age he soon made even long-time members of the leadership, many of whom held offices already as early as his granddad times, respect his opinion. After Kim Jong Il’s death North Korean leadership weren’t hesitant to honor the right of the youth to become the next ruler. Guided by the deeply rooted monarchial traditions and the instinct of self-preservation (everyone realizes well that the fight for power at the top is potent of turning the boat they are all in over) the ruling clique hurried to swear their allegiance to the “new king”.

It can never even occur to the North Korean grass roots to call into question the legitimacy of it because nothing has changed for them: they must execute orders on pain of death, and orders remain the same. The propaganda machine has immediately begun churning out paeans to the young leader. Even if some North Koreans may have doubts over his genius they have to keep them in check. In an ideological state which is North Korea the legitimacy of Kim Jong Un is based on his being the direct descendant of the state’s founder Kim Il Sung who has the “half-god” status rather than on his being Kim Jong Il’s son.

Thus the first stage of the succession went smoothly providing continuity and stability to the workings of the leadership mechanism. Political stability is secured by Kim Jong Un’s reliance on his father’s or even grandfather’s time-tested henchmen. The narrow circle includes the clique of family members, generals and senior party and government officials (the latter three are official power pillars in North Korea). However, it’s wrong to think that the young Kim is a puppet in their hands. Of course, the possibility that the clans will start struggling for the young leader’s mind and of him making mistakes can not be ruled out. More likely, having gained experience Kim will be able to reign on his own, and Kim Il Sung’s comrades’ natural loss of prominence will be accompanied by rising of new people loyal to the regime. Besides, unlike Kim Jong Il Kim Jong Un seems to rely more on the party establishment rather than the military. Nonetheless, the role of the military remains dominant, therefore there are no reasons to believe that a revolt or a military junta are possible – all members of the ruling establishment are kept in check and not politically potent. Those who forget about it never live long.

Can Kim Jong Un become a “Korean Gorbachev”?

In the short-term perspective the wisest thing to do for Kim Jong Un is to keep things as they are (business-as-usual) and in order to be on the safe side even to tighten screws a little. This is what’s currently happening: the border control to prevent refugees has been strengthened, crackdown on the “discontent” has been launched, the attempts to limit economic freedoms, for instance, the circulation of foreign currency, have been undertaken.

That said there are certain hopes that the young leader is not as conservative-minded as the old men in his environment albeit he realizes pretty well the danger of sharp movements. He has education background and life experience different from his predecessors. Actually, he represents the first generation of the North Koreans grown up after the collapse of the world communism. This generation differs much from their fathers and grandfathers: in general, they do not care about “communist ideals” while remaining committed to Korean nationalism, disregard propaganda focusing instead on everyday life issues and personal problems.

Permanent economic crisis which the population of the country take for granted is unlikely to entail the political one. Kim Jr. has to do something if he wants to prevent protest sentiments growth. The country has de-facto accommodated a quasi-market economic system based on small private entrepreneurship and plagued by endemic corruption which proved, as the failed monetary reform of 2009 demonstrated, impossible to eradicate. There has emerged a “new class” economically independent people and the authorities will sooner or later have to admit and legalize the new economic reality. Of course, it will make the totalitarian regime weaker but prevent it from being toppled. Some top North Korean officials have already made cautious statements about the necessity to build knowledge-based economy and learn from the Chinese experience of economic reforms which made much noise in the West.

The young Kim’s team which is only being formed obviously understands much more than their predecessors about global economic trends and is doomed to find the “North Korean path” of reform. It seems that it won’t be the replica of either Chinese or Russian or Vietnamese experience although from each of them much could be borrowed. For example, Chinese experience could contribute to the development of small entrepreneurship ( in order to allow peasants to grow crops and sell it and entrepreneurs to do their small business there’s no need to open up the country) and the creation of an isolated export sector ( it is already taking place in special areas, for instance, the common with South Korea Kaesong zone where the production in 2011 has grown by 14,4%, despite tense relations between the North and the South). From Russia’s experience the members of the military-bureaucratic establishment could borrow an oligarchic-styled privatization, for they have already started to convert political power into economic benefits and management and with time they will go on to convert it into ownership. Both the future of the new leadership and the very existence of North Korean Democratic Republic will depend on the success and the pace of imminent reforms.

New leadership and the world

Can there be “détente” in the relations between North and South Koreas, North Korea and the West? Starting from the early 2000s Kim Jong Il had aspired it but failed because his vis-à-vis would never tolerate the totalitarian regime that as they believed was about to collapse, and out of geo-political concerns (U.S. – China rivalry in Asia) among other things. In particular, it explains why the Nobel prize’s winner Kim Dae-jung’s and his followers’ policy of “solar warmth” had modest success which was soon brought to naught by the conservative government of Lee Myung-bak.

Will the Western powers be able to take an unbiased attitude towards the new North Korean leader who can’t as yet carry the responsibility for the “crimes of the regime”? There is no clarity on this issue because the “new-old” North Korean leadership concerned about the maintaining of stability and possible attempts to weaken the regime during the hard transition period refused point blank from the contacts with the Administration of South Korean President Lee Myung-dak who is dubbed a “traitor” in North Korea. It is understandable, because after the inevitable period of consolidation Pyongyang will have no time for and it will make no sense to reach any agreement with an outgoing South Korean Administration. It’s worth waiting till a new leadership takes the office in South Korea and even trying to get a “progressive” leadership to be elected. North Koreans have the whole set of instruments of influence in their arsenal ranging from bullying average South Koreans to offering the “olive branch” to “progressive forces”.

Instead of establishing contacts with Lee Myung-bak Pyongyang has laid the emphasis on flirting with the USA: the process of negotiations with the Americans re-gained momentum soon before Kim Jong Il’s death. Closed North Korean-Japanese talks have also resumed.

However, North Korea is hardly to make concessions in the sphere of its military capability and nuclear weapons in particular. For Pyongyang this is the only guarantee of its regime security and much should change before it becomes irrelevant for it.

That said North Korea may, in principle, give up the production of weapons of mass destruction and abandon the arms race if it is provided with security guarantees. This may and must result only from the diplomatic process which will bind both North Korea and its allies and foes. Therefore, it’s critical to take advantage of the moment for the resumption of six-party talks. But the agenda of the talks must go beyond the issue of North Korea denuclearization and include the issues of the country’s security guarantees - the matter of the North Korean leadership’s greatest concern – and the creation of a multilateral system for maintaining security and stability on the peninsular. South Korea as well as China and Russia are prepared for such talks but the decision depends mostly on Seoul and Washington.

What are the challenges and opportunities for Russia in the wake of political changes in North Korea? The strategic line remains intact: Russia is interested in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. It is the necessary pre-requisite for the promotion of its economic and political interests, prevention of conflicts and other cataclysms and curbing the arms race including the development of WMD. There is no alternative to the dialogue with the North Korean leaders which should be used for making the country behave wisely on the international arena and, possibly, for the modernization of its economic and political systems. “Soft power” cultural and people-to-people cooperation are as important as the economic and political levers. Remembering that unlike his father Kim Jong Un knows little about Russia it’s necessary to win the trust of the new North Korean leadership (it doesn’t, of course, mean that inappropriate actions of North Korea will be connived at).

Russia boasts some advantages in the multilateral negotiations process: it keeps a certain degree of neutrality and enjoys even relations with all the parties to the talks. Therefore, it’s essential to maintain and even enhance its position in the negotiations without reaching mutual understanding with the North Korean political elite. Pro-active work on agreeing the positions with other participants to the talks is also critical. Among the specific challenges are the intensification of efforts to implement trilateral projects with the participation of South and North Koreas, above all the construction of the gas pipeline which will go through the territories of both Koreas, the connection of the Trans-Korean railway with the Trans-Siberian railway, the construction of electric grids and, possibly, the modernization of the North Korean economy. Apart from economic benefits the realization of these projects promises to all the participants bettering the relations between North and South Koreas and improvement of the situation on the Korean peninsula.