The Art of Diplomacy

What is the art of diplomacy? While the art of war lies in the ability to claim victory through the force of arms, the art of diplomacy aims to achieve the goals set through peaceful means. It is, therefore, the antithesis of using force to solve international problems. In the art of diplomacy, it is the international community’s accumulated experience that serves as a weapon, as does – and herein lies the essence of it – an innovative, creative approach to problems arising. It is on the basis of this that one acts to provide a solution.

What is the art of diplomacy? While the art of war lies in the ability to claim victory through the force of arms, the art of diplomacy aims to achieve the goals set through peaceful means. It is, therefore, the antithesis of using force to solve international problems. In the art of diplomacy, it is the international community’s accumulated experience that serves as a weapon, as does – and herein lies the essence of it – an innovative, creative approach to problems arising. It is on the basis of this that one acts to provide a solution.

***

The first task arising along this path is to gather information and assess the emerging situation. Thus, having information on the negotiating parties’ true goals, the limits to their willingness to make concessions, and their bargaining position, becomes invaluable. The success of further diplomatic moves is often predicated on this. It stands to reason that we keep on reaching for that centuries’ old saying equating possessing information with controlling a situation: information is power.

As a case in point let me give an example of how information is sought and employed.

It is 1975, and we are in the midst of developing the Helsinki Final Act in Geneva.

The Delegation from Malta has shared a proposal on security in the Mediterranean that, among other elements, required Iran and the Gulf States to participate in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and, crucially, the withdrawal of the U.S. Navy’s Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean. The Prime Minister of Malta at that time, Dom Mintoff, insisted that this proposal was taken up, and threatened to block the work of the Conference, which ran largely on consensus-based procedures.

The U.S. and NATO countries categorically rejected Malta’s proposal. Negotiations came to a standstill that risked compromising the integrity of the Conference.

Negotiations on behalf of Malta were led by the Prime Minister’s personal representative, Roving Ambassador Joe Attard Kingswell. He alone was aware of the Maltese Premier’s intentions, but all attempts to find a compromise solution failed – he reiterated Malta’s maximalist demands.

It was then that the Soviet Union’s Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko arrived in Geneva for a meeting with Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger. Gromyko’s main priority in the talks was to finalize, as quickly as possible, the Final Act – so that the States and Governments could meet in Helsinki and sign it as soon as possible. However, the road was blocked by Malta, whose representative said that he could not indicate a date, month, or even a year, during which the Conference might be concluded.

Against this backdrop, as Deputy Head of the Soviet Delegation that worked on the draft of the Helsinki Final Act, I met with Ambassador Kingswell and, over a cup of coffee, told him:

In about 15-20 minutes the meeting between Gromyko and Kissinger will start; just nearby; at the Intercontinental Hotel. This is a unique opportunity. It might be the last chance to address Malta’s concerns. We would be ready to facilitate this. If you, Mr. Ambassador, could tell me what your fallback position is on this controversial issue, then I promise, in a few minutes, Gromyko and Kissinger will discuss it, with all that follows from that.

Did I know for sure that Kingswell had a fallback position? Of course I didn’t. But there must surely have been one! At any rate, the only chance of achieving a compromise without detriment to all parties, including Malta, lay in there being a fall-back or rational reserve position.

It was a tense wait for a reaction from Kingswell. And then I saw it, quite suddenly. Instead of answering, he got out his wallet. Не opened it. He took out a thin strip of paper looking like a telegraph tape with some handwritten notes on it.

Write this down, he said, and dictated a brief wording.

I wrote: “…to contribute to peace and arms reductions in the region…” It was immediately clear that this was the solution. There was no reference to Iran or the Gulf countries. But crucially, there was no mention of the U.S. pulling back its naval forces, the Sixth Fleet, from the Mediterranean.

I wasn’t there to enter into a lengthy conversation – every minute counted. I thanked the Ambassador, told him I had to run off to the meeting between the Minister and the Secretary of State, and bade him farewell.

Indeed, time was running out. It was almost 10 a.m. On my car journey back to the Intercontinental Hotel, the wording was somehow jotted into Russian. Here it is. I didn’t have a pass that would get me in to the place the meeting was being held, but somehow managed to slip through all the security checks. I got into the meeting room as the participants were taking their places at the negotiating table. I slipped the note to Gromyko, virtually without explanation. The minister glanced at the piece of paper being handed to him, and in an even tone said to Kissinger: “I propose we start with a word on European affairs Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, or rather, the Malta issue.”

His words did not seem to elicit much enthusiasm from Kissinger. He responded wryly:

– I don’t object, but there is nothing much to talk about. The conference is at a total impasse. What else can we discuss?

– There is a new Maltese proposal, the Minister answered.

Kissinger seemed perplexed. He looked serious. Instead of responding, he leant over first to the aide on his right, then to the one on his left. From the far end of the room, the Head of the U.S. Delegation at the talks, Ambassador Walter J. Sherer (Ambassador to the USSR) and some other advisors rush over to him. There is a lot of whispering. Now Kissinger is not only perplexed, he is clearly uncomfortable.

– What new proposals are you talking about, he asks. We haven’t received any. We haven’t heard anything.

– We’ve only just received them, Gromyko explains.

– I hope, though, Kissinger responds, suspiciously, that the new wording doesn’t make any reference to the Sixth Fleet.

– There is nothing about it there, Gromyko says.

Gromyko suggests that he and Kissinger pause the meeting and talk face to face. They step aside to the far end of the small meeting room and talk. It doesn’t take long: just a few minutes. Then, they return to the table – looking satisfied. They announce: We have agreed. That phrasing is suitable. It is now up to our delegations to propose this understanding to their allies. This must be done carefully. It’s a delicate exercise. Failure is not an option. No one must suspect, however, that we are acting in collusion. In fact, there is no collusion in the precise sense of the word. The rest of the Maltese crisis is down to technicalities.

Thus, the timely acquisition of information helped move the Conference out of a critical situation.

***

A tremendous achievement of the art of diplomacy was the establishment of the coalition against Hitler in World War II. It took enormous efforts from the Soviet Union, United States and Great Britain to achieve that great victory, despite their substantially different policies on a number of issues. By the end of 1943, it was obvious that the leaders of these countries had to meet to strengthen their unity and ensure further cooperation during and after the war. However, holding such a meeting was no mean feat. Thus, for Stalin, the day-to-day control of wartime operations made it inconvenient for him to go on long trips, since defeating Nazi Germany was the Soviet Union’s paramount goal. In order to achieve this goal it seemed extremely important that a second front was opened not just anywhere – but in France. Meanwhile, the United States faced the problem of the heaviest engagement with Japanese aggression, which was growing rapidly, giving the prospect of long, drawn-out and bloody war.

A carefully thought-through diplomatic move by the Soviet Union’s leaders helped resolve the complex problems that were arising. It happened like this:

In October 1943, U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull and UK Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden paid a visit to Moscow. On October 30, the guests were invited to an official dinner at the Kremlin. At this reception, Stalin had a pleasant surprise for the Americans, gaining a tangible advantage at the future talks of the “Big Three.” This is how Stalin’s interpreter said it happened:

– They were silent for a moment, each in their thoughts. Then I noticed Stalin leaning over to me behind Mr. Hull. I leaned in and heard him saying, barely audibly:

– Listen to me carefully. Translate this word for word: The Soviet Government has examined the issue of the situation in the Far East, and made the decision to move against Japan immediately after the end of the war in Europe when the Allies have defeated Hitler’s Germany. Ask Mr. Hull to convey this to President Roosevelt as our official position. But, in the meantime we want to keep it secret. You too, make sure you say it quietly, so that no one can hear. Understood?

– Yes, Comrade Stalin – I whispered. As I was interpreting Stalin’s words, trying to render them as accurately as possible in English, Stalin was eye-to-eye with Hull, and nodded from time to time as if confirming what he meant. It was obvious that Hull was very moved by what he heard. It was a long-awaited moment for the Americans. Now, the Government of the United States had received an official statement from the Head of the Soviet Government on such an important issue for Washington, albeit strictly confidentially…

Hull was a changed man.

In his memoirs, Hull recalled that at dawn, when he reached the U.S. Ambassador’s residence in Spasso House on the way to the Central Airport, he had time to write a cable, split into two parts for security reasons, to President Roosevelt. The first part was sent by Navy code and the second one by Army code. The Americans feared that one of these codes had been broken by enemy counterintelligence.

The text of the cable was made public soon after the end of the war by the U.S. Department of State. The text, sent by the U.S. Embassy in Moscow with a two-week delay (perhaps they feared sending a cable before Hull could get to safety), read:

Confidential; Urgent; Moscow; November 2, 1943

Top secret, eyes only for President, from Hull: The Person of the highest authority conveyed to me a strictly confidential message for you personally. The message contains a promise to engage and help destroy the enemy. See more in another cable.

The second half of the cable sent, as was mentioned, by another cipher, read:

Confidential Moscow, November 2, 1943

No number. Top secret, eyes only for President, from Hull: in the Far East after the defeat of Germany (that was the end of the previous cable). Please radio-confirm to me receipt in Cairo.

At the same time, Hull sent also a second telegram, discussing the prospects for a meeting between Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill. Hull informed the President that Stalin had decided not to go to Basra. Therefore, Hull suggested that Roosevelt reconsider Tehran since the agreement to hold a conference in that city was the only chance for a meeting.

It seems that Hull’s cable served its purpose, as not long after receiving it, President Roosevelt agreed to a meeting in the Iranian capital [1].

The issues of communist ideology were actually relegated by Stalin to the sidelines. Stalin disbanded the Comintern and reestablished the Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church; a Patriarch was elected and the clergy received extensive government support.

Roosevelt’s response was surprising. In order to demonstrate his sincerity to Stalin, he announced that he agreed to recognize the Western borders of the USSR as of 1941, including the Baltic States. Thus, a problem in relations between the USSR and the Allies – which could have seen some tough bargaining – was to be resolved amicably [2].

The Tehran Conference was held from November 28, to December 1, 1943. It scored outstanding successes: operation Overlord – the opening of the second front – was set to start no later than May, 1944; the Western borders with Poland and Rumania and incorporation of the Baltic Republics in the USSR was confirmed; the 1940 Soviet Union-Finland border recognized; and it was also recognized that Eastern Prussia (Konigsberg now Kaliningrad) would be incorporated into the USSR.

The USSR took on an obligation to launch military actions against Japan three months after the end of the war with Germany. In exchange, Stalin demanded the repeal of the 1905 Portsmouth Treaty, meaning the restitution of the Southern part of Sakhalin island, the Kuril islands and the USSR’s preferential rights in China – thereby the Russian authorities would regain all that they lost in the disastrous Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905;

It was agreed to establish the United Nations Organization and that the USSR would be a member of its governing body [3].

An elegant diplomatic move by Stalin – some words communicated confidentially via an interpreter on October 30 – had cemented the friendship with Roosevelt.

At the Yalta Conference of January 4-11, 1945, it was agreed that the USSR was to maintain its pre-war borders, becoming a powerful European player by achieving the accession of its two republics, Belorussia and Ukraine, to the UN, and also by obtaining veto rights in the UN Security Council. It was agreed with Roosevelt that the Soviet Union would see the restitution of its positions (territories) in the Far East that Russia had in 1904. This meant –leasing the Port Arthur naval base; the restitution of its rights to the Chinese Eastern Railway that linked Chita and Vladivostok in the Russian Far East and its section further south – the South Manchuria Railway; the return of Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril islands. Since the USSR was set to gain influence in Manchuria, which was an important support base for Communist China, Stalin reiterated the commitment to launch military action against Japan within two or three months of victory over Germany [4].

On the April 12, 1945, Roosevelt passed away. The new U.S. President set the country on a path of tougher relations with the USSR. As the U.S. developed nuclear weapons capability, Truman decided to use this factor to launch a nuclear diplomacy initiative that led to a protracted period of tension in international relations.

The Soviet Union fulfilled its obligations and on August 8, 1945, declared war on Japan. Previously, on August 6, 1945, the United States carried out a nuclear bomb strike against Japan; it is indicative, however, that Japan announced its unconditional capitulation only after the Soviet Union entered the war.

On the August 9, at 11a.m. a meeting of the Supreme War Commanding Council was convened. “The entry into the war of the Soviet Union,” Prime Minister of Japan Kantaro Suzuki said, “puts us in a desperate situation and makes further continuation of war impossible” [5]. On August 15, the Emperor went on the radio to announce his decision to end the war. Then, on August 16, all troops were ordered to cease hostilities. On August 17, the Emperor addressed the soldiers and officers of the Japanese Army: he called the Soviet Union’s entry into the war the main reason for capitulation. The nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not mentioned. The Address read: Now that the Soviet Union has entered the war against us, to continue the war under the present internal and external conditions would be only to increase needlessly the ravages of war finally to the point of endangering the very foundation of the Empire's existence [6].

The United States’ subsequent actions seemed strange, against this background.

On August 11, Truman issued the order to occupy the port of Dalny. This ran counter to the Soviet-American arrangements. Nevertheless, when US marines reached Dalny they found Russian soldiers there [7].

Truman was quick to insist that Stalin give him the right to establish a U.S. Air Force base in the Kurils. Gromyko, who was then the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, was outraged when he heard. He responded that this is the way one talks to a defeated country, but the Soviet Union was not defeated [8].

This episode serves as an outstanding example of a large-scale diplomatic initiative that remains relevant today.

***

In the context of the atrocities that World War II unleashed on humanity, freedom-loving states developed the goal of establishing an organization that could serve as an enduring guarantee of peace and international security. During the Tehran Conference, the USSR, U.S. and UK agreed to establish the United Nations Organization. This is the kind of institution that people have long sought to see established. Indeed, the creation of the League of Nations after World War I was just such an attempt. Unfortunately, that initiative failed. The League of Nations’ founders failed to develop a mechanism that could enable it to function effectively in working to attain its intended goals of maintaining peace and security.

The Soviet Union strongly believed that the principle of unanimity, or the veto right of the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council should be specified in the United Nations Charter as a mechanism to these ends.

Gromyko led the Soviet Delegation to the meeting on the development of the UN Charter at Dumbarton Oaks near Washington. He staunchly defended his country’s interests. Gromyko proposed that all 16 Soviet republics should be represented in the United Nations.

“My God,” Roosevelt exclaimed when this was relayed to him. Roosevelt’s biographer recounted this incident as follows:

He asked the Assistant Secretary of State Stettinius to let Gromyko know that such a proposal would destroy any chance that the Senate or the American people would approve the idea of this new United Nations. In fact, the proposal to include the 16 republics with voting rights in the global organization seemed so absurd to Roosevelt that he expected to talk Stalin out of it (as history showed, it was eventually decided that two Soviet Republics, Ukraine and Belarus, will become UN member-states).

Another difficulty centered on the veto: the more the British and Americans objected to it, the more insistent Gromyko became. Stettinius decided to use the ultimate resort: could the President talk to Gromyko? The President received Gromyko at his sickbed. Gromyko was polite but unforthcoming. Then Roosevelt proposed sending a warm but carefully-worded telegram to Stalin. They received an answer within a week. The unanimous vote of the “Big Four” was portrayed as the basis for mutual understanding. It was also presumed that there would be no grounds for mistrust among the Great Powers.

Roosevelt understood that, without the Soviet Union, the newly established organization would not be efficient and that therefore, the right to veto would stay in the Charter, no matter how contentious it seemed. By and large, all the governments wanted to see a new system of international relations emerge that would be able to prevent future wars and conflicts [9].

The rule of unanimity for the UN Security Council’s permanent members became a clear sticking point after it started to operate. By denying the permanent members even the minimal flexibility of being able to abstain during a vote, it risked paralyzing its own activity. The solution was found in 1946, by Gromyko – the Soviet Union’s UN Representative – when draft resolution 4 regarding Spain was under consideration. The Soviet Union deemed it impossible to vote for that resolution. Nor did it want to cast its vote against it. Thus, the Soviet Union’s representative abstained during the vote, but made a statement that not voting in favor of a proposed resolution should not be viewed as a vote against it. This was novel, it set a precedent that continues to be used, and, with all its added value it can be called Gromyko’s amendment to the UN Charter.

Since 1971, the Security Council has adopted the procedure that decisions are made irrespective of permanent members’ non-participation in a vote.

The need for the UN SC permanent members’ votes to converge is now understood being the absence of any votes expressly against a resolution.

The development of this mechanism gave it power and authority as the body that bears primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. Russia’s participation as a permanent member speaks to the fact that the entire world recognizes the Soviet Union’s outstanding contribution to victory in World War II and its considerable diplomatic skill in developing the UN Charter and creating the existing world order.

***

In recent years the international community has found itself confronting a crisis that threatens the sustainability of the entire system: events in and around Syria. It all started with the unrest in that country in 2011 that looked like the kind of protest potential that we saw in Tunisia and Egypt. These riots escalated into a full-scale civil war endangering the very existence of Syria as a sovereign state, threatening further unrest in the Middle East and complicating the international situation so much that it could damage the current system of international security.

These events prompted two different approaches to their assessment and ways to influence these developments from the international community.

On the one hand, we have coercive pressure aimed at toppling President Assad, and his regime, with the potential use of external military intervention. On the other hand, there is the international community’s role in facilitating a peaceful settlement of the conflict through political dialogue between Government and the opposition forces at a conference in Geneva, known as Geneva-2.

A number of U.S.-led Western countries backed a solution through force. The second alternative was mainly backed, at least initially, by Russia and China.

The showdown between the two approaches took place in the Security Council. When in early February 2013, a number of Western countries put forward a draft resolution explicitly aimed at the Syrian Government Russia undertook to prevent events from moving along a path of the use of force. Russia then addressed its partners in the Security Council with a request to postpone this draft for several days in order to allow Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov and Director of Foreign Intelligence Service Mikhail Fradkov to visit Damascus. Moscow was convinced that, after the Russian delegation returns from Damascus, a compromise resolution would be quite achievable.

However, Russia was not given this opportunity. The U.S. insisted on an immediate vote on the Western draft resolution. It seems it was more important for them to distract attention from the armed factions than to reach consensus in the Security Council – Sergey Lavrov said.

The U.S. Administration’s next steps were aimed at forcing preparations for a military strike against Syria. A coalition of states was building to support such an action together with the deployment of naval forces with tomahawks targeted at Syria. U.S. President Barack Obama said that the use of chemical weapons in Syria would be the ‘red line’ that would prompt a missile and bomb strike against the Middle Eastern nation. After an apparent chemical weapons attack in the eastern suburbs of Damascus on August 21, 2013, this threat became real. This threat was aimed against the Syrian Government. There were some voices in the U.S. arguing that no UN Security Council Resolution was needed ahead of a strike, especially since China and Russia would likely veto the resolution. They argued that a U.S. Congress resolution would suffice, and this issue was raised.

But then the story changed. Britain’s lower house of parliament, the House of Commons, voted against a potential military operation against Syria.

Syria found support from much of the world community, led by Russia, acting often with China, some countries in Europe and all of Latin America. But still the military preparations continued. Tensions seemed to be peaking.

It was then that, during the G-20 Summit of September 4-5, at his meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama, Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed putting Syrian chemical weapons under international control. That was quite an unexpected diplomatic move. The U.S. President reacted positively. This was an achievement of truly global significance. On September 9, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov declared that he had convinced Syria to transfer and eliminate its chemical weapons. This means that Syria supported Russia’s initiative. Moreover, Syria immediately sent the UN the documents of accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Russia’s initiatives were supported by most of the U.S. population and even by the U.S Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In his Address to the American People on September 10, Obama asked Congress to postpone the vote on a military strike and stated his readiness to work together with Moscow and the UN Security Council on the proposal to put Syrian chemical weapons under international control.

This was an invaluable achievement. When Russia and the U.S. act in unison, the world breathes a sigh of relief.

The arsenal of chemical weapons stockpiled in Syria should be destroyed or removed from the country by mid-2014. This was the agreement reached by Russia and the U.S. in mid-September following three days of negotiations between the heads of their foreign ministries.

At their joint news conference, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov and the U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry presented their agreed 6-point plan that involves the following:

• Reaching an agreement on the number and types of chemical weapons in Syria and their rapid placement under international control;
• Within a week, Syria must provide “comprehensive” listings of its chemical weapons stockpiles;
• Extraordinary procedures under the Chemical Weapons Convention will be applied to allow for rapid destruction;
Syria must give inspectors full and “unfettered access” to all chemical weapon sites; All chemical weapons must be destroyed. If appropriate, they will first be removed from Syrian territory;
• The UN will provide logistical support for the plan and compliance will be enforced by Chapter VII of the UN Security Council Charter.

Moreover, it was agreed that the Peace Conference on the Syrian settlement, called Geneva-2, would be convened by mid-November.

Russia and the U.S. agreed on the steps that should be taken to ensure the participation of the Syrian Government and opposition forces, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said after talks with his American counterpart on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Bali. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry made a similar statement to the press.

In late September, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution on the elimination of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in Syria. At the same time, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) endorsed the plan for their physical destruction.

At a recent news conference in Brussels, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said that he welcomes the UN Resolution that establishes the framework for elimination of chemical weapons in Syria, and called its adoption a tremendous step forward [10].

During the talks on the sidelines of APEC in Bali the Russian and U.S. foreign ministers announced that the Syrian Authorities are successfully implementing the requirements of the UN Security Council Resolution on the elimination of chemical weapons.

Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry stressed that they believe that the crisis in Syria should be settled by political means and that the military scenario is inadmissible.

“John Kerry and I reiterated our resolve to do our utmost to assist the struggle against terrorism and extremism in Syria,” Lavrov said, stressing the importance of helping those who envision the Syria of the future as being a multi-faith state.

Russia’s foreign minister stressed that Geneva-2 should focus on the future organization and establishment of a new coalition government for Syria, and that Russia wants to see the international peace conference take place in mid-November.

Kerry, in turn, said that the final date of the conference will be established by the UN – its Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, and Special Envoy for Syria Lakhdar Brahimi.

The first batch of Syrian chemical weapons was destroyed by OPCW and UN experts on October 6, – just 10 days after the Security Council passed its resolution.

The joint OPCW and UN statement says that Syrian personnel, under observers’ supervision, began eliminating and deactivating of warheads, bombs, and equipment for the production of chemical weapons. The representative of the two organizations stressed that Syria is eliminating the chemical weapons itself, and that their task is to monitor this process and report back on how Damascus is cooperating with the international community, which has demanded the elimination of Syrian chemical stockpiles and production capabilities.

On October 11, the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the OPCW with the 2013 Nobel Peace Prize. This rankles with the Syrian opposition as it thinks the Nobel Peace Prize Committee gave the award not only to the OPCW but also, de facto, to Syrian President Bashar Assad and Russian President Vladimir Putin, since Russia came up with the idea of eliminating Syria’s chemical weapons arsenals [11].

The efforts to settle the crisis in and around Syria are still continuing. There are great hopes that the peak of the threat has passed. This is a case, for which it is hard to find any precedent.

To prevent war means more than to win one.

Let me stress once more, that this is the pinnacle of the art of diplomacy.

Yu. Dubinin; Distinguished Diplomat of the Russian Federation; Professor; MGIMO (U)

1. Stanislav Rybas. Gromyko. Moscow. Molodaya Gvardiya. 2011. Pp. 143-144..

2. Ibid. P. 145.

3. Ibid. P. 150..

4. Ibid. Pp. 166-167.

5. Inoue Kiyoshi, Okonoki Shinzaburo, Suzuki Shoshi. Istoriia sovremennoi Iaponii (A History of Modern Japan, translated into Russian from the Japanese). М., 1955, p.264. The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy During the Great Patriotic War. Vol. 3 Documents and materials. January 1 – September 3, 1945. М., 1947. Pp. 362-363

6. Reischauer Е., The United States and Japan, New York, 1968, P. 261 Hatori Takushiro. Selected Essays. P 576

7. Stanlislav Rybas. Gromyko. Moscow. Molodaya Gvardiya. 2011. P. 184.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid. Pp. 157 -158.

10. http://rus.ruvr.ru/news/2013_10_10/Rasmussen-Rezoljucija-SB-OON-po-Sirii-ogromnij-shag-vpered-0997/

11. Rosbalt. Politics. October 12, 2013 11:37 (Moscow time)