Hypersonic Warheads for Ballistic Missiles

In the first half of 2015, international media outlets reported the successful Russian and Chinese testing of hypersonic flight vehicles, i.e. gliding hypersonic warheads carried by ballistic missiles. The Russian Project 4202 and the Chinese project WU-14 point to a new spiral in the nuclear and nonnuclear technologies race.

In the first half of 2015, international media outlets reported the successful Russian and Chinese testing of hypersonic flight vehicles, i.e. gliding hypersonic warheads carried by ballistic missiles. The Russian Project 4202 and the Chinese project WU-14 point to a new spiral in the nuclear and nonnuclear technologies race. So far, this concerns technology but not arms because the Russian, Chinese and American (HTV-2 и AHW) experimental hypersonic vehicles are still in the R&D and testing stages.

However, it is not unreasonable to make the prediction that operational gliding missiles systems will significantly expand the range of missions for the strategic nuclear forces of Russia, China and the United States, which are leading the quest for hypersonic technologies. The Americans will realize the concept of a Prompt Global Strike, while Russia and China would be able to surely overcome any future BMD system and engage the nonnuclear version of their strategic nuclear forces during the early phases of a conflict in order to prevent it from escalating.

So far, this concerns technology but not arms because the Russian, Chinese and American experimental hypersonic vehicles are still in the R&D and testing stages.

www.vandenberg.af.mil
Minotaur IV launch, April 23, 2010

Operational gliding missiles systems will significantly expand the range of missions for the strategic nuclear forces of Russia, China and the United States.

The Russian Project 4202 is an intermediate piece en route to a more advanced warhead for existing and future land-based ICBMs, including the RS-28 Sarmat and possibly the RS-26 Rubezh, as well as submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The vertically and horizontally maneuvering warheads of single and split types would render the future U.S. global BMD system useless and act as an ace in the sleeve that could abruptly change the rules of the game and coerce the Americans into a compromise.

In effect since 2011, the Russian-American New Start agreement does not specify any limitations on the development and advancement of the Russian nuclear arsenal. Its quantitative parameters allow Russia to adequately assure strategic containment in peacetime and the absolute destruction of enemy nuclear facilities in case of war.

At the same time, New START requires the two sides to bring the number of delivery vehicles and warheads down to certain levels, i.e. respectively to 700 and 1,550 by 2018, when the missile forces will receive many new systems, among them the light RS-24 Yars (SS-27 Mod. 2/3) and the heavy RS-28 Sarmat (SS-X-30) which will replace the obsolete RS-12М/М2 (SS-25/SS-27 Mod. 1), RS-18B (SS-19 Mod. 2) and RS-20В (SS-18 Mod. 5/6) now in the inventory of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces.

By that time, the U.S. may have perspective CSM missile systems on alert within the ICBM Minotaur IV package, which is an upgraded ICBM Peacekeeper equipped with hypersonic Payload Delivery Vehicles (PDV). The latter will use units based on the existing alternative experimental designs HTV-2 ordered by the Air Force or the AHW ordered by the Army.

The vertically and horizontally maneuvering warheads of single and split types would render the future U.S. global BMD system useless.

Wikipedia.org
Range of various Chinese missiles

If the testing of the experimental hypersonic vehicle WU-14 goes smoothly (both launches were successful), maneuvering warheads may be placed on Chinese ICBMs – on the existing hypersonic Dong Feng-31 (CSS-9) and the perspective Dong Feng-41 (CSS-X-10), as well as the medium-range ballistic missile Dong Feng-21 (CSS-5).

Available data suggests that the lacunae in New START, which have allowed the parties to develop gliding missile weapons over the past 15 years, as well as the Chinese factor, will make Russia and the U.S.A. (by all means with the participation of China whose nuclear missile potential is already significant) sooner or later search for restraints on hypersonic missile technologies that threaten international stability. The formula for the success of negotiations can be found in the history of Soviet-American and Russian-American relations in controlling offensive strategic weapons (see Table 1).