Most of the victims of propaganda are young men on the threshold of adulthood with a low level of education and no wish to study. The propaganda materials published by IS makes a pitch to their primitive instincts. IS is represented as an utopia, an alternative to the habitual world to which an adolescent has failed to adapt himself.

There is a special approach to the young military which often makes use of their resentment of their commanders.

Special approaches are applied to women, especially young women. IS recruiters are conducting their propaganda only among those who can be used either in combat, or in catering to the needs of fighters or in the life-support system of the quasi-state (medical workers, oilmen, lawyers). During the process of recruitment the topic of war is often avoided and the potential target is not told that he/she is sure to end up fighting arms in hand.

Finding themselves in a distinct community through magazines, internet apps, communities and social network groups, the potential victims begin by responding to innocuous proposals to discuss the situation in the Middle East, the problems of Islam and the study of Arabic. Once they discover a heightened interest among would-be IS recruits the recruiters subject them to intensive brainwashing, resorting to new motivations and means of psychological pressure – this time for the purpose of recruiting them.

Sociological surveys of the perception of international problems have in recent year registered growing anxiety in connection with IS activities.

However, against this background the inflow of volunteers joining Islamic State in 2015 continued, including from West European countries. The soaring numbers of militants, notably those fighting in Syria and Iraq, has caused the international community to pay more attention to assessing their numbers.

According to a report of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), 20 730 foreign citizens are fighting on the side of the terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria. The largest number comes from the Middle East (11,000), with 3,000 coming from the former Soviet Union countries.

"Foreign terrorist fighters at present come from more than half of the world's countries. Al Qaeda-related groups worldwide, including the breakaway Islamic State group, currently have more than 25 000 foreign terrorist fighters coming from more than 100 member states." The period between 2014 and 2015 saw "a dramatic rise (from 70% до 73%) of the number of militants from some European and Asian member states." Outside the Muslim world, France and the Russian Federation were named in the report among the states providing the largest number of fighters.

Some 20 000 foreign militants are based in Syria and Iraq where they are members of IS as well as Al Qaeda structures. In Afghanistan, according to the Afghan security forces, there were 6 500 active foreign terrorist fighters in March 2015. The majority of them are linked with Tehrik-i Taliban Pakistan, 300 with Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi, 200 with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, 160 with Lashkar-e-Taiba and 150 with the East Turkestan Islamic Movement.

In the summer of 2015, according to some estimates, 4 000 people from Western countries, including 550 women, were fighting in Syria and Iraq on the side of IS. All in all, in April 2015 150 people were fighting on the side of terrorist groups abroad. As of January 2015 IS included 100 Americans. According to FBI information released in July 2015, more than 2000 Americans had attempted to join IS. Similar data appeared in the US press in late August 2015.

The table below shows the 20 countries which provided the largest number of militants for IS.

The majority of fighters come from countries with Islamic cultural traditions.

There are substantially fewer representatives of non-Muslim countries (outside the EU) among foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. Most of them come either from the Muslim minorities who traditionally live on the territories of these countries or from amongst migrants from Islamic countries. That is why the list contains mainly the countries with Muslim minorities or with a large number of foreign migrants.

According to the Federal Security Service of Russia, as of mid-September 2015 there were 2400 Russian fighters with IS. That puts Russia in third place in the world after Tunisia and Saudi Arabia in terms of the absolute number of fighters. However, it has to be noted that the absolute number of fighters per capita in Russia (considering its large population), although large compared to European countries, is still small compared with many Muslim countries, including post-Soviet ones.

According to available data for other former Soviet Union countries, in addition to some 2400—2500 fighters from Russia, a further 2500—4500 fighters from FSU countries, mainly in Central Asia, are fighting with IS in Syria and Iraq. To this one should add the numbers of former citizens of post-Soviet countries in Afghanistan and in Al Qaeda camps all over the Middle East.

There is a whole range of motives that prompt young people to join international terrorist groups. In general, it is a sign of spiritual and cultural problems in the countries where militants are recruited.

The first cause is the spiritual crisis of secular culture in the post-industrial era. A study carried out by the French Centre for the Prevention of Islamic Related Sects (CPDSI) has revealed the key role, not of social, but of cultural and psychological problems. According to the study, young people in that country who are drawn into radical Islamist groups mainly belong to the middle class (67%) and even come from atheist families (80%).

In the context of the complexities of the modern post-industrial world religious fundamentalists offer very simple answers to spiritual and life problems.

The fundamentalist ideology determines a clear aim in life, creates a sense of being involved in something larger than the individual. Islamists have an idea of belonging to "a group with a pronounced identity which opposes itself to the rest of the world." Young radicals find in the idea of Jihad "a complete system of values they failed to find in their native country," a report of a special French Senate commission points out.

The second cause is social. In the relatively well-off Western world the main motive of being recruited is the low level of integration of Islamic youth in the host society. One of the target audiences of the recruiters are disadvantaged Muslim youths from poor neighbourhoods. Such people fall easy prey to IS, the romanticism of Islamic brotherhood, identification with a great idea, etc. However, the further away from the Western world the recruitment takes place the greater the role of the wish to make a lot of money and to live well. In that sense "joining Jihad" is simply an extreme form of employment. Protest against corruption in third-world countries also plays a part.

The third reason why people get recruited is the effectiveness of Islamic propaganda, especially that coming from IS.

There are five main messages: "cruelty" ("ruthlessness"), "mercy" ("compassion") "sacrifice," "military strength," and "belonging to a great cause." These symbolic concepts, often used in various combinations, constitute the IS brand.

IS mega-strategists have introduced the practice of unprecedented and aggressive demonstration of the brutality of Islamic State (spreading videos of executions through beheading, burning alive, etc.). This is a well-thought-out picture designed to evoke associations of the pictures with ideas – triumph with a vengeance – and to be combined with contrasting pictures of "mercy-compassion" as expressed in set up scenes of repentance of the "lost souls" (typically prisoners or hostages who publicly pledge allegiance to IS) and the "triumph of revenge for the death of Muslims" (pictures of executions are often interspersed with pictures of civilian victims of air raids, etc.).

IS media managers often combine scenes of ruthlessness towards the enemy with demonstration of the readiness of their fighters to consciously sacrifice their lives for an idea: videos are posted of the last hours of some young people who speak about their preparation for a "martyr's death" before the camera zeroes in on the action (the suicide bomber blowing himself up).

The IS media managers belabour the theme of "involvement in a great cause" and "brotherhood within the Caliphate" hoping to lure potential recruits, and the message is directed mainly at Muslims in the West and in Russia. The message is being drummed into the heads of Muslims that they would unite in a single Umma by overcoming ethnic, political, psychological and behavioural differences.

The central item on the Islamic State agenda, the creation of the Caliphate and its successful implementation, is smuggled in indirectly, through reports that mix fact and fiction; propaganda experts stress the creation of government structures promoting the idea of a full-fledged state. To this end the governing bodies at all levels are called "ministries," "departments", a taxation system is introduced, social services are put in place as well as mechanisms of the exercise of executive, judicial and penal functions are introduced.

To set themselves off from rival groups, notably Al Qaeda, IS gears its propaganda to demonstrating its "military might": showing military parades, military hardware, including that seized from the enemy, and demonstration of the flag. A major element in this propaganda is to show IS as "victorious", ie. scoring endless victories in the shape of seizing enemy strongholds, population centres controlled by the enemy. Visually, the same idea is bolstered by the demonstration of the "regular army" with its uniforms, a strict system of command and subordination, discipline, etc. Analysts have managed to spot numerous manipulations and falsifications, as when, for example, fighting is taking place on one section of the front while "successes" are filmed on another section and belong to a different time.

Because most countries have banned IS and deny it access to the media, IS activists use the Internet as their main vehicle, using recruiting techniques modelled on network marketing. Interest groups created in the social media act in a stereotyped way: The members exchange information, videos and photos providing them with certain hashtags.

Until 2013 IS used for its propaganda work Al-Furkan base (which prepared Web materials, CD и DVD). In 2013 two more IS propaganda think tanks were created called Al-Iatisam and Al-Hayat Media Centre which set about producing materials targeting Western audiences, ie materials not only in Arabic, but also in other languages. Propaganda was later extended through Al-Balagh Media, Asawirti Media, and Al-Ghuraba Media Fursan. The year 2014 saw the launching of The Ajnad Media Foundation specializing in broadcasting Muslim Nashid chanting, the online magazine Dabiq in several languages, The Islamic State News journal (ISN) aimed at audiences outside Syria and Iraq and several Arab-language outlets.

In addition, extremists make wide use of smartphone applications such as the currently shut down The Dawn of Glad Tidings, and others which access dating sites. There is plenty of evidence to show that by far the largest number of dates between Islamic States militants and girls from Western countries and Russia are taking place on matrimonial sites (nikah.com, inshAllah.com) and some lesser known sites.

The analysts who study the work of the IS propaganda machine say that 2014 was "the most effective and terrifying" year. That year saw the launching of the first full-length professionally made documentary devoted to IS military operations, "Clanging of the Swords IV." Previously, terrorists shot and regularly launched on the Internet "scary" trailers with a running time of between 50 seconds and 3-5 minutes (more than 5000 videos).